

## PART III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to address the problems and needs of fragile situations. These range from political instruments to crisis management instruments, from Justice and Home Affairs instruments to military capabilities, from trade cooperation to humanitarian aid and development. The objective of this study is *to suggest ways to bring these instruments and the existing policy commitments together into an integrated and comprehensive framework to address fragility and promote structural stability*. It is not to formulate a new policy on fragile situations and difficult environments.

The report recommends ways to make better use of, and adapt existing policies and instruments and improve the process of assessment and policy analysis, prioritisation and strategy design, programming, implementation and dialogue. The objective is to contribute to an improved EU response strategy that can be supported by partners, especially regarding the security/development/governance nexus of EU external policy and action.

The study is deliberately focused on political and strategic issues, although some references are made to more technical aspects of financial and aid instruments. The conclusions and recommendations propose a quite ambitious EU strategy, particularly in light of the challenges of implementation, and particularly as far as well-informed and participative analysis of each context, combined use of assessment tools, coordination, policy coherence and WoG approaches are concerned. Capacity issues and operational and political constraints are an almost constant refrain, and some proposals to address these are made.

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The recommendations are divided in *three parts*:

3.1. *General Recommendations* on approaches to fragility, including:

- The use of the 'fragility' concept to promote stronger and better engagement
- The need to stay engaged, but differently, by addressing structural causes and conflict risks
- The promotion of Democracy, Governance and State-building
- Adopting international principles and working more with others

3.2. *Policy and Operational Recommendations* on how the EU should improve processes of:

- Policy Analysis and Assessments
- Priorisation and Strategy Design
- Programming and Implementation

3.3. *Specific Recommendations on the Security-Governance-Development Nexus*

### 3.1. 'Handle Fragility with Care'. General Recommendations

The EU strategy should be based in the following *general conclusions*:

- > There is no consensus on the *concept* of 'fragile states' – neither on the terminology nor in the substance. An intense dialogue is needed with partner countries on issues of fragility and of adequate cooperative responses. Political sensitivities require the careful use of terminology. This should not lead to a situation where facts and trends as well as established interrelations would be kept out of the debate.
- > In contrast to the strategic importance and political relevance given to State fragility and failure in world politics, *statistical facts* point to a decrease of aid to these countries, as well

as complete withdrawal of donors in some cases, frequently unpredictable aid allocations and either a concentration of aid on a few of these states – leaving many fragile 'aid orphans'. Furthermore, about half of the aid that they do receive is targeted to debt relief and humanitarian assistance.

- > The contexts of fragile situations and difficult environments are *substantially and qualitatively different* from other developing countries and have unique features that require new policy responses and approaches.
- > The concept is broad and entails very different situations within the 'fragility spectrum' (weak/fragile, failed and collapsed states). These require *differentiated and incremental approaches*. The difference between a state's capacity/ability and willing/legitimacy issues is also important in order to distinguish between fragile states with weak capacity and difficult partnerships/unwilling states, thus requiring differentiated approaches.
- > Each fragile State is *complex* and its particular problems are *unique*, which presents difficult policy challenges for donor approaches. Each donor strategy must entail a profound political and social analysis of each specific context.
- > Common to most concepts and approaches to address State fragility is the mutually reinforcing nature of *poverty and State failure*, entailing a *higher risk of instability and violent conflict*, and the issue of a State being incapable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its population. Yet, the *profound causes of State failure are still overlooked in donor policies and early action is hardly ever the donor way* to tackle it.
- > The '*conflict-cycle*' terminology is *misleading* and does not reflect the reality of situations on the ground where multiple stages may be present at once.
- > Democratic governance that prioritises the holding of elections or the existence of 'acceptable governance' may not be the best entry point to prevent situations of fragility. Other elements, like a government's commitment to good economic governance and accountability for the well-being of its people, are often disregarded as a valid yardstick for donor assistance. Elections can be helpful in reducing conflict. If they are rigged, conducted at the very early stages of post-conflict transition, or attract a low turnout, they can be ineffective or even harmful to stability and should, therefore, be regarded as part of a much broader '*democracy-building*' approach.
- > Most lessons learned point to the crucial importance of *state-building* in fragile situations under *local ownership*. Technical assistance and other capacity-building efforts are more successful when they support activities within a nationally defined and nationally owned programme. Institutional support needs long-term engagement and a shift from purely technical solutions supported by individual champions of reform to a multi-donor approach that address the state-society relationships and the political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform. Moreover, not all governance concerns need or can be addressed at the same time: support for targeted reform that does not overwhelm governments with unrealistic demands has proven to be more effective.

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### **1. Use the 'fragility' concept to promote stronger and better engagement**

- The EU should stress that the utility of the 'fragility' concept is to identify the most difficult situations in order to *increase EU attention and engagement, as well as to be able to better*

*respond to their specific problems.* The concept is useful as a way to promote more active engagement and serious attention to these situations.

- The EU should make a strong statement on the *need to engage in fragile situations*, based on moral, legal, development and security arguments.
- In the context of international commitments towards the increase of ODA, the EU strategy should include a strong commitment to raise funds *targeted to development and long-term actions* in countries that face situations of fragility or are conflict-prone or conflict-affected.
- A *sustained and consistent* commitment of financial resources is necessary. There needs to be the flexibility to adapt support according to the evolving capacity of the partner government. Avoid 'stop-and-go' financial decisions based on government short-term performance; avoid imposing conditionalities linked to past performance on governance; and integrate 'fragility' into aid allocation criteria.
- The EU should discuss *development aid allocation criteria* to fragile situations in a similar way to what was already agreed on humanitarian aid (in the framework of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative).
- Acknowledge the existence of a fragility spectrum that requires differentiated responses. *Distinguish between situations* where there is a lack of political commitment (difficult environments) or weak capacity (situations of fragility), or both, with the necessary policy implications.
- Use this terminology carefully. A *working definition* can be "Situations of fragility and difficult environments are those where the State is unable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including security and basic public services, and where the mechanisms within the political system to manage change and inclusion without resort to violence are insufficient or inadequate, therefore entailing a higher risk of instability".
- To promote participation and ownership, the EU must *start a dialogue with partner countries* on the concept of fragility and agree on steps forward. This means moving from a donor-driven perspective to *jointly owned agendas and processes*.

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## **2. Stay engaged, but act differently: address structural causes and conflict risks**

- Prioritise activities that address the *structural causes of fragility*, taking account of the variety of situations that this definition entails.
- Combine responses to short and long-term needs in a *simultaneous* timeframe, with particular attention to timings and flexibility. Disregard the conflict cycle and promote 'joined-up' responses that avoid sequential approaches and combine all policy tools in a coherent package.
- Move from an approach based on precise expected results to a *framework or process approach*, based on a general goal to be achieved and more focused on the dynamics of the process itself. Isolated actions or programmes such as elections holding, DDR or SSR have to be a part of a broader, comprehensive strategy towards state-building, stability and development.
- Develop a *sound political analysis* of the sources of fragility and of the impact of the policies and politics of external actors (regional and international). This will help to create a clear understanding of the root causes and dynamics of the problem. Involve MS, EC Delegations, State and NSAs in the country and region concerned as well as local and international experts, academics, think tanks, and appropriate policy makers with expertise on the country or region.

- *Align* activities with the partner country's plans and procedures and work through its systems, institutions and staff as soon and as much as possible. This avoids creating parallel structures and further undermining the State capacity. Where alignment is not possible, 'shadow alignment' could be an option.
- Move beyond the 'no harm' approach, by investing in *proactive, early and preventive* engagement
- Link *conflict prevention* with fragile situations at strategic, policy and operational levels. An effective strategy must start with an effective EU strategy and capacity to implement conflict prevention. Much, although not all, of what can be said to improve EU action in situations of fragility is valid to improve EU conflict prevention policy. One way to operationalise this is to implement preventive strategies for fragile states. This requires clear guidance on how the different policy instruments will work together to address instability (as was already suggested in the 2001 Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict adopted in Göteborg)
- Implement development cooperation actions that are *conflict-sensitive*; include *conflict analysis* in all policies towards these countries.

### **3. Promote Democracy, Governance and State-building**

- Building a State that can maintain security and provide for the needs of its people should be the *central focus* of EU engagement in fragile situations and difficult environments. The EU should recognise that all its activities have implications for long-term state-building.
- The EU approach to '*democracy-building*' requires various approaches. Any electoral funding should be embedded in a wider governance or state-building programme. EU engagement should also not depend exclusively on the establishment of electoral democracy, but rather focus on the promotion of a culture of democratic politics across a wide range of actors.
- EU state-building actions must have *realistic goals*. This implies:
  - > Basing capacity-building and governance initiatives on a stronger and profound understanding of the local context (including power, state-society interactions, role of different forces, etc);
  - > Using political dialogue mechanisms to create openings for reforms;
  - > Paying careful attention to prioritising and sequencing of interventions – including governance reforms – with clear benchmarks or timelines for completion of the tasks needed in a state-building process, while maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable in fragile contexts;
  - > Promoting an approach that goes beyond technical solutions to include political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform.
- A key objective of state-building is to *strengthen national capacities*. Technical assistance personnel should be combined with other ways of building capacities such as on-the-job training, exchanges and structural and attitudinal changes. State-building activities should take into account the partner country's own mechanisms, organisational and institutional culture, rather than focusing on western institutional models. It is preferable to begin such programmes with no preconceptions about the 'right' types of institutions. Compliance with a vast range of universal human rights can be combined with respect for local ownership and traditions. The EU approach should promote *linkages* between high-level political processes and grass roots democracy-building measures.

- The EU must ensure that the principles established in the 2006 EC Communication on Governance have a practical implementation at field level by mainstreaming them into cooperation programmes. *Multi-levels of political dialogue* can provide for effective means to engage with fragile situations: the EU engagement at a national, regional and continental level in Africa illustrates such approaches.

#### 4. Adopt international principles and work more with others

- Development programmes in fragile situations should conform to the same principles governing development programming anywhere – ownership, partnership, mutual accountability, sustainability, etc.
- EU support and approaches towards situations of fragility and difficult environments must be informed by *international rules of engagement and agreed principles*, promoting coordination of strategies and consensus between donors. The EU should:
  - > Adopt DAC principles as a basis for its engagement, with special attention to (i) establishing clear objectives for the agreed principles, namely that they should contribute to poverty reduction; (ii) debating the principles with partner countries to jointly select the most relevant and adapt them to specific local realities; (iii) actively implement the most relevant principles in EU programming; (iv) expanding the principles to work in broader sectors, such as trade and environment; (v) integrating regional approaches and supporting existing regional and continental structures to address fragile situations.
  - > Implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness also in fragile situations, focusing on the central aim of state-building.
- The EU approach should seek strategically to *work with others*, by:
  - > Strengthening multilateral responses through a reinforced collaboration with the UN;
  - > Cooperating closely with the private sector, including helping to create conditions in which partner countries can attract greater flows of beneficial inward investment;
  - > Strengthening support for progressive elements within civil society;
  - > Reinforcing continental and regional organisations that can influence the partner country's stability and development;
  - > Conceptualising, organising and prioritising policy responses accordingly with the existing partner countries/organisations frameworks (e.g. AU PCRD, APRM, etc);
  - > Increasingly work with regional neighbours to engage together with a fragile country, namely by promoting joint regional approaches;
  - > Including cooperation in tackling fragile contexts as an item in dialogues with middle-income partners and 'emerging' donors, such as China, India and South Africa.

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### 3.2. Operationalising the Concept

Discussing conflict prevention, the recent DAC peer review of the Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of the European Community notes that there are no means to feed lessons into the programming process (knowledge-sharing processes need improvement), no systematic application of conflict sensitivity and prevention in CSPs (the programming process should make more systematic use of conflict analysis), and an overlap of units – in Relex, Dev, Aidco – dealing with this issue and no horizontal regular involvement of these units (some ra-

tionalisation is needed to better provide inputs to delegations). The same can be applied to the EU's approach to fragile situations and difficult environments.

Across the whole policy process, *human resources quality and capacity needs to be developed at all levels* – in the field, in Brussels, as well as in MS capitals – and in the various areas of the strategic, planning and implementation process.

*General Operational Recommendations:*

### **1. Policy Analysis and Assessments**

- EU strategies and policies to address fragile situations must be grounded in an *ongoing systematic process* of risk assessment and monitoring capable of identifying countries at risk of impending crisis.
- The assessment should establish baselines, set out indicators, and provide both quantitative and qualitative information for an adequate assessment of causes and impact of fragility as well as *progress*.
- The EU should identify which of its various assessment tools can be merged into a single *EC-wide exercise* that can also feed into an *EU-wide exercise* to assess causes of fragility with a strong conflict prevention focus. Such exercises would contribute to a common understanding of the situation, needs and priorities, and promote joined up efforts across the EU and other actors.
- That assessment should draw on the *widest range of possible sources of instability* (including political, economic, social and external factors, including vulnerability to natural disasters/climate change).
- The EU assessments should provide information, analysis and guidance on *key changes and reforms* that are needed, mapping actors and stakeholders, identifying suitable interventions as well as progress and evaluation milestones and indicators, and guarantee that action is taken as a result of the analysis.
- It should be a *joint EC, Council and MS effort*, requiring a more systematic and improved sharing of information within the EC, with the Council and with MS.
- It implies *strengthened EU capacities* in Brussels and in Delegations to be able to provide quality assessment based on participatory processes, engaging different stakeholders in multi-actor processes on the ground.
- Any EU assessment of fragile situations should be elaborated with *strong participation of the partner country*, namely through dialogue with the government, civil society and others (e.g. Parliaments, local authorities, local experts, independent researchers, etc). Where 'self-assessments' exist, these should be one of the main bases for EU analysis.
- The *CSPs/RSPs*, if adapted to some of those requirements, could become effective assessment and programming tools, namely by including additional indicators that monitor the causes of instability and the qualitative evolution of context relevant political and economic trends. *Ownership* of CSPs/RSPs is an important existing feature of these tools, ownership should also be sought beyond 'official' stakeholders.
- Following joint and participatory assessment of the CSPs/RSPs, the *Council's preventive strategies* could become a more effective tool for early action.
- EU *early-warning mechanisms* should improve their links with other international organizations and their early-warning mechanisms as well as with local and regional mechanisms. The EU should support the latter in building up their capacity and developing their own compatible assessment and monitoring tools.

## 2 Prioritisation and strategy design

- *Use differentiated approaches.* Disaggregate EU approaches to fragile situations through targeted strategies for different phases of the 'fragility spectrum' (weak, failed, collapsed; conflict situations) and for different kinds of weaknesses (economic, military and political).
- *Think regionally.* This means both elaborating regional strategies and working with regions to jointly address the problems of countries that are fragile or conflict-affected. It also implies investing in long-term support strategies (e.g. the APF has been crucial to plugging a short-term gap, but is not enough for long-term needs) that can reinforce the capacities of regional and SROs.
- Give EC delegations a *political mandate* and clear guidelines on how to move forward on key issues and on a case-by-case basis. Establish effective communication and dialogue mechanisms between the Delegations/EC geographic desks and the relevant Council working groups. A possible solution could be to '*double hat*' the Delegation Heads with a joint EC and Council mandate. The effectiveness of a 'double hatted' role goes beyond the legal aspects of the Delegations; it requires effective *backing* by the whole EU, including the Institutions and MS.
- *Select, prioritise and sequence capacity-building actions and reforms:* While all governance concerns can be addressed at the same time, the EU should not overwhelm fragile governments with a wide range of simultaneous demands. It is important to be realistic on what is possible to achieve in a fragile context. Facing a wide range of capacity problems, the EU has to be clear on selectivity (which agencies or institutions to target), priority (which capacity issues and reforms are most urgent) and sequencing questions (what is the most suitable process of reforms).
- *Rely, as much as possible, on home-grown processes.* EU approaches should build on existing structures in the partner country, take account of local dynamics and existing organisational and institutional frameworks, make use of any existing mechanisms for conflict management (formal and informal), and seek to follow local priorities and other features that can promote ownership.
- *Make better use of political dialogue.* There is much scope to make better use of the several actors involved in political dialogue and preventative diplomacy, namely by empowering those EU/EC institutional actors best placed to engage effectively in dialogue on the ground (e.g. Special Representatives, double-hatted Delegation Heads).

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## 3 Programming and Implementation

- *Adopt special programming rules for situations of fragility.* Greater flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances will be needed to match the evolving capacity and willingness of the government to address certain issues or areas of engagement where other donors are active or where NSAs are filling gaps. This will help avoid 'aid darlings' or 'aid orphans' or an excessive concentration in one specific sector or area of support.
- *Reinforce Policy Coherence* within the EU approach, by:
  - > Selecting the most relevant policy coherence areas in fragile situations and difficult environments (e.g. security, trade or migration, are clearly more relevant than 'transport' or 'information society') and pursuing stronger linkages between them.
  - > Give special attention to diplomacy, security, private investment and trade in fragile situa-

tions, by addressing the development and stability impacts of these actions. Simultaneously, provide sufficient aid to make these other instruments effective.

- > Within the EU, draw on the skills, perspective and expertise of each institution and department.
- *Engage in joint programming with MS.* The EDF may prove to be an advantage in this sense as MS already participate in the decision-making of aid allocation.
- Promote implementation of The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and *Division of Labour* in Development Policy. Create *incentives* for those who engage in greater coherence is one way to actively promote the division of labour.
- *Prefer aid instruments that promote local ownership and accountability.* Social Funds, Joint programmes with multi-donor trust funds, and Budget Support are useful tools but their utility should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Support should follow a step-by-step approach, gradually laying down more stringent indicators for budget support e.g. commitment and progress on financial management reforms, justice system and SSR, good governance and peace consolidation measures, or government investment in service delivery.
- Promote *consistency* in strategy design and programming, by:
  - > Combining short-term rehabilitation, security sector reform and other priority actions with long-term development assistance within a single package.
  - > Drawing on the experience of several types of actors. Promote dialogue and assessments with active collaboration of partner country governments and civil society actors. Also assess the role of other donors to promote better coordination and coherence. In difficult partnerships, it is important to identify moderate and reform-oriented interlocutors and interact with them during the formulation of the country strategies and programmes.
- Include *conflict-sensitivity criteria* in all areas of engagement, including poverty reduction papers and programmes, macroeconomic policy advice, fiscal policy, public expenditure reforms, and others. Mainstream *cross-cutting issues, lessons learned and monitoring/impact assessments* into programming.
- *Articulate and link financial instruments and funding regulations.* There should be provisions in the financial regulations to link funding and the timing of funding decisions across the pillar structure, for instance in situations where one financial instruments cannot fund all the aspects of a programme. This could contribute and further support efforts to bridge the institutional divide, allow for timely sequenced activities and promote integrated approaches.

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### **3.3. Enhance the Security-Governance-Development Nexus**

The security-development nexus is *particularly important in fragile contexts*, where security actions are unlikely to be short-term interventions. Tasks like the formation of a capable army, reform of the security sector, or reinforcement of law and order (e.g. justice, police) are likely to take several months or even years. These actions are part of an incremental process to promote structural stability and are, therefore, linked to political, economic and societal factors, and thus to development work.

The main objective is to inform a more constructive approach in which development and security communities work together more often and in a more integrated manner, at strategic, policy and operational levels.

The EU increasingly takes account of the security-development-governance nexus through its policy statements, strategies and concepts, and action plans and codes of conduct. These generally result from joint Council and Commission work. Such joint strategies and concepts are a step in the right direction to promote integrated approaches and greater policy coherence and coordination within EU institutions and with MS. It is also a good dialogue tool to coordinate with other donors. However, as the EU often underlines and knows well by experience, *ownership* of any strategy or programme is fundamental to sustainable positive achievements.

This is particularly important regarding governance issues. While many causes can trigger State failure and fragility, 'bad' governance is often at the heart of the problem, both as a direct cause or as an amplifier of other weaknesses. Without *shared understanding and agreement* on governance principles and objectives among the various EU actors, and a constructive and gradual approach towards upholding governance in a partner country – based on local specificities and locally owned initiatives or structures – the governance agenda is likely to be perceived as another form of conditionality. It may threaten the success of development, political and security efforts. Likewise, donors and domestic actors need to agree how to prioritise and sequence interventions (including governance reforms) while maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable in fragile situations and difficult environments.

Linking security and development is particularly difficult due to a set of institutional constraints (the pillar structure), discrepancy of mandates, variance in time horizons of missions, and the suspicion with which some parts of the development and security communities regard each other. Thus, little progress has been made towards proper integration of military and development objectives and methods within EU strategies and actions. Among the key *conditions* for a positive and cooperative relationship is clarity of mandates and rules of engagement, openness and collaborative efforts to tackle problems and situations of common interest, quality of human resources, and good communication skills on both sides that can strengthen dialogue, sharing of knowledge and understanding of the each other roles and constraints.

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#### *Strategic Recommendations:*

- Ground EU responses in a *multidimensional approach* that combines instruments from different policy areas. The EU strategy can be distinctive by being based in a *human security* approach, focusing on protecting the safety and livelihoods of individuals. This has greater potential to address the new challenges posed by fragility as it combines security, conflict prevention and development in holistic principles.
- Promote a *more integrated and common understanding* of how security and development work together, translating this into practical implementation by agreeing on a set of *guidelines* at the EU level to bring together security and development perspectives and actions.
- Inform development policy discussions with foreign policy and diplomatic/political know-how, linking the Paris declaration to *other international agendas*.
- Ensure that EU strategies and 'joint' concepts take into account the *needs and perspectives of the countries/regions concerned*, that they are informed by local strategies or policy frameworks, and ideally design them jointly so that efforts are coordinated and do support high-potential 'home-grown' initiatives.

*Operational Recommendations:*

- *Start early:* Promote good collaborative efforts in the early phases, starting with assessment and planning where qualified Commission representatives should be involved (e.g. ensure that the EC has a stronger presence and role in relevant Council working groups or committees from the very early stages, on a possible CFSP/ESDP action in a country where the EC has a long-term presence and an important role).
- *Take into account other actions, means and policies:* The planning of ESDP missions or development programmes should take into account and be planned alongside other EU actions. It must also take into consideration the engagement of other donors/actors and its own capacity to plan and deliver on engagements made. There is also a need to strike a balance between civilian and military instruments.
- *Improve short-term and long-term policy linkages, by:*
  - > Promoting joint assessments and analysis of situations of fragility, not just situations where conflict is imminent, has already erupted, or where a country is in a post-conflict situation.
  - > Investing in more and better information exchange among MS and the EU institutions, thus contributing to a common sense of priority and understanding of a situation or issue.
  - > Encouraging joint programming between the EC and MS: this puts less strain on already weak State capacities and is a greater guarantee of common understanding of the country/region situation and of joined-up action. It is particularly important that the EU programming links up with policies in support of good governance and mutual accountability (EU arms exports, corruption, organized crime, etc).
  - > Sequencing complementary financial support, to ensure effective and timely linkages between short-term and long-term activities, particularly in cross-cutting issues as DDR, SSR and LRRD, but also within EC funded programmes and activities.
  - > Link up EU early-warning mechanisms with other existing mechanisms at local, regional and international level.
- *Promote cross-institutional participation.* At Brussels level, greater coherence and complementarity could be achieved by increasing the frequency and regularising the participation of development ministers in the GAERC; encourage Trade, Development and External Relations (e.g. Africa) working groups to meet more regularly with a broader agenda; transform COARM into a forum where development objectives are also part of the discussion; ensure that ECHO knowledge and understanding of specific crisis situations is taken into account in the planning of crisis management operations by attending planning meetings at the Civil-Military Cell.
- *Improve communication/information and expertise.* Set up mechanisms to pool and disseminate information, involving staff from a wide range of different backgrounds. Deploy and train a new generation of staff with an holistic understanding of the range of developmental and security challenges and the international community's responses.
- *Increase intervention in multilateral level on this issue, by:*
  - > Starting a dialogue to elaborate some 'Governance and Security Goals' that can complement the MDGs, since these lack a strong governance/security dimension, without which development in fragile situations will be impossible to attain.
  - > Pushing in international fora (e.g. OECD-DAC) for a reconsideration of the basic premises of the aid allocation protocols – which tend to neglect the benefits of conflict prevention that

aid can facilitate – and create a non-ODA fund to facilitate funding of non-ODA activities that may foster combined security and development activities, with the final aim of promoting structural stability (e.g. training of a professional army).

- *Within Member States, promote the inclusion of security within the global development agenda of all major ministries, building on the experiences of those who are already doing it (UK, Netherlands, Nordic countries). The creation of special funds/pools dedicated to conflict prevention, post-conflict or fragile contexts, which are jointly managed by different departments within the government, can be a useful tool to combine the two approaches.*