

Impact of Operation *Artemis* on EU crisis management policy and ESDP

Although limited in time, scope, geographical area of action and the number of forces involved, Operation *Artemis* was nevertheless significant in many different ways.

- ▶ It was the first EU crisis management operation outside Europe, and to some the fact that it was in Africa adds to its significance. This does, at least to some extent, suggest EU political willingness to act in the region and to contribute more actively to its stabilisation, going beyond its traditional trade and aid instruments (although that had probably not been the main motivation for the launching of the operation).
- ▶ It provided an opportunity for healing political differences between EU member states, and especially between France and Britain, following the controversy and friction over the intervention in Iraq. The United Kingdom was immediately in favour of Operation *Artemis* and actually no member state opposed it (apart from Germany on its very first reaction, quickly amended).
- ▶ It was the first fully autonomous EU military operation without the use of NATO assets. As stressed by EU representatives, it showed that the EU is perfectly capable of acting alone. This was actually not that welcome to NATO officials (by the United States in particular), who stressed that autonomous EU military operations should not happen again. Yet US ambassadors in the Great Lakes region had been clear that the United States was not interested in intervening in the DRC, engaged as they were in Iraq.⁹⁶ NATO also had no desire to support *Artemis*, given the

priorities it had at the time, namely in the Balkans and Afghanistan.⁹⁷

- ▶ It was decided and mounted very rapidly: it took only 6 to 7 weeks between UNSC Resolution 1484 and the deployment of the first military forces in Bunia: on 6 July all the forces had been deployed (about 3 weeks after the start of deployment). Even decision-making within the European Council was very rapid. In the end, it was *political will* that really mattered. That is certainly the main lesson to come out of this and other previous experiences: when there is the political will to act, operational weaknesses or institutional constraints can be easily overcome.
- ▶ Coordination and cooperation among all EU key actors involved (the French military leading the operation, Secretariat of the Council, Commission, and member states) was very good. No doubt human resources in Brussels were under considerable strain, but fears of a lack of linkage between the different actors were in the end not confirmed.
- ▶ It reinforced the EU's stance and credibility as a capable actor in international security and foreign policy. As such it has reinforced EU links with the UN in the area of crisis management (the EU is already a major partner for the UN in areas like development or humanitarian aid). Furthermore, there was very good cooperation with the UN, on the ground as well as at the highest political level.
- ▶ With regard to the EU-NATO relationship, and despite the negative reaction that was expressed by some NATO allies (the United States in particular), the EU has reinforced

⁹⁶ In fact, the United States did not veto the operation in the Security Council, which it could have done, although it would have been difficult to justify such an attitude.

⁹⁷ Nicolas Fiorenza, 'EU force seeks new mission after Congo', *European Defense*, 8 September 2003.

its position and credibility as an international actor. *Artemis* is one more significant element of the development of ESDP. Operation *Concordia* (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina are other examples. The increasing EU activities in the area of crisis management, whether conducted with NATO assets or not – which is actually not so important at this stage, despite some occasional US ‘hysteria’ – is likely to boost cooperation with NATO rather than hinder it in the longer term, albeit on probably somewhat different grounds than previously. There is a lot of room for more cooperation and complementarity between EU and NATO. Furthermore, most EU countries do not wish to see the EU develop an alternative military capacity to rival NATO. There is however a clear consensus among EU members that the EU must be able to act in areas where NATO has neither a strategic interest nor the political will to do so.

6.1 Impact on the issue of EU capabilities

Notwithstanding the likely positive impact of Operation *Artemis* on EU political and defence policy, both internally as well as in relations with other international actors, the operation in Congo has also highlighted the increasing need to address real problems over capabilities, even if political will remains the key issue.⁹⁸ Few member states, apart from France and the United Kingdom, have the capacity to deploy, support and command such operations. In that sense, Operation *Artemis* and the continued engagement of the EU in crisis management in the Balkans are likely to give a boost to ongoing EU efforts to reinforce its crisis management capabilities.

While the chances that EU member states will agree to increase military expenditure are slim, particularly in the current economic climate in Europe, the current focus is more on enhancing rationalisation, flexibility and coordination of European capabilities. That at least is one of the aims of the European Capability Action Plan agreed in February 2002. Some steps in that direction have already been taken.

- ▶ In May 2003, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was declared operational, even though it is one-third short of the intended 60,000 troops that will be available for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
- ▶ In November 2003, the EU decided on the creation of an Agency in the field of defence capabilities, development, research, acquisition and armaments by 2004.⁹⁹

At a different level, but related to the development of EU operational capabilities, is the need for strategic intelligence sharing and contributions to strategic reserve by member states.

6.2 Towards a single EU command structure?

One of the interesting results of Operation *Artemis* is the effective validation of the ‘framework nation’ concept. Although not directly related, it is nevertheless interesting to remark that, after Operation *Artemis*, there is less enthusiasm and interest for the proposal to create a European Defence Headquarters in Tervuren. To some – at least to France and the United Kingdom, but also to others such as Greece and Italy who have been proposed as potential framework nations in possible future military operations of this kind – the ‘framework nation’ formula has worked well. One of the concerns with regard to this formula is liaison between the lead nation and the European institutions in

⁹⁸ For an assessment of EU military and civilian capabilities for crisis management and the partnerships with NATO and the US, see Hagman, 2002, op. cit in note 70.

⁹⁹ General Affairs Council Conclusions, 17 November 2003.

Brussels. That worked well in Operation *Artemis*, which explains why some question the need to adopt another formula, at least for the time being. This may well appease those within NATO who are not at all keen on seeing the creation of a European Defence Headquarters and who perceive this as a duplication of NATO headquarters.

The ‘framework nation’ concept also appears to some as a good solution for the EU, because of the still relatively small size of the current EUMS, which they consider a real shortcoming in EU operational planning capabilities. The need to at least test such capabilities is linked to the decision to conduct the first joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise with EU planning. The framework nation formula may also allow for greater flexibility and time for further trials until new and more engaging formulas can be found. It was certainly not by chance that the command structures for Operation *Artemis* (in Paris and Entebbe) were much more multinational than the composition of the forces on the ground. Most EU nations were represented in the Paris Headquarters in what can be interpreted to some extent as a ‘joint command post exercise’. There will probably be some useful lessons learned from that perspective as well, and this may in turn help EU decision-makers to further evaluate the needs and constraints at this particular level. Others may, however, see in this formula an instrument for the most powerful nations in Europe to use their military might to impose a defence agenda on the EU, although that remains to be seen of course.

At the European summit of December 2003, the EU agreed to establish an autonomous European military planning element within the EUMS. Its natural choice will still be to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, but when NATO as a whole is not engaged – for instance in a region where NATO has no interest or is not involved, like Africa – the EU will choose

whether or not to use NATO assets. In the case of autonomous EU military operations, the first choice will be to use national headquarters, which can be multinationalised for the purpose of conducting EU-led operations, as was the case in Operation *Artemis*. Where no national headquarters is identified the EU can have recourse to the operational cell within the EUMS to plan and run the operation.¹⁰⁰

It is now more likely that the EU will engage in peacekeeping operations, and perhaps also in peace enforcement, particularly in situations where humanitarian needs are pressing and/or the risks of an outbreak of conflict or escalation are very high, with potentially even higher costs to European nations. Besides, these are the types of situations that are more likely to appeal to European public opinion and where European leaders will probably have less difficulty in getting public endorsement for such operations (at least while the level of risk remains relatively ‘low’).

6.3 *The need to address the issue of financing for CFSP and ESDP operations*¹⁰¹

One of the limitations of the ‘framework nation’ concept is financial. Few EU memberstates have the capability to conduct such operations, particularly when these imply strategic capabilities. It is unlikely that under the current financial arrangements for ESDP, and in particular in the current economic context, those few EU states with the capability to act as framework nation will be willing to accept the inherent financial burden. In Operation *Artemis*, France not only paid for its own troops (which constituted the large majority of the forces involved in the operation) and equipment, but also for the transportation costs and the costs of the Force

¹⁰⁰ In the December 2003 agreement, the EU has, in addition, decided to establish a small EU planning cell in NATO’s military headquarters, SHAPE, and NATO is invited to establish liaison arrangements at the EUMS. See European Council Conclusions of 12 December 2003 and Presidency document on ‘European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations – UK/FR/GE paper’.

¹⁰¹ For an overview of this issue, see Antonio Missiroli, ‘Euros for ESDP – financing EU operations’, *Occasional Paper 45* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003).

Headquarters (costs for the latter would be considered as common costs, but were none the less borne by the framework nation).¹⁰² There is a recognised need for the EU to find ways of sharing the burden of costs. The framework agreement on the financing of EU-led crisis management operations with military and defence implications is to be revised, if necessary, in June 2004. The need to do so is recognised by many players. The discussion has already been under way for some time in the Council, but also in the Commission, which can finance certain conflict-related activities.

Conflict prevention, post-conflict and crisis management are also areas where the Commission is active and new financial instruments have been created to address needs for more rapid action often inherent in that type of situation. The RRM is an illustrative example. An even more interesting case regards EDF. Traditionally perceived as an almost purely development-oriented financial instrument of the EU, the EDF is being currently reoriented to cover peace and security related expenditures, in line with the perception that these are necessary conditions for sustainable development. In legal terms, EDF funds cannot be used to finance activities other than those falling under the first pillar and thus within the Commission's competence. However, the Commission also has legal competence in areas that can be perceived as CFSP areas, like activities regarding conflict prevention, civilian crisis management and conflict resolution. Indeed, if one takes for instance the case of the Strategy Paper for Burundi (2003-2007), the EDF is funding activities aimed at restoring peace, reconciliation, integration of demobilised combatants, support to the judicial and penitentiary system. The EDF is also supporting regional and national programmes

administered by the WB on disarmament, demilitarisation and reintegration of demobilised soldiers (namely in the Great Lakes region). It was previously quite uncommon to see EDF funding being channelled to such activities, although they are often of fundamental political importance for long-term stability and development. That seems now to be an *acquis*. Furthermore, on CFSP matters the Commission not only administers the CFSP budget (under the EU budget and in accordance with the inter-institutional agreement of 6 May 1999), but also shares the right of initiative with the Council, which can open new funding possibilities for CFSP activities. ESDP is a different matter; it is purely intergovernmental and is not covered by the EU budget.

An increased effort to link EU policies, in so far as the use of civilian and military crisis management tools may be more often required in support of long-term policies aimed at enhancing 'structural stability', may well lead to a more flexible use of community financial instruments, although these are likely to be subject to certain conditions and in limited amounts.

6.4 Civilian-military cooperation and complementarity with other EU instruments

Despite fears by some inside and outside the European institutions that reinforcement of the military dimension of crisis management may be pursued to the detriment of the civilian dimension, the emphasis of EU crisis management instruments and policy is likely to remain on the civilian dimension for various reasons,

¹⁰² The General Affairs Council of 17 June 2002 (Luxembourg) approved a general framework for financing operations having military or defence implications, confirmed by the European Council held in Seville on 20 June 2002 (see Annex II of the Presidency Conclusions). Under the agreed framework 'common costs' cover costs for headquarters for EU-led operations (such as transportation costs, administration, locally hired personnel, communications, transportation/travel within the operations area and HQs and barracks and lodging/infrastructure) and for providing support to the forces as a whole (infrastructure, additional equipment, medical care). 'Individual costs' (personnel, arms, equipment) are to be borne by each member state involved accordingly to its degree of involvement ('the principle of 'costs lie where they fall'). Furthermore, the Council will decide on a case-by-case basis whether the costs for the transportation of the forces and their accommodation are to be funded in common.

including financial ones. There is widespread recognition that it is important to have the possibility of using military instruments and capabilities when necessary, but the issue of the balance, coordination and complementarity between military and civilian power assets is very much under discussion these days.

Operation *Artemis* may have exacerbated such fears, as it was essentially a military operation. The civilian dimension was not very visible and yet probably at least equally needed. It is recognised that, for instance, the issue of an

integrated police force, urgent reform of the judicial system and support for the Ituri administration are important elements for the stabilisation of the situation in Bunia and in the district beyond the EU military intervention. The EU has already approved programmes related to some of these areas, while others are still under consideration. In that sense, the benefits of military efforts may prove to be short-lived if they are not immediately accompanied by other complementary measures.

