

THE
ACTORS
IN
EUROPE'S
FOREIGN
POLICY



EDITED BY

Christopher Hill

First published 1996
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an International Thomson Publishing company

© 1996 Christopher Hill, the edited collection; individual
contributions © 1996 the contributors

Typeset in Baskerville by
Ponting-Green Publishing Services, Chesham, Bucks
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Mackays of Chatham PLC, Chatham, Kent

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be
reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known
or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the
British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
The Actors in Europe's foreign policy / edited by
Christopher Hill.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Europe-Foreign relations-1989- 2. European Union.

I. Hill, Christopher, 1948- .

D2009.A37 1996

327.4-dc20

96-11315

CIP

ISBN 0-415-12222-8 (hbk)

ISBN 0-415-12223-6 (pbk)

Contents

List of contributors	vii
Preface	ix
Introduction: actors and actions <i>Christopher Hill and William Wallace</i>	1
Part I The major actors	
1 France: the impact of François Mitterrand <i>Françoise de La Serre</i>	19
2 Germany's role in the CFSP: 'Normalität' or 'Sonderweg'? <i>Reinhardt Rummel</i>	40
3 United Kingdom: sharpening contradictions <i>Christopher Hill</i>	68
4 Regional reassertion: the dilemmas of Italy <i>Gianni Bonvicini</i>	90
5 Spain: the uses of foreign policy cooperation <i>Esther Barbé</i>	108
6 The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy <i>Simon Nuttall</i>	130
Part II The smaller countries	
7 Belgium: the importance of foreign policy to European political union <i>Christian Franck</i>	151
8 Denmark: a new activism in foreign and security policy <i>Bertel Heurlin</i>	166
9 Greece: the limits to convergence <i>Panos Tsakaloyannis</i>	186

10	Ireland and common security: stretching the limits of commitment? <i>Patrick Keatinge</i>	208
11	Luxembourg: new commitments, new assertiveness <i>Pierre-Louis Lorenz</i>	226
12	The Netherlands: the weakening pull of Atlanticism <i>Alfred Pijpers</i>	247
13	Portugal: pressing for an open Europe <i>Álvaro de Vasconcelos</i>	268
	Conclusions: the European rescue of national foreign policy? <i>David Allen</i>	288
	Index	305

Portugal

Pressing for an open Europe¹

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Portugal has a vital interest in Europe developing a common foreign policy. It is equally vital to Portugal that the idea of an open Europe is consolidated, meaning that the Union should not become from an economic and human point of view a closed trading bloc with a minimalist view of its own identity, and that it should increasingly seek a central role in world affairs. During the 1991 intergovernmental conference Portugal affirmed that 'the Community's external relations should be geared to the prime objective of building a Europe that is open to the world'.² Historical, cultural, and geographical factors have made Portugal a country with deep roots in Europe and strong links to other parts of the world, particularly to the other Portuguese-speaking nations, namely: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe. Portugal's traditional ties to other parts of the world have also led to an international effort by Lisbon to grant East Timor, a territory illegally occupied by Indonesia and still technically under Portuguese administration, the right to self-determination. Portugal also continues to have links with the Far East because of its administration of Macao, which is scheduled to return to Chinese sovereignty in 1999.

In my opinion, the less constrained at its geographic periphery, the more active and global the European Union becomes in international issues, the more Portugal will feel that its own particular foreign policy objectives are being met by the Union. Were the European Union to revert to the stage of being a mere market, albeit huge, Portugal would be little more than a poor relation. If the capacity for international political action counts, however, then the existing Lusophone area in Africa and Latin America will also be credited to Portugal's status within the European concert. In Prime Minister Cavaco Silva's words, 'a Europe speaking with a louder voice in the international arena favours the affirmation of Portugal in the world, and especially our traditional external relations with Africa, Latin America and the Maghreb'.³ In this light, it becomes clear why one of Portugal's concerns as regards the European Union's external action, which has been revealed

since the fall of the Berlin Wall, is the need for a balance to be struck between the Union's eastward and southward priorities.⁴

EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC?

With the exception of the Salazar years, the choice between Europe and the Atlantic has never been an insoluble dilemma for Portugal's foreign policy.⁵ For the supporters of the 'ancien régime', membership of the European Community (which, had it been sought, would anyhow have been refused given the anti-democratic nature of the Salazar period) was totally incompatible with the emphasis given to the continuation of the African policy and to relations with Brazil. In those days, the choice to be made was a simple one: Portugal had to opt for the Atlantic as opposed to Europe, since Europe also meant democracy and decolonization.⁶ Ironically, this Atlantic option, and leaving aside the politico-diplomatic rhetoric of good relations with Brazil, led to the continuation of an absurd colonial war in Africa and deteriorating relations with the USA,⁷ the most important Atlantic power of the time. Salazar had never hidden his suspicions of American intentions, while Lisbon unilaterally continued to stress the ever less meaningful, but traditional, Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

In practical terms, Portugal's Atlanticism in those days meant participation in NATO (Portugal being a founding member) and a relationship with the USA built essentially around the Defence Agreement, in existence since 1951, which allowed the USA access to military facilities in the Azores, especially the Lages airbase. Both participation in NATO and Portuguese-American relations understandably suffered, however, as a consequence of the nearly fifteen years up to 1974 when Portugal concentrated on the sole objective of maintaining its overseas territories amidst unanimous international condemnation.

Between the onset of democratic rule in 1974-5 and Portugal's entry into the European Community on 1 January 1986, the Atlantic option began to signify the development of what the democratic leaders of the day saw as a privileged relationship with the USA and a more active participation in NATO. The new emphasis given to Atlanticism was to a large extent an 'interiorization' of the Cold War, or in other words, a natural consequence of the struggle which the main democratic parties waged against the Soviet-backed Communist Party in the period 1974-5.⁸ The bilateral defence agreement with the USA was extended in 1983 for another seven years, amidst a wealth of statements stressing the vital importance of such a relationship for Portugal. During the consultations on the first review of the agreement in the post-Cold War era (which resulted in a revised agreement signed in 1993) Lisbon made an effort to extend Luso-American co-operation beyond its traditional domain into other fields such as economics and technology, and sought increased cooperation in foreign policy.⁹

Closer cooperation between Lisbon and Washington led to the creation of a troika along with the now Russian Federation in 1990 during the Angolan peace process to monitor events in this troubled African state. This troika, which from late 1992 onwards began working closely with the UN, is still in operation.¹⁰

The other traditional elements of Portuguese Atlanticism, Lusophone Africa and Brazil, were for a variety of reasons relegated to second place during the early years of the post-1974 democratic regime. The appearance of Marxist-inspired regimes in the former Portuguese overseas territories following decolonization greatly strained relations between them and the ruling political parties in Portugal in the second half of the 1970s, and the relations between Portugal and the new independent countries suffered accordingly.

However, by the early 1980s normal state-to-state relations began to emerge. In the early days of independence, the adoption of Portuguese as the official language by nationalist leaders of Lusophone Africa was designed to provide a unifying factor to countries made up of a variety of nations and whose borders, arbitrarily drawn at the Berlin conference, often cut across national groups, which were thus split between different states. The present-day leaders of Lusophone Africa, while stressing the importance of the Portuguese heritage, are increasingly aware of the need to value traditional cultures and languages.¹¹ As far as Brazil is concerned, in spite of all the rhetoric surrounding a Luso-Brazilian community, relations with Brazil, by far the largest Portuguese-speaking country, have remained until quite recently confined to cultural affairs. It should be highlighted, however, that Brazil values its European and Portuguese cultural roots and even managed not to condemn publicly Portugal's colonial policy (singling itself out among otherwise almost unanimous condemnation) in the UN.¹²

The strongly pro-NATO, Atlanticist position held by the leaders of the country's main political parties in the period before European membership was not in itself anti-European. The then European Community and NATO were seen as complementary aspects of a world to which Portugal wanted to belong. From the onset of the democratic transition in Portugal, it was clear that Community membership was an overriding top priority in Portuguese foreign policy. As then Prime Minister Mário Soares used to say, Community membership was a national project which would endow Portugal with a new destiny. Eight years later, having become President of the Republic in the meantime, he would conclude that: 'Community membership has continued to be an invaluable contribution to bolster Portugal's position in the contemporary world, its measure of intervention in world affairs thereby becoming, in proportion, superior to its dimension as a nation.'¹³

Two rival camps emerged during the pre-accession debate in Portugal. On the one hand, there were those both on the traditional left and the traditional right who feared that membership would cause Portugal to lose

freedom of external action and gradually drift away from the Lusophone world, thus putting at stake its very survival as an independent entity in the Iberian Peninsula; on the other hand, there were those who strongly believed that membership of the Community in no way prejudiced the country's 'Atlantic vocation'¹⁴ and proposed a Euro-Atlantic foreign policy.¹⁵ The latter has remained the most basic premise behind foreign policy since the end of the 1970s and the consolidation of democratic rule.

Integration in Europe had an important and logical effect: it brought Portugal and Spain closer together than they had ever been for centuries. For the first time since the Second World War, Portugal and Spain began to share the same fundamental options in foreign and security policy – NATO (since Spain's accession in 1982) and the European Community. Also for the first time bilateral relations were now placed within a multi-lateral framework. It should be noted in this regard that Portugal and Spain also share parallel interests outside Europe, particularly in Latin America and the Maghreb, in relation to which there has been a greater co-ordination of positions during the annual Iberian summits between the leaders of the two countries.¹⁶

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND EUROPE

In analysing the main foreign policy priorities and how they relate to Europe, it becomes clear that Portugal seeks in relation to Portuguese-speaking Africa and South Africa to prolong, through Europe, a national foreign policy objective (the 'national' prevails over the 'European' in this area), while with regard to Latin America the objectives are to value or give substance to national objectives through the Community factor. The Mediterranean and to a lesser extent Central and Eastern Europe have become a part of Portuguese foreign policy as a consequence of European integration. East Timor, on the other hand, is a theme that Portugal has brought into European Political Cooperation, with particular emphasis on the human rights dimension.

The Lusophone world

Membership of the Community and participation in EPC have actually proved a factor in strengthening Portugal's relations with the Lusophone world, as the pro-Europeans had anticipated during the pre-accession debate. The decision of the five Lusophone countries in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé e Príncipe) to join the Lomé system further substantiated the notion that by joining Europe Portugal would not sever its ties with Africa.

Portugal's interests in relation to Africa within EPC are all too exclusively focused, as some contend, on Lusophone countries and to a lesser extent

on South Africa. This is a common trait of the African policy of all other former colonial states, namely Britain and France, who tend to focus on the Francophone and Anglophone areas respectively. Diplomatic efforts by Portugal within the Community led to the treatment of the Lusophone Five as a regional entity on the basis of cultural affinities, this being the sole regional grouping that is not defined from a geographical viewpoint (i.e. whose borders are not contiguous). All five countries have engaged, after 1989, in transition processes, with a widely differing degree of success. Since then the theme of democratic transition in Africa has become prominent in Portugal's initiatives within EPC, and as a result communiqués have been issued to welcome the 'sense of civic responsibility' in the aftermath of each election.

Portugal has, since 1986, adopted in EPC a distinctive position in relation to South Africa, considering economic sanctions ineffective and opposing new sanctions. It has to be said that some 50–70,000 Portuguese living in South Africa could head for home in the event of a worsening crisis and that developments in South Africa have direct implications in Angola and Mozambique. In the first of the yearly reports produced by the Foreign Ministry since accession to the Community, it was stated that Portugal's 'determination' had contributed to 'check the escalation of punitive sanctions of an economic nature against South Africa'. The government felt sanctions were especially damaging to the less well off, having particularly in mind the considerable migrant miners' community from Mozambique.¹⁷ Portuguese positions were not far from those of Britain or Germany, who shunned the more radical stances of France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland. Since the very beginning, Portugal lent its support to F. W. de Klerk's reforms. In 1990, on the occasion of the Dublin informal ministerial meeting, Portugal along with Britain stood for support and encouragement for the reform and political dialogue initiated by President de Klerk, and Lisbon persistently proposed, throughout the rest of that same year, that the EC sanctions imposed in 1985 and 1986 be eased.¹⁸

Insofar as the peace and transition processes in its own former colonies are concerned, Portugal's action is mainly national, and the European framework is seen as a means to gather political support for its own stances or to muster economic support for the necessary reconstruction of those countries. In the Angolan process, Portugal has led the troika of international mediators, which includes the USA and the USSR (later, Russia) in the negotiations that brought about the Bicesse peace accords signed on 31 May 1991. During the negotiations, João de Deus Pinheiro, Foreign Minister at the time, spoke in favour of a 'miniature European Marshall Plan' to be implemented immediately after the Angolan election. It was on Portugal's initiative that the Twelve greeted the holding of the Angolan election in October 1992. And when Unita, upon losing the election, cried fraud and went back to the battlefield, Portugal tried to find support within

the Community to force Unita to abide by the election results, declared 'free and fair' by the UN. Portugal intends to look for economic support among its European partners to help the stabilization process and assist in rebuilding the country as soon as a UN-brokered accord is reached.¹⁹

Similarly in 1993, when the government of Guinea-Bissau threatened to join the Francophone area if Portugal refused to refrain from pressing for free pluralistic elections, Portugal tried to lead the Belgian presidency into adopting firmer stances on human rights and democratic values, thereby trying to neutralize a possibly less consistent French approach.

The contribution which the international dimension of the two Iberian countries could make to Europe's position in the world, especially in relation to Euro-Latin American relations, was recognized by the Twelve even before the membership of Spain and Portugal came about. Although both countries became part of EPC with observer's status, upon signing the treaty of accession in July 1985, they had already been involved in EPC initiatives, albeit on an informal basis, when it came to issues like South America (e.g. the San José I meeting in 1984). Moreover, a joint declaration of intent relative to EC relations with Latin America was appended to the treaties of accession of the two Iberian states, pointing out that 'on the occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal', the Community has the 'intention of developing and improving the economic and commercial relations and co-operation with the aforementioned countries [of Latin America]'.²⁰

Portugal's European dimension has been increasingly valued by Latin American countries as a means of forging closer relations with the European Union. Brazilian sociologist Hélio Jaguaribe defined the role played by Portugal in the following manner:

As an EC member state and as a participant in the Luso-Brazilian cultural universe, Portugal will open a door for Brazil and its Latin American partners when it comes to the European Community. Portugal can also in the same manner help the Community understand that it is very much in the Union's enlightened interest to adopt a more favourable relationship with Brazil and Latin America.²¹

Portugal's membership of the EC has profoundly changed its relationship with Brazil, both politically (institutionalization of Luso-Brazilian summit meetings) and even economically. Brazil has not only become a large investor in Portugal, but Portugal has also become a popular destination for Brazilian migrants. Brazil's interest in Lisbon's position as a bridge with the European Union led it to follow closely Portugal's preparation of its EC presidency, through the sending of various missions.

The 1992 Portuguese Presidency of the EC led in fact to a deepening of the EC-Brazil relationship. A third-generation agreement was signed, overcoming the opposition of member states like Britain, in June 1992,

which diversified areas of cooperation, namely by encouraging cooperation in technology, the environment and telecommunications. The Portuguese Presidency also privileged group-to-group relations with Latin America through support for subregional integration processes already underway in Central America and the Southern Cone (i.e. Mercosur: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), starting a series of informal meetings between the Twelve and the Mercosur foreign ministers (the first took place in Guimarães, on 1 May 1992) with a view to putting such consultations on a regular and institutionalized basis. Moreover an interinstitutional agreement was signed on 29 May 1992 between the European Commission and the Mercosur Council. The purpose was to develop technical cooperation and to transfer integration know-how, by supporting setting up Mercosur institutions and the common market.²²

Meetings between the Twelve and the Rio Group²³ which continue to be held regularly are typical of Political Cooperation in the sense that it remains essentially declaratory and causes some measure of frustration on the Latin American side. More often than not, only Portugal, Spain and the country holding the EU presidency are represented by senior ministers in meetings with their Latin American counterparts. The meetings between the Twelve and the Mercosur Four are significant in the sense that while emphasizing the relationship with a regional integration process, one with which, furthermore, the Twelve have established a varied agenda, the dialogue is both more substantial and still encompasses the political dimension. The Twelve have in fact been eager to respond to the integration process of Mercosur. Portugal and Spain have been particularly active in cooperation with the German Presidency in this regard, and the Essen Council in December 1994 agreed that there should be 'an early opening of negotiations with the Mercosur states on an inter-regional framework agreement'.

Spain and Portugal became the champions of a privileged relationship between the Community and Latin America. Both countries believe that it is against the EU's best interests to shut itself away from a part of the world closely linked through history, culture, and language to Europe, and which furthermore is now almost entirely made up of democracies, albeit fragile, and which contains a collection of market economies with strong financial and business sectors (a non-negligible 'comparative advantage'). Moreover, in these last few years there has been a marked improvement in the general economic situation throughout the region. The priority status which the Mercosur subregional process is being accorded by the Twelve clearly favours Portugal's position in European foreign policy towards the region.

The Mediterranean: 'Europeanization' of Portuguese foreign policy

Unless one goes back to the fifteenth century, the Mediterranean can be

seen as one particular area where Portuguese involvement is a direct consequence of EU membership. The notable exception is relations with Morocco, not only because it is close by but also given the context of transatlantic and Iberian relations.

Until 1986, Portugal clearly thought that its foreign policy priorities were concentrated in the Atlantic and that involvement in the western Mediterranean would cause excessive overlapping with Spanish priorities, while showing an interest in the Middle East would somewhat limit its bargaining power towards the USA, since Portugal would no longer be in a position to argue that their use of the Lages base in the Azores was exclusively an American interest: the same logic applied when it was suggested that Portugal could contribute to the multinational force sent to Lebanon in 1982.²⁴

At the time when, in 1983, French President François Mitterrand made the proposal in Marrakesh for a conference involving France, Italy, Spain, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, Portugal was invited merely as an observer, and this was considered convenient by Lisbon. As a consequence of European integration, however, the Mediterranean, especially North Africa, became a part of Portugal's foreign policy agenda. Portugal's interest in the region has actually grown, both within EPC and at the southern European and the bilateral level, on foreign policy and defence aspects alike. This is made easier by the fact that the western Mediterranean is an area virtually free of domestic constraints: neither the Maghreb, nor Islam are domestic political factors due to the conspicuous absence, at least for the time being, of a resident emigrant population originating in the Maghreb.

Portuguese foreign policy has increasingly tended towards 'Mediterraneanization' as a result of the common perceptions Portugal shares with other Southern European countries,²⁵ that is the shared concerns over possible developments in the neighbouring Maghreb region. The Maghreb is also seen as an area which is important in terms of European foreign and security policy where Portugal is poised to have a role (i.e. as a window of opportunity in terms of its own status in Europe).

Later, when President Mitterrand relaunched the Mediterranean cooperation initiative in 1988, Portugal fully participated and was one of the original signatories of the Rome declaration which launched the Five-plus-Five cooperation process.²⁶ Favouring a subregional approach, Portugal was sceptical towards the Spanish-Italian proposal of a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, following the CSCE model, involving the European countries, the USA, Russia and the Islamic countries from Mauritania to the Persian Gulf. During its EC Presidency, Portugal would have liked to see the Five-plus-Five dialogue develop into a Twelve-plus-Five dialogue. Efforts made in this direction came to no avail, however, since the whole initiative was more or less paralyzed due both to sanctions against Libya and to the Algerian crisis. It is unclear whether, like President

Mário Soares, the government would have preferred a condemnation of the Algerian authorities at least to be implied in the wording of EC positions towards Algeria, after the election process was interrupted in December 1991. But as a result of differing positions among the Twelve the fact is that the January 1992 statement and the declaration on Algeria were exceptionally mild. The European Parliament's veto on the financial protocol with Morocco led Portugal and the other southern Europeans (notably Spain) to seek an alternative solution, which was found in the Declaration of the European Council in Lisbon on Euro-Maghreb relations. This points to the 'gradual creation, in time, of a free trade area'.²⁷

Together with its Southern European partners, this time including Greece, Portugal took part in the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, launched in Alexandria, largely on Egypt's initiative, in July 1994. Algeria, Morocco and Turkey were also involved, with the idea to improve the political capacity for dialogue in the region. Three expert working groups were set up to deal specifically with cultural, political and economic and social issues.

Nonetheless, Portugal faces a foreign policy dilemma when it comes to the Mediterranean: because many of the products exported by the southern Mediterranean countries are similar if not identical to those exported by Portugal (especially textiles), Lisbon finds it hard to repeat the type of active diplomacy it has carried out in the political sphere in relation to strengthening Euro-Maghreb economic relations, which would mean calling for a no barrier, free trade policy. Portugal shares the hesitations of the Southern European countries when it comes to opening up trade with the Maghreb, and would also like to see financial instruments made more freely available instead. Although the free trade area arrangements currently being discussed between the EU and Morocco (the idea being to bring in Tunisia and in time perhaps Algeria) originated in a Spanish proposal, the Southern European countries, including Spain, want to leave agricultural produce out altogether.

East Timor and human rights: a new item on the EPC agenda

Portugal's accession has introduced on to the EPC agenda the question of East Timor, the former Portuguese colony militarily occupied by Indonesia in 1975. Portugal did not accept the occupation and subsequent annexation, nor did the UN, which in the resolutions passed in December 1975 condemned Indonesia and supported Portugal's pledge to the right of the East Timorese to self-determination, freedom and independence.²⁸

Between 1975 and 1982 successive resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on East Timor with fewer and fewer favourable votes (72 to 10 in 1975, 50 to 46 in 1982), and all the Twelve, with the exception of Greece and Ireland, systematically abstained. Portugal's support thus came

mainly from countries aligned with the USSR, which was naturally a cause of some embarrassment.

Accession to the European Community in fact coincided with a changing of the guard both in the presidency and the premiership (Mário Soares having been elected to replace General Eanes who had served two terms, while Cavaco Silva was also elected with an impressive electoral support). This was seen as a fresh opportunity for Portugal to break its isolation in the western camp in relation to East Timor.

Portugal has therefore persistently sought support among its EC partners for its condemnation of the annexation and of the persistent violation of human rights by Jakarta. But the EC member states have reacted cautiously to Portuguese proposals, avoiding in particular the issue of self-determination, mainly because of the place of Indonesia, one of the most important Islamic countries, in the context of EC-ASEAN relations. However, they have slowly begun to address the question of East Timor; in September 1988 the EC Presidency (held by Germany) made the first reference to the issue, notably expressing the desirability of an 'acceptable international settlement' of the question of East Timor, although falling short of an explicit reference to human rights, in its statement before the forty-third plenary session of the General Assembly of the UN. Because of Portugal's persistence, the Twelve gradually reached a consensus in emphasizing the defence of human rights in East Timor, which subsequently became a part of the declarations issued by the EC Presidency,²⁹ while also supporting the contacts between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the Secretary General of the UN.

The turning point came with the serious incidents in East Timor on 12 November 1991, when the Indonesian army opened fire on a peaceful group of demonstrators in Dili which resulted in some 200 people being killed³⁰ and made headlines in the Western media. The Twelve strongly condemned the Indonesian army's violent action as an outright violation of the most basic human rights. Having dropped its original intention of pushing for self-determination for the East Timorese, Portugal was able subsequently to follow up on the East Timor dossier during its Presidency, strongly emphasizing the human rights dimension. However, the draft resolution submitted by Portugal on behalf of the Twelve to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, on 29 January 1992, demanding the respect for human rights in East Timor, was watered down owing to US pressure into a statement of the chair of this UN body, mentioning the Dili killings and urging Indonesia to take action on the matter. In March 1993, a resolution was again presented to the Commission where the Twelve voiced their 'grave concern' over 'continuing and serious human rights violations' in this territory.³¹ And this time the resolution was passed. The same was not true however, in 1994, when yet again the wording became vaguer to accommodate Indonesia into the broad consensus required for

a chairman's statement to be made. Strong economic interests on the part of a number of member states (Germany and to a lesser extent Britain) conflict with Portugal's principled positions, supported by countries less interested in the region together with Ireland, for whom self-determination is a sensitive issue, and the Netherlands, which fell out with Jakarta over aid and human rights. These interests are particularly evident during the meetings between the Twelve and ASEAN. The statements issued after these meetings, however, now explicitly mention the issue of human rights, to the Asians' dislike, although falling short of the explicit reference to East Timor which Portugal would like.³²

Since the third generation EC-ASEAN agreement is up for negotiation, Portugal has made granting the respective mandate to the Commission conditional on Indonesia's pledge to respect human rights in East Timor. Initially dependent almost exclusively on Portugal's initiative the question has been brought up by other member states, notably Ireland. In July 1994, after serious incidents in a church in Dili, the Twelve issued a statement stressing 'the need for observance of Human Rights, particularly as regards freedom of worship' in East Timor.

Accommodating principles and interests is not always an easy task, as this particular case seems to prove. Portugal is trying to single out the human rights issue and pushing for it to be dealt with as a matter of principle, while other member states tend to regard it as one among others that should be taken into account in the broader set of economic and strategic issues in the region. The fact remains that member states have finally proven their solidarity in this issue, so that East Timor is now a part of the EPC agenda and one that is taken into account in the Presidency's decisions, in the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights, and in EC-ASEAN relations.

With Timor, a new emphasis has also been added to the human rights and democracy issue in Portuguese foreign policy as a whole. This issue is equally relevant in the difficult question of returning Macao to full Chinese sovereignty in 1999, two years after Hong Kong. Notwithstanding the particular obstacles which the process may encounter, the question of a coherent human rights policy is obviously a point to be borne in mind. In brief, Portugal considers human rights a horizontal issue, in the sense that it decisively cuts across its own and the European Union's cooperation efforts (i.e. one that Portugal is resolved to deal with both bilaterally and in its actions as an EU member).³³

Portuguese foreign policy both towards Lusophone Africa and East Timor is strongly influenced by domestic factors (the only other comparable case in this regard being bilateral relations with Spain). Lusophone Africa, Angola in particular, is present in Portuguese politics as a divisive issue, and most Portuguese will have not only an opinion but a strong position of love or hate for the two rival movements, the MPLA and Unita.

This alone would suffice to explain the restraint which the government has shown with regard to Unita's violation of the peace accord that had led to the 1992 election. While it did condemn Unita for going back to war, the harsher words were left to the UN Security Council and EPC statements, which the government certainly supported but could not publicly endorse without paying an internal political price. The Portuguese public stands for a stronger condemnation of Indonesia and a tougher fight for self-determination for East Timor. Widespread criticism against the 1992 consensus on the issue at the UN Commission on Human Rights seems to confirm this. Naturally, therefore, public pressure is an obstacle to greater diplomatic flexibility in the contacts with Indonesia.

PORTUGAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

East-South equilibrium

German unification and the great changes in Central Europe were initially viewed in Portugal with a degree of apprehension. It was feared that a marginalization of the South (Southern Europe, at first, and then the non-European outer circles) would undoubtedly follow. Shortly after the mesmerizing event in Berlin, Mário Soares stated that: 'We will be affected by this, although less so than Latin America or Africa. I am well aware that EC resources are limited and that today Eastern European countries will be their priority destination, but to penalise the Latin Americans or the Africans would be an act of sheer madness.'³⁴

Hence Portugal was concerned that a correct balance be struck between the East and the South; this preoccupation dominated the Portuguese Presidency and was apparent in the first drafts of the report on priority areas for the development of CFSP. In the third draft, presented to the informal meeting of foreign ministers in Guimarães, possible regions and countries for joint actions were extensively enumerated: Central Europe; the Maghreb and the Middle East; North America; Latin America and the Caribbean; Africa; Asia and the Pacific.

This document was criticized both for under-prioritizing and for insufficiently dealing with security issues.³⁵ In the final document on CFSP approved by the Lisbon European Council, on 26-7 June 1992, the geographical overstretch was not retained, and the idea put forward by various delegations in Guimarães for a common position towards developing countries was not adopted. Those more specifically Portuguese priorities such as Africa and Latin America would be given much less attention by the European Council, which allocated the two of them no more than a single paragraph,³⁶ and that only in the context of North-South relations, against six pages devoted to relations with Africa and Latin America in

earlier versions. Geographical proximity and important political, economic or security interests prevailed, and thus the Maghreb and the Middle East were placed on an equal footing with Central and Eastern Europe (this was favourably viewed in Portugal as going in the direction of an East-South equilibrium). The dilemma faced by Lisbon in this regard is not to forget, while championing the cause of the South, the importance of stability in Central and Eastern Europe for the development of the Union and thus the imperative need for Portugal to support those fledgling democracies and the resolution of conflicts such as that underway in the former Yugoslavia. This has become clear to the Portuguese government since 1991, as Foreign Minister Durão Barroso's words illustrate. Asked whether Portugal's interests were more clearly at stake in Africa or in Bosnia, he did not waver: 'Portugal's priority interests lie, beyond a shadow of a doubt, in Europe and in the European Union.'³⁷ Although this says nothing about Bosnia, it does signify that were the European process to collapse, Portugal would be one of those with more to lose.³⁸ At the same time, it is true that Portugal has gradually become more concerned with Central and Eastern Europe and cast aside its original reticence over the accession of the Visegrad states.

Joint Actions

Portugal has generally stood for the promotion of Joint Actions. But it has also warned that too many of them could have a trivializing effect while at the same time creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled,³⁹ particularly because of their financial and budgetary implications. The case-by-case budget approach is not commended in Lisbon, and Portugal thinks that funds for Joint Actions should come from a special budget. The fact that the first Joint Action was the mere monitoring of Russian elections was seen as proving the point about risking a loss of credibility.

Promoting regional stability is one of the horizontal concerns of CFSP to which Joint Actions, in Lisbon's view, should conform. This accounts for its support for the Pact for Stability, which Lisbon considers the most relevant of the first five Joint Actions agreed. The inclusion of Africa as a possible area for joint action in addition to those already agreed at the June 1992 Lisbon Council was accepted, and Portugal thinks support for the consolidation of South African democracy to be a meaningful action. Portugal's proposal on 20 May 1994 for a Joint Action in Mozambique involving monitoring the country's first ever free elections, helping with the huge refugee and homeless problem, assisting with the reintegration of demobilized personnel, and supporting the rebuilding of this devastated country was certainly more controversial. First, because it goes against Portugal's argument for selectiveness, and second because it breaks with the notion, still held in many quarters, that former colonies should be a *chasse gardée*

for national initiatives. Traditionally, Mozambique has been a source of Luso-British friction, and the proposal, which was set, moreover, in a regional perspective, met with Britain's immovable opposition. As a result, there was indeed no Joint Action, although the Twelve decided in July that they would provide electoral technical assistance, funded from the Community Cooperation budget.

The development of a European defence identity

For countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy, the relationship with the USA is perceived not only as a crucial factor in maintaining both an inter-European equilibrium and security on the continent, but also as another means of bolstering the country's position within the context of European Union. This explains Portugal's attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and its generally cautious attitude towards a European defence identity.

During the Intergovernmental Conference's discussion over the development of a common defence policy, Portugal allied with the Atlanticist group, arguing that the Atlantic Alliance remained the fundamental pillar of European defence and that any step towards a European defence identity should in no way affect the transatlantic relationship. Portugal opposed the creation of a European defence identity within the European Union, and aligned with those who argued for WEU being kept as an autonomous organization, that would perform a bridging role between NATO and the European Union.⁴⁰

The creation of a Franco-German Eurocorps was generally met with widespread criticism throughout the political spectrum as well as from within the military establishment. The Eurocorps was viewed in Portugal as no more than a French initiative to establish a rival organization to NATO that would lead to 'transatlantic decoupling'. The criticism levelled by the Bush administration at attempts to create a European defence identity was well received in Portugal.

France's decision to move closer to NATO and the explicit support which the new Clinton administration has given to the idea of a European defence identity, as was evident in the January 1994 NATO summit, has also led to a narrowing of the gap between the pro-European line, which Portugal has generally adopted since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and its position on a European defence policy. In the light of this, Portugal's Defence Minister recently commented that Portugal may shortly be sending an observer to Eurocorps, and it has decided to participate in the Air-Naval Mediterranean Force, formed already by Italy, France and Spain, as well as allowing the Marines to participate in the WEU's Anglo-Dutch amphibious brigade.⁴¹

It should be noted, however, that this small measure of involvement

represents a departure from traditional Portuguese positions, that is, to avoid direct participation in armed conflict in Europe altogether. The Gulf War may have provided the last example of the traditional pattern of Portuguese involvement, even if its foreign and security policy was already tending towards 'Europeanization' at the time. While expressing 'solidarity with our allies' the Prime Minister indicated right from the start of the Gulf crisis that 'Portugal will not be directly engaged in the armed conflict'.⁴² Solidarity took the form of granting the USA full overflight rights and unrestricted use of the Azores base, and making medical and hospital care and personnel and transportation facilities available. Under the framework of WEU coordination, a support ship was made available to the British naval forces, and transport aircraft flew several missions carrying both relief medical aid and military material to Turkey.⁴³ In any case, solidarity with NATO and the European Union/WEU, as events determine, remains a strong precondition for any Portuguese military involvement in the European strategic environment (i.e. Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean).

Despite the new awareness of the importance of the political dimension inherent in European integration, Portugal has not escaped the general post-Cold War tendency to a relapse into the 'nationalization' of defence policy. While after the end of the colonial wars the Soviet threat made it impossible even to think about choosing between Europe and the South in security terms, the debate over what option to take has now resurfaced.

The Portuguese Eurosceptics restate the traditional argument that Portugal's peripheral position in Europe protects the country from involvement in the continent's regional conflicts, and therefore that Portugal will be best served by strengthening its presence in Africa, whether through bilateral or multilateral UN actions. Portugal already has a communications battalion in the UN operation in Mozambique, and was instrumental in the failed attempt at setting up a new, unified Angolan army, while it has taken steps to intensify military cooperation as a whole with the Lusophone African Five.

The military efforts made by Portugal, like those of France or the UK, both of which are also involved in Angola and Mozambique, are clearly outside the European domain, and consist either of a bilateral initiative or an action within the context of the UN. It seems desirable that the military efforts of member states when it comes to UN operations, whether outside Europe or not, should become progressively 'Europeanized', in order to prevent the renationalization of foreign policies which post-Cold War events have persuaded certain member states active outside Europe to undertake.

For the Euro-Atlanticists, Portugal's borders no longer stop at the national frontiers and the African effort which they consider important is not as decisive, as participation in the European Union and fulfilling the obligations which stem from membership. For this group the borders of

Germany and Italy (i.e. the outer borders of the Union) are also Portugal's security frontiers. The underlying rationale behind this argument is that such a position prevents a few key states achieving a quasi-hegemony in the European Union, including defence.

The current Portuguese concepts of defence, approved in 1993, are a compromise formula between two main schools and, not surprisingly, they display a number of ambiguities. For its part and for the time being, CFSP is certainly not free from ambiguity, but is rather built around it. Whether or not the ambiguity in Portuguese thinking will be resolved depends primarily on a clarification of the European Union's own stances, hopefully resulting from a further deepening of European integration, where it is most needed – in the realm of political union.

The institutional dimension

Portugal belongs to the group of countries that in the 1991 IGCS stood for the need to maintain the intergovernmental character of the foreign policy pillar of the Union. On the basis of its positive experience within EPC,⁴⁴ the Portuguese government feels that purely extending the mechanisms of Community decision-making to encompass foreign policy would not sufficiently safeguard the specifics of Portugal's international experience and its traditional ties.⁴⁵ The idea of a voting strength ultimately based on the criteria of size enjoys little sympathy in Portugal. The opposition of many to qualified majority voting is also explained by concerns relating to the need for CFSP to integrate fully the specific and varied contributions of member states in foreign policy.

Portugal values Europe's ability to forge close relations with various areas of the globe, by pooling the privileged cultural and historic links of its members. This is one of Europe's particular strengths. The Union must be capable of balancing integration to the East and Centre with a greater opening to, and spirit of cooperation with, the South – not only because of the need to achieve greater projection in world affairs, but also due to the need to balance its own internal equilibrium. A Europe centred on the East alone would marginalize countries which have important relations with areas of the world outside of continental Europe. Even the Franco-German axis would come under pressure if relations with the South were ostensibly neglected.

From a Portuguese perspective the institutional reform scheduled for 1996, which aims at conferring upon the Union greater capabilities in terms of both foreign and defence policy, should not lead to the creation of a directorate or the end of Union presidencies by smaller states. The appearance of a directorate would be tantamount to an abandonment of the European project. It would mean going backwards to a League of Nations phase or even to a balance of power system. Furthermore, it is

impossible to assess the specific contribution that each country can make to the Union's foreign policy based merely on the size of its population. How can one weigh the value of historical and cultural ties? A similar argument can be made in terms of the Presidency, which has at times brought other nations closer to the Union. This was the case of South America during both the Portuguese and the Spanish Presidency of the Community.

Portugal has a vital interest at stake in a political and open Europe which takes into consideration the specific contribution which each member country can make. In a European Union that is little more than a civilian power, giving priority to the economic instruments of external relations, Portugal remains little more than a poor relation; yet in a Europe capable of taking on its full international role, with a strong political output, Portugal's heritage makes it a more relevant partner.

NOTES

- 1 This chapter draws widely on the author's contribution to IEP's project Spain and Portugal in EPC.
- 2 Memorandum from the Portuguese delegation, 'A União Política na perspectiva da Conferência Intergovernamental' [Political union with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference], Lisbon, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 30 November 1990, in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union*, Maasticht, EIPA/IEAP, 1992, pp.304-12.
- 3 Aníbal Cavaco Silva, *Afirmar Portugal no Mundo - Discursos Proferidos durante a Vigência do XII Governo Constitucional*, Lisbon, INCM, February 1993, p.157.
- 4 This concern was particularly apparent during Portugal's membership of the troika and subsequently during its first EC Presidency, which began in January 1992. The need to strike a balance between an opening to the East and the needs of the South was indeed laid out in the programme of the Portuguese Presidency. Cf. statement of Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro, quoted in *Diário de Notícias*, 17 January 1992.
- 5 See José Calvet de Magalhães, *Breve História Diplomática Portuguesa*, Lisbon, Europa-América, 1991.
- 6 The attitude of the Portuguese government towards Europe prior to 1974 is thoroughly described and analysed in José Calvet de Magalhães, 'Portugal na Europa: O Caminho Certo', *Estratégia - Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, no. 10-11, Winter 1993-4.
- 7 On the history of Portuguese-US relations, and on presentday economic and security relations, see José Calvet de Magalhães, Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Joaquim Ramos Silva, *Portugal: An Atlantic Paradox*, Lisbon, IEEI, 1990.
- 8 For the Cold War era, see Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 'Portuguese defence policy: internal politics and defence commitments' in John Chipman, (ed.), *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp.86-139.
- 9 Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 'A Ideia de um Tratado Luso-Americano', *Público*, 14 April 1993.
- 10 For a discussion of the Angolan process and the UN involvement, see Moisés

- Venâncio, *The United Nations, Peace and Transition: Lessons from Angola*, Lisbon, IEEI, Lumiar Papers, no. 3, September 1994.
- 11 Diogo Pires Aurélio, 'A Questão Nacional em Angola e Moçambique', *Estratégia – Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, no. 7, Spring 1990.
 - 12 Only once did Brazil actually vote against Portugal in the UN: on 31 July 1963, when Security Council Resolution 5380 was passed, in which Portugal was invited to recognize the right to self-determination of its overseas territories forthwith. Eight Security Council members voted for the resolution and three abstained (France, Britain and the USA).
 - 13 Mário Soares, *Intervenções* 8, Lisbon, INCM, April 1994, p.162.
 - 14 Jaime Gama, Foreign Minister in 1983–5, summarized this point of view, stressing: 'the role Portugal may come to play, both as a factor of expansion of the European area towards Africa and Latin America and in bringing Community logic, institutions and decisions closer to those Latin American and African regions. . . . As a member of the Community, Portugal will contribute to a greater interest, in both directions, in relations between Europe and Africa.' *Política Externa Portuguesa 1983–1985*, Lisbon, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1985, p.197.
 - 15 For a discussion of this 'natural and basic premise' of Portuguese foreign policy, see José Calvet de Magalhães, 'Portugal e o Euro-Atlantismo', *Estratégia – Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, no. 1, Spring 1986, pp.21–34.
 - 16 In the summit meeting held in Palma de Majorca, although bilaterals were dominant in the meeting's agenda, it is interesting to note that Portugal and Spain decided to coordinate actions towards the Maghreb. *Público*, 18 December 1993.
 - 17 *Portugal nas Comunidades Europeias – Primeiro Ano*, Lisbon, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1987, p.200.
 - 18 *Portugal nas Comunidades Europeias – Quinto Ano*, Lisbon, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1990 p.392–3.
 - 19 Yet another outburst of heavy fighting after the Lusaka accord had been completed, after eighteen-month long negotiations mediated by the UN, delayed the signature of the agreement from 15 to 20 November. Even then, neither President dos Santos nor Jonas Savimbi appeared to sign in person.
 - 20 The impact of Portuguese and Spanish membership on the European Union's relations with Latin America is analysed by Angel Viñas, 'Portugal y España en la Unión Europea ante los desafíos del Sur', *Estratégia – Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, no. 12, Spring 1995.
 - 21 Hélio Jaguaribe, 'Portugal e o Brasil perante a Integração Europeia', *Estratégia – Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, no. 6, Spring 1989.
 - 22 Celso Lafer, 'Acordo Mercosur/CE' in *A inserção internacional do Brasil*, Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1993, p.26.
 - 23 Formed by the members of LAIA (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay), plus, with an observer status, a Central American country and the country holding the presidency of the Caribbean Community.
 - 24 Álvaro Vasconcelos, 'Portuguese defence policy: internal politics and defence commitments', in John Chipman (ed.), *Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*.
 - 25 See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 'The shaping of a subregional identity' in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, London and New York, Pinter, 1992, pp.15–27.
 - 26 Declaration on cooperation in the Western Mediterranean, signed in Rome on 10 October 1990, by Portugal, Spain, France, Italy (later joined by Malta) and

the five members of the Arab Maghreb Union: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

- 27 Lisbon European Council, 26–27 June 1992, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, Appendix Four, SN 3321/1/92, p.48.
- 28 General Assembly resolution 3485, 12 December 1975, adopted by 72 votes to 10, with 43 abstentions; and Security Council resolution 384, of 22 December 1985, adopted unanimously.
- 29 It is interesting to compare the reference made to East Timor in the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly in 1988 with the speech of the EC Presidency in 1994:

Concerning the question of East Timor, the Twelve reiterate their support for the contacts between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They express the hope that it will soon be possible to achieve progress, thus paving the way to a just, comprehensive and internationally accepted settlement of the question, with full respect of the interests of the people of East Timor.

The speech of the EC Presidency in the 49th session in 1994 states:

The European Union continues to support a dialogue without preconditions between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. In that context, it took due note of the fourth round of meetings held by the UN Secretary-General with the foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia on 6 May 1994. The Union encourages all efforts aiming at a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement to the question on East Timor with full respect for the legitimate interests and aspirations of the East Timorese people, in conformity with the principles embodied in the charter of the United Nations. The European Union remains deeply concerned at reports of continuing human rights violations in East Timor. In its statement on 18 July, the Union expressed its concern about the most recent incidents in Dili which have again heightened tension in the territory. The respect for human rights is a vital prerequisite for a lasting solution to the question of East Timor. In this context the European Union calls upon the Indonesian government to comply fully with the relevant decision adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.

- 30 Indonesia admitted to some fifty killings.
- 31 This was abundantly reported in the Portuguese press. See for instance, 'CE Quer Timor aberto à ONU', *Diário de Notícias*, 3 March 1993.
- 32 *Le Monde*, 1–2 November 1992.
- 33 Statement on the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union, issued by the Prime Minister's office in 19 December 1991, p.10.
- 34 Mário Soares, *Intervenções 4*, Lisbon, INCM, April 1990, p.591.
- 35 *Europe*, no. 5722, 4–5 May 1992, p.5.
- 36 Lisbon European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, Appendix One, SN 33221/1/92, p.33.
- 37 Foreign Minister Durão Barroso, interviewed by *Público*, 9 January 1994.
- 38 *Idem*.
- 39 *Idem*.
- 40 Aníbal Cavaco Silva, *Afirmar Portugal no Mundo – Discursos Proferidos durante a Vigência do XII Governo Constitucional*, Lisbon, INCM, February 1993, p.129.
- 41 'Portugal Quer Reforçar Posição na UEO', *Público*, 25 March 1994.
- 42 Press statement released by the PM's Office, 1 March 1991, p.4.

- 43 For a detailed description and assessment of Portuguese participation in the Gulf crisis, see Álvaro Vasconcelos, 'Portugal, the Gulf crisis and the WEU', in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (eds), *Western Europe and the Gulf*, Paris, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1992, pp.109-25.
- 44 See João de Matos Proença, 'A Cooperação Política Europeia', *Estratégia - Revista de Estudos Internacionais*, nos. 10-11, Winter 1993-4; Álvaro Vasconcelos, 'Portugal and European political cooperation', *The International Spectator*, vol. XXVI, no. 2, April-June 1991.
- 45 See Manuel Fernandes Pereira, 'A Evolução da Posição Portuguesa na Negociação sobre a PESC', in *Política Internacional*, vol. 1, no. 6, Spring 1993, p.31.

The rise of the European Union led to speculation that collective European positions on international relations would become more important than national foreign policies. However, Europe's divided responses to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to the war in the Balkans indicate that such speculation was premature. Although the EU has made some strides towards acting as a single bloc, expectations have raced ahead of achievement.

The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy is a timely survey of the interplay between the European Union's common foreign and security policy and the long-established national foreign policies of the Union's member states. The contributors discuss the individual foreign policies of the member states and look at their experiences in trying to make their concerns compatible with collective interests. There is a separate chapter on the European Commission, whose role in the external relations of the Community steadily grew during the 1980s.

This book will be invaluable for students and scholars of the European Union and of international politics. It will prove a worthy successor to *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, first published in 1983, and will be of great interest to practitioners in all countries concerned with Europe's role in international affairs.

Christopher Hill is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

International Relations/European politics/European studies

Cover design: Richard Earney



11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE
29 West 35th Street
New York NY 10001
Printed in Great Britain

ISBN 0-415-12223-6



9 780415 122238