

EU – INDONESIA: Necessary Actions

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Introduction

The magnitude and severity of the present Indonesian crisis demands more than mere emergency assistance programmes. Roughly there are three feasible scenarios:

- total anarchy and a melt-down of the social fabric of the present Indonesian republic;
- the emergence of a “strong man” who will restore ‘order and stability’ at the cost of political freedom; and thirdly,
- the present crisis may act as a catalyst to enhance the development of a more pluralistic and democratic nation-state in the Republic of Indonesia.

Admittedly, one must have an optimistic outlook to see Indonesia’s crisis as a potential “blessing in disguise” [*hikmat dalam sengsara*]. But, only optimism will mobilise the necessary forces, including ones from Europe, to change the present situation for the better, and to prevent the first two scenarios from occurring.

Notwithstanding this profound optimism, one needs to be realistic. Especially in relation to Europe’s, or more precisely to the European Union’s, external relationships; a critical assessment of its past performance vis-à-vis Indonesia (or for that matter the ASEAN countries in general) is necessary to avoid overoptimistic expectations.

Against the background of a very brief and concise critical assessment of past EU-Indonesia relations, but also based on the conviction that Europe cannot ignore its responsibility to join in the battle against the present crisis in Asia [our common future], I intend to outline some possible fields of action by the EU. These can be either as an organisation on its own, i.e. through its Commission or Parliament, or bilaterally by its member states, and also by its civil, non-governmental, organisations which should participate in, or could even take the lead, in the best interest of the people of both regions.

The fields cover a wide range of economic, political and societal aspects. For the purpose of this conference I will group them into two categories:

- A: combating the crisis, by means of (1) building up a social safety net programme, (2) by restructuring the financial and economic sectors, and (3) by strengthening the civil society and**
- B: maintaining peace and stability, by (1) diminishing the arms trade between EU member states and Indonesia and (2) by assisting in solving the East Timor conflict.**

At this stage, only a rough outline can be formulated. The discussion during the conference will hopefully provide an opportunity to further elaborate some of the suggested actions.

Our common future

Putting “the EU” alongside “Indonesia” one may immediately think of a heavily lop-sided relationship: a block of 15 countries, more or less organised by common institutions and regulations on one side, and just a single state on the other. Indeed, in many respects the

relationship between the EU and Indonesia does reflect an enormous unbalance. Politically, militarily, and economically the two cannot be compared in strength, even more so than before as a consequence of the present crisis. However, it would be too superficial, and indeed a mistake often made in the past, to view (and to assess) such a relationship in quantitative terms only. However even with such measurements, Europeans tend to ignore Indonesia's territorial size and the magnitude of its population. Being the world's 4th largest nation in terms of population [more than 200 million], Indonesia alone counts for approximately 40% of the total population of all ASEAN countries [450 m.], and has roughly half the population of the 15 EU member states together! Geographically, its surface area, laid on the map of Europe, stretches from roughly, Northern Ireland to the Ural Mountains and from Estonia to Cyprus, covering nearly all 54 European countries. These four troubled areas within Europe were purposefully selected to remind one that not only Indonesia has trouble spots within its boundaries. More importantly, Indonesia's geo-political location is of the utmost strategic importance to Japan, the USA and Australia. Therefore, a crisis in the Indonesian archipelago, as serious as the present one, is of direct importance not only for its neighbouring countries, Australia and all ASEAN member states, but also for the main actors in the Asia-Pacific Rim: Japan, USA, Canada, and China, and **thus**, indirectly, also for Europe, including the EU. Much more than the actions and reactions from within the EU so far would have one believe. For instance, the Dutch government's policy declaration of the 15th September 1998, made only a passing remark in one sentence to the crisis in Asia and its possible negative impact on the Dutch economy in 1999. This underestimation of the seriousness of the actual situation reflects the over optimism, characteristic of general opinion, until just a few weeks ago. A further deterioration and deepening of the Indonesian crisis – a scenario which may be more realistic than the rather optimistic standpoint formulated above – may trigger a global crisis resulting in a depression larger than the Great Depression of nearly 70 years ago. Since, besides being a financial and economic crisis, it is foremost a political one threatening the nation with a process of social and political disintegration that could lead to a total melt-down of the Indonesian socio-political fabric which in turn could have a dramatic global fall-out. Therefore, any attempt to combat just the financial and economic dimension of the crisis will be in vain. Also, over a longer time horizon, the crisis may result in further and faster deterioration of the environment, especially Indonesia's rainforests – part of the fast shrinking world's lungs. Hence, this may seriously endanger the future of the people of Indonesia and that of the world community at large: Our Common Future. The EU cannot afford to watch from the sidelines and let this doom-scenario happen.

The EU's ambivalent and inconsistent attitude towards Indonesia in the (recent) past

In relation to ASEAN countries, or in this case to Indonesia, the EU reacted rather late and passively in response to the monetary crisis which started with the *baht* crisis in Thailand during July 1997. This laxity fits well within the more general context of EU-ASEAN relationships, and for that matter, with Indonesia, which are predominantly economic-driven. Notwithstanding its intention to develop into a political union, as stated in the Treaty of Maastricht, November 1991¹⁾, and reconfirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, June 1997, the EU is still foremost an internal monetary and economic union. Hence, due to the fact that, from the perspective of the EU, the direct economic importance of trade with Indonesia, and even with the whole of ASEAN, is low²⁾, the EU initially left the lead to the IMF and the World Bank.

And, moreover, the EU seems to have followed their evaluation and recipes blindly instead of making its own assessment of the causes and consequences of the 'Asian Flu' as the crisis was misappropriately called until the end of 1997. The Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM, in early April this year in London was the first opportunity for the EU to address the Asian crisis seriously³⁾.

Although still relatively rather limited, the volume of trade between the two blocks has increased rapidly during the nineties and there were high expectations of further growth. Statistics show that the total exports from the EU to Indonesia have increased considerably over recent years. This was especially the case in the period from 1987 to 1995, when imports from the EU increased from US\$ 2,4 billion to US\$ 8,2 billion. Indonesia's export to the EU also shows an enormous increase from US\$ 1,5 billion in 1987 to US\$ 5,8 billion in 1994⁴⁾.

Until the 1997 crisis Indonesia was part of the phantom called the 'Asian Miracle'. As such, Europe's attitude was ambivalent: admiration for the impressive annual growth rates in the region was accompanied with a certain fear of too much competition due to low wages. In a critical assessment of EU-ASEAN relationships, the German scholars, Schumacher and Hampe (1998), point to the double standards applied by the EU, which result in a lack of legitimacy on the EU's side. They refer here to the EU's trade policy concerning its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). As the EU became confronted with a permanent trade deficit with ASEAN countries, this System, originally aimed at facilitating export from the ASEAN block, was modified by the EU in 1995, thereby transforming the original system of preferred access into a highly restrictive and protectionist trade regime. This measure resulted almost immediately in a positive trade balance with the ASEAN countries. Referring to this policy, the Philippine scholar Alfredo Robles (1998), even used the expression of "democratic deficit".

Undoubtedly, another explanation for the weak and inadequate performance of the EU, is the lack of any coherence in the EU's foreign policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam, June 1997, was intended to widen the EU's character from a mere monetary and economic union [EMU] to include political aspects, the EPU, by formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However it still appears that the sovereignty of its member states in respect of foreign affairs still overrules the European Commission and Parliament to act according to its own CFSP (Schulte Nordholt and Klein Haarhuis, 1998). Even on Europe's immediate borders, i.e. in the Balkans, the EU is incapable of acting adequately. So, one should not be too surprised that with regard to problems in a region as far away as Southeast Asia the policy statements made, and instruments developed, so far by the EU are insufficient and inadequate.

Again here, if inconsistency and a lack of coherence in the EU's foreign policy continue, the EU and its member states may rightly be accused of lacking legitimacy to deal with problems of security and peace, and political aspects such as good governance, transparency and corruption, and, in general, respect of human rights.

And precisely these issues were put high on the political agenda by the Western donor countries after the end of the Cold War. In fact the conditional linkage between development aid and these issues only entered EU documents after that event. But this linkage did not much change the EU's appreciation of ASEAN countries, and Indonesia in particular. Abuses of human rights in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, as the general public is now abundantly informed about - but on which all governments were briefed extensively when these cruelties occurred [Chomsky, 1996] - did not prevent the EU from treating Indonesia in a favoured way. Especially since the formation of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) in 1994, the EU has feared losing its position in this booming

market to the USA and Canada. Therefore, soon afterwards, in 1996, the EU met with the enlarged ASEAN Regional Forum, at the first Asia-Europe Meeting in Bangkok, which included both Japan and China, and hence excluded Taiwan. In fact, one may say that only in this forum did political issues, like good governance, anti-corruption and human rights, become formally part of the agenda next, of course, to the main purpose of dealing with each other in economic aspects (Schulte Nordholt, 1997). Although most of the Asian members, especially China, Malaysia and Indonesia, tried to prevent it, other Asian countries, like Japan, endorsed the EU pressure to deal with these issues, even including such sensitive matters as Burma's admission to the ASEAN and the East Timor conflict. During the meeting of ASEM's ministers of foreign affairs in Singapore, in March 1997, under the co-chair of the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Portugal managed to discuss the East Timor issue with Indonesia - although this was not mentioned in the Joint Declaration - without causing Indonesia to boycott the meeting, as minister Ali Alatas had threatened. Notwithstanding its economic importance, for political-psychological reasons, the ASEM platform appeared to be very fragile and complex in nature (Schulte Nordholt, 1998).

On the Asian side the conviction existed that its own specific political and societal systems, symbolised by the concept of "Asian Values", were the cause of the imposing growth rates. Contrary to values inherent to Western liberal economic and democratic systems, the Asian countries, or more precisely their ruling elites, were convinced that there was no relationship between economic growth and human rights, including the rights of freedom of expression and organisation, such as a free press and independent labour unions. The most vocal voice in this respect was Malaysian Prime-Minister, Mohammed Mahathir, but former Indonesian president, Suharto, nearly equalled him in his fervent defence of Indonesia's own interpretation of the way human rights should be respected.

Suharto's decision on March 25th, 1992, in the aftermath of the Sancta Cruz massacre on the 12th November, 1991, in Dili, East Timor, to terminate the aid relationship with the Dutch government can be regarded as exemplifying his views. Later on I will come back to this issue of the East Timor conflict as one of the problems it is deemed necessary to solve as soon as possible. However, in relation to the advocacy of Asian Values as a kind of protectionism against Western criticism, it is worthwhile to note that Suharto's nationalistic and even patriotic stance towards the accusations of abuse of human rights, was until very recently strongly endorsed by his close aide and longstanding protégé, B. J. Habibie, the present president of Indonesia, and by all of his generals still in power, especially General Yunus Yosifiah, Habibie's Minister of Information. In the course of the present crisis, on 24th July this year, the development relationship between The Netherlands and Indonesia was restored, albeit without sincere discussions between politicians on the real causes of the rupture in 1992.

In an extensive and detailed analysis I have dealt with this case elsewhere (1995), and hence for the purpose of this paper I can limit myself to just those aspects which are still relevant for the future of the relationship, more or less as lessons learnt.

From the outset, the rupture was presented by the Indonesian side as if it was merely the action of just one person, the then Dutch Minister of International Co-operation, **J.P. Pronk**SM, hence this event is, in Indonesia, commonly referred to as the "Pronk-Affair". Although it would be hard to deny the personal dimension of Pronk's attitude and reactions in this case, it would be utterly superficial to blame only one actor. So, although I hold no brief for the role of the former Dutch minister, it might be useful to recall some aspects of the rupture in order to avoid a repetition of this traumatic event in the future.

On the Dutch-side, this one-dimensional explanation of the cause of the 25th March, 1992 decision was immediately endorsed by the influential daily newspaper, **De Telegraaf**, and members of parliament from the Liberal Party, the VVD, at that time the main opposition party.

This picture of the situation, however, leaves unmentioned the fact that the political standpoint of the then Dutch minister was not only supported by the whole Cabinet, but also by almost the whole Second Chamber, including the Liberal Party, [VVD]. This could hardly be avoided as, since 1978, a link had been established between foreign policy, development aid and human rights.

The massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili was not only a tragic incident but reflected also the systematic and large scale oppression of the Maubere people by the Indonesian army. It was exactly this argument that resulted in the broad political support in the Dutch parliament for the critical stand taken by the Dutch government - as expressed by the then minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van der Broek [CDA], presently one of the two European Commissioners for Foreign Policy in Brussels, and Jan Pronk [PvdA] - towards Indonesian's responsibility for the Santa Cruz massacre on the 12th November, 1991, and its aftermath.

Except for mistakes in the personal sphere - minister Pronk's obviously arrogant behaviour - general policy mistakes have also been made by the Dutch side, i.e. the systematic underestimation of the strong nationalist feelings and forces in Indonesia (Schulte Nordholt, 1989). However, the largest political mistake appears to be, in retrospect, the arrogance to assume that a policy document, unilaterally composed by a donor, would also be compelling for a recipient country. The linkage between foreign policy, development aid, and human rights appeared to be no longer enforceable, when it concerned a recipient country that deemed itself strong enough to ignore the conditionality of such a linkage. At the end of 1991, the Netherlands, when acting as six-monthly chair of the EU, thought that on the basis of the new document that had been formulated during the Treaty of Maastricht, and in which is spoken of the same linkage between foreign policy, development aid, and human rights as in Dutch policy, that the other EU member states would take the same stand, or at least would endorse the position taken by The Netherlands. Nothing proved to be further from the truth, member states preferred a good relationship with the Suharto-regime to obeying their own policy document on which the ink had not yet dried.

By 1997 Dutch foreign policy had learnt to deal more appropriately with human rights as shown during the above-mentioned Singapore meeting. Now, in the midst of the crisis in the ASEAN countries, it is necessary to resist the temptation to return to the former attitude of "raising the moral finger". This does not mean that any compromise has to be made in order to firmly and consistently comply with the EU's policy documents regarding the linkages between development aid and respect of human rights. The lesson learnt by the Dutch politicians is, hopefully, that they will not isolate themselves again from their EU partners.

In early 1992 Indonesia was regarded by the West, and indeed by itself, as one of the promising new Asian Tigers, and hence felt itself strong enough to challenge external criticism. By the end of 1998, Indonesia recognised its structural weaknesses and, as ever being very pragmatic, avoided referring to Asian Values. Indeed, the arrogance derived from the one-sided interpretation of Asian Values, a characteristic of several ASEAN leaders, including Indonesian ones - from inside as well as from outside of the government - has ceased. However one may seriously question to what extent the present Habibie-Cabinet, containing two-thirds of the ministers of the last Suharto-Cabinet, has genuinely changed its views on the linkage between development aid and the respect of human rights

as stated in EU documents since 1991. It may be more realistic to see the dramatic gestures in support of further democracy, such as freedom for political parties and labour unions to organise themselves, as mere lip-service for at least three reasons.

Firstly, for what reasons would so many of the former and present power holders turn into “born-again democrats” overnight?

Secondly, since the present social and economic crisis barely allows new democratic forces to develop: anarchy seems more likely than a strengthening of the civil society.

Thirdly, because in matters of human rights the present Indonesian government may very well count on the argument that the EU will be very willing to accept the face-value of certain decisions. At least in the recent past this has appeared to be the case.

This perception by the Indonesian side may be strengthened by the apparent lack of legitimacy on the EU-side, due to its application of double standards in trade as well as in politics. Therefore, only if the EU, and its member states in their respective bilateral relations, do change genuinely will the EU be able to keep the Indonesian government to its pledge to uphold human rights, including the promise of free and fair elections.

A. Combating the crisis

To prevent the crisis further deepening and hence jeopardising the implementation of the scheduled national elections before the end of May 1999, intended to be a sincere expression of the political will of the whole of the nation, all efforts should be directed at alleviating the negative aspects of the financial and economic crisis **and simultaneously** strengthening the civil society. More than just a stabilisation of the Rupiah, for example at the level of Rp. 5.000 – 1US\$, or a restoration of economic growth, should be aimed at. One lesson learnt from the causes of the crisis is that clearly without a thorough restructuring of the financial and economic sectors no prospect of a sustained improvement for the masses will be achieved. However, such a restructuring will profoundly influence the present political, ethnic, religious and, in the final analysis, military power bases, and hence it will require a profound restructuring of the political scene. A political restructuring which, inherently, may imply a fundamental change in the political-ideological basis of the republic, i.e. the *Pancasila*. Although hardly any of the political actors in Indonesia are explicitly referring to this possibility, the present power game, as an interlude to the scheduled national elections next year, is already very much poisoned by the real contest about state ideology: either Islam or *pancasila*.

Moreover, unfortunately, this deemed necessary restructuring will also cause even more tensions and cleavages in the already threatened and near to being torn-apart society. It goes without saying that this dilemma is entirely a matter that should be dealt with by the Indonesian people themselves. The outside world can only pray that at this crucial moment in Indonesia's history a similar strength and grandeur of thought may exist as during the early days of the republic when its “founding fathers” proclaimed its independence. However, the EU's responsibility is, in my opinion, to endorse and to facilitate, wherever possible, those forces that aim to develop a genuine civil society. Taking such a principled position immediately leads to two conceptual difficulties.

First, according to Mohammad S. Hikam², within Indonesian society itself the discourse on the concept of civil society has not yet resulted in sufficient clarity. Secondly, the presently popular concept of “*ekonomi kerakyatan*” [people's economy] – as an expression of the restructuring deemed necessary in the economic sector – apparently still raises many questions, such as: who does belong to ‘the people’? Does the Chinese community still have the right, and even more importantly, real opportunities to be active in trade and commerce?

Again, it is up to the Indonesian society to formulate answers. Nevertheless, to facilitate the continuation of such a discourse amidst the heat of the present crisis is deemed necessary. For this purpose a three-fold strategy should be implemented:

- (1) First of all, the EU and its member states could give full support to the initiative taken by the World Bank to build up a large Social Safety Net programme. Considering the severity of the process of rapid impoverishment, that especially affects very small children and the millions of jobless youngsters, who will be unemployed for many years to come, the funds needed will surpass the means of the World Bank, and hence additional funding by the EU is necessary. However, in this matter, one should be careful that the remedy does not worsen the problem. Currently there is a limited absorption capacity to channel large amounts of funding in a transparent and accountable manner. This is an absolute necessity to insure that those groups in society in most need will be reached, and to prevent the funds becoming 'vote-buying money' in the coming election campaign. Such a Social Safety Net programme must be built up very carefully, and hence gradually. The World Bank has indicated its intention to channel its funds through NGOs. Based on previous experiences, one is inclined to question their capabilities of doing so effectively. Moreover, to what extent will NGOs act independently, and not in favour of one of the contesting political forces in the course of the coming national elections? Legitimate questions, but nevertheless actions have to be taken, and hence risks cannot be avoided. However, to reduce as far as possible such risks, an independent team consisting of high-standing domestic and international members could, as far as possible, monitor the implementation of this programme. Such a team, financed by the EU, should have the freedom and authority to publish freely and frequently its findings on all parties concerned.
- (2) The second track of the proposed strategy concerns the EU's active involvement in the restructuring of the banking system to create a transparent and accountable financial infrastructure. This would create the necessary sound basis for any economic development plans decided upon by a new legitimate Indonesian government. Through its influence within the board of the IMF, the EU can actively promote that restructuring, primarily, will help to maintain the Small and Medium sectors of the Indonesian economy. This will help guarantee the employment opportunities for large parts of the labour forces, and not primarily be for the interests of foreign (private) players gambling during the 'Asian Miracle' phantom period. Foremost, all efforts should be directed at promoting Indonesian export commodities in order that this sector may stimulate further production in other sectors. Hence, all regulations concerning the existing GSP should be carefully re-assessed to avoid discrepancies that will further hurt the already weak Indonesian economy.
- (3) The third track of the strategy focuses more on the political dimension. A similar initiative as the assistance programme, set up by the combined efforts of nearly all Dutch political parties, aimed at strengthening the organisational capacities of all political parties in South Africa after Apartheid formally ended in 1991, is strongly recommended. Sufficient financial and organisational means should be made available by the EU to enhance the organisational capacities of all, on the whole newly established, Indonesian political parties. In this regard, one can immediately benefit from the organisational structure and the experiences acquired in the collaboration programme with South Africa. In addition to this programme, one could also consider a form of financial support system for the Indonesian mass media to ensure that, in this period of crisis, a

pluralistic and open discourse continues. The criteria to be met for the mass media to be supported should then be formulated by a broad spectrum of highly respected Indonesians who represent a wide range of interests. The form of assistance could be in the field of trade facilities for the purchase of paper for a limited period of time, or, a guarantee of payment for advertisements spread across the mass media selected. Of course, also in this matter, many questions can be raised. For instance, how to protect the autonomy and independence of the supported media, Also, how to avoid such a programme reducing the healthy competitiveness between the existing media? But here again, all such risks should be balanced against the possibility that a worsening of the crisis would jeopardise the existing limited freedom of expression.

On another level it is recommended that a two-fold policy be developed in order to maintain peace and stability in the Indonesian archipelago, and hence to promote and to enhance a pluralistic civil society.

B: maintaining peace and stability

Both the EU and Indonesia should restore their damaged moral image. The EU by immediately and fully complying with its own Code of Conduct for arms exports as formulated in June 1991 and June 1992. If these agreed criteria had been followed, the population of Indonesia and Maubere would not have suffered so much from arms sold by European states. Since the above mentioned Code of Conduct was only initiated after the end of the Cold War, no excuse can be made based on geo-political considerations. Only the interests of the arms industries in the European member states counted in the selling of these weapons. According to the authors of the *Europe-Asia Arms Trade Challenges ASEM Security Dialogue* (1998), the Europeanisation of the defence industry pushed Europe into becoming the world's second largest arms vendor after the USA.

However, the present economic crisis may be regarded as a source of little comfort in this respect. But, if the case of the delivery of 24 new Hawk aircraft, the Indonesian and UK governments are presently considering a rescheduling of the payment worth approximately 440 million Pound Sterling, by the end of the day the taxpayers of both countries will pick up the bill.

Apart from the argument that a continuation of the arms trade, either rescheduled or otherwise, will further destabilise the region - and one only has to refer to the Spratly Islands as an example of a 'hot spot' in the region - the concept of security needs to be broadened beyond that of just military threats. If the environmental and social dimensions of the concept of security are also included it will become immediately obvious that the scarce financial and economic resources at present, and for many years to come, are necessary for security in this broader sense. As the editors of the above mentioned study recommend: "*Security policies must be broadened to encompass more than military security. Broader and deeper participation will also lead to an expanded agenda not limited to military, but inclusive of political, economic, social, human, cultural and environmental threats to governments, the poor, ethnic groups, women and children*". [p.12]

Hence, the EU relations with Indonesia should become security-driven, in this broader sense. It is obvious that such a broad agenda will imply an extended partnership of actors in the dialogues between the EU and Indonesia (ASEAN/ASEM). Representatives of the civil societies on both sides should participate in such a manner that the voices of the poor, of abused ethnic groups, and of women and children are listened to.

Closely related to the issue of the arms trade, both financially and politically, is the East Timor conflict. Apart from its international legal and humanitarian dimensions, the war and the occupation by the Indonesian army requires such a huge amount of money that, if only for that reason, a very quick and peaceful solution is deemed necessary. In this regard, not only may the present economic crisis be viewed as a 'blessing in disguise', but even more so the collapse of the Suharto-regime offers opportunities to settle this conflict unforeseen while the New Order was firmly in power.

Since this issue is the theme of several other sessions of this conference, I can limit myself to just one dimension: the EU's participation in finding a peaceful and fair solution for all parties involved.

As mentioned above, in relation to the East Timor conflict, the EU does not have a record to be proud of. In a recent set of published papers, from a conference entirely devoted to Europe's role in relationship to East Timor, the hypocrisy, weaknesses and inconsistencies of the EU are all painfully listed. So, in this respect, the EU has little credit when pretending to play a significant role.

Portugal, being a member of the EU as well as one of the actors in the Tripartite consultations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN, is part of both the problem and of the solution. Hence the EU cannot ignore its own involvement. It was not until June 1996 that the EU – under continuous pressure from Portugal – finally recognised its responsibility by drafting a Common Position on the East Timor conflict. Also in this respect, as in the case of the EU's Code of Conduct on arms trading, the nice phrasing of the six good intentions apparently does not prevent further negotiations with Indonesia by, for instance, the UK arms trade over the scheduled delivery of the 24 new Hawks.

Basically, in line with the 1983 formulated peace proposals without pre-conditions by Xanana Gusmão, and repeated by Ramos Horta, on behalf of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (NCFM), in 1993 in submitting these proposals to the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the European Parliament, the EU should more actively endorse the East Timor Peace Talks Process, taking place under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The original proposals of the NCFM saw a period of 7 to 12 years during which demilitarisation of East Timor by the withdrawal of the Indonesian army would be followed by a phase in which the population of Maubere prepared itself, under the supervision of the United Nations, to exercise their right to self-determination. The present crisis offers an opportunity to hasten this process. The EU should consider offering the UN the facilities and means to supervise the preparatory period in the course to self-determination.

As the British historian Peter Carey (1996) aptly stated in a brilliant analysis of the East Timor tragedy, the massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12th November, 1991, can be regarded as a similar historical watershed to decisive events such as at Amritsar in 1919, which eventually led to India's independence in 1947, and the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960, which led to the eventual abolition of Apartheid in South Africa in 1991. So, sooner or later, following Santa Cruz, the people of Maubere will one day achieve their right for self-determination.

Within the context of the present debate in the Tripartite consultations, the issue is still whether autonomy to a large degree, as proposed by the Habibie-government, or a referendum (in fact, an act of self-determination), as demanded by Xanana c.s., should occur. However, from the point of view that the Santa Cruz massacre can be regarded as the watershed-event in the history of East Timor, the actual dynamics within the Maubere communities seem to lead to the conclusion that self-determination will be unavoidable. Instead of more bloodshed and much suffering, at high material costs to both sides, the EU should offer its good services to realise as soon as possible self-determination.

1) Treaty on the European Union, Article 130 U, 1 and 2, Development Aid:

1. The policy of the Community concerning development aid, that is supplementary to that of the Member States, is aimed at the stimulation of:
 - the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly that of the poorest developing countries;
 - the harmonic and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
 - the fight against poverty in developing countries.
2. The policy of the Community in this area contributes to the general aim of development and the consolidation of democracy and of the constitutional state, as well as to the aim of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2) For the whole of ASEAN the export to the EU amounts to 12% - 14%, while from an EU-perspective the trade with the ASEAN only accounts for less than 2%. Specified for Indonesia the available data are as follows:

Imports/export Indonesia EC/EU (in 1000 US \$)					
	1967 (1)	1977 (2)	1987 (3)	1994	1995
Total imports (%)	152,960 (23,6%)	1,296,036 (20,8%)	2,352,425 (19%)	5,827,850 (18,2%)	8,175,231 (20,1%)
Total exports (%)	121,190 (18,2%)	919,349 (8,5%)	1,541,064 (9,1%)	5,825,260 (14,6%)	6,758,735 (14,9%)

- 1 EG =6;
2 EG=9;
3 EG=12.

Source: International trade statistics yearbook : vol. 1 / United Nations. - New York : United Nations. Several years

3) The EU had supplied to the IMF some \$US 17 billions to counter the crisis and in April 1998 by means of an ASEM Trust Fund: appr. \$US 50 billion for all ASEAN-countries affected by the crisis.

4) International trade statistics yearbook: vol. 1/United Nations. - New York: United Nations. Several years

5) While in Holland Pronk's name rarely is written in combination with his two initials, **J.P.**, in Indonesia this happens often; this can be interpreted only as a clear, negative, reference to the initials of the first Governor-General, J.P. Coen, the founder of the VOC in Batavia, now some four centuries ago.

6) Mohammed S.Hikam, is one of the best-informed Indonesian experts on this matter; he has extensively published in Indonesia on this subject, one of his latest publications was presented as draft not for citation at the Euroseas Conference, 3-6 September, 1998, Hamburg, Germany

7) This conference was organised by the IPJET, International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, and held in Dublin, December, 1996; A positive exception should be mentioned by referring to the role of several non-governmental organisations in Europe, explicitly the role of a few women of the organisation *Seed of Hope: East Timor Ploughshares*, see pp. 293 -299, *ibid*.

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