
Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective

MOHAMMED EL-SAYED SELIM

The Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-Med) world, a term which we use to refer to member-states in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), is one of the most dangerous arenas for the development, deployment, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and their delivery systems. Britain and France are 'legitimate' nuclear powers under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and they possess a highly developed nuclear arsenal. Eleven of the member-states of the European Union (EU) are members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As such, they are protected by NATO's nuclear umbrella, and some of them are arenas for the deployment of NATO's air-delivered nuclear warheads.¹ In the Middle East, Israel has 100–200 nuclear warheads. The Vanunu revelations, Thomas Hirsch's book on Israel's nuclear capabilities, and the confirmations by different Israeli officials have made it quite clear that Israel has introduced the nuclear factor into the Middle Eastern politics.² No other non-European member of the EMP is even close to Israel's nuclear capability. Iran's nuclear capabilities are still in their infancy and it will be a number of years before the Islamic Republic may be in a position to realize its nuclear aspirations. Algeria has a 15-megawatts nuclear research reactor near Ain-Oussera which was placed in 1991 under the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Syria and Egypt are not known to have any significant nuclear facilities and the Iraqi nuclear programme has been crippled.³

As far as other forms of WMD are concerned, the US Office of Technology Assessment has confirmed that Israel, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt possess chemical weapons.⁴ It is also widely believed that these countries have biological weapons. Most of them have the capability to deliver their WMD, but the range and accuracy of Israel's delivery systems

are widely acknowledged to be superior to those of any non-European actor. Whereas Israel is working towards the achievement of a protective anti-missile system, other Middle Eastern actors are not. Further, some WMD-possessing states in the EMP are not parties to the global regimes to eliminate or prevent their proliferation. Israel is not a party to the NPT and many Middle Eastern actors, mainly Egypt, Syria, Iran and Libya are yet to accept the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). None of them, except Israel, have endorsed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Cognizant of the potentially hazardous consequences of the deployment and proliferation of WMD, the parties to the Barcelona Declaration undertook to promote regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, biological, and chemical non-proliferation, through adherence to non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements, such as the NPT, the BWC, the CWC, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as regional agreements such as weapons free zones. They also pledged to fulfil in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation conventions. Realizing the security threats inherent in the Middle East in particular, they undertook to establish a verifiable Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, and chemical and their delivery systems.

Notwithstanding these general undertakings, the parties of the EMP are in deep disagreement over virtually all the issues involved. They differ on the objective of the entire enterprise, in terms of whether this involves the removal of WMD or simply their non-proliferation. They also differ regarding the mutuality of the commitments and the geographical universe in which they should take place. Whereas some actors perceive themselves as being outside the scope of the projected system for the removal or non-proliferation of WMD, others advocate a pan-Euro-Med commitment. Finally, they disagree on the modalities of dealing with the question of WMD, such as the linkages between peace settlements and the arms control process.

The objectives of this comment are to delineate the main issues involved in the question of WMD within the EMP framework, identify the main approaches advocated by different parties, and suggest certain modalities for dealing with the issue. The intention is not to defend the Arab approaches to the issue, but to identify a policy framework based on explicitly-stated assumptions, goals, and concepts, and to draw from it certain inferences concerning future directions of the EMP in the area of WMD. Neither is the concern to present a master plan for dealing with the question of WMD, but rather to suggest a possible agenda for action which addresses itself to the security concerns of all actors in the EMP.

Problematics

The issue of WMD within the framework of the EMP poses major problems which make it difficult to achieve the objectives spelled out in the Barcelona Declaration and which also call for an innovative approach to deal with them. These problems can be categorized as problems related to the characteristics and perceived utility of WMD, problems centered around the diversity of regional sub-systems in the Euro-Med universe, problems related to the strategic connections between these sub-systems and adjacent sub-systems, and finally problems related to the strategic disequilibrium in the EMP in the area of WMD.

- (1) WMD are characterized by their accessibility, transferability, usability, and ability to inflict unacceptable losses. Chemical and biological weapons are relatively easy to manufacture and stockpile, using low-level technology at low cost. They can be produced for civilian purposes and transferred to military ones at short notice. Further, certain WMD systems can be used with insufficient preliminary warning, and the attacker may remain unidentified, particularly in the case of biological weapons. Contrary to the widely-held belief that WMD serve only as a deterrent and as last resort weapon, they can actually be employed in situations that fall short of total war waged for absolute annihilation or survival. Certain categories of WMD, including nuclear weapons, lend themselves readily to tactical uses especially if the attacker perceives that there is no deterrent. The accessibility of WMD and their use as tactical weapons have increased the temptation to develop, deploy, and use or threaten to use them in conflict situations, especially when they are perceived as an ultimate security insurance, given their ability to inflict tremendous losses which can result in the elimination of entire communities. Taken together, these characteristics complicate the task of persuading states to remove their WMD, especially since removing these weapons is almost as costly and complicated as developing them.
- (2) The EMP is a highly diversified entity. It comprises a variety of sub-systems such as the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, Southern Europe and Northern Europe. Each sub-system has its own dynamics, problems, and conflicts. These sub-systems are different in terms of their levels of economic development, political stability, regional integration, and, more importantly, they have different commitments under the global regime for the control of nuclear weapons. Despite their diversities these sub-systems are interrelated. Security threats and arrangements in one sub-system necessarily spill over other sub-systems. This combination of diversity and interconnectedness calls for an approach which takes into

consideration the particular problems of each sub-system and the universality of commitments under any security arrangement. Such formula requires building not only inter-state agreement but also inter-region consensus. The task of reconciling diversities with commonalities, and particularism with universalism is clearly a formidable one.

- (3) There are strong geo-strategic connections between the Euro-Med world and adjacent regions at different levels which are both geographical and functional. Most Euro-Med actors have strong strategic linkages with powers outside the EMP. The European partners and Turkey are members in NATO, which necessarily brings NATO into the picture. NATO's nuclear strategy takes into account both national European nuclear deterrents and global arms control. One cannot discuss the future of nuclear weapons within the framework of the EMP without taking these linkages into account. Furthermore, although the USA is not an EMP partner, its role in the issue of WMD in the EMP cannot be ignored. It has a strong military presence in the Mediterranean and has been fully supporting the Israeli nuclear programme.⁵

In addition, the Euro-Med system is also connected with adjacent sub-systems, such as the Arabian Gulf, and Southern Asia. Controlling WMD in the Euro-Med system must take into account that such sub-systems may be ridden with WMD. Israel may feel threatened if its nuclear weapons have been eliminated while South Asian actors keep theirs. These actors are under no Euro-Med obligations to remove their nuclear arsenals. The issue of WMD in the EMP is also being dealt with in other forums, such as the Middle Eastern multilateral negotiations (Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, ACRS), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the American-Russian arms control negotiations. Attempts within the EMP to create regimes for the control of WMD could duplicate or complicate negotiations in these forums.

- (4) The strategic structure of the EMP regarding WMD represents, in our judgment, the most serious obstacle to the control of those particularly deadly weapons. Whereas the two nuclear European members in the EMP and Israel have developed elaborate arsenals of nuclear weapons, including efficient delivery systems, and – although complying with treaties calling for their removal – they may still possess other kinds of WMD, whilst other EMP actors cannot match these capabilities. Some of those actors do not possess nuclear and other WMD in the first place, and those who possess the latter do not have the capability to deter a first strike or to launch a deadly first or second strike. Building on its

extensive capability to wage a first nuclear strike with its long-range delivery systems, as well as on its satellite reconnaissance assets, Israel is in a position to wage a non-conventional war, yet remain relatively immune from counter attacks.

As a result of all these factors, the structure of the EMP is characterized by a high level of strategic disequilibrium. There are no historical precedents for the control of WMD under these conditions. Historically, the issue of WMD was dealt with under one of three conditions: military defeat, strategic collapse, and strategic equilibrium. The first case scenario is well represented by Iraq. The Iraqi arsenal of WMD was only removed after the military defeat of Iraq in the Second Gulf War in 1991. Iraq was forced to accept the unilateral removal of its WMD under the threat of military action including missile attacks by the Americans. The second historical precedent occurred when Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus, former Soviet republics, agreed to remove their nuclear weapons after their independence as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although these republics were inclined to retain their nuclear capabilities, domestic economic hardships and Western pressure persuaded them to remove them. Rooted in a strategic collapse, the nuclear disarmament of South Africa was more or less similar to the experience of the former Soviet republics. The collapsing apartheid regime was coerced to de-nuclearize before the black majority take-over. The third historical model in which WMD were removed was the American-Soviet agreements during the cold war to reduce nuclear capabilities. Such agreements were made possible when the two superpowers reached a situation of strategic equilibrium and a relationship of balance of terror. Fear of mutual destruction convinced the Americans and the Soviets that a reduction of their WMD was in their best interest.

The strategic structure of the EMP is quite different to these historical models. As we have seen, the main distinguishing characteristic of the EMP is the strategic disequilibrium between the partners. Under this condition, it is extremely difficult to remove or control the proliferation of WMD. Countries possessing WMD do not feel obliged to give up what they already have simply because this will reduce their strategic superiority in an international system characterized by anarchy and security dilemmas. Meanwhile, perceptions of security threats will always motivate non-WMD powers to strive to possess such weapons in order to reach a situation of equilibrium which could enable them to engage positively with others. The task of persuading the haves to give up what they have and the have-nots not to pursue the path of the haves, is certainly not an easy one to achieve.

In this comment, we shall try to develop some ideas which could help the Euro-Med partners to deal with these problematics. In order to achieve this

objective, we will briefly review the main issues involved and the various approaches advocated by EMP actors to deal with them. We now present a policy framework for dealing with the WMD and infer from it a set of policy recommendations which could present a viable approach to the control of WMD in the Euro-Med world.

Control of WMD in the EMP: Issues and Approaches

Because the Euro-Med world consists of multiple actors with different capabilities, commitments, and legitimacies in relationship with WMD, the issue of the control of WMD entails a number of different issues. Although these issues are interconnected, each has its own history, and dynamics. For the purpose of our argument, the most important issues are the control of WMD in the Arab-Israeli context and the issue of the nuclear capabilities of France and the UK in the EMP as well as the linkages between the EU and NATO. A brief review of these issues and the approaches advocated by different actors to deal with them may be useful before we turn to the task of identifying possible future policy options.

WMD within the Arab-Israeli Context

The issue of WMD was only put on the agenda of Arab-Israeli negotiations seriously after the second Gulf crisis (1990–91) which had unveiled Iraq's arsenal of WMD.⁶ The issue was included in the Middle East peace negotiations both because of the declarations and proposals of the USA, France, and the permanent members of the Security Council, and through the deliberations of Middle Eastern actors within the ACRS. It became increasingly clear that there were two main approaches to the control of WMD in the Middle East – the 'non-proliferation and selective elimination' approach and the 'comprehensive elimination' alternative. The two approaches differed in their views of the relationship between different forms of WMD, the universality of the commitments involved, and the timetable for the elimination of WMD.

The first approach was represented by the US arms control proposals of 1991 and 1993, the French arms control plan of 1991, the 1991 declaration of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Israeli proposals. The May 1991 arms control in the Middle East proposal submitted by former President Bush called for a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the Middle East and restrictions on export licenses for the technology involved with a view to their ultimate elimination.⁷ The proposal also called for the establishment of a verifiable ban on the acquisition and production of separated plutonium, enriched uranium, and other elements used in nuclear weapons, the accession of all Middle

Eastern countries to the NPT, and the placing of all nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Middle Eastern countries were also persuaded to join the BWC and the CWC.⁸ These conventions call for the total elimination of biological and chemical weapons. The Bush proposal was criticized on grounds that it did not specify a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons thereby leaving countries which already possessed them with an advantage over those who would be denied access to them.

It also focused on the export of missile technology, leaving local capabilities to manufacture them intact. Israel, being the only Middle Eastern countries with indigenous missile-production capabilities, would be under no obligation to remove them. Further, the application of the American proposals resulted in keeping Israel as the only nuclear power in the Middle East for an unlimited period of time. Whereas the Arabs would be committed to remove their biological and chemical weapons, Israel would be under no obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenal even if it joined the NPT, for the mandate of the NPT does not include nuclear weapons stockpiled in the basement! Despite these criticisms, President Clinton reiterated similar proposals in his statement before the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993. Addressing the issue from a global framework, Clinton suggested banning the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for the purpose of producing nuclear devices. He also suggested reaching more restrictive regional measures in areas ridden with instability and the threat of nuclear proliferation. According to Avner Cohen, Israel's present nuclear capabilities would not be affected by the Clinton proposal.⁹

The French proposal for arms control in the Middle East announced by former President Mitterrand in May 1991 and the Declaration issued by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in July 1991 on the issue of WMD in the Middle East subscribed to the same philosophy. The Mitterrand proposal called for the 'banning' of chemical and biological weapons, the 'reduction' of nuclear weapons, and monitoring missile technology with a view to limiting their use for military purposes. Likewise, the 1991 Declaration of the permanent members of the Security Council asserted that their goal was to ban WMD in the Middle East. In order to achieve this objective, they suggested a freeze on the acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles as a prelude to their removal and a ban on the production and export of materials which could be used in producing nuclear weapons. It also called on Middle Eastern countries to place their nuclear activities under the regular inspection of the IAEA. The selectivity of both the Mitterrand and the permanent members proposals must not be overlooked. The Mitterrand approach called for the removal of some categories of WMD and the reduction of others. It happens that the ones to be removed are the only ones

possessed by some Arab states and the ones to be reduced are the only ones monopolized by Israel. Further, the freeze and inspection processes suggested by the permanent members will serve only to prevent the Arab countries from acquiring missile and nuclear technology, since IAEA inspection does not apply to nuclear stockpiles.

The Israeli approach is in line with these proposals. Israel agrees in principle on the de-nuclearization of the Middle East. However, such step should be taken only after peace treaties have been reached with 'all' Middle Eastern countries, and confidence-building and confidence-and-security-building measures have been incrementally introduced. Meanwhile, all Middle Eastern countries should subscribe to the BWC and the CWC and a ban on the exportation of missile technology to the Middle East should be imposed.¹⁰ Operationally, this means that Israel will be turned into the only power possessing nuclear weapons and missiles in the Middle East for an unlimited period of time.

The second approach was mainly advocated by the Egyptians and to a lesser extent by the Syrians. The crux of the Egyptian approach to WMD in the Arab-Israeli context is the simultaneous elimination of all categories of WMD. This means that the Arabs and the Israelis will join all global regimes for the control of WMD at the same time and that Israel will place its nuclear arsenal under international control as a prelude to its destruction. In this context, Egypt links its accession to the CWC to Israel's endorsement of the NPT and its de-nuclearization within a specified framework. Further, the Egyptians favour the adhesion of all actors to the verification measures of the IAEA. The Israelis consider these measures as inadequate and advocate the establishment of a regional verification and inspection regime similar to the one created by the Latin Americans in the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The Egyptians call for a ban on the transfer and local production of WMD and their ingredients. They argue that a ban on the transfer of WMD technology only will work in Israel's favour because it locally manufactures a considerable portion of its needs in WMD. They also prefer to begin the process of removing all forms of WMD from the Middle East without necessarily waiting for the completion of the peace process.

Removing such weapons, in their judgment, would provide a strong momentum to the peace process.¹¹ However, the Egyptians are not clear over their perception of Iranian and Turkish commitments towards the suggested arms control regime. They seem to favour an Arab-Israeli regime for the elimination of WMD that would leave aside Iran and Turkey. As for the Syrians, although they advocate the comprehensive elimination of WMD, they agree with the Israelis that any arms control regime must be preceded by an Arab-Israeli political settlement. The first step in the control of WMD

should be an Israeli commitment to 'no-first use' of its nuclear weapons. This will be the first step in the process of their inclusion into the projected arms control regime. However, ballistic missiles should not be included in that regime because they are a stabilizing factor, given Israel's air superiority. Certain measures could be introduced to minimize the risk of their use, such as pre-notification of missile experiments.¹²

WMD in the European Context

The issue of the possession of nuclear weapons by France and the UK in the EMP has been a subject of debate only within the framework of East-West arms control negotiations. As these countries enter into a security partnership with their Mediterranean neighbours, the issue of WMD deployed in the European theatre will have to be discussed within the EMP as well. The European approach toward this issue has been enunciated in the London Declaration issued on 6 July 1990 by the Heads of State and Government of NATO countries with respect to both national deterrents and their coordination within NATO's strategic planning.

The Declaration emphasizes that nuclear weapons 'will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action may be discounted'.¹³ The former British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, also asserted that his country would not dismantle its nuclear deterrent as 'new threats have developed in a thoroughly disorderly world'. The 1995 edition of the *NATO Handbook* affirmed that 'the maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe will be required for the foreseeable future'. It went on to argue that the fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear power is 'to preserve peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion'.¹⁴ Along with other EU partners, Britain and France subscribe to the principle of the universal removal of biological and chemical weapons, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. The Arab partners would prefer to see the Mediterranean as an area free of WMD. This would include the removal of the nuclear warheads from European territory, and a firmer British and French commitment to fulfill their obligations under the NPT, such as the gradual reduction of their nuclear capabilities and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries for peaceful purposes.

A Policy Framework for the Control of WMD in the EMP

The problematics and contending approaches just outlined call for the identification of a policy framework in response, from which specific policy options may be inferred. Our suggested policy framework has two main

dimensions, conceptual, and structural. Proposals for the control or removal of WMD must be based on explicitly stated assumptions, goals, and concepts. If these assumptions, goals, and concepts are acceptable, we can then infer from them certain policy options. Such proposals must also draw upon the existing knowledge and historical experience of arms control and the conditions under which it could contribute to peace. The second dimension of our policy framework relates to the structural arrangements for the control of WMD, especially the choice between a pan-Euro-Med system or sub-regional systems and the nature of the linkages between them. The two dimensions will be reviewed respectively.

The Conceptual Dimensions of the Control of WMD

The end of the cold war and the threat of a global nuclear confrontation, the rise of global interdependence, and the primacy of socio-economic issues should have logically led to the decline of the need to develop and stockpile WMD. Despite the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the establishment of a global regime for the removal of chemical weapons under the CWC, it seems that WMD will remain as a major component of international politics throughout the twenty-first century. Nuclear powers have vowed to keep their nuclear arsenals and are engaging in activities designed to ensure their indefinite monopoly of these weapons. Non-nuclear powers are also trying to develop nuclear options or less expensive non-conventional weapons. Most countries still view WMD as an ultimate instrument of security and political coercion. They develop and possess WMD to achieve and reinforce security, as defined by them, and (unless they are subject to conditions of military defeat or political collapse) they will only remove them if such removal will achieve the same objective. Consequently, a viable approach toward the control of WMD is one which brings about security for all the parties. The viability of such approach can only be properly judged from this perspective. An approach which jeopardizes the security of the parties or of some of them, or achieves the security of some to the detriment of the others is not likely to endure. It logically follows that the issue of the control of WMD must be discussed within a security-for-all framework. If such framework is accepted, then the next question to be resolved is the conditions under which the control of WMD would promote the security of all. If such conditions are identified, then we could proceed to draw policy recommendations from them.

The functions of WMD have been conceptualized differently by two main schools of thought; liberal and realist. The liberal school argues that WMD are a threat *par excellence* to national and international security because they are inherently de-stabilizing. The possession by one actor of WMD in a conflict situation motivates others to do likewise, which results in the proliferation of these particularly deadly weapons. A country which develops

WMD in order to achieve security will ultimately be threatened by them. The production and use of the American nuclear bomb in the 1940s persuaded the Soviets to produce their own nuclear weapons, China's development of the nuclear bomb in 1964 obliged India to develop its own, which, in turn, motivated Pakistan to go nuclear, and the Arabs began to consider the nuclear option after it became clear that Israel had developed its nuclear bomb. In all these cases the original producer of the bomb ended up as a target of the same weapon. Further, the availability of WMD to one actor represents a strong motivation for their use, even if such use is not absolutely necessary, especially if the attacker perceive there is no deterrent to such use.¹⁵ The USA used the nuclear bomb twice against the Japanese in the final days of the Second World War although it was known that it would have been possible to defeat Japan with conventional means, albeit at high human cost. Consequently, the elimination of WMD is crucial to achieve security for both possessing and non-possessing states. The liberal argument is partially reflected in the Barcelona Declaration's emphasis on the non-proliferation of WMD and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. The assumption is that nuclear weapons are a threat to all actors. In the Middle Eastern context, Yazid Sayigh has argued that WMD are a destabilizing factor, especially in the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and given geographical proximity, small national territorial spaces and population size in the area. He also asserts that Israeli non-conventional weapons have 'underpinned past refusal to contemplate certain political and territorial concessions, and then encouraged a manipulative approach to regional politics. Out of a strategy of superiority come notions of political domination'.¹⁶

The realist school, which is widely accepted by most analysts and politicians, contends that WMD perform a stabilizing function in inter-state relations because they create a credible deterrence. After all, the cold war did not escalate into a third world war, despite the bi-polarity of the international system, because of the introduction of the nuclear factor. Consequently the best insurance against the use of nuclear weapons is to maintain the capability to use them. Kenneth Waltz, a widely respected International Relations theorist, has argued that

Nuclear weapons may lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of wars among their possessors. For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long or hard over important interests, indeed they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another.¹⁷

Adrian-Price also contends that:

Nuclear weapons have an indispensable deterrent function. Given their

enormous destructive power, they render the notion of war as a continuation of politics by other means totally absurd. No configuration of conventional forces can fulfil this deterrent function.¹⁸

Further, Gerald Segal and other authors have asserted that it is difficult to dismiss the utility of nuclear weapons in a world in which nuclear proliferation is likely to continue. They went on to argue that a British nuclear capability is the most likely way that Britain could retain its independence through a policy of deterrence.¹⁹

In the Arab-Israeli context, Avner Cohen argued that Israel's WMD have served to deter Arab attack on Israel and achieved their objective of maintaining security and regional stability.²⁰ WMD are not only a policy insurance for national security, but also a safeguard mechanism for regional stability and peace, the realists argue. Such stabilizing functions can only be fulfilled when the contending parties are in a situation of equilibrium. In this situation, the incentive to use WMD will disappear for fear of retaliation. Philip Sabin has succinctly made this argument in his analysis of the restraints on the use of WMD when he writes:

The pattern of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare over the past eighty years suggests that the most important disincentive to use these weapons has been fear that the enemy would respond in kind. Most instances of NBC use have been against opponents incapable of effective retaliation, whereas in the conflicts, such as the Second World War and the 1991 Gulf War, chemical weapons have been held back despite being available to both parties.²¹

In the Arab-Israeli context, Shai Feldman developed a similar view arguing that an Arab-Israeli nuclear deterrence would be effective, stable, and credible.²² Adel Safty also advocated a nuclear option for Egypt on grounds that it would reduce the risk of future wars between Egypt and Israel by ensuring that no political or ideological difference could lead to a military confrontation and would place serious restrictions on the strategy of escalation used by the Israelis in 1956 and 1967. He went on to argue that 'there is no reason why nuclear deterrence, which worked between nuclear powers, cannot work between Egypt and Israel'.²³ Also, General Gur argued that WMD could result in regional stability if there is an Arab-Israeli balance of terror, whereas the Arabs and the Israelis would find it difficult to accept the destruction expected as a result of their use.²⁴

An examination of the liberal and realist arguments reveals that, although they differ in their perception of the utility of WMD, they agree that these weapons will have a negative impact on global and regional security only when they are unevenly distributed among the conflicting parties. They also

agree that WMD are likely to be dysfunctional to regional security if the regional environment is ridden with conflicts in which territorial and statehood issues are at stake. The conclusion to be drawn is that the impact of WMD on security depends on their distribution, and the context within which they are being considered.

WMD serve as a regional security guarantee when they are evenly distributed among conflicting parties. By even distribution we mean the possession by all actors of WMD capable of delivering a deadly second-strike to the enemy. This is the situation which characterized superpower relations during the cold war and Indo-Pakistani relations since the 1970s. If one actor enjoys a monopoly over WMD, there will be a great motivation to use or threaten to use them to blackmail or compel others to act in preferred ways. The USA used the nuclear bomb against the Japanese in the final days of the Second World War, but did not use them against the Soviet-backed Viet Kong during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Iraqis used chemical weapons against the Iranians during the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-88), but they did not use them against invading Western coalition forces during the Second Gulf War (1990-91). The common denominator amongst these cases is that the attacker used WMD only when he perceived no deterrent and refrained from using them when the adversary was perceived as capable of delivering a similar response.

Israel has actually used its nuclear arsenal during the October 1973 War as a means of compulsion. This has occurred when nuclear-tipped missiles were put on alert and deployed in their firing position to compel the United States to accelerate its aerial re-supply effort, although the war was being fought on Arab territories and the survival of Israel was not at stake. As a group of scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently put it, 'one-sided possession of nuclear weapons confers such a great military advantage that it has implicitly meant the coercion of the have-nots', a form of 'nuclear imperialism'.²⁵ In short, one can conclude that uneven distribution of WMD is the worst scenario in which their use, or the threat of their use, could be encouraged.

It could be argued that the use of WMD will also depend on the nature of the political regime. Democratic regimes are not likely to use WMD even if they were available to them. But because authoritarian regimes are adventurous and perceive no domestic constraints on the ability to go to war, they are more likely to use WMD if they are at their disposal. Consequently, the nuclear bomb will be safe in the hands of Britain, France, and Israel, but will be a dangerous weapon in the hands of Iraq, Syria, or Iran. In his analysis of Arab-Israeli nuclear capabilities, Uri Bar Joseph has argued that, because some Arab leaders are irrational, a nuclear bomb in their possession will be extremely dangerous and for this reason Israel must retain its nuclear

capacity.²⁶ We are not sure whether there is a relationship between the nature of the political regime and its propensity to use WMD. All political regimes are likely to use WMD depending on the deterrence relationship with their adversaries. After all, one must not forget that the nuclear bomb was used for the first time by a democracy. This was because, as we have just argued, the attacker perceived no deterrent. Furthermore, the Saddam Hussein authoritarian regime did not use WMD against the United Nations coalition forces, although it was losing the war and facing total military defeat, because the regime was aware of the deterrent capabilities of these forces.

Strategic disequilibrium is not the only variable which could lead parties to consider WMD. The use of WMD also depends on the issues in whose context WMD use is being assessed. WMD are more likely to be used if the issues at stake are major political issues – especially those related to the control of disputed territories, national identity and statehood – and in the context of relations characterized by profoundly socio-cultural and protracted conflicts. Conversely, they are less likely to be considered or used when the issues at stake are mainly technical or ideological in nature. Major political issues and protracted conflicts create deep goal incompatibilities which could result in the WMD-possessing power to consider using them to break the political impasse. This explains the differential outcomes which might result from two relationships characterized by strategic disequilibrium. WMD are not likely to be used in disequilibrated relations such as Euro-Arab relations or American-Canadian relations, because of the technical nature of the issues in the former and the overall positive context of the latter. However, they have been considered in the Middle Eastern context because of the intensity of territorial and identity conflicts there.

It logically follows that the reinforcement of regional stability and peace in the Euro-Med universe depends on the pursuit of a strategy of equilibrium between conflicting parties, especially if regional relations are dominated by major political issues. A strategy which brings in or perpetuates disequilibrium is likely to result in the same outcome it was supposed to avoid. Yet we have seen that the Western and Israeli approaches focus mainly on perpetuating Arab-Israeli disequilibrium by insisting on eliminating only some categories of WMD, thus leaving Israel as the only nuclear power in the Middle East for an undefined period of time. In the absence of an Arab deterrent, this will result in Israel using or threatening to use its nuclear capabilities to dictate a political settlement.

The strategy of equilibrium has two main implications for the control of WMD. The first implication is that a strategy of non-proliferation will not necessarily serve the cause of regional stability and peace, especially in regions ridden with conflicts related to territory and statehood and in which one actor monopolizes certain categories of WMD. In this case, a non-

proliferation strategy will be a prescription for hegemony and protracted conflict rather than peace. When the non-proliferation strategy was introduced in 1968, within the framework of the NPT, the global system was a bipolar one and there was a strategic equilibrium between the superpowers. Despite their diverse political loyalties, most states accepted this concept because they were sure that the bipolar equilibrium provided a reasonable safeguard against the use of the nuclear bomb by any of the 'legitimate' nuclear powers. We have seen earlier that the structure of the EMP is quite different from the global structure under which the non-proliferation strategy was introduced. Under these conditions, a non-proliferation strategy will not bring about stability, especially in the Middle East which is characterized by disequilibrium in the context of basic conflicts over territories. This is essentially because that strategy will not result in a stable deterrence.²⁷ Criticizing the strategy of non-proliferation does not necessarily mean abandoning it, but rather recognizing the conditions under which the strategy has worked in the past and beginning to introduce it in the EMP only when such conditions are present.

The second major implication of the strategy of equilibrium is to approach the issue from the wider concept of linkages. The core linkages in the EMP are those between different categories of WMD, between WMD and conventional weapons, between arms transfers and local production of arms, between different actors in the Euro-Med universe, between the Euro-Med universe and adjacent regional sub-systems, between regional and extra-regional actors, and between the issue of WMD and the political resolution of conflicts within the EMP. The worst scenario for the future of WMD in the EMP is to remove one category of WMD and retain the other, especially if these weapons are not equally possessed by all the actors. As we have seen, this could result in perpetuating regional disequilibrium and hegemony. A more rational and far-sighted approach is to address all non-conventional weapons including their delivery systems either through a maximalist strategy of removing them or a minimalist strategy of retaining them. The policy implication of this approach is that if biological and chemical weapons are to be removed then nuclear weapons must also be removed.

Secondly, 'the barrier between WMD and conventional and non-conventional weapons is rapidly eroding. New conventional weapons are expected to have a revolutionary impact on the future battlefield.'²⁸ Removing WMD without regard to the conventional balance of power is not likely to result in stability if that balance is in a state of disequilibrium. One may recall that, during the post-Second World War decade, Western nuclear superiority represented the main deterrent against Soviet conventional superiority in the European theatre. The removal of Western nuclear weapons, leaving the Soviets as the only conventional power in Europe, was inconceivable.

Likewise, removing WMD from the Middle East, whilst leaving Israel's qualitatively superior conventional arsenal intact, will only result in the reinforcement of disequilibrium and hence instability. Approaches to remove WMD should proceed in parallel with approaches to control conventional weapons. This element was acknowledged by the Barcelona Declaration when it affirmed that the parties 'will consider steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional weapons'. Nevertheless, the Declaration did not link progress on the removal of WMD with progress on the control of conventional weapons. It also put more emphasis on the non-proliferation of WMD than on the control of conventional weapons. References to the former are more detailed, emphatic, and precise, than those to the latter.

Thirdly, most proposals on arms control in the Middle East have approached the issue from the angle of restricting arms 'transfers'. As the Arabs import most of their weapons while Israel manufactures most of its arms needs, such control will only help to reinforce Arab-Israeli disequilibrium. Hence, a control on the transfers of WMD components should proceed in parallel with control on the local production of those materials.

Fourthly, the reciprocity and mutuality of commitments of all Euro-Med partners are crucial if a meaningful progress is to be achieved. Exempting certain actors from these commitments, as envisaged by the Bush proposal, is not likely to be accepted by other actors, as it will create new sources of threat.

Fifthly, it is only logical to expect that some Euro-Med actors, such as Israel, would reject the removal of their WMD as long as some extra-regional powers are still armed with these weapons. Perhaps the main non-Euro-Med actor whose WMD capabilities may represent a threat to some Middle Eastern actors is Iran. Although we believe that Iran's strategic thrust is not towards the Middle East, but rather towards the Arabian Gulf and Central Asia, the Iranian factor must be taken into consideration when assessing the status of WMD in the EMP. This will require engaging positively with Iran so that it would accept the same controls on WMD as applied in the EMP. However, the strategic outreach of the EMP cannot extend as far as Pakistan, as Israel has proposed. The inclusion of Pakistan will bring India and China, and eventually all the nuclear powers, into the picture – which would mean that no control over WMD in the Euro-Med context is possible.

Finally, progress on control must be linked with progress on the resolution of political issues which led to the stockpiling of WMD in the first place. WMD are outcomes rather than causes of conflicts. The contradiction of interests and the perception of injuries and grievances of some of the contending parties motivate them to develop these deadly weapons.

Madariaga has eloquently argued in 1937 that 'nations don't distrust each other because they are armed. They are armed because they distrust each other'.²⁹ Elsewhere, this author has argued that Middle Eastern arms races are consequences of regional conflicts, not the other way around.³⁰ If this is the case, then an emphasis on the control of WMD without reference to the unresolved political issues will lead to the wrong strategies. An arms control regime based upon unresolved conflicts and perceived injustices is not likely to lead to peace. As a result, control of WMD should be linked to any relevant peace process that is in progress. Agreements on the control of WMD must be entrenched into the peace treaties. In this case, such agreements will provide security guarantees and serve to solidify the peace process. The argument that one actor should be allowed to keep its nuclear arsenal even though peace agreements have been reached contradicts the logic of equilibrium. It could be agreed that all parties will be permitted to keep their WMD, until total confidence between the parties has been achieved and maintained. This would be a more practical approach but would mean that the peace process itself would then still be incomplete.³¹

Accepting these linkages does not necessarily imply that Euro-Med actors should proceed simultaneously in all dimensions, or make progress in one dimension conditional on progress in others. It means that all parties should acknowledge the centrality and vitality of these linkages for the establishment of a durable regime for the control of WMD, and that they should set an action agenda postulated on them and on the overall concept of strategic equilibrium. Such linkages will have a heuristic value in identifying priorities and feasible courses of action.

The Structural Dimensions of the Control of WMD

Having argued for a policy framework based on the concepts of security, equilibrium, and linkages, the next question to be addressed is whether or not we can speak meaningfully of a pan-Euro-Med regime for the control of WMD, or whether we should establish sub-system regimes, each of which suits the characteristics and needs of a specific sub-system. We have seen earlier that the Euro-Med universe is a diverse region with a wide range of highly differentiated sub-regions. Such diversity has made some analysts sceptical about the notion of a pan-Euro-Med regime. Further, the deficiencies of global regimes for the control of WMD, such as the NPT and the BWC, have led some actors to advocate a sub-regional approach. For example, Israel prefers a Middle Eastern regime for the control of WMD.

Despite the diversity of the Euro-Med universe, one can identify certain elements which call for a pan-Euro-Med approach to the question of WMD. The security environments in the Euro-Med sub-regions are highly

interdependent. Political instabilities and economic uncertainties in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkan are likely to influence European long-term security concerns, and the emerging forms of chauvinism, economic exclusivism and protectionism in Europe will create new security threats in other regions. The deployment of WMD and their long-range delivery systems around the Mediterranean is a security concern for all the partners. Consequently, a Euro-Med approach has considerable merit as a means of identifying common sources of threat and new forms of inter-relationships. Further, from a pragmatic viewpoint, the EMP cannot remain oblivious to the threats posed by WMD. The socio-economic partnership will remain fragile as long as it does not recognize the threats that result. For example, the expansion of new export routes for oil and gas across the Maghreb, and across the Mediterranean, and the opening of new transport links between Turkey, Iran, and Central Asia with possible links to Europe, could be jeopardized as a result of the deployment of WMD. Finally, a Euro-Med approach could complement other approaches, offer fresh ideas, and provide alternatives to stalemated sub-regional frameworks.³²

In our judgment, these forms of interdependence call for a pan-Euro-Med approach, but do not necessarily mean the establishment of a pan-Euro-Med regime for the control of WMD. Whereas a pan-Euro-Med approach refers to a set of concepts and principles universally accepted by the actors as a framework for dealing with the question of WMD, a pan-Euro-Med regime means a set of institutional arrangements and operational mechanisms empowered to take specific steps to control WMD. The asymmetrical perceptions of sources of threat in the Euro-Med world, and the inter-linkages between most of the actors and extra-regional ones reduce the feasibility of a Euro-Med regime, similar to the one envisaged by the NPT or the CWC. The EMP could function as a facilitator of communication among the partners with a view of developing a set of ideas and concepts universally agreed upon, and on which sub-regional negotiations, and regimes could be based. It could also serve as the initiator of commitments to join all global regimes for the control of WMD, as a prelude to establish sub-regional ones. Finally, the EMP could take the initiative to reform present global regimes for the control of WMD so as they would become better instruments for achieving security for all.

For example, the BWC lacks a mechanism for verification of compliance. The MTCR is yet to be formalized and globalized. It is not based on a treaty or a convention, and it focuses on banning the 'transfer' of ballistic-missile technology to proscribed as well as potentially proscribed states, leaving domestic manufacture of such technology outside its scope. No wonder the MTCR is the only global regime accepted by Israel as it denies missile technology to its rivals, but retains its own.

A New Euro-Med Agenda for Action

Euro-Med approaches to the issue of WMD must be based on the premise of achieving security for all through a strategy of equilibrium and linkages. Given the present disequilibrium, and the hegemonic tendencies the latter has already brought into the Middle East, we believe that the starting point in this strategy is the role of the European Union. The EU is the initiator and most powerful partner in the EMP. Under conditions of strategic disequilibrium, the role of the EU is crucial in setting precedents for the control of WMD and persuading other WMD hegemonies to do likewise. A credible and effective EU role could proceed along four main lines of action, namely:

- a conceptual adjustment of the strategies of non-proliferation and confidence-building measures (CBMs);
- an active pursuit of a strategy of global nuclear disarmament under the NPT regime;
- an active role in the peace processes in different regions in the EMP;
- and a positive engagement in providing security guarantees to non-EU partners after the removal of their WMD.

The most crucial element in the EU role is a conceptual one. The strategy of non-proliferation needs to be placed within the wider framework of strategic equilibrium. A strategy of non-proliferation (or counter-proliferation as advocated by Les Aspin, former United States Secretary of Defense in 1993) could result in disequilibrium and instability. In this case, the strategy would be counter-productive. The EU can pursue a strategy of non-proliferation to the extent it would not jeopardize regional equilibrium or reinforce present forms of disequilibrium. Likewise, the emphasis of the EU on introducing CBMs will not necessarily help to achieve breakthroughs in the area of the control of WMD. This is essentially because the strategic requirements for the successful application of the concept of CBMs in Europe when it was introduced in the 1970s, are not present in other areas of the Mediterranean. Europe started applying the concept of CBMs when it reached a point of strategic equilibrium with the Soviet Union and all parties had agreed on the stabilization of present borders. Both conditions do not exist in other regions, especially in the Middle East. These regions are characterized by strategic disequilibrium and acute territorial claims. Being a *status quo*-oriented concept, at least in its early versions, CBMs will result in the reinforcement of present forms of disequilibrium rather than rectifying them. However, this does not necessarily mean that we should abandon the concept of CBMs in approaching the question of WMD. Rather, the concept should be

adapted to the requirements of an effective control of these weapons.³³

The second main dimension in the EU role is the initiation of specific steps towards reducing the present stockpiles of WMD in Europe with a view to their ultimate removal. We have seen that the European powers have vowed to keep their nuclear weapons because new threats have developed. We are not sure whether the handling of these new threats requires a nuclear deterrent, but we are sure that, with this logic, there is no way the EU can convince others of the importance of giving up their WMD or refraining from developing them unless the EU itself makes moves towards the global delegitimization of WMD. An Egyptian scholar has taken issue with this approach arguing that 'if nuclear weapons play an important role in preventing war ... why could this inexorable logic not apply between other regional nuclear powers?'³⁴ It is important for the EU to take operational steps toward implementing British and French commitments under the article 6 of the NPT. According to this article 'each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'.

During the 1990s, NATO took major steps towards the reduction of the nuclear arsenal in Europe. The overall NATO stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe has been reduced to about one-fifth of the level of the 1990 stockpile, and it has already been decided, under the START II Treaty signed in 1993, that multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles will be eliminated and strategic nuclear stockpiles will be reduced by two-thirds. These are extremely positive steps towards creating a safer Europe and convincing others to do likewise. However, considerable nuclear weapons still remain in Europe and in the hands of the Americans and Russians, whilst the nuclear powers in Europe are determined to retain these weapons. We believe that the EU would better serve the cause of the Euro-Med security if it called for the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers to begin the process of the de-legitimization and elimination of nuclear weapons. This would provide a powerful stimulus to the process of eliminating WMD from the EMP.

The third dimension of the proposed role for the EU is its active involvement in promoting the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Turkish-Greek conflict - although the latter already seems on the way towards resolution. Such involvement will alter the way in which the elements of security are perceived and managed by regional actors, especially in relationship with the utility of WMD. Furthermore, in parallel with these processes, which are expected to be long-term in nature, the EU should be prepared to provide negative and

positive security guarantees to non-European partners once they endorse the principle of the elimination of their WMD. So far, the nuclear powers have been reluctant to give positive security assurances, because some of the most obvious states against which the assurances will have to be given are allies.³⁵

In the Middle East, the power politics paradigm is still alive and well. Forces of strategic disequilibrium are constraining any serious move on the question of WMD. Without an active European role, Middle Eastern actors are not likely to engage in serious negotiation. In this respect, there are three possible options which could be considered by the negotiating actors, all of which satisfy the criteria of equilibrium and security for all.

- (1) The first option is an agreement among Arabs, Turks, and Israelis on the elimination of WMD without undue delay and before reaching final settlements of the outstanding issues between them. The parties would join all global regimes for the control of WMD and destroy existing stockpiles of WMD under Euro-Med supervision. NATO will provide security guarantees for non-NATO members. In the meantime, political negotiations will proceed between Arabs and Israelis, and between Arabs and Turks to reach political agreements with active EU participation.
- (2) The second option is an agreement between the same actors to eliminate their WMD within the framework of peace settlements. In this case, no actor will be required to join any global regime for the control of WMD until peace agreements have been reached and implemented. The Arabs will not be asked to join the CWC, and the Israelis will not be persuaded to accede to the NPT. Political negotiations will proceed in earnest and the final status of WMD will be entrenched into the peace agreements and implemented in parallel to these agreements. The EU will also halt its differential treatment of various Euro-Med actors regarding their access to WMD, until peace agreements are reached.
- (3) The final option is that the parties will postpone the removal of WMD until after peace agreements have been reached, secured, and solidified. The parties will not begin negotiations until after the peace agreements. They will reach an agreement on the removal of their WMD to be implemented at a later date in a specified time frame.

Within these options the accession of all the parties to the global regimes could be supplemented with sub-regional verification regimes, and the EU or NATO could provide security guarantees once the final status of the territorial issues has been decided. Further, the crucial linkages between arms transfers and the local production of arms, and between WMD and conventional weapons should be firmly secured. Combinations of these options are also

feasible provided that they create balanced commitments and power relationships.

Although we advocate the immediate removal of WMD from the Middle East through the pursuit of the first option, we believe that the second option is more practical, given the present Syrian and Israeli approaches. Israel and Syria are not likely to accept the reduction or removal of their WMD as long as the present political impasse persists. Once genuine momentum is restored to the Middle East peace process, the parties will be in a better position to talk seriously about their WMD. Until such a time, it would not be feasible to ask the Syrians to accede to the CWC and destroy their non-nuclear WMD without asking the Israelis to accede to the NPT and eliminate their nuclear weapons as well. However, we believe that Israel's accession to the NPT would provide a strong CBM in the Middle Eastern context. Such a measure would put Israel on a par with the Arabs as far as the NPT is concerned. It would not jeopardize Israel's security as it would not be required to destroy its nuclear arsenal, but only to cease the production of nuclear bombs. However it would drastically change the context of Arab-Israeli relations, and create a better environment for engaging in serious negotiations on the issues of the occupied territories and WMD. Egypt has recently joined the Pelindaba Treaty which declares Africa to be a nuclear-free zone – and Israel should reciprocate by joining the NPT.

Conclusion

Despite the forces of globalization and interdependence, and the reduction of the European nuclear arsenal, the EMP is a prime arena for the stockpiling and deployment of WMD. Euro-Med actors still view these weapons as an ultimate security guarantee, and whoever develops them first strives to prevent others from pursuing a similar course of action. However, the actors pledged in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration to incorporate the question of WMD into the Euro-Med projected security arrangements through a strategy of non-proliferation and establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

In this comment, we have attempted to present policy recommendations and scenarios for dealing with the issue of WMD in the Euro-Med world. We have argued that controlling WMD in this universe confronts certain formidable problems, such as the diversity of regional sub-systems, the geographical and functional connections between the Euro-Med universe and adjacent regions, the strategic disequilibrium which characterizes the EMP, and the basic disagreements among the parties on virtually all the issues involved. These problems make the issue of WMD in the EMP unique. Because there are no historical models to draw upon, we have to begin by identifying a policy framework from which certain strategies could be drawn.

We have argued that a viable approach for the control of WMD is one based on two main postulates: (i) achieving security for all the conflicting parties by preventing them from using or threatening to use WMD; and (ii) acknowledging the conditions under which WMD are more or less likely to be used or considered as a viable option. Our review of the literature has shown that WMD are likely to be used or perceived as a useful instrument of coercion if power relations are characterized by strategic disequilibrium in the area of WMD, and in relationship with major political issues. We have concluded that a strategy which brings about equilibrium is more likely to achieve the objectives of stability and peace. A strategy of equilibrium has two main implications for the control of WMD, namely: (i) the assessment of the strategies of non-proliferation and CBMs from the perspective of their impact on regional equilibrium; and (ii) approaching the question of the control of WMD from the wider framework of the linkages between different elements involved – such as the linkages between different forms of WMD, between WMD and conventional weapons, between arms transfers and local production of WMD, between the Euro-Med universe and adjacent regions, and between the issue of WMD and the peace processes. The acknowledgment of these linkages and their overall impact on strategic equilibrium will have a heuristic value in identifying priorities and feasible courses of action.

At the policy level, we have argued that the EU is in a position to set the Euro-Med agenda in the direction of controlling WMD with a view to their total removal. Given a strategy of equilibrium, especially between the non-European partners in the EMP, the EU could then proceed towards the conceptual adjustment of the strategies of non-proliferation and CBMs, the active pursuit of global nuclear disarmament under the NPT regime, the activation of the Euro-Med peace processes, and the positive engagement in regional security guarantees. At the Middle Eastern level, we have suggested three policy options, all postulated on the concepts of equilibrium and linkages. We have advocated the option of removing all WMD from the Middle East within the framework of peace settlements between Arabs, Israelis, and Turks. Until such time, the major thrust of any EU approach would be to guarantee stability through a strategy of equilibrium, which would mean that all regional powers will maintain similar relationships with global regimes for the control of WMD.

NOTES

1. For a review of British and French strategic nuclear forces, see IISS, *The Military Balance 1996/97*, London: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.53, 73–5.

The Barcelona Process

2. For a review of Israel's nuclear capabilities, see S.H. Hersh, *The Samson Option*, London: Faber & Faber, 1991.
3. Leonard Spector, 'Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: The Next Chapter Begins', in E. Karsh, M. Navias and P. Sabin (eds.), *Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp.145-8.
4. SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1992, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp.161-2; SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1994, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.316; J. Robinson, 'Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East,' in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., pp.69-98.
5. W. Burrows and R. Windrem, *Critical Mass*, New York: 1994, asserted that 'although Washington denied Israel off-the-shelter nuclear weapons, it did almost everything else possible to ensure that the Israelis developed exactly what they needed', p.309.
6. Before that, it was known that Israel was the only power with actual nuclear capabilities. However, the USA and Israel rejected the Egyptian request to put the issue on the agenda of the Camp David negotiations in the Middle East in 1978; see W. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986, pp.356-60.
7. The Bush proposal excluded Turkey from the geographical domain of its projected arms control regime, which means that Turkey would be permitted to keep any WMD it might have. As a result, it would enjoy a position of superiority in relationship with Syria and Iraq, countries which have considerable disagreements with Turkey.
8. *Facts on File World News Digest*, 1991, pp. 390-391, and SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1992, op. cit., pp.161-7.
9. Avner Cohen, *Towards a New Middle East: Re-thinking the Nuclear Question*, Abu-Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996, p.46 (in Arabic).
10. For a review of the Israeli approach, see Interview with Isaac Rabin, *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 13 July 1994; Eytan Bentsur, 'Israel's Vision on the Goals and Principles of the Regional Security and Arms Control Process', in Fred Tanner (ed.), *Arms Control, Confidence Building and Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East*, Valletta: University of Malta, 1994, pp.69-75; Savita Bande, 'Israel and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime', *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), 15/4, April 1993, pp.147-60.
11. Speech by Foreign Minister Amr Moussa at the NPT Review Conference on 20 April 1995, *Al-Ahram*, 21 April 1995; Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Egypt and the Middle Eastern Nuclear Issue', *Strategic Analysis*, 18/10, Jan. 1996, pp.1381-98; Hossam Aly, 'Prospects for Arms Control in the Middle East: A View from Egypt,' in T. Couloumbis and T. Dokou (eds.), *Arms Control and Security in the Middle East and the CIS Republics*, Athens: The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995, pp.165-80. For a review of the Arab and Israeli approaches, see Gerald Steinberg, 'Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security', *Survival*, 36/1, Sept. 1994, pp.126-41.
12. Mohammed Diab, 'Regional Arms Control in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Syrian Viewpoint', *Review of Palestinian Studies (Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filistinyia)*, 18, Spring 1994, pp38-52 (in Arabic).
13. See the 'London Declaration', *Survival*, Sept.-Oct. 1990, pp.469-72.
14. *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, Oct. 1995, pp.41-2.
15. M. Bundy, W. Crowe Jr. and S. Drell, 'Reducing Nuclear Danger', *Foreign Affairs*, 73/2, Spring 1993, p.141.
16. Yezid Sayigh, 'Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., pp.179-80, 190-91. This view was also advocated by two Egyptian former Generals: Mamdouh Atiyya, and S. Selim, *Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Contemporary World*, Kuwait: Soad al-Sabbah Publishing House, 1992, pp.11-51 (in Arabic).
17. Kenneth Waltz, 'Towards Nuclear Peace', in D. Brite, M. Intriligator and A. Wick (eds.), *Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation*, Lexington, DC: Heath, 1983, pp.132-3.
18. Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security Beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2000*, London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1991, p.177.
19. G. Segal et al., *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace*, London: Macmillan Press, 1988, p.155.
20. Cohen, op. cit., p.19.

A New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

21. Philip Sabin, 'Restraints on Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons: Some Lessons from History', in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., p.13.
22. Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp.71-83.
23. Adel Safty, 'Proliferation, Balance of Power, and Nuclear Deterrence: Should Egypt Pursue a Nuclear Option?', *International Studies* (New Delhi), 33/1, 1996, p.32.
24. Quoted in Khalil Shikaki, 'The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and Egypt', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14/10, Summer 1985, pp.77-91.
25. Wiesner B. Jerome et al., 'Ending Overkill', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1993, pp.12-23.
26. Uri Bar Joseph, 'The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 5/2, June 1982, pp.210-22.
27. Some analysts have argued that 'deterrence stability will be strengthened by proliferation': G. Quester, 'Nuclear Proliferation and Stability' in Brite, Intriligator and Wick, op. cit., p.115. A former Egyptian General has also suggested that one option for the Middle Eastern states is to possess a specific numbers of non-conventional weapons by permission. Quoted in Sayigh, op. cit., p.198.
28. S. Neuman, 'Controlling the Arms Trade: Prospects for the Future', in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., p.279.
29. Quoted in Barbara Tuchman, *The Alternative to Arms Control*, Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Studies, University of California, 1982, p.13.
30. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Reconceptualizing the Arms Control Process in the Middle East: Towards a New Framework', *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), 49/4, Oct. 1996, p.29.
31. This linkage was advocated by Sabin when he argued that 'the ideal outcome remains NBC disarmament as part of the Middle East peace process', Sabin, op. cit., p.30. It was also recommended by Hans Blakes, Director-General of IAEA. He maintained that any peace agreement in the Middle East must include a clause on nuclear disarmament: interview with *Al-Ahram*, 27 July 1994. A former Egyptian General also maintained that arms control in the Middle East without a peace settlement will be counter-productive. Othman Kamel, 'Arms Control in the Middle East', in *Challenges to the Arab World under the Global Transformations*, Paris: Center for Euro-Arab Studies, 1994, p.309 (in Arabic). On the other hand, Kemp advocated de-linking the peace process from the process of eliminating WMD in the Middle East. He argued that 'once there is peace between Israel and its neighbors, it will become much more practical to discuss regimes to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their means of production': J. Kemp, 'Arms Control and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,' in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., p.258.
32. Our arguments for a Euro-Med approach draw upon Ian Lesser's valuable paper, *New Dimensions of Mediterranean Security*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996 (mimeo).
33. W. Hopkinson suggested that a 'dose of confidence and security-building measures, which might be the precursor of weightier developments, would be welcome': 'Arms Control and Supplier Restraints: A UK View,' in Karsh, Navias and Sabin, op. cit., p.238. Kemp also argued that Israel should unilaterally open its Dimona nuclear reactor to inspection in return for Arab commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. He considered this to be a confidence-building measure: Kemp, *ibid.*, p.250. Kemp's suggestion results in keeping Israel as the only nuclear power as it does not deal with the Israeli nuclear bombs in the basement.
34. Safty, op. cit., p.23.
35. SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1994, op. cit., p.613.