

## EU policy towards Africa

European policy towards Africa has existed ever since the European integration process started.<sup>44</sup> That policy was very much influenced by the colonial links some of its member states had with newly independent African states. However, EU policy towards the region has evolved significantly, particularly since the end of the Cold War. What was an almost exclusive focus on economic and social development has increasingly developed into a more complex and comprehensive policy, where the political dimension has gained importance, partly due to the recognition of the ‘failure’ of development policies or impact on the development of the recipient countries. The link between peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance was reinforced in EU cooperation and development policies towards Africa, either in bilateral (the EU has concluded Association Agreements with practically all African countries) and multilateral agreements with African countries.

Current relations between the EU and countries in sub-Saharan Africa take place first and foremost within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and are based on three main pillars: political dialogue, trade and economic cooperation, and development aid. The Cotonou Agreement tries to address the shortcomings of previ-

ous agreements by reinforcing the political dimensions of ACP-EU cooperation, namely by enhancing the importance of respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance,<sup>45</sup> of civil society participation, and of the need to address issues such as the reinforcement of capacities for conflict prevention and management activities.

Since the early 1990s, the issue of conflicts in Africa has gained particular importance in the overall EU policy towards Africa and has been the subject of intense discussions within the European Union and with other international partners (the OECD, the UN and OAU, among others). Following these discussions, triggered by a number of factors including the increasing number of violent conflicts in Africa and the willingness of regional organisations to tackle these problems, in 1994, France and the United Kingdom presented to the EU a joint non-paper on ‘Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in Africa’, suggesting in particular measures the EU (and then also the Western European Union) could take to support African capacities for conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>46</sup> These changes in approach happened at a time when the EU was trying to have a greater political and security role in world affairs. It was developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and advancing the means through which it could

<sup>44</sup> Cooperation with African countries exists ever since the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community in 1957. In the aftermath of decolonisation, those relations were institutionalised in the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-69, 1969-75), later replaced by the Lomé Agreements enlarged also to Caribbean and Pacific countries. In June 2000, in Cotonou (Benin), the ACP states and the EU signed a new partnership agreement, named after the city where it was signed.

<sup>45</sup> The respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are ‘essential elements’ of the ACP-EU partnership in the Cotonou agreement; their violation can lead to a suspension of aid. Good governance is a ‘fundamental element’ of the partnership.

<sup>46</sup> For more information on this, see Martin Landgraf, ‘Peace-building and conflict prevention in Africa: a view from the European Commission’, in Ulf Engel and Andreas Mehler (eds.), *Gewaltsame Konflikte und ihre Prävention in Afrika* (Hamburg: Institute for African Affairs, 1998).

engage in activities with defence implications.<sup>47</sup>

Since 1995, the issue of conflict prevention has often been addressed by the European Council (in Council declarations, conclusions of Council meetings, adoption of common positions and Council decisions<sup>48</sup>) and by the Commission, which in 1996 issued its first Communication to the Council on the subject.<sup>49</sup> EU official documents on conflicts in Africa stress the following key elements that constitute the basis of EU policy with regard to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa:

- ▶ African pre-eminence and ‘ownership’ in conflict prevention, management and resolution in the region;
- ▶ EU commitment to support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa – a priority aim of the CFSP – in close cooperation with relevant bodies, namely the UN, OAU and African sub-regional organisations;
- ▶ assistance for building African capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts, through the OAU and subregional organisations;
- ▶ developing a pro-active, comprehensive and integrated approach, enhancing coordination between EU and member states’ efforts and policies, and making coherent use of EU instruments to best address the root causes of violent conflicts and to support of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa;
- ▶ focusing primarily on conflict prevention, while addressing the whole cycle of conflict and peace;
- ▶ while privileging non-military actions, the EU does not exclude the need to use military means in upholding EU commitment to support peace-related efforts.

Prior to its integration into EU structures, the Western European Union (WEU) had also been discussing ways of supporting African peacekeeping capabilities since 1995. Some areas of assistance were identified – provision of equipment, logistic means and communications, training of personnel – but that support never materialised for lack of either consensus or political will.<sup>50</sup> WEU often mentioned the possibility of participating in missions in Africa in the framework of the Petersberg Declaration,<sup>51</sup> but this never happened.

#### *4.1 A new EU development policy or the ‘politicisation’ of aid?*

EU policy on conflict prevention – puts great emphasis on addressing the root causes of instability and violent conflict. It is therefore understandable that the EU would seek first of all to address the shortcomings of its development policy. According to some observers the EU has put almost all its eggs in one basket:

... consistently with the heavy imbalance of resources in favour of the Commission [as compared with the Council Secretariat], the EU is staking much on the contributions of development cooperation and democratisation to conflict prevention (through peace building). Although the balance is slowly shifting, this has tended to give EU conflict prevention thinking a disproportionately heavy focus on economics, human rights and democratisation to the neglect of diplomatic conflict prevention measures

<sup>47</sup> In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht replaced European Political Cooperation with a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It outlined the (five) fundamental objectives for EU external policy action and set the framework for the development of policies with defence implications through recourse to WEU. Later in 1992, the Petersberg Declaration stated the type of military/defence activities WEU could engage in, the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’.

<sup>48</sup> A list of the main Council documents on the issue is given at the end of the paper, in ‘documents and bibliographic references’.

<sup>49</sup> ‘The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’, 06/03/1996COM, SEC(96)332. Other important communications from the Commission on the issue or related matters are listed in ‘documents and bibliographic references’.

<sup>50</sup> UEO, ‘Note d’évaluation de l’initiative de l’UEO en matière de maintien de la paix en Afrique’, C(00)70, 13 avril 2000.

<sup>51</sup> In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers stated that forces from member states could be used for ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’.

that seek to significantly alter the political dynamics of an emerging conflict.<sup>52</sup>

The European Union is the world's largest provider of official development assistance and humanitarian aid, and the major donor to Africa. According to OECD data, in 2001, about 55 per cent of total world aid was provided by the EU (EC and member states combined),<sup>53</sup> and more than 40 per cent of EU aid and humanitarian assistance goes to Africa.<sup>54</sup> EU relations with Africa are not just limited to aid, though. Other instruments – trade and political and financial – are also of great importance in relations with the continent.

In the last few years, there has been an increasing effort within the EU to improve coherence between its various instruments in the interests of more effective action, namely by pursuing a greater coordination between the Commission Directorates dealing with foreign relations (External Relations, Enlargement, Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid) and streamlining conflict prevention policies towards Africa (and developing countries in general). There is particular concern, in some circles within EU institutions and among some external actors, about the possible undesired impact of EU common policies on developing countries, in so far as those might contribute (directly or indirectly) to local crises and eventual conflicts. That is particularly true with regard to trade, which is often perceived as being less 'development-friendly', in that trade measures can sometimes have a negative impact on local economic life and the social fabric, undermining stability and possibly even fuelling conflict where stability is already very fragile.

Reform efforts include a simplification of EU procedures that are often too complex and lengthy, to say the least, and are not compatible with the need to quickly disburse funds in order to respond to situations of emergency, imminent crisis or immediate post-conflict needs. In 2001 the Council thus decided on the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)<sup>55</sup> allowing the Commission to make use of available funds without having to go through the bureaucratic procedures normally required for the approval of a development programme (which take, in average, about 18 months). The RRM has a separate budget of €25 million per year and can be used in a wide range of areas of EU cooperation, including areas which are essentially political and/or emergency-related (namely human rights, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border management, judiciary, police training and provision of police equipment, pacification, resettlement, mediation, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction). Unlike humanitarian aid, which is meant to relieve human suffering, the RRM aims to preserve or re-establish civic structures necessary for political, social and economic stability. It is therefore meant to be a crisis management tool and, in that sense, it is essentially political in nature: it allows quick implementation of activities that can, directly or indirectly, influence a crisis situation or a deteriorating political context.<sup>56</sup>

The RRM is managed by a unit within the External Relations Directorate General (RELEX) dealing with Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and ACP countries political issues, created in late 2000.<sup>57</sup> The role of this unit is to pursue

<sup>52</sup> International Crisis Group. *EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management*, 26 June 2001. IGC Issues Report no. 2, Brussels, p. ii.

<sup>53</sup> Out of the almost \$58 billion of world aid in 2001, more than 32 billion was provided by the EC and EU member states. OECD data can be accessed at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd>.

<sup>54</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council. *The EU-Africa dialogue*. 23/6/2003. COM(2003) 316 final, p. 2.

<sup>55</sup> EC Regulation no. 381/2001, 26 February 2001; available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/doc/rrm.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/rrm.pdf).

<sup>56</sup> On this issue and for more information and analysis on the overall issue of development and conflicts see Felix Nkundabagenzi & Federico Santopinto, *Le développement, une arme de paix* (Bruxelles: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), 2003).

<sup>57</sup> It was first created as a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. The Africa (and ACP) expertise was added later into the unit. This is seen by some as a means of DG RELEX increasing its role in relations with ACP countries, which have been and still are the domain of DG Development, although to a lesser extent since the creation of EUROPAID who is now responsible for the implementation of DG DEV (and DG RELEX) projects. As the reform process continues, there is some talk of a possible fusion between DGs RELEX and DEV.

conflict prevention goals within the work of the Commission. It is interesting to note that a conflict prevention unit was initially created within DG Development (DG DEV) in the second half of the 1990s, and that the first Commission communication on the issue related to conflicts in Africa.

The Commission's efforts to mainstream conflict prevention policies into overall EU external action (at the Community and inter-governmental levels) were further reinforced by the Commission Communication of 2001 on Conflict Prevention (replacing the previous communication of 1996) and the EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, endorsed by the Göteborg Council of June 2001.

Efforts to enhance coordination between EU and member states' policies have also been high on the agenda. That is in principle a role for the Heads of Mission of EC delegations in third countries, whose powers and resources have been reinforced by the 'deconcentration' policy that has been gradually implemented since late 2001. As actors on the ground, delegations are also expected to play an important role in the EU conflict prevention and management policy. Efforts are under way to coordinate donor support (within the EU but also with other donors) to the AU, and the aim is to pursue similar efforts at the subregional level.

## 4.2 Developing African regional and subregional institutions and capabilities

In line with one of the principles of EU policy on this matter – African leadership and ownership in conflict prevention, management and resolution – the EU has actively engaged in political dialogue with, and support of regional and sub-

regional organisations in Africa. Since 1994 the EU started political dialogue (formalised in 1996) with the OAU, which is seen as complementary to existing dialogue at bilateral and regional levels. The EU has shown particular interest in supporting the Organisation's peace and security efforts. It has therefore supported the development of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and provided financial support to the Peace Fund and early warning system, as well as institutional support to the organisation. But effective actions fell well short of expectations, partly due to limitations on the part of both the EU and the OAU.<sup>58</sup> However, since 2000, EU-Africa dialogue and cooperation have gained a new momentum.

The Africa-Europe Summit (its first meeting was held in Cairo in April 2000, following a Portuguese proposal) has, on the one hand, confirmed the slow progress made since the mid-1990s, but on the other hand renewed the commitment of the parties to cooperate, *inter alia*, in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace-building. Some actions concerning these aims are already under way.<sup>59</sup>

The launching of NEPAD in 2001 and the official establishment of the African Union in 2002 have further boosted cooperation with the African states' commitment to playing a more proactive and effective role in dealing with the problems of the continent. Reactions in Brussels and in European capitals in general have been quite positive. The EU considers the AU to be the central organisation for peace, security and regional integration on the African continent. In April 2002, a programme in support of AU peace-building and transition activities was signed. Its prime objective is to fund the operational activities of the Peace and Security Council. The programme will also reinforce the AU's

<sup>58</sup> Nkundabagenzi, 1998, op. cit. in note 9, pp. 14-15.

<sup>59</sup> The Action Plan of the Africa-Europe Summit (Cairo, 3-4 April 2000) refers namely to the reinforcement of the OAU Mechanism, strengthening capacities and efficiency of the Conflict Management Centre, operationalising the OAU early warning system, providing political, financial and equipment support to peace efforts in the region, support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, fight against the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons, and combat the use of anti-personnel landmines.

capacity-building in transitional phases.<sup>60</sup> It will first and foremost finance AU mediation and peace monitoring activities (as is the case with the AU observation mission in Burundi that is currently funded under the European Commission's RRM), but it could include support to peacekeeping training, and logistical and financial support for the deployment of African peacekeepers.

In November 2003, it was agreed that the EU-Africa dialogue would be restructured around four common priority clusters, including peace and security issues.<sup>61</sup> A stronger commitment to EU support for African organisations, capabilities and efforts to deal with crisis in the region was made at the General Affairs Council of 17 November 2003, where the EU approved a draft decision (to be adopted by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers) on the use of European Development Fund (EDF) resources for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa in line with the request made by the African Union and a Commission proposal made in a recent Communication on EU-Africa dialogue.<sup>62</sup> The Peace Facility will support African-led operations and build African institutions' long-term capacity to carry out such operations. The Commission will propose to the EDF Committee a budget of €250 million from the EDF to enable the Peace Facility to become operational before the end of 2004.<sup>63</sup>

The European Council on 12 December 2003 confirmed and reiterated its support for such developments as well as its commitment to peace efforts in Africa:

The European Council reaffirms the importance of the partnership with Africa and welcomes the strengthening of the EU-Africa dialogue as indicated by the positive and constructive outcome of the EU-Africa

Ministerial Troika in Rome on 10 November 2003.

The European Council welcomes the developing partnership between the EU, the UN, the African Union and subregional African organisations in the field of conflict prevention, conflict management and development, in particular through NEPAD.

In this context the European Council recognises the importance of restoring peace and security in Africa as a pre-requisite for development and welcomes the establishment of a Peace Facility for the financing of African peace-supporting operations, which will provide a significant boost to Africans' own ability to bring peace to their continent.

The European Council reiterates that the European Union remains committed to supporting the peace processes on the continent such as in the Great Lakes, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea. It stresses the need to make use in a coherent and coordinated manner of all the instruments available to the EU, inter alia as regards reconstruction, development and ESDP. It welcomes the growing role played by the African Union and the African subregional organisations (ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC) in this regard as well as in the field of regional integration and development. (European Council Conclusions, 12 December 2003, paras. 75-78).

The EU also has political dialogue with some subregional African organisations - SADC and ECOWAS - which is perceived as complementary to its dialogue with and support to the AU. Political dialogue and cooperation with SADC

<sup>60</sup> The EU allocated €10 million to activities of the Peace and Security Council and 2 million for institutional support of the AU transition process.

<sup>61</sup> The other three are: governance, regional integration and trade, and key development issues (Final communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, Rome, 10 November 2003).

<sup>62</sup> One of the Commission proposals is the pooling of EU aid, now scattered among different financial instruments, in support of an 'operational EU-Africa Agenda' if pan-African activities are to develop in the future. That 'pool' could help establish a continent-wide 'Facility for peace support operations' to enable African partners to cover the costs of both peace support operations and capacity-building efforts in this domain. 'The EU-Africa dialogue', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(2003) 316 final, 23 June 2003.

<sup>63</sup> See the Council Conclusions of 17 November and 12 December 2003.

on peace- and security-related matters has been hampered by internal divisions within SADC regarding the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The EU nevertheless provides financial support to SADC regional efforts for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Burundi and the peace process in DRC. Finally, the EU supported ECOWAS peace efforts in the region. It provided support to ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia (1994-97), namely vehicles, and coordinated when possible its development assistance in order to assist ECOMOG operations. The EU has also agreed to finance the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, peacekeeping and security and other related peace efforts, including the reinforcement of the capacity of ECOWAS states and the Secretariat to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, it has reaffirmed its commitment to continue its financial support to the countries in the region that are still consolidating the peace process.<sup>64</sup> The EU is also supporting IGAD in its efforts to reach and implement a peace agreement in Sudan.

### 4.3 Coordination with other international organisations

As mentioned before, the EU is engaged in coordinating efforts with other international organisations and other donors with regard to supporting peace-related efforts in Africa, at the institutional (e.g. support to the AU and subregional organisations) and operational levels (peacekeeping, capacity-development, etc.), whether these are led by the international community or by regional or subregional African organisations or actors.

The EU recognises a primary role for the UN in the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that the EU would engage in major peace efforts – much less where military engagement was involved – outside the UN framework or without the approval or endorsement of the UN Security Council. The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN system. It pays 37 per cent of the UN's regular budget, more than two-fifths of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations and about half of all UN member states' contributions to UN funds and programmes, many directly or indirectly related to peace and security.<sup>65</sup> The EU has also been urging the UN and other countries to support African efforts and ownership in securing peace and stability on the continent. As the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, put it in his speech on Africa at the UN Security Council:

'African ownership' can only function effectively, when other countries and the United Nations help to enhance African institutional capacities and closely cooperate with them.<sup>66</sup>

Beyond the financial contribution of the EU to the UN system and activities, the EU is getting more engaged in crisis management. 2003 has already provided two major examples (out of four EU crisis management missions launched in 2003, one of them in Africa<sup>67</sup>) of close collaboration between the EU and the UN in that area: the handover of responsibilities from the UN International Police Task Force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, and the EU military Operation *Artemis* in Bunia (DRC). Possible support for setting up an integrated police unit in Kinshasa, at the request of the UN and the DRC authorities, is under

<sup>64</sup> ECOWAS-EU ministerial meeting of 15 October 2003.

<sup>65</sup> EU, *The Enlarging EU at the UN: Making Multilateralism Matter*, January 2004.

<sup>66</sup> EU Presidency Statement – HR Solana's Speech on Africa at the Security Council, 29 January 2002, available on <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=1116>.

<sup>67</sup> The latest EU crisis management mission to be launched in 2003 is a police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA), launched on 15 December, the day Operation *Concordia* ended.

consideration by the EU. Under the Italian Presidency, on 24 September 2003 the EU and the UN signed a declaration on cooperation in crisis management. They agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism whose task will be to examine ways and means to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility in areas like planning, training, communications and regular information on lessons learned and best practices.<sup>68</sup>

In the field of crisis management, the EU collaborates closely with the OSCE. Although OSCE areas of activity do not include Africa, its experience in election monitoring, institution building, confidence-building measures, small and light weapons, among others, could be useful in the EU dialogue and cooperation with African regional and subregional organisations.

Collaboration with NATO in this particular area has developed significantly since the start of the negotiations on the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements.<sup>69</sup> Being more focused on the operational level, it is meant to enhance EU capacities to conduct crisis management operations wherever the EU considers necessary. So far, the use of NATO assets and capabilities available to the EU under existing EU-NATO arrangements have only been used in Europe (military Operation *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), but there is in principle no geographic constraint on EU-led operations (other than operational constraints, which may help explain the decision to limit EU-led peacekeeping operations to a maximum distance of 4,000 km and humanitarian interventions to a maximum of 10,000 km). Those assets can in principle be used in whatever scenario or part of the world the EU decides. In late November 2003, both organisations conducted their first joint Crisis Management Exercise to test how the EU

plans at the strategic politico-military level for a possible EU-led operation (in a 'Petersberg tasks' scenario) with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The focus of the exercise was on planning prior to a decision to take action and deploy forces.

Future collaboration between NATO and the EU will depend very much on the evolution of ESDP and the relationship between the two organisations. Whatever the outcome, that collaboration is likely to develop further despite the political differences between some European states and the United States, as well as between some EU member states. The more the EU appears as a valid and capable partner, the more the links are likely to develop, although that does not exclude friction along the way.<sup>70</sup>

#### *4.4 Shared views and priorities between the Commission and the Council?*

Relations between the Commission and the Council, as well as between these two and the European Parliament, have on various occasions been marked by differences of perspective and priorities, often related to their different but sometimes overlapping competences.

The EU has a multitude of tools that range from economic instruments (economic and development cooperation, trade, emergency, reconstruction and rehabilitation aid) to legal and political ones (political dialogue, mediation or ESDP instruments) which allow it to address in a comprehensive manner the root causes as well as the immediate causes of conflict. As the European Security Strategy, 'A secure Europe in

<sup>68</sup> On EU-UN cooperation see also the EU Presidency Statement on the review of peacekeeping operations, 16 October 2003; available on <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2910>.

<sup>69</sup> The latest related agreement signed by NATO and the EU regards common standards to share classified information and be able to consult and cooperate on security issues (NATO-EU Security of Information Agreement, 14 March 2003).

<sup>70</sup> For a point of view on this see Hans-Christian Hagman, 'European Crisis Management and Defence: the Search for Capabilities', *Adelphi Paper* 353, 2002.

a better world' adopted by the European Council in December 2003, has pointed out, this is a quite unique advantage of the EU as compared with other international actors. Furthermore, unlike a single country (which can also dispose of a varied range of instruments) the financial means the EU can mobilise are certainly much more significant. Other international organisations have the means, but few have such a variety of complementary tools. Most of the aforementioned instruments the EU has at its disposal to promote long-term peace and stability are managed by the European Commission. Instruments falling within the CFSP (where the Commission shares the right of initiative with the Council) and ESDP (a fully intergovernmental policy) are the Council's responsibility (although the CFSP budget is also managed by the EC).

The EU intervention in DRC was welcomed by the Commission but it also raised some concerns with regard to overall EU priorities in crisis management, namely regarding previous European policy towards Africa. There are concerns within the Commission that the EU Council may be putting too much emphasis on the military instruments for crisis management to the detriment of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention instruments and policies. Military intervention is seen as a short-term and expensive instrument that, if isolated, is not likely to have the same strong and durable long-term political and economic impact as the other instruments the EU has at its disposal. However, the Commission also recognises that such crisis management operations are indeed sometimes necessary and complementary to other EU instruments. However, it is the Commission

view that military instruments ought to be used only when all other instruments have failed.<sup>71</sup>

The Council perspective is not fundamentally different from that of the Commission in acknowledging the primacy of long-term instruments for sustainable peace and stability. However, better coordination between the various EU means is needed, and some crisis management instruments may need to be further developed. As the European Security Strategy prepared by Javier Solana points out:

Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments . . . The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command . . . Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states. Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Presentation by a Commission official (RELEX, unit of conflict prevention, crisis management and ACP political issues) in a Conference at the European Parliament on Conflict Prevention, 16 October 2003.

<sup>72</sup> Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world', European Security Strategy document adopted at the European Council in Brussels, 12 December 2003.