SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY

CHALLENGES FOR AN EUROPEAN RESPONSE STRATEGY

SITUAÇÕES DE FRAGILIDADE

DESAFIOS A UMA ESTRATÉGIA DE RESPOSTA EUROPEIA

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Situações de fragilidade: desafios a uma estratégia de resposta europeia

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Acronyms VI

PREFÁCIO IX

SUMÁRIO, CONCLUSÕES E RECOMENDAÇÕES XI

PREFACE XXXIII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XXXV

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I: DONOR ENGAGEMENT IN SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND FINDINGS 4

1.1. Conceptual Framework 4
1.1.1. The Term 'Fragile State' *4*
1.1.2. The Fragility Spectrum *5*
1.1.3. Common Elements in the Definitions *7*
1.1.4. Assessment Tools *8*

1.2. Causes and Features of Fragility 11

1.3. Reasons for Engaging 14

1.4. Donor Strategies 18

1.5. Challenges and Dilemmas to Donors 20

1.6. Addressing Fragility 25
1.6.1. Democracy *26*
1.6.2. State-building and Governance *27*
1.6.3. Aid Modalities *30*
1.6.4. Aid Effectiveness *32*

PART II: THE EU RESPONSE STRATEGY 37

2.1. Policy Framework 37

2.2. The Actors 39

2.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Instruments and Policies 43
2.3.1. The Policies 43
2.3.2. Assessment and Programming Tools 47
2.3.3. The Financial Instruments 49
2.3.4. Political Dialogue 53

2.4. Policy Coherence 56
2.4.1. Institutional Issues 57
2.4.2. Programming 59
2.4.3. EU and Member States Coordination 61

2.5. Coordination with Other Donors and Developing Partners 65
2.5.1. Donor Coordination 65
2.5.2. Working with Regional Organisations in Africa 68

2.6. Enhancing the Security-Development-Governance Nexus 71

2.7. How to Mobilise? What Drives Early Action? 77

PART III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 80

3.1. 'Handle Fragility with Care'. General Recommendations 80

3.2. Operationalising the Concept 84

3.3. Enhance the Security-Governance-Development Nexus 87

Annexes 91

Selected Bibliography 106

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AfDB	African Development Bank
AidCo	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AusAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CCA	Country Conflict Assessments
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
COARM	Working group on conventional arms (Council of Ministers)
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DG Dev	Development Directorate General
DG Relex	External Relations Directorate General
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness Programme of ECHO
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO	EC Humanitarian Aid department
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPLO	European Peace-building Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force (military deployment)
EUPOL	European Union Police mission
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FRIDE	Fundación par las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior

GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICG	International Crisis Groups
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (East Africa)
IPU	Integrated Policy Unit
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategies
LDC	least developed countries
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN guidelines)
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MS	Member States
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development
NSA	Non State Actors
OCHA (UN)	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU)
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSC	EU Political and Security Committee
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SRO	Sub-regional organisations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN Refugee Agency)
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WB	World Bank
WoG	Whole-of-Government
WTO	World Trade Organisation

PREFÁCIO

Em Julho de 2007, a primeira sessão pública da Presidência Portuguesa da União Europeia (UE) na área da cooperação para o desenvolvimento foi dedicada à apresentação, em Bruxelas, deste estudo[1]. Pareceu-nos ser uma maneira apropriada de dar início à nossa Presidência, que tem por lema «Uma Europa mais forte para um mundo melhor». O trabalho de reflexão prática que propusemos às autoras traduziu-se neste documento com o tema *A resposta da UE a situações de fragilidade*. Este constituiu uma das prioridades da Presidência Portuguesa da UE, e o documento que agora se publica serviu de base para que, ao longo dos meses seguintes, aprofundássemos as nossas ideias e encontrássemos soluções práticas, em conjunto com os outros Estados membros e com as instituições comunitárias.

Fizemo-lo porque entendemos que era importante, no actual contexto internacional, reforçar a coerência da UE num domínio em que pode e deve ser um actor de primeira importância. Acreditamos que a eficácia da intervenção europeia, na promoção da estabilidade e do desenvolvimento, depende da nossa capacidade de sermos mais coerentes nas nossas diversas abordagens. A nossa ambição deve ser não apenas a de sermos o maior doador internacional, mas também o melhor, qualitativamente, e neste sentido devemos promover mecanismos integrados para as nossas intervenções em situações de fragilidade. É este passo fundamental que nos permitirá sermos capazes de responder aos desafios que o mundo de hoje, complexo e multidimensional, apresenta.

No quadro da UE, há diversas Comunicações e outros documentos que se têm referido a esta problemática. Em Outubro de 2006, o Conselho chamou a atenção para a necessidade de melhoria da resposta da UE em relação a parceiros difíceis e Estados frágeis e igualmente para a necessidade de abordar a prevenção da fragilidade dos Estados de uma forma coerente, complementar e harmonizada, adaptada à situação de cada país e construída a partir de experiências e lições aprendidas.

Por sua vez, os dados disponíveis indicam que os volumes de Ajuda Pública ao desenvolvimento (APD) são mais voláteis, e portanto menos previsíveis, para países em situações de fragilidade. Sabemos que nessas circunstâncias a tendência é para a APD ser de natureza mais humanitária, mais virada para o imediato ou o curto prazo, e menos vocacionada para a promoção do desenvolvimento no médio ou longo prazo. E sabemos ainda que a APD tende a ser direccionada sobretudo para países onde há preocupações geopolíticas mais evidentes. Estas realidades constituem desafios que procuram respostas do nosso lado.

Por outro lado, é importante que as nossas intervenções sejam pensadas no contexto de um diálogo próximo com as organizações regionais e com outros actores internacionais, como as Nações Unidas ou o Banco Mundial. Todas estas instituições estão num processo mais ou menos avançado de reflexão sobre a mesma problemática, o que sublinha ainda mais a urgência do nosso debate se quisermos ser interlocutores úteis.

Gostaria de dar especial enfoque à emergência do termo *situações de fragilidade*, que o estudo ajudou a clarificar e a promover como conceito de base consensual. Efectivamente, esta terminologia não só evita a estigmatização desnecessária de países em crise, como sublinha que a

1 A presente publicação é a versão revista e actualizada do estudo apresentado em 9 de Julho de 2007, em Bruxelas, sob o título «An Adequate EU Response Strategy to address situations of fragility and difficult environments».

fragilidade institucional não deve ser vista como uma característica permanente e inevitável. Ao mesmo tempo, mantém-se a necessidade de distinguir entre, por um lado, aqueles Estados que têm dificuldades em assegurar as suas obrigações mínimas em matéria de segurança e justiça, ou ainda no acesso à saúde, ou à educação; e por outro lado, os que não estão disponíveis para o necessário compromisso político com critérios de boa governação, as chamadas «parcerias difíceis». Em relação a ambos, o estudo aponta pistas para pensarmos como melhorar as nossas intervenções.

Este estudo constituiu um contributo fundamental para o trabalho destes meses de presidência portuguesa da UE, potenciando uma Comunicação da Comissão e Conclusões do Conselho de Assuntos Gerais de Novembro 2007. Quero por isso deixar aqui nota pública de agradecimento pela forma como as autoras souberam interpretar os desafios contemporâneos com que nos confrontamos, e expressar a minha convicção de que este trabalho será certamente uma referência importante para um debate cuja hora chegou.

João Gomes Cravinho,

Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação do Governo de Portugal

Novembro de 2007

SUMÁRIO, CONCLUSÕES E RECOMENDAÇÕES

A necessidade do envolvimento em contextos frágeis

Desde meados da década de 1990 e particularmente após os acontecimentos do 11 de Setembro, a fragilidade e o falhanço do Estado têm uma relevância política e importância estratégica crescentes na política mundial.

As consequências (e custos) da instabilidade e fragilidade do Estado em termos económicos, de segurança e de desenvolvimento são consideráveis, aos níveis nacional, regional e global. Este facto levou alguns doadores a desenvolverem estratégias específicas para lidarem com os desafios colocados por situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis. No entanto, a evolução positiva no campo do pensamento teórico e das orientações políticas contrasta ainda com os factos: os países frágeis recebem menos ajuda do que outros países em circunstâncias similares; os fluxos de ajuda são mais voláteis (com os doadores a tomarem decisões de parar ou recomeçar a ajuda de uma forma descontínua); cerca de metade da ajuda recebida é direccionada para o alívio à dívida ou para assistência humanitária (o que significa que o envolvimento é mais reactivo do que pró-activo); e a maior parte dos fundos tende a concentrar-se num número restrito de Estados – normalmente países em situação de pós-conflito e/ou considerados estrategicamente importantes para a segurança global – enquanto outros permanecem «órfãos da ajuda». Para além disso, nos contextos pós-conflito, os doadores tendem a diminuir a ajuda, ou a retirarem-se, precisamente quando a capacidade de absorção aumenta e a ajuda poderia, portanto, tornar-se mais eficaz. Os critérios de afectação da ajuda pouco transparentes ou inconsistentes também reforçam o problema, uma vez que tornam os fluxos de ajuda imprevisíveis.

É actualmente reconhecido que a responsabilidade primordial por evitar o falhanço do Estado reside nos próprios países, nomeadamente na capacidade e/ou vontade da sua liderança para prevenir, absorver, gerir e ultrapassar crises potenciais ou reais. Contudo, é igualmente reconhecido que a comunidade internacional pode desempenhar um papel importante no reforço de uma liderança responsável e com capacidade de resposta, bem como na prevenção do aumento da instabilidade e de outros factores de fragilidade (como a pobreza). Existe um grande dilema sobre as formas e nível de envolvimento que os doadores deverão prosseguir; mas existe um consenso crescente sobre a necessidade de se envolverem de forma pró-activa e o mais cedo possível (centrando-se em estratégias preventivas). A necessidade de envolvimento nestes países pode ser justificada ao nível estratégico por uma série de argumentos morais, legais, de segurança, de desenvolvimento e mesmo financeiros. O envolvimento pró-activo pode ser combinado, se necessário, com respostas *ad hoc* após a eclosão da crise.

Dinâmicas e características da fragilidade: necessidade de respostas adaptadas

Embora cada contexto seja único nas suas causas e problemas, os elementos gerais que caracterizam a fragilidade são bem conhecidos. Estes incluem, entre outros, uma governação e capacidade institucional fracas, falta de autoridade, de controlo sobre a totalidade do território ou do monopólio do uso da força; desempenho económico fraco/em declínio e desenvolvimento desigual; níveis altos de corrupção e falta de transparência; risco mais elevado de instabilidade política e de conflito violento (o conflito pode ser, em simultâneo, um resultado da fragilidade e um factor da mesma); cultura democrática insuficiente; e a presença de implicações ou ligações

regionais (uma vez que a fragilidade se pode tornar altamente contagiosa e ter efeitos nos países vizinhos, afectando o seu desenvolvimento e segurança). A fragilidade não é homogénea nem determinada pelas fronteiras do Estado. Pode, assim, afectar países, partes do território ou regiões envolvendo vários países; pode igualmente atingir algumas áreas sectoriais mais do que outras.

A fragilidade é também um conceito dinâmico (e não uma classificação ou condição permanente), que resulta normalmente de um processo construído durante um longo período de tempo. O «ciclo do conflito» é enganador em contextos altamente voláteis, em que os países enfrentam simultaneamente grandes necessidades de curto-prazo e desafios de longo-prazo. As dinâmicas do conflito e da fragilidade são descontínuas, pelo que as abordagens sequenciais são muito menos eficazes do que estratégias conjuntas (*joined-up strategies*) que combinem vários instrumentos e políticas num pacote coerente, incluindo instrumentos políticos, de segurança, humanitários e de desenvolvimento. Para a União Europeia, uma das principais motivações para utilizar o conceito de «fragilidade» é poder identificar as situações mais difíceis, de forma a aumentar a atenção e envolvimento da UE, bem como a capacidade de responder aos problemas específicos destes países de forma mais integrada, atempada e eficaz.

Em suma, o contexto de situações frágeis ou difíceis é substancialmente e qualitativamente diferente de outros países em desenvolvimento, em termos de características e problemas, com elementos únicos que requerem políticas e abordagens adaptadas. O conceito é vasto, incluindo uma grande variedade de situações dentro do «espectro de fragilidade» (Estados fracos/frágeis, falhados e aqueles que deixaram de existir), exigindo a aplicação de abordagens diferenciadas. É igualmente importante distinguir entre a capacidade do Estado e as questões de legitimidade/vontade, por forma a separarmos os «Estados frágeis» das chamadas «parcerias difíceis» – onde há uma falta de compromisso político –, com consequências para as abordagens dos doadores.

Isto implica a existência de instrumentos de avaliação (*assessment tools*) adequados, que sejam incluídos na programação dos doadores. A multiplicidade de mecanismos de avaliação resulta em várias tipologias de países e em grandes disparidades entre os doadores nas classificações (*rankings)* dos países. Enquanto alguns instrumentos já englobam um conjunto estruturado e multidimensional de indicadores que podem levar a uma melhor qualidade na avaliação da situação dos países (por exemplo, Clingendael, o Foreign Policy Index), outros não têm sido tão rigorosos nos seus métodos de análise, são incompletos por ignorarem algumas causas importantes da fragilidade, ou não analisam a evolução do desempenho ao longo do tempo.

Ao nível da UE, a impressão geral é que não há falta de instrumentos de avaliação, de acordo com áreas específicas – sendo que as situações de fragilidade são transversais a estas áreas –, mas que são fragmentados e/ou duplicados. Verifica-se a necessidade de rever e melhorar estes instrumentos no seio da Comissão Europeia e do Conselho, por forma a reforçar a análise qualitativa e a canalizar algumas destas ferramentas específicas de avaliação para um mecanismo mais abrangente, que permita não só avaliar mas também programar, e que possa guiar a Comissão e os Estados membros. Este mecanismo deverá, idealmente, ser partilhado com os países parceiros, sempre que possível. Embora sejam um instrumento da Comissão para concretização das políticas de desenvolvimento, os Documentos de Estratégia por País (*Country Strategy Papers*) e por Região (*Regional Strategy Papers*), são elaborados em colaboração com os Estados membros e é suposto que integrem todas as dimensões das relações externas num quadro coerente, devendo orientar o diálogo político e as políticas num determinado país/região. Na prática, estes

documentos acabam frequentemente por ser uma mera junção de diferentes perspectivas, sem um quadro de orientação comum. Para além disso, a qualidade e os resultados dos instrumentos de avaliação actualmente existentes são muito desiguais. Nem sempre integram as perspectivas/avaliações efectuadas pelos países parceiros e normalmente não são partilhados entre as instituições europeias, o que questiona a sua validade e adequação. Muitos dos instrumentos da UE poderiam ser fundidos num único exercício da Comissão e por sua vez canalizados para um exercício global da União que avaliasse as causas profundas de fragilidade e de potencial conflito – sendo que os documentos estratégicos são provavelmente o instrumento com maior potencial para desempenhar este papel. Isto pressupõe várias mudanças em termos de capacidade e de partilha de informação no seio da UE.

Construção do Estado, governação e democracia

A intervenção da UE deve centrar-se principalmente em ajudar os reformadores nacionais a construírem instituições estatais legítimas, eficazes e fortes. No entanto, as abordagens dos doadores (incluindo da União) em situações de fragilidade são questionáveis de muitas formas, particularmente no que respeita à democracia, governação e construção do Estado (*state-building*). O reforço do Estado é uma tarefa difícil e que implica um processo de longo-prazo (com avanços e recuos), sem resultados rápidos, visíveis ou quantificáveis. Tendo em consideração os limites temporais da programação, os mandatos e formas de actuação (incluindo a pressão para resultados mensuráveis e impactos visíveis), as agências externas enfrentam vários constrangimentos nesta tarefa. Um dos principais desafios que a União enfrenta é encontrar o *timing* adequado e a sequência correcta de reformas, que possa contribuir para o reforço do Estado sem estimular tensões políticas e sociais ou sobrecarregar as instituições já fragilizadas. Neste contexto, deve ser assegurado um compromisso consistente e sustentável de recursos financeiros, sendo as adaptações determinadas pela evolução da capacidade de absorção do governo parceiro.

A utilização de mecanismos de diálogo político é fundamental para criar abertura às reformas e uma abordagem que não se limite a soluções técnicas, equacionando questões como os incentivos políticos e as instituições que realmente influenciam as perspectivas de reforma. Seria desejável conferir uma atenção especial aos mecanismos próprios do país parceiro (mesmo informais), à sua cultura organizacional e institucional, em vez de prosseguir num modelo de *state-building* baseado exclusivamente nas instituições ocidentais e que frequentemente descura as dinâmicas locais.

A realização de eleições ou a existência de uma «governação aceitável» (*good-enough governance*) é, muitas vezes, a forma de condicionalidade preferida pelos doadores, enquanto outros elementos – tais como o empenho do governo em investir no bem-estar da sua população – são descurados. É importante fazer a distinção entre as conotações normativas da democracia e as implicações práticas que um processo de democratização pode ter na segurança humana e na subsistência das populações num determinado contexto. Isto implica que a UE se centre na construção da democracia enquanto conceito lato, por via da promoção de uma cultura democrática através de um vasto leque de actores.

Pontos fortes e fracos das políticas e instrumentos da UE

A UE está rapidamente a adquirir experiência em situações de fragilidade, através do envolvimento em actividades específicas – como acções de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração

(DDR), de Reforma do Sector de Segurança (RSS), missões da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa (PESD) – por exemplo no Afeganistão, nos Balcãs, na R.D.Congo, ou a próxima missão no Chade/República Centro-Africana, entre outras – e ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Beneficia igualmente de um quadro político recentemente melhorado e cada vez mais consciente da necessidade de promover a coerência e a coordenação entre as diversas abordagens da UE, incluindo: documentos sobre a Coerência de Políticas para o Desenvolvimento (*Policy Coherence for Development*), o Código de Conduta sobre a Divisão do Trabalho na Política de Desenvolvimento, o próximo Consenso Europeu sobre Ajuda Humanitária, o Consenso Europeu para o Desenvolvimento, a Comunicação sobre a Ligação entre Emergência, Reabilitação e Desenvolvimento, a próxima Estratégia Conjunta UE-África, as Comunicações da Comissão sobre Governação (2003 e 2006) e a Estratégia Europeia de Segurança (2003), bem como os documentos de conceptualização sobre DDR, RSS e sobre o reforço das capacidades africanas para prevenção, gestão e resolução de crises. Estes documentos fornecem orientações políticas mais abrangentes e objectivas. Existe, porém, um longo caminho a percorrer para que estes compromissos sejam traduzidos na prática de forma efectiva.

No que respeita aos países em situações de fragilidade em particular, a Comissão Europeia é um bom parceiro potencial, devido ao seu envolvimento de longo-prazo. Quando falamos da capacidade da União para desempenhar um papel mais eficaz e positivo e ajudar os países e sociedades afectadas a responderem e reverterem as causas e efeitos da fragilidade, a questão não é tanto se a UE possui os meios e instrumentos necessários, no quadro das possibilidades que estão à sua disposição, tanto nas instituições comunitárias como nos Estados membros. Trata-se sobretudo de ver como interligar e combinar este vasto conjunto de políticas e instrumentos, de forma a constituir uma estratégia bem informada, baseada nas necessidades, com uma politica de orientações claras. A questão é como optimizar e adaptar os instrumentos/políticas aos requisitos específicos de situações complexas e muitas vezes voláteis e imprevisíveis, onde pode ser necessária uma reavaliação contínua da situação e do impacto das abordagens em curso.

As políticas e os instrumentos financeiros da acção externa da UE têm sido objecto de reformas nos últimos anos. Estão em curso esforços para melhorar a interligação entre estas políticas e instrumentos, tornando-os mais flexíveis, sensíveis às questões dos conflitos (*conflict-sensitive*), compatíveis com o desenvolvimento (*development-friendly*), baseados nas necessidades (*needs-based*), e integrados em estratégias holísticas e abrangentes. Registaram-se vários progressos, nomeadamente no seio da Comissão (maior volume de ajuda, taxas de desembolso mais rápidas e melhor qualidade da assistência prestada).

Estas reformas dos instrumentos financeiros de acção externa da União deverão permitir uma maior flexibilidade e decisões de financiamento mais rápidas, graças a uma estrutura política e administrativa simplificada. Neste contexto, são particularmente relevantes em contextos frágeis: o Instrumento de Estabilidade e os instrumentos geográficos – Instrumento de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento (ICD), Instrumento Europeu de Vizinhança e Parceria e o Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento (FED) – em conjunto com a ajuda humanitária e os instrumentos temáticos, como a Iniciativa Europeia para a Democracia e os Direitos do Homem e o programa sobre «Actores Não-Estatais e Autoridades Locais no Desenvolvimento».

Contudo, o Instrumento de Estabilidade tem sido criticado por não corresponder à necessidade de uma resposta europeia coerente, consistente, rápida e eficaz às crises, criando confusão adicional entre os financiamentos e objectivos do desenvolvimento e da segurança. Permanecem

em aberto várias questões sobre a maneira como este instrumento irá funcionar, nomeadamente no que respeita às prioridades dos financiamentos, em que medida será determinado pelas solicitações/necessidades, e como se interligará com ou complementará outros instrumentos financeiros (PESC, FED e comunitários). Por outro lado, o FED fornece actualmente um quadro integrado para o financiamento de actividades de desenvolvimento ou ligadas à segurança (sem cobrir os custos militares), uma vez que financia acções de DDR, combate às armas ligeiras, reforma do sector de segurança, Estado de Direito, planeamento policial, mediação, alerta antecipado, observação eleitoral, processos de paz e reforço de capacidades na maior parte destas áreas, bem como o Instrumento de Paz para África. Os constrangimentos legais têm impedido o ICD e outros instrumentos regionais de desempenharem o seu papel potencial na prevenção de conflitos e de responderem a alguns problemas relevantes em contextos frágeis. Com efeito, a Comissão e o Conselho encontram-se numa batalha legal sobre competências. O Serviço Externo Comum poderá resolver alguns destes problemas, mas as mudanças terão de ir bem mais para além da arquitectura institucional.

As políticas de desenvolvimento têm de se interligar cada vez mais com as missões PESD (gestão civil e militar de crises) e vice-versa, particularmente em situações onde questões transversais (como os direitos humanos, o Estado de Direito) e actividades (como as acções de DDR ou de RSS) são tão importantes – ou mais – que as áreas tradicionais da política externa da UE. A União tem igualmente apoiado várias iniciativas internacionais que visam controlar e regular actividades com impacto na segurança e nos conflitos, tais como o processo de Kimberley (diamantes), o *FLEGT* (legislação, governação e comércio no sector florestal), ou a *EITI* (Iniciativa para a Transparência nas Indústrias Extractivas). No entanto, muitos dos esforços mais recentes têm estado concentrados na necessidade de responder melhor a situações de crise ou pós-crise, enquanto a prevenção eficaz e atempada permanece uma das maiores fraquezas. Existe também controvérsia sobre a coerência de outras políticas da UE em relação ao desenvolvimento, como é o caso do comércio ou das migrações.

Para além da questão fundamental da vontade política, existem vários constrangimentos institucionais e operacionais ao nível da UE, incluindo limitações nos instrumentos, na organização interna, nos processos de tomada de decisão e na capacidade de responder totalmente às necessidades e requisitos das políticas preventivas. Alguns dos obstáculos a uma maior coordenação e coerência têm origem no quadro institucional que define papéis e competências para cada órgão da União, resultando em diferentes perspectivas e prioridades entre os serviços da Comissão e numa reconhecida deficiente interligação institucional entre esta e o Conselho. O processo de programação tem várias limitações: a programação por vezes parece estar desassociada do planeamento estratégico e da prática, que nem sempre reflecte o que foi programado. Entre outros factores que prejudicam a flexibilidade e a eficácia, contam-se uma fraca apropriação (*ownership*) local e nacional do processo e do resultado do exercício de programação, bem como uma fraca integração de questões transversais, de lições aprendidas e de avaliações do impacto na programação. Certamente que é complicado fazer uma programação eficaz em assuntos e políticas de transição (como o LRRD – ligação entre a emergência, a reabilitação e o desenvolvimento) e transitar para abordagens integradas que tomem em consideração os programas dos Estados membros e de outros doadores; estes devem, porém, ser os principais objectivos dos exercícios de programação em contextos frágeis.

De entre a multiplicidade de instrumentos disponíveis, o diálogo político é um mecanismo preventivo e de longo-prazo fundamental para a acção externa da UE, constituindo um «bom sensor» da situação num dado país, na medida em que pode permitir a identificação de tendências positivas e negativas. Apesar de ter sido negligenciado no passado, podemos considerar como positivo o investimento da UE na capacidade de se envolver mais eficazmente no diálogo político – nomeadamente tornando-o um exercício mais flexível e com a participação de uma multiplicidade de actores. Algumas das formas de melhorar os mecanismos de diálogo político incluem um maior apoio ao papel e aos esforços de outros parceiros (por exemplo, organizações sub-regionais, União Africana), bem como a capacitação e *empowerment* dos actores instituicionais da União/Comissão que estejam melhor colocados para se envolverem eficazmente no diálogo no terreno (por exemplo, os representantes especiais da UE, os chefes de delegação conjuntos Comissão/Conselho).

Trabalhar com vários actores

A UE trabalha com um vasto leque de actores, não só na concepção e implementação das suas políticas, como no processo de tomada de decisão. Para além do envolvimento com os Estados e com as instituições estatais – que são a contraparte «natural» e primordial da UE – trabalha igualmente com as administrações locais (actores estatais descentralizados) e com actores não-estatais locais e internacionais (ONG, organizações comunitárias de base, sector privado, media, etc), podendo dialogar com estes actores.

Os *actores não-estatais* (ANE) oferecem um dos possíveis pontos de entrada para a cooperação e apoio a áreas-chave do desenvolvimento, bem como da governação, da justiça e da segurança em países onde as instituições estatais não funcionam ou se desmoronaram, e/ou em países onde não existe vontade política – estando o diálogo político e a cooperação suspensos ou reduzidos ao mínimo. Esta é uma das vantagens comparativas da UE em relação a outros doadores institucionais. Para além da revisão do Acordo de Cotonou efectuada em 2005 (que oferece novas oportunidades ao facilitar o acesso directo dos ANE aos recursos dos programas indicativos), os novos instrumentos financeiros também tendem a aumentar a participação dos ANE. A UE está a envolver-se de forma crescente em parcerias com estes actores, na prevenção de conflitos e na gestão de crises. No entanto, é importante salientar que a cooperação com ANE e o apoio às suas capacidades não significa uma alternativa aos governos, mas antes o objectivo de complementar a acção e papel do Estado. Idealmente, a criação e reforço de capacidades em situações de fragilidade deveria englobar um envolvimento tanto com o Estado como com os ANE, promovendo parcerias construtivas entre estes actores.

As *organizações regionais* são também parceiros cada vez mais importantes para a UE, desde o diálogo político à definição e implementação de abordagens estratégicas para tratarem de prioridades partilhadas e assuntos de interesse comum. Tanto em relação às situações de crise como às questões da governação em países frágeis, muitas organizações regionais – particularmente em África – estão a desenvolver mecanismos e estratégias para lidarem com problemas estruturais e a tentarem desenvolver capacidades para responderem a necessidades de curto e longo-prazo, incluindo o alerta antecipado, a gestão de crises e a construção da paz (*peace-building*). Com efeito, os líderes africanos têm expectativas que os actores europeus respeitem, complementem e apoiem o trabalho que a UA e as organizações sub-regionais estão já a efectuar nos países

africanos em situação de fragilidade. Para além de todas as actividades positivas em curso (como o reforço das capacidades institucionais, a Facilidade de Paz para África, o apoio ao estabelecimento de sistemas de alerta antecipado, entre outros), a ideia de a UE trabalhar conjuntamente com os vizinhos regionais num país em situação de fragilidade pode constituir a pedra-de-toque da política europeia nesta matéria. A prevenção de conflitos é ainda uma dimensão menor na acção pan-africana (se compararmos com as medidas reactivas) e a UE pode desempenhar um papel de charneira neste âmbito, nomeadamente através do reforço das iniciativas africanas para a governação e do apoio aos esforços africanos no campo dos direitos humanos e da construção da democracia.

Coordenação e divisão de trabalho

As intervenções descoordenadas e incoerentes são particularmente nocivas em contextos frágeis, na medida em que podem exacerbar tensões e prejudicar os esforços de *state-building*. Estes países são especialmente vulneráveis à fragmentação dos doadores e à sobrecarga que isso significa em termos de capacidade do governo, uma vez que são eles próprios menos capazes de liderar a coordenação dos doadores. É necessário que a UE trabalhe conjuntamente com os Estados membros e outros parceiros internacionais, para desenvolver princípios operacionais e abordagens comuns, em particular com organizações que lideram os esforços internacionais de construção da paz, como as Nações Unidas e as instituições regionais.

Verifica-se igualmente uma evolução positiva recente na coordenação entre a União e os Estados membros. A UE financia cada vez mais projectos liderados por Estados membros, realiza diagnósticos conjuntos dos requisitos de formação para as operações de gestão civil de crises, ou desenvolve tentativas de programação conjunta com Estados membros que têm uma forte presença e interesse num dado país. O *Código de Conduta da UE sobre Complementaridade e Divisão de Trabalho na Política de Desenvolvimento* (Maio de 2007) apela a uma divisão de trabalho maximizada, na qual o número de doadores da UE presentes num país e/ou nos vários sectores é reduzido e racionalizado. Se isto constitui um enorme desafio em termos sectoriais (uma vez que alguns sectores são mais apelativos para os doadores do que outros – por exemplo, educação e saúde *versus* ambiente, cultura, etc), será ainda mais difícil em termos de racionalização geográfica, uma vez que esta está ligada aos interesses bilaterais de política externa. Com efeito, alguns Estados membros iniciaram já um processo de racionalização da sua presença externa, como o Reino Unido ou a Suécia, mas isto deve-se mais a prioridades políticas, internas e externas, próprias do que a motivações de complementaridade. Os progressos na coordenação de doadores no seio da UE são ainda muito lentos e alguns Estados membros encaram este processo como uma interferência nas suas políticas nacionais. A divisão de trabalho pode conduzir a uma menor visibilidade ou perda de oportunidades, pelo que deve ser tratada com cuidado. Em suma, as expectativas podem ter de ser reduzidas nesta questão, pois depende sempre da vontade dos Estados membros preencherem os espaços de forma complementar, numa base voluntária.

Para além da coordenação no seio da UE (com as políticas bilaterais dos Estados membros, analisada no ponto 2.4.3), um dos desafios mais árduos para os doadores é a harmonização das abordagens do Banco Mundial, dos Bancos Regionais de Desenvolvimento, do PNUD e da UE, para chegar a uma divisão de trabalho funcional relativamente à actuação em Estados frágeis. Os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento parecem estar a começar a lidar mais seriamente com

esta questão, e a UE deverá também trabalhar nesta base de uma forma mais sistemática. Um bom ponto de partida seria analisar onde estão localizadas as vantagens comparativas da UE, de forma a avançar com uma divisão de trabalho entre as agências multilaterais.

A coordenação entre a UE e as Nações Unidas é, certamente, uma grande prioridade. A União está fortemente empenhada na reforma do sistema de segurança colectiva e de construção da paz nas Nações Unidas. Isto inclui a criação do Conselho de Direitos Humanos e da Comissão de Consolidação de Paz (*Peace-building Commission*), ambos tendo exigido da parte da UE uma adaptação aos novos quadros institucionais. Uma das limitações ao nível global é ainda a ausência de um quadro comum de *peace-building* que possa orientar uma multiplicidade de actores externos e internos; este poderia, portanto, ser um dos temas importantes para a cooperação União-Nações Unidas no futuro próximo. Alguns dos exemplos recentes de coordenação entre a UE e a ONU incluem: reuniões regulares do Steering Committee UE-ONU sobre Gestão de Crises, bem como o diálogo sobre prevenção de conflitos com equipas integradas das Nações Unidas; equipas de avaliação e acordos para elaboração de avaliações conjuntas das necessidades no pós-conflito e pós-emergência; acções complementares em termos de operações de paz (Bósnia-Herzegovina, R.D.Congo, UA no Darfur, Kosovo-UNMIK); e uma forte parceria no apoio à reforma do sector de segurança, a acções de DDR e a outras tarefas de consolidação da paz em vários países.

A maior parte da cooperação UE-Nações Unidas tem lugar no âmbito da gestão de crises e em actividades pós-conflito; contudo, nos Estados frágeis é crucial a prevenção dos conflitos e a resposta às causas da fragilidade, o mais cedo possível. Esta necessidade de cooperação é ainda mais forte se tivermos em conta que ambas as organizações estão a apoiar o reforço das capacidades africanas, principalmente através da UA e das organizações sub-regionais, estando igualmente envolvidas na cooperação tripartida em operações de apoio à paz. O enfoque na prevenção implica que a UE e a ONU se envolvam noutros níveis de coordenação, nomeadamente através da tentativa de melhorar a coordenação político-diplomática e de investir, sempre que possível, numa posição única e conjunta. Um dos maiores desafios reside em traduzir o diálogo que está em curso ao nível estratégico numa cooperação mais forte no terreno, particularmente no que respeita a acções de desenvolvimento de longo-prazo.

Coerência de políticas e a ligação segurança-desenvolvimento

A UE está longe de ter uma abordagem conjunta na sua totalidade – "*whole-of EU approach*". Estão actualmente em curso esforços para conseguir uma maior coerência das políticas em relação ao desenvolvimento, em doze áreas que têm impacto na obtenção dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM), incluindo a segurança, as alterações climáticas, o comércio, as migrações e a energia, entre outras. No entanto, existem vários obstáculos neste processo: a falta de um apoio político adequado, confusão quanto às áreas de intervenção dos mecanismos de promoção de coerência política para o desenvolvimento, insuficiência da informação e de conhecimentos profundos, e a falta de recursos, capacidades e qualificações técnicas para lidar com casos complexos em disciplinas variadas, entre outros.

Este estudo defende que a UE deverá seleccionar as áreas mais relevantes em termos de coerência de políticas nos países em situação de fragilidade e investir em interligações mais estreitas entre as áreas seleccionadas. A necessidade de interligar melhor a segurança e o desenvolvimen-

to é reconhecida nestes países. A abordagem estratégica da UE poderá ser construída a partir de um enfoque na «segurança humana», que prossegue simultaneamente os objectivos de segurança pública (*freedom from fear*) e de desenvolvimento humano (*freedom from want)*.

Existem perspectivas divergentes sobre quais devem ser as áreas prioritárias para o apoio internacional em situações de fragilidade, incluindo no pós-conflito. A população local muitas vezes encara a segurança como o principal problema, pelo que a restauração da lei e da ordem se torna a prioridade mais urgente, para permitir o progresso noutras áreas. Por outro lado, reconhece-se também que uma abordagem centrada apenas na segurança imediata não contribui para a segurança e estabilidade de longo-prazo, existindo a necessidade de equacionar as questões da governação política e económica (para que os benefícios da resolução de problemas imediatos de segurança sejam sustentáveis). O objectivo será constituir uma abordagem mais construtiva, em que as comunidades de segurança e de desenvolvimento trabalhem conjuntamente. No entanto, a interligação entre estas duas perspectivas torna-se particularmente difícil no plano operacional, devido a vários factores: constrangimentos institucionais (a estrutura de pilares da UE), discrepância de mandatos, variações nos horizontes temporais e nos quadros em que as missões são realizadas (as intervenções militares e de segurança tendem a focalizar-se em acções de curto-prazo e com duração limitada, enquanto o desenvolvimento é considerado um objectivo de longo-prazo); e a suspeição com que algumas partes das comunidades de desenvolvimento e de segurança se encaram mutuamente. Assim, registaram-se poucos progressos em termos de integração e complementaridade dos objectivos e métodos do campo militar e do desenvolvimento, no contexto das acções e estratégias da UE.

Existe, contudo, espaço e oportunidade para melhorar estas ligações, nomeadamente: pela promoção de um entendimento comum e mais integrado sobre como estas duas perspectivas poderão trabalhar em conjunto, através da elaboração de um conjunto de orientações ao nível da UE; pela melhoria da comunicação e informação (através do estabelecimento de um mecanismo que reúna e divulgue a informação, constituído por pessoal com diferentes formações e experiência); pelo envio e formação de uma nova geração de pessoal que tenha uma visão abrangente dos novos desafios de desenvolvimento e de segurança que estes países enfrentam, bem como a comunidade internacional (através de programas de formação e de reforço das capacidades nas delegações). A adopção de estratégias abrangentes para a acção externa da UE em certas regiões (como a Estratégia da UE para África) ou de conceitos conjuntos em áreas específicas (DDR, RSS), possuem grande potencial para melhorar a interligação entre segurança e desenvolvimento, desde que sejam reduzidas as disparidades entre as estratégias e a programação, e entre a concepção de políticas e a prática.

No seio dos Estados membros da UE é igualmente possivel promover a inclusão da segurança na agenda global do desenvolvimento dos principais ministérios, tendo por base a experiência daqueles que já o fazem (como o Reino Unido, a Holanda ou os países nórdicos).

Conclusões e Recomendações

A União Europeia tem à sua disposição um vasto leque de instrumentos para responder aos problemas e necessidades dos contextos frágeis. Estes vão desde instrumentos políticos a instrumentos de gestão de crises, de instrumentos na área da justiça e assuntos internos às capacidades militares, da cooperação comercial à ajuda humanitária e ajuda ao desenvolvimento. O objectivo deste estudo não é formular uma nova política para situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis, mas sim sugerir formas de juntar estes instrumentos e compromissos políticos num quadro integrado e abrangente, de forma a promover uma estabilidade estrutural.

O relatório recomenda algumas maneiras para usar mais eficazmente e adaptar as políticas e instrumentos existentes, bem como para melhorar o processo de diagnóstico e de análise política, a definição de prioridades e elaboração de estratégias, o processo de programação, a implementação e o diálogo. O objectivo é contribuir para uma estratégia de resposta melhorada, que possa ser apoiada pelos parceiros, tendo especialmente em atenção o nexo segurança-desenvolvimento-governação na política e acção externa da UE.

O estudo centra-se deliberadamente em questões políticas e estratégicas, embora sejam feitas algumas referências a aspectos mais técnicos sobre os instrumentos financeiros e de ajuda. As conclusões e recomendações propõem uma estratégia ambiciosa para a UE, particularmente no que respeita aos desafios da concretização, a uma análise participativa e bem informada de cada contexto, ao uso combinado de instrumentos de diagnóstico, coordenação, coerência de políticas e abordagens abrangentes (*Whole-of-Government*). Estão quase sempre presentes obstáculos relativos a questões de capacidade ou a constrangimentos operacionais e políticos, pelo que algumas propostas são também avançadas neste âmbito.

As recomendações dividem-se em *três partes*:

A) Recomendações Gerais, incluindo:
- A utilização do conceito de «fragilidade» para promover um envolvimento mais forte e melhorado.
- A necessidade de permanecer envolvido, mas de forma diferente, respondendo às causas estruturais e aos riscos de conflito.
- A promoção da democracia, da governação e da construção do Estado.
- A adopção de princípios internacionais e de colaboração com outros parceiros.

B) Operacionalização do Conceito. Recomendações políticas e operacionais sobre como a UE deverá melhorar os processos de:
- Diagnóstico e análise política.
- Definição de prioridades e elaboração de estratégias.
- Programação e implementação.

C) Melhorar o eixo segurança-governação-desenvolvimento.

A. Recomendações Gerais

A estratégia da UE deverá basear-se nas seguintes *conclusões* gerais:

> Não existe consenso sobre o *conceito* de «Estado Frágil» – nem na terminologia nem no conteúdo. É necessário um diálogo intenso com os países parceiros sobre a questão da fragilidade e de respostas adequadas de cooperação. A sensibilidade política desta questão requer uma utilização cuidada da terminologia. Isto não pode conduzir a uma situação em que os factos e as tendências, bem como interligações reconhecidas, sejam retiradas do debate.

> A importância estratégica e a relevância política da fragilidade do Estado na política mundial contrastam com os *factos estatísticos*, que apontam para uma diminuição da ajuda a estes países, bem como uma retirada completa dos doadores em alguns casos, afectações imprevisíveis de ajuda e uma concentração da ajuda em poucos Estados – o que deixa muitos na situação de «órfãos da ajuda». Para além disso, cerca de metade da ajuda recebida por estes países é direccionada para alívio da dívida e para ajuda humanitária.

> Os contextos das situações de fragilidade e dos ambientes difíceis são *substancialmente e qualitativamente diferentes* de outros países em desenvolvimento, possuindo características específicas que requerem novas respostas e abordagens.

> O conceito é lato e abrange situações muito diferenciadas dentro do «espectro de fragilidade» (Estados fracos/frágeis, falhados, colapsados). Estes requerem *abordagens diferenciadas e progressivas*. A diferenciação entre a capacidade de um Estado e as questões de vontade/legitimidade é igualmente importante, de forma a distinguir entre países frágeis com fracas capacidades e aqueles que constituem parcerias difíceis em que não existe vontade política, exigindo por isso abordagens diferentes.

> Cada país frágil é *complexo* e os seus problemas particulares são *únicos*, o que representa desafios políticos difíceis para os doadores. Cada estratégia deve incluír uma análise política e social profunda de cada contexto específico.

> Alguns elementos são comuns à maioria dos conceitos e abordagens: a pobreza e o falhanço do Estado como elementos que se reforçam mutuamente, um maior risco de instabilidade e de conflito violento, e o facto do Estado não demonstrar capacidade ou vontade política de prestar funções e serviços básicos à maioria da sua população. No entanto, *as causas profundas do falhanço do Estado são ainda descuradas nas políticas dos doadores*, que raramente apostam em acções antecipadas.

> O «*ciclo do conflito» é enganador* nestas situações e não reflecte a realidade no terreno, onde várias fases podem estar presentes em simultâneo.

> A governação democrática, que enfatiza a realização de eleições ou a existência de uma «governação aceitável», pode não ser o melhor ponto de entrada para prevenir situações de fragilidade. Outros elementos, tais como o empenho de um governo na boa governação económica e na *accountability* para assegurar o bem-estar dos seus cidadãos, são muitas vezes negligenciados como um possível padrão para afectação da ajuda. As eleições poderão ajudar a reduzir o conflito, mas se forem manipuladas, realizadas numa fase muito embrionária da transição pós-conflito, ou se registarem uma fraca afluência, podem ser ineficazes ou mesmo contraproducentes para a estabilidade, devendo, assim, ser encaradas como parte de uma abordagem mais abrangente da «*construção da democracia*».

> A maior parte das lições aprendidas salientam a importância fundamental do reforço do Estado (*state-building*) em situações de fragilidade, sob apropriação local (*ownership*). As acções de assistência técnica e outros esforços de capacitação são mais bem sucedidos quando apoiam actividades no âmbito de um programa definido em termos nacionais. O apoio institucional requer um envolvimento de longo-prazo e uma mudança de abordagem: de soluções puramente técnicas que são suportadas por motores individuais de reforma para abordagens com uma multiplicidade de doadores, que equacionem as relações Estado-sociedade, os incentivos políticos e as instituições que realmente influenciam as perspectivas de reforma. Para além disso, nem todos os elementos de governação podem ser tratados ao mesmo tempo; será sempre mais eficaz um apoio a reformas direccionadas que não sobrecarreguem os governos com exigências irrealistas.

1. Utilizar o conceito de «fragilidade» para promover um maior e melhor envolvimento

- A UE deve sublinhar que a utilidade do conceito de «fragilidade» está em identificar as situações de maior dificuldade, de forma a *aumentar a atenção e o envolvimento da União, bem como a responder melhor aos problemas específicos destes contextos*. O conceito é útil como forma de promover uma resposta mais activa e mobilizar a atenção para estas situações.
- A UE deve tomar uma posição forte sobre a *necessidade de envolvimento em situações de fragilidade*, com base numa série de argumentos morais, legais, de desenvolvimento e de segurança.
- No âmbito dos compromissos assumidos internacionalmente para o aumento da Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento, a estratégia da UE deverá incluir um forte compromisso de aumentar os fundos *direccionados para o desenvolvimento e para acções de longo-prazo* em países que enfrentam situações de fragilidade e que são susceptíveis ou afectados por conflitos.
- É necessário um compromisso *sustentável e consistente* de recursos financeiros, existindo igualmente flexibilidade para adaptações de acordo com a evolução das capacidades do governo parceiro. Para isso, é necessário evitar decisões financeiras contraditórias e baseadas em desempenhos de curto-prazo, evitar a imposição de condicionalidades que estejam ligadas ao desempenho da governação no passado, e integrar a «fragilidade» nos critérios de afectação da ajuda.
- A UE deverá debater os *critérios de afectação da ajuda ao desenvolvimento* em situações de fragilidade, de forma similar ao que foi já acordado no âmbito da assistência humanitária (no quadro dos princípios e boas práticas de ajuda humanitária – *Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative*).
- Reconhecer a existência de um espectro de fragilidade, que requer respostas diferenciadas. Fazer uma *distinção entre situações* em que existe falta de compromisso político (contextos difíceis) ou fraca capacidade (situações de fragilidade), ou ambas, com necessárias implicações ao nível das políticas.
- Utilizar cuidadosamente a terminologia. Uma possível *definição de trabalho* poderia ser: «situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis são aqueles onde o Estado é incapaz ou é relutante em fornecer funções centrais à maioria da sua população, incluindo segurança e serviços públicos básicos, e onde os mecanismos políticos de gestão da mudança e de inclusão sem recurso à violência são insuficientes ou inadequados, englobando por isso um maior risco de instabilidade».
- Para promover a participação e a apropriação, a UE deverá *iniciar um diálogo com os países parceiros* sobre o conceito de fragilidade e chegar a acordo sobre os passos seguintes. Isto significa transitar de uma perspectiva de doador para um processo e agenda conjuntos.

2. Permanecer envolvido, mas agir de forma diferenciada: lidar com as causas estruturais e riscos de conflito

- Dar prioridade a actividades que equacionem as *causas estruturais da fragilidade*, tendo em conta a variedade de situações que esta definição engloba.
- Combinar respostas a necessidades de curto e de longo-prazo num *quadro temporal simultâneo*, com particular atenção ao *timing* e flexibilidade. Desconsiderar o ciclo de conflito e promover respostas conjuntas/multifacetadas que evitem abordagens sequenciais e combinem todos os instrumentos num pacote coerente.
- Transitar de uma abordagem baseada nos resultados esperados para uma *abordagem «de processo»*, que se baseia num objectivo geral a ser atingido e que se centra na dinâmica do processo em si. As acções ou programas isolados – como a realização de eleições, as actividades de DDR ou de RSS – têm de ser *parte integrante de uma estratégia mais abrangente* de reforço do Estado, da promoção da estabilidade e do desenvolvimento
- Desenvolver uma *análise política profunda* sobre as causas da fragilidade e sobre os impactos das políticas dos actores externos (regionais e internacionais). Isto ajudará a criar um entendimento claro sobre as origens e dinâmicas do problema. É necessário envolver os Estados membros, as delegações da Comissão, os actores estatais e não-estatais no país e na região em causa, bem como peritos locais e internacionais, académicos, *think thanks* e os decisores políticos apropriados, com experiência no país/região.
- *Alinhar* as acções com os planos e procedimentos do país parceiro, trabalhando através dos seus sistemas, instituições e pessoal, tão cedo e tanto quanto possível. Deve-se evitar criar estruturas paralelas e debilitar ainda mais a capacidade do Estado. Nos casos em que o alinhamento total não seja possível, o «alinhamento-sombra» poderá ser uma opção.
- Ir para além da abordagem de «não causar danos», para investir num *envolvimento pró-activo, precoce e com carácter preventivo*.
- Interligar a *prevenção de conflitos* com as situações de fragilidade, aos níveis das políticas e da operacionalização. Uma estratégia efectiva implica começar com uma estratégia e capacidade da UE em implementar a prevenção de conflitos. Muito do que possa ser dito para melhorar a acção da UE em situações de fragilidade é também válido para a política de prevenção de conflitos. Uma das formas de operacionalização é implementar estratégias preventivas em Estados frágeis. Isto requer uma orientação clara sobre como os diferentes instrumentos trabalham juntos para lidar com a instabilidade (tal como foi sugerido no Programa de Prevenção de Conflitos Violentos, adoptado em 2001, em Gutemburgo).
- Implementar acções de cooperação para o desenvolvimento que sejam sensíveis a conflitos (*conflict-sensitive*) e incluir uma *análise sobre conflitos* em todas as políticas para estes países.

3. Promover a democracia, a governação e o reforço do Estado

- O *enfoque central* do envolvimento da UE em situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis deverá ser a construção de um Estado que possa manter a segurança e responder às necessidades da sua população. A UE terá, portanto, que reconhecer que todas as suas actividades têm implicações em termos de *state-building* no longo-prazo.
- A abordagem da UE à «*construção da democracia*» requer diversas perspectivas. Qualquer financiamento para a realização de eleições deve estar incluído num programa mais abrangente

de governação e construção do Estado. O envolvimento da UE também não deverá depender exclusivamente do estabelecimento de democracias eleitorais, mas antes centrar-se na promoção de uma cultura democrática junto de um vasto leque de actores.

- As acções de construção do Estado deverão ter *objectivos realistas*. Isto implica:
  > Basear o reforço de capacidades e as iniciativas de governação num entendimento mais forte e profundo do contexto local (incluindo as questões do poder, as interacções Estado-sociedade, os papéis das diferentes forças, etc);
  > Utilizar mecanismos de diálogo político para criar abertura às reformas;
  > Prestar uma atenção cuidadosa às prioridades e sequência das intervenções – incluindo as reformas de governação –, com metas claras ou quadros temporais para a realização das tarefas necessárias ao processo de construção do Estado, mantendo simultaneamente um sentido realista do que é exequível em contextos frágeis;
  > Promover uma abordagem que vá para além das soluções técnicas e inclua os incentivos politicos e as instituições que realmente influenciam as perspectives de reforma.
- Um dos principais objectivos da construção do Estado é o *reforço das capacidades nacionais*. Os peritos de assistência técnica deverão ser combinados com outras formas de criação de capacidades, tais como formação no trabalho, troca de experiências, mudanças estruturais e de atitude. As acções de *state-building* devem ter em conta os mecanismos próprios do país parceiro, a sua cultura organizacional e institucional, em vez de se centrarem em modelos institucionais ocidentais. É preferível iniciar esses programas sem qualquer ideia pré-concebida sobre o «tipo certo» de instituições. O cumprimento de um vasto leque de direitos humanos universais pode ser combinado com o respeito pelas tradições e apropriação locais. A abordagem da UE deverá promover as *ligações* entre os processos políticos de alto-nível e as medidas de construção da democracia ao nível da base.
- A UE deverá assegurar que os princípios estabelecidos na Comunicação da Comissão sobre Governação, em 2006, tenham uma operacionalização prática no terreno, integrando-os nos programas de cooperação. A existência de *múltiplos níveis de diálogo político* pode ser um meio eficaz de envolvimento em situações de fragilidade; a acção da UE em termos nacionais, regionais e continentais em África ilustra tais abordagens.

4. Adoptar princípios internacionais e trabalhar mais com outros actores

- Os programas de desenvolvimento em situações de fragilidade devem obedecer aos mesmos princípios que governam a programação em qualquer parte – apropriação (*ownership*), parceria, *accountability* mútua, sustentabilidade, etc.
- O apoio e as abordagens da UE em situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis devem ser enquadrados pelas regras e princípios internacionais de resposta, promovendo a coordenação de estratégias e o consenso entre doadores. É desejável que a União:
  > Adopte os princípios do CAD como base de envolvimento, com especial atenção para (i) estabelecer objectivos claros para os princípios acordados, nomeadamente que estes devem contribuir para a redução da pobreza; (ii) debater os princípios com os países parceiros, para seleccionar conjuntamente quais os mais relevantes e adaptá-los às realidades locais específicas; (iii) implementar activamente os princípios mais relevantes na sua programação; (iv) expandir os princípios a sectores mais amplos, como o comércio e o ambiente; (v) integrar

abordagens regionais e apoiar as estruturas regionais e continentais existentes para responder a situações de fragilidade.
  > Implementar a Declaração de Paris sobre a Eficácia da Ajuda também em situações de fragilidade, com enfoque no objectivo central de construção do Estado.
- A abordagem da UE deverá procurar *trabalhar com outros* de forma estratégica, nomeadamente:
  > Fortalecendo as respostas multilaterais através de uma colaboração reforçada com as Nações Unidas;
  > Cooperando de forma estreita com o sector privado, incluindo na ajuda à criação de condições para que os países parceiros possam atraír maiores fluxos de investimento;
  > Reforçando o apoio a elementos progressistas no seio da sociedade civil;
  > Reforçando as organizações continentais e regionais que podem influenciar a estabilidade e desenvolvimento nos países parceiros;
  > Conceptualizando, organizando e dando prioridade a respostas e políticas que estejam de acordo com os quadros existentes nos países/organizações parceiros (por exemplo, o Documento sobre Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento pós-conflito ou o Mecanismo Africano de Revisão pelos Pares, ambos da UA);
  > Trabalhando de forma crescente com os países vizinhos na região para promover o envolvimento conjunto num país frágil, nomeadamente através de abordagens regionais;
  > Incluindo a cooperação em contextos frágeis como um item no diálogo com países de rendimento médio e doadores emergentes, como a China, a Índia e a África do Sul.

B. Operacionalização do Conceito

No âmbito do debate sobre a prevenção de conflitos, a recente revisão do CAD sobre as Políticas e Programas de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade Europeia refere que não existem meios de integrar as lições no processo de programação (pelo que os processos de partilha de informação necessitam de ser melhorados), não há uma aplicação sistemática da sensibilidade e da prevenção de conflitos nos Documentos de Estratégia por País (pelo que o processo de programação deve utilizar de forma mais sistemática uma análise de conflito), e que existe uma sobreposição de unidades – na Relex, Dev e Aidco – que lidam com esta questão, sem um envolvimento regular destas unidades em termos horizontais (pelo que é necessária alguma racionalização para fornecer melhores *inputs* às delegações). O mesmo pode aplicar-se à abordagem da UE a situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis.
Em todo o processo de desenvolvimento de políticas, *a qualidade e capacidade dos recursos humanos precisa de ser reforçada a todos os níveis* – no terreno, em Bruxelas, bem como nas capitais dos Estados membros – e nas várias áreas do processo estratégico, de planeamento e de implementação.

Recomendações Operacionais Gerais:

1. Diagnóstico e Análise Política
- As estratégias e políticas da UE em situações de fragilidade deverão ser baseadas num *processo contínuo e sistemático* de diagnóstico e monitorização dos riscos, capaz de identificar os países em risco de crise iminente.

- O diagnóstico deverá estabelecer linhas de base, definir indicadores e fornecer informação, tanto quantitativa como qualitativa, para um diagnóstico adequado das causas e impacto da fragilidade, bem como da *evolução* da situação.
- A UE deverá identificar quais dos seus instrumentos de diagnóstico podem ser fundidos num *único exercício da Comissão Europeia*, que possa também alimentar um *exercício abrangente da União* para avaliar as causas da fragilidade, com o enfoque na prevenção de conflitos, Tais exercícios contribuiriam para um entendimento comum da situação, das necessidades e prioridades, e promoveriam esforços conjuntos, transversalmente, na União, e com outros actores.
- Este diagnóstico deve recorrer às mais variadas fontes de instabilidade (incluindo factores políticos, económicos, sociais e externos, bem como a vulnerabilidade a desastres naturais/alterações climáticas).
- Os diagnósticos da UE deverão fornecer informação, análise e orientações sobre quais as *principais mudanças e reformas* necessárias, mapear os actores e detentores de interesse, identificar intervenções adequadas, bem como indicadores e metas de avaliação e progresso, garantindo que são tomadas medidas em resultado dessa análise.
- Deverá ser um *esforço conjunto* da Comissão, do Conselho e dos Estados membros, requerendo por isso uma partilha de informação melhorada e mais sistemática dentro da Comissão, com o Conselho e com os Estados.
- Implica a existência de *capacidades reforçadas* da UE, em Bruxelas e nas Delegações, para que haja capacidade de fornecer um diagnóstico de qualidade, baseado em processos participativos que envolvam diferentes actores no terreno.
- Qualquer diagnóstico de situações de fragilidade deve ser elaborado com uma *forte participação do país parceiro*, nomeadamente através do diálogo com o governo, a sociedade civil e outros (dos Parlamentos às autoridades e peritos locais, a investigadores independentes, etc). No caso de existirem diagnósticos próprios, estes deverão constituir uma das principais bases para a análise da UE.
- Os *Documentos de Estratégia por País e por Região (DEP/DER)*, se adaptados a alguns destes requisitos, podem tornar-se instrumentos eficazes de diagnóstico e de programação, incluindo, nomeadamente, indicadores adicionais para a monitorização das causas de instabilidade e da evolução qualitativa das tendências políticas e económicas. A *apropriação* (*ownership*) dos DEP/DER é uma característica importante destes instrumentos, que deve igualmente ser procurada para além dos detentores de interesse «oficiais».
- No seguimento de uma análise conjunta e participativa dos DEP/DER, as *estratégias preventivas do Conselho* poderiam tornar-se uma ferramenta mais eficaz para acções de carácter mais preventivo do que reactivo e atempadas.
- Os *mecanismos de alerta antecipado* da UE deverão interligar-se melhor com outras organizações internacionais e com os seus mecanismos de alerta, bem como com mecanismos locais e regionais. A UE deverá apoiar estes mecanismos a aumentarem as suas capacidades e desenvolverem os seus próprios instrumentos de análise e monitorização.

2. Definição de prioridades e elaboração de estratégias

- *Utilizar abordagens diferenciadas*. É necessário desagregar as abordagens da UE em situações de fragilidade, através de estratégias direccionadas para as várias fases do «espectro de fragilidade» (fraco/frágil, falhado, ou que deixaram de existir; situações de conflito) e para vários tipos de fragilidade (económica, de segurança e política).

- *Pensar em termos regionais*. Isto significa elaborar estratégias regionais e trabalhar com as regiões para equacionar conjuntamente os problemas dos países frágeis ou afectados por conflitos. Implica igualmente investir em estratégias de apoio de longo-prazo (por exemplo, o Instrumento de Paz para África tem sido crucial para preencher os espaços de curto-prazo, mas não suficiente para responder a necessidades de longo-prazo), que possam reforçar as capacidades das organizações regionais e sub-regionais.
- Conferir às delegações da Comissão *um mandato político* e orientações claras sobre como avançar em questões-chave e segundo as especificidades de cada caso. Estabelecer mecanismos de diálogo e de comunicação efectiva entre as delegações/desk geográficos na Comissão e os grupos de trabalho relevantes no Conselho. Uma possível solução passa por nomear chefes de delegação conjuntos, com um mandato conjunto da Comissão e do Conselho. A eficácia destas nomeações vai para além dos aspectos legais das delegações; requer antes um apoio efectivo por parte da UE, incluindo as instituições e os Estados membros.
- *Seleccionar, estabelecer prioridades e sequenciar as reformas e acções de capacitação*. Apesar de as reformas poderem ser tratadas em simultâneo, a UE não deverá assoberbar os governos, já fragilizados, com um vasto leque de exigências e solicitações. É importante manter o sentido de realismo sobre o que é possível realizar num contexto frágil. Ao enfrentar um vasto conjunto de problemas de capacidade, a UE tem de ser clara em termos de selectividade (quais as agências e instituições alvo das acções), de prioridades (quais as questões de capacidade e quais as reformas mais urgentes), e de sequência das questões (qual o processo mais adequado de reformas)
- *Basear-se, o mais possível, em processos endógenos*. As abordagens da UE deverão partir das estruturas já existentes no país parceiro, ter em conta as dinâmicas locais e os quadros institucionais e organizacionais, fazer uso de quaisquer mecanismos de gestão de conflitos (formais e informais) que já existam, e procurar seguir as prioridades nacionais e outras características que possam promover a apropriação (*ownership*).
- *Utilizar melhor o diálogo político*. Existe espaço para aproveitar melhor os vários actores envolvidos no diálogo político e na diplomacia preventiva, nomeadamente conferindo poderes aos actores institucionais da União/Comissão que estão melhor colocados para se envolverem de forma efectiva no diálogo ao nível do terreno (os representantes especiais ou os chefes de delegação conjuntos, por exemplo).

3. Programação e implementação

- *Adoptar regras específicas de programação para situações de fragilidade*. Será necessária uma maior flexibilidade e adaptabilidade à alteração das circunstâncias, de forma a corresponder às evoluções da capacidade e vontade do governo parceiro em lidar com certas questões ou sectores, onde outros doadores estão activos ou onde os actores não-estatais estão a assegurar as acções. Isto ajudará a evitar o fenómeno dos «órfãos da ajuda», ou uma concentração excessiva num sector ou área específica de apoio.
- *Reforçar a coerência entre políticas* no âmbito da abordagem da UE, nomeadamente:
  > Seleccionando as áreas mais relevantes de coerência de políticas para o desenvolvimento em situações de fragilidade e contextos difíceis (por exemplo, a segurança, o comércio ou as migrações são claramente mais relevantes do que as áreas dos «transportes» ou da «sociedade de informação»), e procurar assegurar uma maior interligação entre as áreas seleccionadas.

> Conferindo especial atenção à diplomacia, à segurança, ao investimento privado e ao comércio em situações de fragilidade, equacionando os impactos destas acções em termos de estabilidade e de desenvolvimento. Conferir, simultaneamente, ajuda suficiente para que estes outros instrumentos sejam eficazes.

> No seio da UE, trabalhar a partir das competências, perspectivas e experiência de cada instituição e departamento.

- *Envolver-se em programação conjunta com os Estados membros*. O FED pode ser uma vantagem neste âmbito, uma vez que os Estados já participam nas decisões de afectação da ajuda.
- Promover a implementação do Código de Conduta da UE sobre Complementaridade e *Divisão de Trabalho* na Política de Desenvolvimento. Uma das formas de apoiar a divisão de trabalho é criar *incentivos* para os que se empenham numa maior coerência.
- Dar preferência a *instrumentos que promovem a accountability e apropriação local*. Os Fundos Sociais, os programas conjuntos e os fundos multi-doadores, bem como a ajuda orçamental, são instrumentos úteis (embora a sua utilidade deva ser avaliada caso-a-caso). O apoio deve seguir uma abordagem gradual, estabelecendo progressivamente indicadores mais rigorosos para o apoio orçamental, como por exemplo o compromisso e progressos realizados ao nível das reformas de gestão financeira, o sistema judicial e a reforma do sector de segurança, a boa governação e a tomada de medidas de consolidação da paz, ou o investimento do governo na prestação de serviços.
- Promover a *consistência* na elaboração de estratégias e na programação:
  > Combinando, num pacote único, a reabilitação de curto-prazo, a reforma do sector de segurança e outras acções prioritárias com ajuda ao desenvolvimento de longo-prazo.

  > Aproveitando a expertise de vários tipos de actores, pela promoção do diálogo e análises que tenham uma colaboração activa dos governos e actores da sociedade civil dos países parceiros. Avaliar igualmente o papel de outros doadores, de forma a promover uma melhor coordenação e coerência. Nas parcerias difíceis, é importante identificar interlocutores moderados e propensos à reforma, interagindo com eles na formulação de estratégias e programas para o país.
- Incluir *critérios relativos à conflitualidade*, em todas as áreas de envolvimento, incluindo os programas e papers de redução da pobreza, assessoria para a política macro-económica, política fiscal, reformas da despesa pública e outras. Incluir *questões transversais, lições aprendidas e monitorização/avaliações dos impactos* no processo de programação.
- *Articular e interligar os intrumentos financeiros e as regras de financiamento*. Na regulamentação financeira, deveriam existir disposições para interligar o financiamento e o *timing* das decisões de financiamento ao longo da estrutura de pilares da UE, por exemplo em situações em que o Instrumento de Estabilidade não possa financiar todos os elementos de um programa (é o caso dos processos de DDR ou de RSS, em que os aspectos militares não podem ser financiados por instrumentos comunitários). Isto poderia contribuir para minimizar a divisão institucional, permitir actividades sequenciais e promover abordagens integradas.

C. Melhorar o eixo segurança-governação-desenvolvimento

O eixo segurança-desenvolvimento é *particularmente importante em contextos frágeis*, onde é improvável que as acções de segurança sejam intervenções de curto-prazo. Tarefas como a formação de um exército capaz, a reforma do sector de segurança, ou o reforço do Estado de Direito

(por exemplo, a justiça e a polícia) durarão provavelmente vários meses ou anos. Estas acções são parte de um processo progressivo de promoção da estabilidade estrutural do país e estão, por isso, ligadas a factores políticos, económicos e societais – e, consequentemente, ao trabalho de desenvolvimento.

O objectivo principal é edificar uma abordagem mais construtiva, na qual as comunidades de desenvolvimento e de segurança trabalhem juntas, com maior frequência e de uma forma mais integrada, aos níveis estratégico, político e operacional.

A UE toma em consideração, cada vez mais, o eixo segurança-desenvolvimento-governação através das suas declarações políticas, estratégias e conceitos, planos de acção e códigos de conduta. Estes resultam, normalmente, do trabalho conjunto entre o Conselho e a Comissão. Tais estratégias e conceitos conjuntos são um passo na direcção certa, para promover abordagens integradas e uma maior coordenação e coerência de políticas no seio das instituições da UE e com os Estados membros. São igualmente bons instrumentos de diálogo para a coordenação com outros doadores. Contudo, tal como salientado e provado pela experiência de actuação da União, a *apropriação* de qualquer estratégia ou programa é fundamental para obter resultados positivos sustentáveis.

Isto é particularmente importante no que respeita às questões da governação. Apesar de muitas causas poderem estar na base da fragilidade e fracasso do Estado, a «má governação» está frequentemente no centro do problema, quer como causa directa, quer como amplificadora de outras fraquezas. Sem um acordo e entendimento partilhado sobre objectivos e princípios de governação entre os vários actores da UE, e sem uma abordagem construtiva e gradual no sentido de apoiar a governação no país parceiro – baseada nas especificidades locais e em estruturas ou iniciativas locais – a agenda de governação pode ser percebida como uma outra forma de condionalidade. Pode, assim, ameaçar o sucesso dos esforços políticos, de segurança e de desenvolvimento. Da mesma forma, é necessário que os doadores e os actores locais cheguem a acordo sobre como conduzir as intervenções em termos de prioridades e de sequência (incluindo as reformas de governação), mantendo simultaneamente um sentido realista do que é possível atingir em situações de fragilidade.

A ligação entre segurança e desenvolvimento é particularmente difícil devido a uma série de constrangimentos institucionais (a estrutura de pilares), discrepância de mandatos, variações nos horizontes temporais das missões e a suspeição com que alguns sectores das comunidades de desenvolvimento e segurança se encaram mutuamente. Desta forma, realizaram-se poucos progressos no sentido de integrar de forma adequada os métodos e objectivos militares e de desenvolvimento no seio das estratégias e acções da UE. Entre as *condições essenciais para um relacionamento positivo de colaboração* salientam-se: a clareza de mandatos e regras de actuação, a existência de abertura e esforços de cooperação para tratar de problemas e situações de interesse comum, a qualidade dos recursos humanos e boas capacidades de comunicação que permitam reforçar o diálogo, partilhar os conhecimentos e compreender o papel e constrangimentos de cada parte.

Recomendações Estratégicas:

- Assentar as respostas da UE numa *abordagem multidimensional* que combine instrumentos de várias políticas. A estratégia da UE pode distinguir-se por se basear numa abordagem de *segurança humana*, que se centre na protecção da segurança e da subsistência dos indivíduos.

Esta abordagem tem um grande potencial para lidar com os novos desafios decorrentes da fragilidade, uma vez que combina a segurança, a prevenção de conflitos e o desenvolvimento em princípios holísticos.

- Promover um *entendimento mais integrado e comum* sobre como a segurança e o desenvolvimento podem trabalhar em conjunto, traduzindo-se na prática através de um conjunto de *orientações* ao nível da UE, para aproximar as perspectivas e acções na área da segurança e do desenvolvimento.
- Incluir o *know-how* diplomático/político e de política externa nos debates sobre a política de desenvolvimento, interligando a declaração de Paris com *outras agendas internacionais*.
- Assegurar que as estratégias e conceitos «conjuntos» da UE tenham em conta as *necessidades e perspectivas dos países/regiões a que dizem respeito*, que sejam alimentados pelos quadros políticos e estratégias locais, e que sejam idealmente desenhados em conjunto, para assegurar a coordenação dos esforços e o apoio a iniciativas endógenas.

Recomendações Operacionais:

- Envolvimento precoce: promover esforços de colaboração nas primeiras fases, começando pelo diagnóstico e pelo planeamento onde a Comissão deverá participar activamente (por exemplo, assegurando que a Comissão tem, desde o início, um papel e presença mais fortes nos grupos de trabalho ou comités relevantes do Conselho, sobre a possibilidade de uma acção PESC/PESD num país onde a Comissão tem um papel importante e uma presença de longo-prazo).
- Ter em atenção outras acções, meios e políticas: o planeamento de missões PESD ou de programas de desenvolvimento deve tomar em atenção e ser elaborado lado a lado com outras acções da UE. Devem igualmente ter em consideração o envolvimento de outros doadores/actores e a sua própria capacidade de planear e concretizar os compromissos assumidos. Existe ainda a necessidade de fomentar um equilíbrio entre instrumentos militares e civis.
- Melhorar as interligações entre políticas de curto e longo-prazo, nomeadamente:
  - > Promovendo diagnósticos e análises conjuntas das situações de fragilidade, e não apenas de situações em que o conflito está iminente ou activo, ou em que o país está numa fase de pós-conflito.
  - > Investindo numa maior e melhor partilha de informação entre os Estados membros e as instituições da UE, de forma a contribuir para um sentido comum das prioridades e um entendimento comum da situação.
  - > Encorajando a programação conjunta entre a Comissão e os Estados membros: isto coloca uma menor pressão nas fracas capacidades dos Estados e fornece uma maior garantia de entendimento comum e de acções conjuntas num determinado país/região. É particularmente importante que a programação da UE se interligue com as políticas de apoio à boa governação e de responsabilização mútua (mutual accountability) (exportações de armamento, corrupção, crime organizado, etc).
  - > Sequenciando apoios financeiros complementares, para assegurar ligações eficazes e atempadas entre actividades de curto e longo-prazo, particularmente em questões transversais como DDR, RSS e LRRD, mas também no seio dos programas e actividades financiados pela Comissão Europeia.
  - > Interligar os mecanismos de alerta antecipado da UE com outros mecanismos existentes ao nível local, regional e internacional.

- *Promover a participação entre instituições*. Em Bruxelas, pode atingir-se uma maior coerência e complementaridade através de várias medidas: aumentar a frequência e regularizar a participação dos ministros de desenvolvimento no CAGRE; encorajar os grupos de trabalho de Comércio, Desenvolvimento e Relações Externas (por exemplo, para África) a reunirem regularmente com uma agenda mais alargada; transformar o COARM num fórum em que os objectivos de desenvolvimento façam também parte da discussão; assegurar que a experiência, conhecimento e preocupações do ECHO sobre situações específicas de crise seja tido em conta no planeamento de operações de gestão de crises (participando nas reuniões de planeamento da Célula Civil-Militar, por exemplo).
- *Melhorar a comunicação/informação e a* expertise**.** Estabelecer mecanismos para reunir e difundir a informação, envolvendo pessoal de vários quadrantes. Destacar e formar uma nova geração de pessoal com um entendimento abrangente dos desafios de desenvolvimento e segurança e das respostas da comunidade internacional.
- *Aumentar a intervenção ao nível multilateral* sobre esta questão:
  > Iniciando um diálogo para a elaboração de «Objectivos de Governação e Segurança» que possam complementar os Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio, na medida em que estes não possuem uma dimensão de governação/segurança, sem a qual será impossível atingir o desenvolvimento em contextos frágeis.
  > Pressionando nos fora internacionais (por exemplo, no CAD-OCDE) para serem reconsideradas as premissas básicas dos protocolos de afectação da ajuda – que tendem a descurar os benefícios que a ajuda pode ter na prevenção de conflitos – e criar um fundo para actividades não-APD que poderão fomentar acções conjuntas de segurança-desenvolvimento, com o objectivo final de promover a estabilidade estrutural (a formação de um exército profissional, por exemplo).
- *No seio dos Estados membros*, promover a inclusão da segurança na agenda global do desenvolvimento nos principais ministérios, com base na experiência dos Estados que já o estão a fazer (Reino Unido, Holanda, países nórdicos). A criação de fundos especialmente dedicados à prevenção de conflitos, a situações de pós-conflito ou a contextos frágeis, que são geridos conjuntamente por diferentes departamentos no seio do Governo, pode ser um instrumento útil na combinação das duas abordagens.

PREFACE

In July 2007, this study was presented in Brussels as the Portuguese Presidency's first public session in the area of development cooperation[2]. We considered it an appropriate way to kick start our Presidency that runs under the motto: "A stronger Europe for a better world". The practical reflections we proposed to the authors resulted in this document on an EU response to situations of fragility. This issue has been one of the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency of the EU. The current document was a basis for in-depth discussions and exchange of ideas in the months that followed its public presentation. It also informed our search for practical solutions in collaboration with other Member States and the community institutions.

We believe it is important in the current international context to strengthen EU coherence in an area where it can and should be a prominent actor. That is why we chose this issue as a priority for our Presidency and therefore commissioned this study. We believe that the efficiency of EU interventions in the promotion of stability and development depends on our capacity to be more coherent in the variety of our approaches. It must be our ambition to be not just the major international donor, but also the best one, in qualitative terms, and we therefore need to promote integrated approaches and interventions in situations of fragility. This is the fundamental step that will allow us to better respond to the challenges of today's complex and multidimensional world.

Various EU documents, EC Communications and other documents have referred to this issue. In October 2006, the Council identified the need improved EU responses to difficult partners and fragile States. It also signaled the need to approach the prevention of State fragility in coherent, coordinated and harmonized ways, adapted to each country situation and building on experiences and lessons learned.

Available data indicate that Official Development Assistance (ODA) for countries in situations of fragility is more volatile, and thus less predictable than for other countries. In such circumstances, we know that ODA tends to be used more for humanitarian activities, more immediate or short-term, and hence less for the promotion of medium or long-term development. We also know that ODA tends to be more directed towards countries where geopolitical concerns are more evident. These are challenges that require an adequate response from our side.

On the other hand, it is important that we plan our interventions in close dialogue with regional organisations and with other international actors, like the United Nations or the World Bank. All these institutions have engaged in a more or less advanced process of reflection on these matters, which only underlines the urgency of our debate if we want to be valid interlocutors.

I would particularly like to emphasize the emergence of the term "*situations of fragility*" that this study has helped to clarify and promote as a consensual concept. It avoids the unnecessary stigma of 'countries in crisis' and underlines the point that institutional fragility must not be considered a permanent and unavoidable characteristic. It remains critical, however, to distinguish between States that are unable to or face great difficulties in meeting their minimum obligations in the provision of security and justice, or in granting access to health or education; and other States that are unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities according to good governance

2 The current publication is a revised and updated version of the study "An Adequate EU Response Strategy to address situations of fragility and difficult environments" presented on July 9, 2007, in Brussels.

principles – the so-called "difficult partners". In both situations, the study provides much 'food for thought' on how to improve our interventions.

This study was a fundamental contribution to the work developed during the period of the Portuguese Presidency of the EU, including for the European Commission Communication and the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 2007. I wish to publicly thank the authors for their work in interpreting (and for the way they have done it) the contemporary challenges we are confronted with. I am convinced it will remain an important reference in a debate whose time has come.

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The Need to Engage in Fragile Contexts

Since the mid-1990's, and particularly after the 9/11 events, state fragility and failure have taken an increasing strategic importance and political relevance in world politics.

The economic, security and development consequences (and costs) of state fragility and instability are huge, both at national, regional and global levels. This has led most donors to develop specific strategies to deal with challenges posed by fragility and difficult environments. However, these positive developments in theoretical thinking and policy orientations are in strong contrast to action on the ground: Fragile countries receive less aid than other countries in broadly similar circumstances; aid flows are more volatile (with donors making 'stop-and-go' decisions); about half of the aid received is targeted to debt relief and humanitarian assistance (engagement is often reactive rather that preventive); and most aid tends to be concentrated in a few countries – generally nations in post-conflict situations or considered strategically important for global security – while others are 'aid orphans'. Furthermore, in post-conflict settings, donors tend to decrease aid or start to pull-out precisely when absorption capacity increases and aid could, therefore, become more effective. Non-transparent and inconsistent allocation criteria exacerbate the problems for fragile states by making aid flows unpredictable.

The primary responsibility to avoid failure is widely acknowledged to lie in the country itself, namely in the ability or willingness of the country's leadership to prevent, absorb, manage and overcome potential or real crises. It is also recognised that the international community can play an important role in reinforcing responsible and responsive local leadership and helping prevent rising instability and other fragility factors (such as poverty). There is a strong dilemma on the ways and level of engagement that donors should pursue; but there is a growing consensus on the need to engage in a pro-active manner and at the earliest stages (with strong focus on preventive strategies). The need to engage can be supported at strategic level by several moral, legal, security, development and financial arguments. Pro-active and early engagement can be combined, if necessary, with ad-hoc responses once the crisis has occurred.

Dynamics and Features of Fragility: the Need for Adapted Responses

Although each context is unique in its causes and problems, the general features of fragility are well-known. They include, among others, weak governance and institutional capacity; lack of authority and control over the territory and or monopoly of the use of force; poor/declining economic performance and uneven development; high corruption levels and lack of transparency; higher risk of political instability and violent conflict (conflict can be simultaneously an outcome of fragility and a driving factor of fragility); lack of a democratic culture; and the presence of regional linkages and implications (fragility can become highly contagious and have spill-over effects in neighbouring countries, affecting development and security). Fragility is neither homogeneous nor determined by state boundaries; therefore it can affect whole states, parts of states or entire regions; it can also affect some policy areas more than others.

It is also a dynamic concept (not a permanent condition or classification), which often results from an incremental process over a long period of time. The 'conflict-cycle' terminology is misleading in a highly volatile environment, where countries face enormous simultaneous short-

term needs and long-term challenges. The dynamics of conflict and fragility are discontinuous and sequential approaches are therefore far less effective than 'joined-up' strategies that combine all policy tools in a coherent package that includes political, security, humanitarian and development instruments. For the European Union (EU), one of the main motivations in using the concept of 'fragility' is to identify the most difficult situations where the Union should increase its attention and engagement, as well as being able to respond to their specific problems in a more integrated, timely and effective manner.

The context of fragile situations and difficult environments is substantially and qualitatively different from other developing countries, having unique features that require adapted policy responses and approaches. The concept is broad, it encompasses very different situations within the 'fragility spectrum' (weak/fragile, failed and collapsed states), and requires differentiated approaches. The difference between a state's capacity/ability and willing/legitimacy issues is also important as it can be used to distinguish between fragile states with weak capacity and difficult partnerships on the one hand, and unwilling states where there is a lack of political commitment on the other. These have several policy implications for donors.

It implies that adequate assessment tools are mainstreamed into donor programming. However, we face a situation where the many assessment tools used result in different country typologies and huge disparities in country rankings. While some of the tools have a structured and multidimensional set of indicators that can improve the quality of assessment, others are less rigorous in their methods, are incomplete, or do not analyse performance over time.

There are many assessment tools at the EU level but they are scattered and sometimes overlapping. They need to be revised and refined to be more qualitative, and to channel their outputs into comprehensive assessments that can guide policy and programming decisions by the European Commission (EC), the Member States (MS), and partner countries themselves. Although Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) are supposed to integrate all dimensions of external relations in a coherent framework and should guide political dialogue and policies in a given country/region, they often just assemble different perspectives without a common guiding framework. Moreover, the quality of existing assessment tools and their results is very unequal. They are not always well-informed by partner countries perspectives and assessments, and tend not to be shared among EU institutions, raising doubts over their validity and adequacy. Many EU tools could be merged into a single Commission-wide exercise that feeds into EU-wide exercises to assess the root causes of fragility and potential conflict. The CSPs/RSPs seem to be the tool with the greatest potential to do this. However, such an approach presupposes several changes in terms of capacity and information-sharing within the EU.

State-building, Governance and Democracy

The main focus of EU interventions should be to help national reformers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. However donor approaches (including the EU) to fragility are questionable in many ways, particularly regarding democracy, governance and state-building. State-building is inherently difficult, it entails a long-term process (often with advances and setbacks), and often produces few quick, visible or quantifiable results. Taking into consideration the programming timeframes, mandates and ways of operating (including the pressure for measurable results and visible impacts), external agencies face severe limitations in pursuing this

goal. One of the main challenges for the EU is to find the right timing and sequencing of reforms that can contribute to state-building without fuelling social and political tensions or overloading already weakened institutions. In this context, a sustained and consistent commitment of financial resources has to be ensured, with adaptations being determined by the evolving absorptive capacity of the partner government.

The use of political dialogue mechanisms is fundamental to create openings for reform and an approach that goes beyond technical solutions – to address political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform. It is desirable that special attention is also given to the partner country's own mechanisms (even at informal level) and organisational and institutional culture, instead of pursuing a state-building model that is based on western institutions and often disregards local dynamics.

Holding elections or the existence of 'acceptable governance' is often a donor's preferred form of conditionality, while other elements – such as a government's commitment to invest in the well-being of its people – are often disregarded. One should distinguish between the normative connotations of democracy and the practical implications a democratisation process may have for human security and the livelihoods of people in a given context. This implies that the EU focus should be on democracy-building as a broad concept, attained by promoting a culture of democratic politics among a wide range of actors.

Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Policies and Instruments

By engaging in specific activities – such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SRR), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions (e.g. in Afghanistan, in Balkans, in DRC, the forthcoming mission in Chad/CAR, to name a few) and development aid – the EU is rapidly gaining valuable experience in many fragile situations, It also benefits from an improved policy framework, increasingly aware of the need to promote coherence and coordination between EU diverse approaches, activities and actors, e.g. policy documents on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in development policy, the forthcoming European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the European Consensus on Development, the communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), the forthcoming joint Africa-EU Strategy, the EC Communications on Governance (2003 and 2006), the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) as well as concept documents on DDR, SSR and on strengthening African capabilities for crisis prevention, management and resolution. These provide more comprehensive and objective political guidance. There is, nevertheless, a long path to effectively translate these commitments into practice.

For many countries with fragile characteristics, the EC is a good potential partner because of its long-term engagement. When it comes to the EU's ability to play a more effective and positive role in helping these states and societies cope with and reverse the causes and effects of fragility, the issue is not whether the EU has the means and tools available, but rather how the wide range of policies and instruments inter-relate and mingle to make a coherent, needs-based and well-informed strategy and a clearly guided policy. How best can they be optimised and adapted to fit the specific requirements of complex and often volatile and unpredictable situations, where a continuous reassessment of the local situation and the progress of ongoing policies and approaches may be needed.

In recent years, EU policies and financial instruments for external action have been the subject of significant reforms. There are efforts to improve linkages between the various policies and instruments – to make them more flexible, conflict-sensitive, development-friendly, needs-based and integrated in holistic and comprehensive strategies. Progress has been achieved, namely within the EC (increased volume of aid, quicker disbursement rates, and better quality of assistance).

These reforms to the EC's financial instruments for external action should allow for greater flexibility and a more rapid funding decision response, thanks to a simplified political and administrative structure. In this context, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the geographic instruments – Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and European Development Fund (EDF) – alongside humanitarian aid and thematic instruments like the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the programme on "Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development", are particularly important to address fragile contexts.

The IfS has, however, been criticised for not responding to the need of a coherent, consistent, rapid and effective response by the EU to crisis, creating further confusion between development and security objectives and funding, as well as between humanitarian and development mandates. Many questions remain as to how this new instrument will operate, regarding namely the prioritisation of its funding, how demand driven will be the interventions it finances and how will it connect with/complement other – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), EDF and community – financial instruments.

On the other hand, the EDF provides an integrated framework for funding development and security-related activities (but no military costs can be covered): it funds activities like DDR, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), SSR, rule of law, policy planning, mediation, early-warning, electoral observation, peace processes and capacity-building in most of these areas, as well as the African Peace Facility (APF). Legal constraints have limited the use of DCI and other regional instruments in conflict prevention and in addressing some problems in situations of fragility. In fact, the EC and the Council have engaged in legal battles about matters of competence and who could do best in what. A common external service could provide some answers to these, but the essential work is much deeper.

Development policies increasingly have to link with ESDP missions (civilian and military crisis management) – and vice-versa – particularly in situations where cross-cutting issues (e.g. human rights, rule of law) and activities (e.g. DDR, SSR) are likely to be as important (or even more so) as traditional areas of EU foreign policy engagement. The EU is also supporting several international initiatives aimed at controlling and regulating activities that have impact on security and conflict, such as the Kimberley process (on diamonds), the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT, on timber and forests) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

While these latest efforts have focused on the need to better respond to and address situations of crisis and post-crisis, effective and timely work on prevention remains the major weakness. There is also much controversy on the coherence of other EU policies in relation to development, such as on trade or migration.

Beyond the fundamental question of political will, the EU faces several institutional and operational constraints, including limitations of EU instruments, internal organisation and decision-making processes, and capacities and ability to fully respond to the specific needs and require-

ments of upstream and preventive policies. Some of the acknowledged obstacles to greater policy coherence and coordination within the EU derive from the institutional set up that defines the roles and competences of each EU organ, resulting in different views and priorities between the various services within the Commission and in a recognised institutional disconnect between the EC and the Council.

The programming process also has some limitations: programming sometimes appears to be disconnected from strategic planning, and practice does not always reflect what was programmed. Factors that further undermine flexibility and effectiveness include poor local and national ownership of the process and outcomes of the programming exercise, as well as poor mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, lessons learned and impact assessments into programming. Addressing the shortcomings of effective programming of transitional policies and issues (e.g. LRRD) and moving towards integrated approaches that take into account MS and other donors' programmes are difficult tasks, but should remain the main goals of programming exercises in fragile contexts.

Among the many instruments available, political dialogue is a critical preventive and long-term tool for EU external action and it is a good 'sensor' of a country situation, possibly allowing positive and negative trends to be identified. Although it has been neglected in the past, the EU investment in its capacity to engage more effectively in political dialogue – namely by trying to make it a more flexible and multi-actor exercise – is positive. Some ways to improve political dialogue mechanisms entail an increased support to other partners' roles and efforts (e.g. subregional organisations, African Union), and the empowerment of EU/EC institutional actors best placed to engage effectively in dialogue on the ground (e.g. Special Representatives, double-hatted Delegation Heads).

Working with Several Actors

The EU works with a wide range of actors in the design and implementation of its policies as well as its decision-making process. Beyond engaging with States and State institutions – these are EU 'natural' and primary counterparts, the EU also works with local administrations (decentralised state actors) and local and international non state actors (NSAs) – Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, private sector, media, etc. – and can engage in dialogue with these actors.

Non-state actors are one of the possible entry points to engage in cooperation and support to key areas in development, as well as in governance, justice and security in countries where State institutions are basically non-functioning or have collapsed, or in unwilling countries where political dialogue and official cooperation are reduced to a minimum or halted. This is a proven comparative advantage of the EU with regard to other institutional donors. Beyond the 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement – which provides new opportunities by facilitating direct access of NSAs to EC resources – the new financial instruments also aim to increase NSA participation. In conflict prevention and crisis management the EU is increasingly engaged in partnerships with these actors. It is, however, important to stress that such cooperation with NSAs and supporting their capacity is not meant as an alternative to cooperation with governments. The aim is to mobilise critical complementary resources and expertise. Ideally, building capacity in situations of fragility ought to encompass a critical engagement with both State and NSAs and in promoting constructive partnerships between these actors.

Regional organisations are an increasingly important partner for the EU, from political dialogue to the definition and implementation of strategic approaches to address issues of common interest and shared priorities. Many regional organisations – particularly in Africa – are developing their own mechanisms and strategies to address structural problems and they are trying to develop capacities to address short and long-term needs, including early warning, crisis management and peace-building. Many African leaders expect EU players to respect, complement and support the work that the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional organisations (SROs) are already doing to engage with fragile neighbours. Beyond all the positive ongoing support activities (such as institutional capacity-building, the APF, support to the establishment of early warning systems, and others), the idea of the EU working with a country's regional neighbours to jointly address situations of fragility could become a cornerstone of EU policy on this issue. Conflict prevention is a weaker dimension in pan-African action (compared to reactive measures) and the EU can play a major role in this area, namely by reinforcing African governance initiatives and African owned human rights and democracy-building efforts.

Coordination and Division of Labour

Uncoordinated and incoherent interventions are particularly damaging in fragile contexts as they can exacerbate tensions or undermine state-building efforts. These countries are especially vulnerable to donor fragmentation and its potential burden on government capacity, since they are also less capable of leading donor coordination themselves. The EU needs to work with its Member States and with other international partners to develop common approaches and operating principles in fragile states, in particular through efforts to improve coordination and division of labour with organisations leading peace-building efforts, such as the United Nations (UN) and regional institutions.

There are some recent positive developments on EU-MS coordination. The EU increasingly funds projects led my MS, there is a joint identification of training requirements for civilian crisis management operations, and several attempts of joint programming with MS that have a strong presence and interest in a given country. The "EU Code of Conduct on Complementary and Division of Labour in Development Policy' (May 2007) calls for an optimal division of labour in which the number of EU donors present in a country or across sectors is reduced and rationalised. If this is a huge challenge among sectors (some of which are usually more appealing to donors than others), it is even more difficult to achieve concerning geographic rationalisation, since it is linked to bilateral foreign policy interests. In fact, some MS have already started to rationalise their foreign presence, such as the UK or Sweden, but this is mainly due to political and foreign policy priorities rather than concerns to achieve better complementarity. The progress on EU donor coordination is still too slow and some MS perceive it as an EU process that interferes with national policymaking. Division of labour may lead to reduced visibility or loss of opportunities and, therefore, needs to be addressed carefully. In sum, expectations may need to be downgraded on this issue, because it always depends on MS being willing to fill gaps (in sectors or among countries) on a voluntary basis.

Beyond this 'intra-EU' coordination, the question on how multilateral organisations such as the World Bank (WB), Regional Development Banks, UNDP and the EU will harmonize their approaches to come to a functionally convincing division of labour with regard to fragile state is

one of the toughest challenges on the donor side. Multilateral development banks seem to be starting to deal with this issue in a more serious way than before, and the EU should also work on this basis in a more systematic way. A good point to start would be to analyse where concrete comparative advantages of the EU are located in order to advance a division of labour among multilaterals.

The EU-UN coordination is a major priority. The EU is contributing to efforts to reform the system of collective security and peace-building in the UN, including the creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peace-building Commission, both of which have required the EU to adapt to the new institutional set-ups of these fledgling UN bodies. One of the serious limitations at this global level is still the lack of an international common peace-building framework that can guide multiple external and internal actors. This could be an important theme for future EU-UN cooperation. Some recent examples of EU-UN coordination include regular meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management, as well as the desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention with integrated UN teams; assessment teams and stand-by arrangements to elaborate joint post-conflict and post-disaster needs assessments; complementary actions in the field of peace operations (Bosnia-Herzegovina, DRC, AU in Darfur, Kosovo-UNMIK); and a strong partnership to support SSR, DDR and other peace-building tasks in several countries.

Most EU-UN cooperation takes place concerning crisis management and post-conflict activities. In fragile states however, conflict prevention and addressing the causes of fragility at the earliest stages is crucial. This necessity is even stronger since the EU and UN both support the reinforcement of African capabilities, mainly through the AU and subregional organisations, having also engaged in tripartite cooperation in peace-support operations. The focus on prevention implies that the EU and UN further engage in other levels of coordination, namely by enhancing political/diplomatic coordination and trying to agree, whenever possible, on a clear single voice. One of the major challenges is also how to translate the ongoing dialogue at strategic level into a stronger cooperation on the ground, particularly on long-term development actions.

Policy Coherence and the Security-Development Nexus

The EU is very far from having an EU-wide approach to these issues. While work is underway to achieve greater policy coherence for development in 12 policy areas, such as security, climate change, trade, migration, and energy, there are several obstacles to this process. These include a lack of adequate political support, of clarity on the precise intervention areas of Policy Coherence for Development' mechanisms; insufficient information and knowledge, and the lack of resources, capacity and specialised skills with which to argue complex cases in different disciplines.

This study argues that the EU should select the most relevant policy coherence areas in fragile situations and difficult environments (security, trade or migration are clearly more relevant than 'transport' or 'information society') and invest in stronger linkages among these areas. The need to better link security and development actions is acknowledged. The focus on human security, which pursues both 'freedom from fear' (the goal of public safety) and 'freedom from want' (the goal of human development), can be very useful in developing an EU strategic approach.

There are conflicting perspectives on what ought to be the priority areas for international support in situations of fragility, including post-conflict. Security is very often felt by locals as the major problem and restoring law and order the most pressing priority to allow for progress in

other policy areas. On the other hand, it is also acknowledged that focusing only on immediate security does not contribute to long-term security and stability, and there is a need to focus on economic and political governance to sustain the benefits of gains in immediate security problems. The objective would be to develop a more constructive approach in which development and security communities work together. At the operational level, linking the two perspectives is particularly difficult due to institutional constrains (the pillar structure), the discrepancy of mandates, variance in time horizons and the frameworks of missions (military and security interventions tend to focus on short-term actions and limited timeframes while development is regarded as a long-term quest); and to the suspicion with which some parts of the development and security communities regard each other. Therefore, little progress has been made towards proper integration and complementarity of military and development objectives and methods within EU strategies and actions.

There is, nevertheless, space to improve these linkages: by promoting a more integrated and common understanding of how security and development work together through a set of guidelines at EU level; by improving communication and information; and by deploying and training a new generation of staff with holistic understandings of the new range of developmental and security challenges and responses. The adoption of comprehensive strategies for EU external action in certain regions (such as the EU Strategy for Africa) or joint concepts in specific areas (SSR, DDR) could greatly increase the links between security and development, provided that the gaps between the strategies and programming and between policy design and practice are reduced.

Within EU Member States, it is also possible to promote the inclusion of security within the global development agenda of all their major ministries, building on the experience of those who are already doing it (e.g. United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Nordic countries).

INTRODUCTION

The last few years has seen a growing literature on so-called 'fragile states.' Several donors have developed, or are in the process of developing, strategies setting out how best to address the challenges they pose.

The High Level Review of the Millennium Goals and the UN Secretary-General Report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (September 2005) reiterate the inextricable links between development and security and recognise that development's role in building capable states is an indispensable foundation of a new collective security. Many key multilateral institutions, including the UN, OSCE, OECD and World Bank, as well as certain bilateral donors (such as the US or the UK) have developed theoretical thinking and practical approaches to engage in fragile countries. Several *Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations* were approved by the DAC/OECD, following discussions at the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, and tested in nine country pilot case-studies. The long-term vision for this international engagement is to help national reformers to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. Progress towards this goal requires joined-up and coherent action within and among governments and organisations, including a more coordinated and integrated approach between donors.

These multiple debates highlight a common perception that some key elements (e.g. security, governance) need to be taken into account to achieve long-term development and stability. They also highlight the differences in people's perceptions on the concept and on which indicators of 'fragility' should inform it. Moreover, some of the existing strategies mainly focus on different types of difficulties and constraints in addressing state fragility, from an external perspective, which tends to lead to donor-driven approaches rather than reflecting the specific problems and priorities of each situation.

At the EU level, important progress has been made in the last decade concerning the establishment of a conflict prevention, management and resolution policy, as well as the mobilization of necessary financial, political and trade instruments. The dangerous circle between state failure, conflict, regional instability, terrorism and organized crime was underlined in the *European Security Strategy*, adopted in December 2003, which further committed the EU to the active pursuit of the full spectrum of instruments of crisis management and conflict prevention, including development assistance, especially with regard to failed states. State failure is recognised as one of the five key threats facing Europe, since these countries often become a breeding ground for organised crime with spill-over effects that have a direct impact on the EU – for example through refugee flows and the illicit trafficking of people, drugs and weapons. Furthermore, state failure also undermines the EU objective of poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, the promotion of human rights, the prevention of conflict, and increasing trade and investment, amongst others.

These concerns are strongly embedded in the *European Consensus* and in the *EU Strategy for Africa* adopted by the December 2005 European Council, as well in the October 2006 GAERC Conclusions on 'Governance on the European Consensus for the Development' – which *inter alia* called for an *improved EU response to difficult partnerships and fragile states*, and for the need to address the prevention of state fragility through coherent, complementary and harmonised approaches adapted to each country situation and building on previous experiences.

Despite the important progress in theoretical approaches and thinking and policy statements, the causes of state failure are still overlooked in the policies of EU donors. In particular, there is a need to identify and carry out policies designed to consolidate state structures and state capacity to correspond to its primary responsibilities. Several civil society organisations have been pushing policy makers at EU level to engage in further efforts to put policy into action, including through a more coherent and active approach towards particularly fragile situations.

This study takes into account thinking and practice developed in international forums on this issue and the stocktaking exercise that is on-going in various organisations (e.g. WB, DAC-OECD). It takes the specific political context of the Portuguese EU Presidency (2007) as an opportunity and a catalyser for a renewed thinking on the issue of state fragility. It is linked to the *18-Month Programme on Development Policy of the EU Presidencies of Germany, Portugal and Slovenia (January 2007 – June 2008)* which states that the "three Presidencies will, furthermore, examine whether to possibly conduct a study on an appropriate EU strategy on crisis prevention and fragile states, with special reference to the situation of women and children in armed conflict and the general issue of poor governance". Beyond this tripartite strategy, the *Portuguese Presidency* itself is keen to promote the debate on the EU approach and response to fragile states, considering the significant potential and responsibility of the EU as a major development partner to these countries.

The political momentum of the Joint Development and Defence Council meeting at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of November 2007 will largely coincide with the EU-Africa Summit planned for early December in Lisbon. The issue of fragile countries that will be discussed at the November GAERC is also part of the ongoing debate on a joint Africa-EU Strategy expected to be adopted at the Lisbon Summit, and has illustrated differences of perception and understanding of what the concept stands for and why has it been 'adopted' by Europe while in Africa it is perceived rather negatively, illustrating the gap between donors and recipients in the donor driven debate on 'fragile states'. Yet, both donor and recipients agree on the fundamental link between security and development and on state-building[3] as a fundamental issue to promote peace, good governance and sustainable development. Therefore, the study is focused in three different, but complementary *dimensions*, where literature reviews indicate that further thinking is still required:

i) the gap between policy thinking/design and practical implementation
ii) the internal EU dimension: a common European understanding of the concept and what 'working effectively in fragile states' actually entails (policy coherence, intra and inter-institutional coordination, including MS national policies and approaches, with a particular emphasis in the security/development nexus, and focus on the adequacy of EU mechanisms and instruments to deal effectively with such situations).
iii) The dialogue dimension: what needs to be improved in the dialogue with recipient countries and organisations like the AU on the issue of 'fragile states'? What dialogue is needed on

3 The study is based in a broad and comprehensive concept of "*State*", which is neither opposite to "society" nor synonymous with "government" and "public administration". Given the role that many social groups have in the development of public policy and the extensive connections between state bureaucracies and other institutions, it has become increasingly difficult to identify the boundaries of the State. The concept used in this study refers not only to instruments of political power, but to the ensemble of all social structures that function to produce collectively binding decisions in a society (including the political regime, political parties, and various sorts of policy-networks and organisations. Likewise, state-building is not limited to state-state approaches and can only be done by effective engagement with civil society. In other parts of the study, "State" is also used interchangeably with "country" (an organized political community occupying a definite territory, having an organized government, and possessing internal and external sovereignty).

'home-grown' understandings of the essential underlying problems of 'state fragility' and how to best address these problems in order to prevent conflict and state failure?

The study is deliberately focused on political and strategic issues, more than on specific technical aspects. The overall *objective* is to explore how to improve the EU approach and response to crisis prevention and situations of fragility, taking into account lessons learned and the discussions within the OECD-DAC on the principles for good international engagement with fragile states. The central aim is to build an overall strategy and direction that can refine the existing policy instruments and include different policy areas**.** The study outlines why and how a coherent EU strategy for engaging in states considered 'fragile' from a conflict prevention or peace-building perspective should be developed, focusing on the causes and structural problems that affect these states, as well as on their immediate and long-term needs and priorities. Operationally, the study contributed to an EC Communication[4] and to the debate in the informal meeting of Development Ministers in September and in the November GAERC.

The study is divided in *three parts*. Part I is a conceptual framework that clarifies the concepts of fragility from a European perspective, defines the main characteristics and degrees of state fragility and failure, and addresses some of the key challenges that face donors' approaches in these countries. It also identifies the main findings from current donor approaches. The fundamental lessons for an EU approach are mentioned in each sub-chapter.

Part II draws an EU response strategy to address situations of fragility, focusing on the instruments available and the range of policies that can be used across pillars, the major accomplishments and limitations of the EU approach and past response to address situations of fragility, and issues of policy coherence (linkages between the various policies and instruments, in particular the development-security nexus). It identifies the opportunities provided by different dialogue processes (such as with Africa) for a European approach to promote structural stability and it looks at the range of available policy instruments and structures (including the EU 'whole-of-government/organisation' instruments, such as governance profiles, DDR and SSR concepts, regional strategies) that could be used to achieve a more coherent and effective response.

Finally, the study provides some conclusions and recommendations for an improved EU response strategy (Part III) that can also be shared and supported by partner countries/organisations/actors seeking to address fragility and promote structural stability, especially regarding the security/development/governance nexus of EU external policy and action.

4 *Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace*. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2007) 643 final, 25/10/2007.

1.1. Conceptual Framework

1.1.1. The Term 'Fragile State'

There is no consensus among donors and partner countries on the concept of 'fragile states', neither in the terminology nor in contents. The denominations have been varied and encompass a number of partially overlapping, yet analytically distinct concepts regarding vulnerability, difficult aid partners or environments (OECD), fragile, failing or failed states (US), Low Income Countries Under Stress – LICUS (World Bank), poor-performing countries or weak performers (AusAid, Asian Development Bank), and countries at risk of instability (UK). Other terms that emphasize particular elements include 'warlord states', 'shadow states', 'neo-patrimonial states', and 'quasi-states'. However, 'fragile states' or 'state fragility' has emerged as a more frequently used term – the World Bank has issued several papers on fragile states; the OECD has approved the principles for international engagement in fragile states and situations; DfID has adopted this terminology in most of its thinking; the US has approved a USAID Strategy for fragile states and the African Development Bank has recently issued a Proposal for Enhancing Bank Group Assistance to Fragile States in Africa (November 2006). The draft Joint Africa-EU Strategy presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting of 31 October 2007 also decides to "hold a dialogue on the concept of fragility of states aimed at reaching a common understanding and agreeing on steps that could be taken"[5].

For the international community in general, the concept represents a coming together of four distinct communities – humanitarian, human rights, development (development banks and donors) and security – but it means very different things to each of these communities, undermining the dialogue on approaches and responses.

Selected Definitions of 'Fragile States'

"Countries where there is a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies" (OECD)[6]. Also countries "unable to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population"[7]

The ones in which "the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor" (DfID)[8]

Failed and failing states are "characterised by a gradual collapse of state structures and a lack of good governance" (Germany)[9]

Countries that "are facing particularly severe development challenges such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, violence, or the legacy of conflict" (WB)[10]

"State fragility is defined as the extent to which a state can or cannot provide the basic functions of governance to its population" (CIDA)[11].

5 *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. Draft presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting of 31 October 2007, p.9
6 OECD-DAC (2006a); *Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, DAC Senior Level Meeting, 5-6 December 2006.
7 OECD (2006b), "Whole-of-Government Approaches to fragile states".
8 DfID (2005a), *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*, January.
9 German Federal Government, *Action Plan: 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building* (2004). The recent German BMZ strategy (2007) establishes a new concept that highlights the often encountered connection between state fragility and bad governance. BMZ KonZepte 149, "*Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and poor Government Performance*".
10 World Bank (2007), *Millennium Development Goals, Confronting the Challenges of Gender Equality and Fragile States.* Global Monitoring Report 2007, Washington.
11 CIFP (2006); *Failed and Fragile States 2006: A Brief Note for the Canadian Government*. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, November.

For partner countries, there is a negative reaction to the concept, which has also prompted attempts by other donors, namely the EU, to avoid the term 'fragile states' and emphasize the structural problems that affect most of these states by using the terminology 'state fragility' or 'difficult environments'. That has not, however, managed to fully dissipate the 'mistrust' with which some European partners in Africa perceive the debate in Europe and elsewhere. It has been acknowledged in the DAC pilot exercise on implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations that many governments perceive a negative connotation in the terminology and this has proved to be an obstacle to their engagement in the exercise[12]. New policy frameworks, such as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy provides an opportunity to remove such misunderstandings.

Much of this concern is however, focused in formal issues, more than in content. First, it is feared that the consequences of labelling a state as 'fragile' can result in a stigmatisation which discourages private and other foreign investment, paradoxically condemning these countries to chronic instability and vulnerability. That most of these countries are in Africa can also lead to stereotypes in relation to the development perspectives in African countries and regions. Second, the term has been criticised for being too broad, unspecific and donor-centric, not taking into account the different causes and unique problems of individual countries. Finally, the concepts of fragile and failed states are associated primarily with the US national security doctrine after September 11 and the assumed right to intervene 'pre-emptively', which does not reflect the concerns of most developing countries.

However, some donor approaches and most partner countries that can be classified as 'fragile' tend to agree on central issues:

- The importance of peace-building and state-building as fundamental to development;
- That durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile countries will need to be driven by their own leadership and people and that the long-term vision for international engagement in fragile situations is to help national reformers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions.
- That progress towards this goal requires joined-up and coherent action within and among governments and organisations.

1.1.2. The Fragility Spectrum

There is general consensus that a fragility spectrum exists which includes *different degrees of vulnerability and instability risks*. In fact, the concept is broad and most lists include countries that are hardly comparable: countries that have low development indexes and suffer from weak state structures (e.g. Mozambique, Nigeria, East-Timor), countries that are in conflict (e.g. Sudan, Nepal) or in post-conflict phases (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia), countries that are particularly vulnerable to natural catastrophes that contribute to their fragility (e.g. Indonesia), countries that have strong capacity but are unresponsive to their populations' needs (e.g. Angola, Zimbabwe), to countries that are in a more advanced stage of fragility in which state structures have literally collapsed (e.g. Somalia, or Afghanistan for many years prior to the fall of the Taliban[13]). State

12 See the Suplementary Note to and the Synthesis Report by OPM for the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group on the pilot exercise of the principles for good international engagement in fragile states, OPM 2007 and September 2006, respectively.

13 Many argue that Afghanistan was never a State in our understanding of the modern State. The different nations within Afghanistan have often engaged in power struggles among themselves and against foreign rule. Current international efforts to support State rebuilding in Afghanistan are again facing enormous challenges.

collapse is a much rarer phenomenon than fragility and it refers to a particular situation where the state has entirely ceased to function, no longer holds a monopoly over coercive instruments and has lost control over considerable parts of its territory; therefore the government loses its legitimacy, both nationally and internationally[14].

Donors differ in the terminology used to classify these fragility degrees. For instance, USAID distinguishes between countries that are Vulnerable States (unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question) and those that are already Crisis States (where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk). It considers that "it is more important to understand how far and quickly a country is moving from or toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not"[15].

Most donors tend to adopt a scale of fragility, *from strong to weak/fragile, failed and collapsed states*:

- *Strong* states are generally those that are in control of territory and boundaries, willing and able to deliver a full range of public goods to their citizens.
- *Weak or fragile* states tend to have limited governance capacity, suffer from economic stagnation and /or an inability to ensure full security of their borders and domestic territory, having also difficulties in providing basic social services to their populations.
- *Failed* states, which represent a higher degree of vulnerability, are characterised by economic collapse, humanitarian crises and/or conflict. In these cases, government authority, legitimacy and capacity no longer extends throughout the state, but instead is limited either to specific regions or social groups.
- *Collapsed* states are those in which the central government no longer exists, lacking state authority, legitimacy and capacity.

The OECD identifies differentiated constraints and opportunities in several types of fragile situations; it distinguishes among countries that are facing deteriorating governance, those in post-conflict or political transition, those in conflict or crisis, and those transiting from fragility. A similar range is adopted by the World Bank and the African Development Bank. (*see Table A.1 in Annex A*)

Many donors distinguish between the *state's capacity/ability* and *willing/legitimacy issues*. For instance, the USAID analytical framework for fragile countries establishes a matrix that combines effectiveness and legitimacy. It identifies 4 types of states: Stable states, Low Legitimacy/High Effectiveness States, High Legitimacy/Low Effectiveness States and Highly Vulnerable States. The WB also points to a major difference between states that are willing to promote growth and reduce poverty but are unable to do so for a variety of reasons (such as a lack of territorial control, political cohesion, and administrative capacity) and others that may be unwilling to take necessary actions because they are not substantively committed to overall poverty reduction, or they may promote poverty reduction while excluding certain social or geographical groups[16].

14 François, M.; Sud, I. (2006); *Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States*. Development Policy Review, 24(2), pp.141-160
15 USAID (2005); *Fragile States Strategy*.
16 WB (2007) Global Monitoring Report, p. 46.

In the same context, DfID distinguishes between weak capacity and lack of political will, dividing countries in these two categories in relation to four broad elements: state authority for safety and security, effective political power, economic management and administrative capacity to deliver services. The final classification includes (i) "*good performers* with capacity and political will to sustain a development partnership with the international community; (ii) *weak but willing* states with limited capacity; (iii) *strong but unresponsive* states that may be repressive; and (iv) *weak-weak* states where both political will and institutional capacity pose serious challenges to development"[17]. (*See also Table A.2 in Annex A*).

1.1.3. Common Elements in the Definitions

One element that appears in all definitions is that this type of state (whether you call it fragile, weak, poor-performer, failed or other) is *substantially and qualitatively different* from other developing countries in its characteristics and problems, with unique features that require new policy responses and approaches. In other words, 'business as usual' does not work; the way that development, security and diplomatic instruments are used has proved to be incoherent or insufficient to reach the final common goal: to stabilise and rehabilitate these states, promoting structural stability.

Common to most concepts and approaches is the mutually *reinforcing nature of poverty and state failure*, since weak governments tend to be associated with poor governance and difficulties in providing for the basic needs of their populations. In these contexts, the desperately poor are forced to engage in illicit activities in order to survive – such as drug production or trafficking and criminal activities – and tend to be more permeable to criminal or terrorist networks[18].

Another common element is incapacity or unwillingness to deliver *core functions of the state* to the majority of the population. This includes, amongst others, territorial control, safety and security, public resources management, and the delivery of basic social services (such as health and education).

Although there is not a cause-effect relation between fragility and conflict, most definitions highlight the fact that state fragility usually means *higher risk of instability*, and therefore, can be related to violent conflicts. (See 1.2.)

There are also some *other basic elements that need to be stressed in the concept of state fragility*, which are currently *consensual among donors*:

- Fragility is a dynamic concept. It is a *status*, not a permanent condition. Vietnam, Mozambique or Uganda have all graduated from fragile state status, other countries have experienced a deterioration of their capacities (e.g. Ivory Coast). For instance, as CPIA ratings change, countries move in and out of the WB list of fragile states.
- Geographically, it is a *widespread* phenomenon. While most typologies show about half of the so-called 'fragile countries' on the African continent, it can also be observed in many countries of Latin America (Colombia, Haiti) as well as in Central Asia and East and Southeast Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka). When one is concerned about both state failure and state fragility in a broader sense, all developing regions face severe challenges.

17 DfID (2005a), *Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states*, p. 8.
18 Studies show that a country with a GDP per capita of US$250 has a 15% probability of becoming a war zone, whereas a country with US$5000 the probability is less than 1%. See: Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2002) "*On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa*" Journal of Conflict Resolution.

- There is *no simple causal process* and each case is the unique outcome of a set of complex chains of events and interactions.
- Fragility is *neither homogenous nor determined by state boundaries*. It can affect whole states, parts of states or entire regions; it can also affect some policy areas more than others.
- Fragility and failure are often the *outcome of an incremental process* over a long period of time. One of the main motivations in using the concept is to be able to focus on prevention and address the fragility factors at the earliest stages.

1. These common elements have to be incorporated by the EU in a working definition of 'fragile states'. Because of the reasons mentioned above, the terminology utilised should refer to '*situations of fragility and difficult environments'*, rather than using the label of 'fragile states'. A suggested definition can be "Situations of fragility and difficult environments are those where the state is unable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including security and basic public services, and where the mechanisms within the political system to manage change and inclusion without resort to violence are insufficient or inadequate, therefore entailing a higher risk of instability".
2. It would be desirable for the EU to stress that the utility of the concept in drawing a specific strategy for fragile situations is not to put a label on countries. It is exactly the contrary – to identify the most difficult situations in order *to increase EU attention and engagement, as well as to be able to better respond to their specific problems. The concept is useful as a way to promote more active engagement and serious attention to these situations*.
3. The EU approach towards situations of fragility should acknowledge the existence of a fragility spectrum that requires differentiated responses, and *distinguish between situations where there is a lack of political commitment (difficult environments) or weak capacity (situations of fragility)*, or both. It shall also recognise the reinforcing nature of poverty and state fragility, as well the higher risk of instability and conflict entailed by fragile situations.
4. To promote participation and ownership, the EU should also *start a dialogue with partner countries* on the concept of fragility, aimed at reaching a common understanding and possibly adopting a consensual terminology that would imply no 'stigma' or 'blame' and also agree on steps forward. An EU response strategy to situations of fragility and difficult environments shall be based primarily in what partner countries and regions are doing to address fragility, moving from a donor-driven perspective to *jointly owned agenda and processes* (e.g. Africa Peer Review Mechanism – APRM[19], etc)

1.1.4. Assessment Tools

In defining policies and approaches towards situations of fragility, organisations have used different criteria as well as different terms. There is *no uniformity* in country classifications proposed by donors, think thanks or academic institutions.

There is, however, a widespread consensus among donors on the *necessity to improve analyses on the causes and manifestations of fragility*. Most of these tools are developed individually by each donor agency and differ in their methodology and results. Some attempts have not been

19 The APRM is an initiative of the African Union and NEPAD, which consists in a voluntary process to audit and review a country's political, economic and corporate governance, resulting in detailed assessment reports.

rigorous – combining subjective and objective indicators in ways that obscure reality and they can lead to unhelpful blanket rankings of countries. In particular, they have not analysed performance over time.

The main approaches are summarised in *Annex B*[20]. The WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) remains one of the main proxies for most donor classifications of fragile countries. The OECD and DfID consider that countries appearing in the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA ratings can be considered fragile. However, the WB approach excludes explicitly political variables (such as political instability, susceptibility to conflict and others) and puts major emphasis on assessments of policy performance[21].

There are also a number of assessment tools developed specifically to assess conflict situations – such as the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA) of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, or Germany's Conflict Analysis and Project Planning and Management tool – or humanitarian crises – such as the UN OCHA Early Warning Indicators Methodology – but not state fragility in particular. This is much broader and must include *multidimensional aspects* such as economic development, social aspects, and political governance.

The tendency is to create broader typologies. Many of these (including DfID, Clingendael and Foreign Policy Fragile States Index) are based in an integrated approach developed by the *Forum on Early Warning and Early Response* (FEWER). This promotes a comprehensive framework that *combines risk assessment and early warning*. It has become the basis of several methodological frameworks that rely on multiple sources of data and a variety of analytical approaches. These frameworks also allow an assessment of the impact of state fragility on donor interests and the consequences of their interventions in the partner countries.

Governance indicators are particularly problematic since they can be quite subjective and are subject to different interpretations and do not fully reflect non-measurable trends and processes. In fact, governance is multidimensional and there is no unique path from poor to good governance. In this regard, the Global Monitoring Report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2007 states that "actionable indicators to track performance are being developed in several areas, including contributions from independent civil society organisations: Global Integrity released 43 new country reports, the Afrobarometer network released the results for 18 African countries of its third round of surveys, and a new index that monitors transparency in public budgets— the Open Budget Index—was released after four years of development. The World Bank Group also released publicly for the first time its CPIA scores (...) which play an important role in allocating concessional financing. By contrast, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments made less encouraging progress. While the use of PEFA indicators has greatly expanded and many new country assessments are planned, so far only 4 of 33 country reports have been made public, limiting the potential benefits from this valuable tool for analysis"[22].

This multiplicity of assessment tools results in *different country typologies and huge disparities in country rankings*. Assessments using criteria focused on policy performance (e.g. WB) yield entirely different results from those focused on security, conflict, capacity and legitimacy (e.g. UNDP). Furthermore, it is difficult to have substantial developments in policy coherence and

20 For more information on this issue, see: Macrae et al (2004); *Aid to Poorly Performing Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues*, Chapter 3; or Cammack, Diana et all (2006); Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice, Annex B.
21 A country like Sudan, when analysed using the CPIA aggregates, appears to be slightly better-off than Angola.
22 WB, *Global Monitoring Report* 2007, p.8.

donors' coordination if country typologies are not harmonized or do not take into account the *perspectives of developing countries*. These countries often express scepticism about the objectivity of the ratings used by donors, arguing that aid allocations are less sensitive to recipients' needs and potentials than to geopolitical and commercial concerns. One of the demands is that donor assessments adequately distinguish between policy performance on the one hand and the initial conditions and constraints imposed on developing countries by history and geography (e.g. colonial rule, conflict, natural resource dependence, etc).

Currently, the EU does not have an assessment tool specifically for state fragility. In the EC 10th EDF 'Programming Fiche on Fragile States', it is mentioned that "efforts should be made to detect as early as possible signs of state fragility", but there is no reference to specific assessment tools nor to whether the existing ones are suited or could be adapted to do this. (see Part II).

1. EU strategies and policies to address fragile situations must be grounded in an *ongoing systematic process of risk assessment and monitoring* capable of identifying countries at risk of impending crisis and providing guidance as to the type of interventions required to either neutralise or mitigate the crisis. With shared understanding of both the nature of the problems facing a given state and the likely solutions to those problems, EU engagement is likely to be more effective.
2. The assessment should take into account the dynamics of fragility. In other words, an EU assessment on state fragility should be grounded in both quantitative indicators as well as *qualitative assessments* of progress in the country's situation. These should be included in EU decisions (programming, aid modalities, etc) on that country. This means the EU would have to overcome some important constraints in its own capacity (see Part II).
3. This assessment should draw on the *widest range of possible sources of instability* (including political, economic, social and external factors, including vulnerability to natural disasters/climate change[23]). To focus on a single factor such as governance or conflict is to invite incomplete analysis of the problem, and ineffective intervention. Building on other donor assessment methodologies and other existing tools at the EU level (see *Annex F*), some existing assessment tools could be merged into a single EC-wide exercise that can also feed into an EU-wide effort to assess causes of fragility with a strong conflict prevention focus.
4. Since many donor assessments mainly reflect their own perspectives, they sometimes lack a full understanding of specific local dynamics that can be fundamental to state fragility. The EU assessment of fragile situations must also be elaborated with *strong collaboration of the partner country*, namely through dialogue with the government, civil society and others (e.g. Parliaments, local authorities, local experts, independent researchers, etc). This would have the advantage of fostering a common understanding not only among donors but also with the local actors.
5. Where *'self-assessments' exist, these should be one of the main bases for EU analysis* (e.g. African Peer Review Mechanism reports and plans of action). If necessary, the EU should offer diplomatic, technical and financial support to strengthen capacities of the country to self-assess its own processes – for instance by supporting those leading the APRM process and those who participate in and monitor the reviews at national level.

23 Vulnerability to natural disasters or climate change can exacerbate tensions over the control or access to natural resources (e.g. water, land) particularly in weak states with poor capacity to deliver and to manage conflict of interests.

6. An EU assessment should be more than just summaries of the country situation. They should also give conclusions and recommendations to guide design of reforms to address the problems identified. The tool should ensure early warning on potential issues; it should also *provide information on key changes that would be needed and set out ways to measure progress*. A subsequent step would be to guarantee effective follow-up once the analysis has been produced.

1.2. Causes and Features of Fragility

Fragile states face enormous challenges to meet human development needs and to stave off the potential downward spiral of conflict, human abuse and other instability factors. According to different sources, there are anywhere between 20 and 60 states that can de considered 'fragile' or 'failed' or are at risk of failing in the near future[24].

Causes of fragility are unique in each country and depend on specific historic factors, social composition and interaction between groups, regional and environmental factors, characteristics and evolution of political regimes and other political factors, economic factors, amongst others. As Tolstoy said, "all happy families are happy alike; while every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way (...) It is tempting to say the same thing of states"[25]. However, it is widely recognised that, to function effectively, any state must exhibit three fundamental properties: authority, legitimacy and capacity. Weaknesses in any of these dimensions can be sufficient to destabilize a country. There are also precipitators or triggers, which, combined with structural causes and features, can intensify their effects and increase fragility, pushing the state into crisis and violent conflict. Most donors tend to include the general following features in state fragility.

Weak governance and institutional capacity[26]

Many studies show that levels of stability are related to the relative strength of state institutions. In fragile situations, weak performance is clearly linked to chronically weak institutional capacity and governance, which undermine the capacity of the state to deliver basic social and infrastructure services to citizens. Countries that experience a steady deterioration of social and political institutions may be in a process of state failure (e.g. Zimbabwe, Guinea). In many instances, and in Africa in particular as a result of colonial rule that attempted to forge modern states and impose new rules of territoriality and control, many of these 'so-called fragile' states were never effectively 'functioning states' in our Weberian notion of State[27].

Weakness in state institutions also relates to the incentives governing the behaviour of social groups, particularly those with political power. Power selection mechanisms, control on the state executive and public participation in political processes are three main components that tend to have signs of inadequacy or fragility in difficult environments. Many situations of fragility show a preponderance of personalities over institutions and a blurred distinction between the legisla-

24 The WB has identified about 30 LICUS, DfID presents a proxy list of 46 fragile states and USAID as put the number of failing states at about 20.
25 Chesterman, Ignatieff, Thakur (2004); *Making States Work: From state failure to state-building*. International Peace Academy/ United Nations University, New York.
26 Capacity is defined as "the emergent combination of attributes, capabilities and relationships that enables a system to exist, adapt and perform". Fragile states are usually unable to ensure one or more of the 'five core capabilities': the capability to self-organise and act; the capability to generate development results; the capability to establish supportive relationships (across societal groups); the capability to adapt and self-renew; and the capability to achieve coherence. Brinkerhoff, 2007.
27 On the impact of colonial rule in Africa and its implications for current international state-building efforts, see namely Englebert, Pierre (Pomona College) and Tull, Denis (SWP, Berlin) (2007), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States*, September (mimeo).

tive, executive and judicial arms of the state (with uneven power distribution among them). In most cases, an overly centralised system of administration has weakened already ineffective local government institutions.

Often, weak state institutions also mean that the state is no longer able to manage the natural tensions that occur in society. There are cases where this aggravates grievances. Natural resources, ethnic composition or colonial heritage do not themselves drive fragility, but the political manipulation of these factors can impact on state stability – and this manipulation is more likely in states with weak institutions. When countries have a long history of political rights violations, rent-seeking, economic and political exclusion and non-participatory decision mechanisms, political systems are not well equipped to face economic, ethnic or cultural challenges that might trigger state fragility[28].

Lack of authority, control over the territory and or monopoly of the use of force

A country whose government is losing control of its territory (resulting from the loss of its monopoly on the legitimate use of force associated with important rule of law deficits) is more likely to be in a process of state failure. This can result from a combination of weak institutional capacity and territorial dimension (e.g. DRC) or conflict (e.g. Sierra Leone). In this context, the state's institutional capacity to maintain law and order and to retain viable internal accountability mechanisms is severely hampered.

While some states might be able to maintain authority and a measure of state control even in the absence of strong legitimacy or capacity (e.g. North Korea, Zimbabwe), many others with strong legitimacy and capacity are unable to exercise effective control over the full extent of their territory (e.g. Colombia, Sri Lanka). Yet, both entail a degree of state fragility. The lack of authority may undermine attempts to provide development assistance, even if the government is willing and able to support, cooperate and take ownership of international development programmes.

Poor/declining economic performance and uneven development

Several studies show that fragile countries' macroeconomic indicators tend to be inferior to those of other low-income countries. For instance, all the 46 fragile states listed by DfID are low income countries and most of them are among the least developed countries (LDCs). Another approach to the same problem is to use the MDGs as a point of reference, mentioning that fragile countries are those where the MDGs will not be achieved. In addition, these countries have found it more difficult to satisfy the conditions for reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative completion point for debt relief.

There is also a close relationship between human development and state stability. Poverty in the form of low levels of education and social exclusion may contribute to weaknesses in governance, and this can open the way for increased instability. UNDP data shows that the proportion of deaths by war in countries rated low in the Human Development Index (HDI) is ten times higher than in the medium countries and twenty times higher than in countries with high HDI rating. Moreover, there is a vicious cycle between poverty, weak institutions and other aggravat-

28 See namely **Akude, John Emeka (2007):** *The failure and collapse of the African state: on the example of Nigeria*, FRIDE (Madrid): Comment, September.

ing social, economic and political factors (e.g. rapid economic decline, uneven distribution of resources, marginalisation of social segments/groups within the country population, unemployment, resource dependency) and conflict. In this 'conflict trap' poverty fuels conflict, which in turn sustains and aggravates poverty[29].

Some of these countries also experience low levels of economic growth despite the existence of huge natural resources. These resources are usually interlinked with higher conflict potential, when there is weak management and regulation capacity. These resources have in the past been used by rebel forces or by governments to finance and sustain the war (e.g. oil and diamonds in Angola, diamonds in Sierra Leone, several minerals in DRC).

More than poverty levels, it is uneven economic development (between regions or social groups) that contributes to state fragility. The lack of economic and social opportunities and unequal access to basic services, as well as the (real or perceived) discrimination by a particular social group or region ('horizontal inequality') can play an important role in reinforcing fragility and instability. Likewise, some research in Africa concludes that states experiencing unbalanced development – high urbanisation accompanied by low GDP per capita or strong regional unbalances – have higher propensity for fragility[30]. Unemployment rates are usually also higher in countries that experience fragility, exacerbating social tensions. Studies have shown that people are much less likely to fight when they have something to lose, and that is also why stability and democracy are less fragile in higher levels of economic development[31].

High corruption levels and lack of transparency

Overwhelming corruption and generalised lack of accountability are generally associated with fragile situations, resulting in weakened beyond repair institutions. Criminalization or de-legitimisation of the state generally occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal or ineffective. In this context, it is usually linked to low investments in pro-poor policies and development. Facing these conditions, people often shift their allegiances to other leaders – opposition parties, warlords, ethnic leaders or rebel forces, further weakening the state.

The governance and transparency of monetary and financial institutions is also worse in situations of fragility and difficult environments. There is, however, significant variance across the group, since several countries – such as East Timor, Haiti or Liberia – have made important progress in this regard.

Higher risk of political instability and violent conflict

The countries are not necessarily conflict zones, although it is estimated that 75 per cent are conflict-affected or conflict-prone[32]. Some studies highlight that, within five years, almost half of all countries emerging from civil unrest fall back into conflict in a cycle of collapse (e.g. Haiti, Liberia)[33]. Moreover, some countries may remain in a state of 'no war, no peace' for a long time.

Conflict can be simultaneously an outcome of fragility and a driving factor of fragility. On the one hand, fragile situations usually include other features (such as weak institutions and uneven

29 Collier, P. et all (2003): *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington.
30 François, M.; Sud, I. (2006); *Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States*. Development Policy Review, 24(2), pp.148.
31 Vallings, Claire and Moreno-Torres, Magüi (2005); *Drivers of fragility – what makes states fragile*, DfID working paper, April, p.13.
32 International Alert / Saferworld (2005); *Developing An EU Strategy to Address Fragile States: Priorities for the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005*.
33 Collier, P. et all (2003): *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. The World Bank.

development) that are important causes for higher instability. Particularly in states where there is an active political or economic discrimination or mechanism of social exclusion against particular groups (ethnic, religious or others), fragility tends to entail a higher potential for violent conflict. On the other hand, conflict tends to undermine the state service delivery capability, to weaken institutions and to affect economic performance (e.g. destruction of infrastructures, lack of production, less investment) therefore causing or reinforcing fragility.

Lack of a democratic culture

The correlations between fragility and regime type is complex and misleading. More than the issue of being a democracy or an authoritarian regime, fragile countries tend to lack an effective democratic culture that is widespread across society and political spheres (including in central and local government structures). Having frequently a legacy of war or of authoritarian regimes, most situations of fragility are linked to public structures that are obsolete, to an institutional culture that is inadequate to respond to the population's aspirations, and political systems that urgently need capacity-building and reform.

This generally results in other features that are commonly associated with state fragility, such as the absence of a rigid delineation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches; the importance of the army in politics; or reported human rights violations. Michael Ignatieff[34] characterises weak and collapsing states as the chief source of human rights abuses in the post-cold war world.

Regional linkages and implications

Geographically, fragility can become highly contagious and have spill-over effects to neighbouring countries, affecting development and security. Chauvet and Collier estimate that when a fragile country is a neighbour, the result is a loss of 1.6 percent of GDP for that country per year. This risk is heightened by the existence of ethnic, economic or other relevant links, in connection with long-standing grievances towards respective central authorities. Recent history of the Balkans – as conflict spread throughout former Yugoslavia – and the conflict in the Great Lakes – where there are complex social linkages between Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern DRC – are cases in point.

In countries that lack effective control over their entire territory, these effects are more likely to occur, frequently resulting in transnational problems such as drug trafficking, criminal networks, arms flows, refugee flows and cross-border alliances between rebel groups (in the case of conflict-affected countries). Neighbouring states often take part in conflicts in situations of fragility, as a direct part of the conflict (DRC conflict in 1998), by supporting militias or funding rebel groups (Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s), by providing a safe haven for rebels (e.g. Chad, Sudan and Central Africa Republic), or by other indirect means. National borders are no longer the dividing line between security and insecurity, which further add to the complexity of state fragility.

1.3. Reasons for Engaging

Since the early 1990s there was an emphasis in rewarding the development efforts of so-called 'good performers' – countries with relatively effective governments and stable macroeconomic policies. This means that weak performers have been neglected. They are also, by definition, often the ones that most needed aid.

34 Ignatieff, *Intervention and State Failure*. In Dissent, vol.19(1), 2002.

Aid Flows to Fragile Environments

- Aid flows to difficult partnership countries and fragile countries are smaller and more volatile than to other countries in broadly similar circumstances: fragile states receive at least 40% less aid than their levels of poverty, population, and policy effectiveness would justify[35]. This kind of state is under-funded even when taking their limited absorptive capacity into account[36].
- Despite overall aid to fragile countries rising by more than two-thirds in 2005, about half of the aid received was in debt relief and humanitarian assistance[37]. In the DAC countries, the 'other ODA', which traditionally finances development projects and programmes, accounted for less than a quarter of aid given to 'fragile states' in 2005[38]. Therefore, engagement is often reactive rather that preventive.
- Aid flows are also twice as volatile as those to other low income countries, as much is committed for only 1 to 2 years. Many donors have an erratic engagement and make 'stop-start' decisions based on short-term government performance[39].
- In post-conflict settings, donors tend to decrease aid or pull-out precisely when absorption capacity increases and aid could, therefore, become more effective (some 4-5 years after the end of the conflict)[40].
- Most aid in fragile environments tends to be concentrated in a few states – generally nations in post-conflict situations or considered strategically important for global security[41]. Many states receive comparably smaller amounts of aid and this results in the 'aid-orphans' phenomenon or 'forgotten crisis' – typically very large or very small countries that are considered strategically insignificant or that suffer from chronic aid fatigue[42].
- Non-transparent and inconsistent allocation criteria exacerbate the problem for these countries by making aid flows unpredictable[43]. On humanitarian aid, donors have agreed principles of aid allocations based on need in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. Discussions are also under way on a Practical Humanitarian Needs Assessment, a single assessment tool to be shared by donors and concerned actors alike.

These facts contrast with the *increasing strategic importance and political relevance* that is being given to state fragility and failure in world politics. The origin of this focus began in the mid-

35 This conclusion is based on the poverty-efficient allocation benchmark developed by Paul Collier and David Dollar, as measured by the WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).
36 For further information on aid flows, see: Levin, V. and Dollar, D. (2005): *The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in Difficult Partnership Countries*, paper prepared for the DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnership Countries Senior Level Forum, January. See also McGillivray, M. (2005); *Aid Allocation and Fragile States*, World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU, Paper presented at the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, January.
37 WB (2007), Global Monitoring Report 2007, p.15.
38 WB (2007), Global Monitoring Report 2007.
39 Following a phase of intensive engagement, a complete volte-face often takes place, culminating in conscious passivity. This zig-zag course is well observed in cases like Somalia, Haiti, Burundi or DRC. Debiel, T., Klingebiel, S., Mehler, A. and Schneckener, U. (2005); *Between Ignorance and Intervention: Strategies and Dilemmas of External Actors in Fragile States*, Policy paper 23, Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn, Germany.
40 DfID (2005a), p.13. East Timor is often mentioned as an example of this premature pull-out.
41 In 2005, 10 fragile states saw an expansion in ODA of over 50 percent. The largest increases were in Afghanistan, Republic of Congo, DRC, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan. More than half of fragile states actually saw a decline in aid from 2001 to 2005, despite overall aid to fragile states increasing more that 167%. WB Global Monitoring Report 2007, p. 151.
42 See Annex F for more information on EU assessment tools. For instance ECHO has assessment tools to evaluate on 'forgotten crisis'; although some are shared with MS, it is not clear if and how they inform MS national responses to those needs.
43 McGillivray, M. (2005); *Aid Allocation and Fragile States*.

1990s with efforts by countries such as Norway, Canada or Japan, together with the UNDP, to reorient the focus and policies of international security away from states to persons, according to the concept of 'human security'[44]. The effort has created a new consensus around the obligation to protect peoples' rights and has now evolved towards a "responsibility to protect", as stated by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes[45].

It is currently acknowledged that the primary responsibility to avoid failure lies in the country itself, namely in the ability or willingness of the country's leadership to prevent, absorb, manage and overcome potential or real crises. However, is also recognised that the international community can play an important role in reinforcing responsible and responsive local leadership and helping prevent rising instability and other fragility factors (such as poverty). Three main reasons to engage in fragile situations and difficult environments can be highlighted:

Universal *moral and legal arguments*. When the state cannot or will not fulfil its core functions, citizens suffer. If we agree that all human life is of equal worth and all human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, then we all have an obligation to help each other when that dignity and security is threatened. All states and international organisations are to respect international law, which *inter alia* promotes the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights (e.g. United Nations Charter). This means there are legal obligations regarding security and development in every country.

Development arguments. The goal of poverty eradication is seriously compromised and MDGs will not be met unless progress is made in the weaker countries. The WB considers that 'fragile states' – identified as countries with particularly weak governance, institutions and capacity – comprise 9 percent of the developing world's population, but over one-fourth of the extreme poor (living on less than US$1 per day), nearly one-third of all child deaths and 29 percent of 12-years old who did not complete primary school in 2005[46]. It also concludes that 'fragile states' have lower absolute performance and slower improvement in economic and social indicators that non fragile ones. Therefore, the global optimism over the prospects for improved growth and poverty reduction does not apply to these countries: by 2015, it is estimated that extreme poverty levels in non-fragile countries will decline to 17 percent, more than achieving the MDG 1 target, while levels of extreme poverty in fragile states will remain over 50 percent, higher than the level in 1990. This 'MDG deficit' is particularly severe in several Sub-Saharan African countries, where there is a small decline in the share of people living in poverty, but the absolute number of poor has stagnated. For most MDGs, sub-Saharan Africa is more off-track than fragile states in general, and more fragile states are off track when compared to other developing countries. There are, however, countries that contradict this general tendency, such as Mozambique or Uganda, that have made a successful transition to sustained gains in growth and poverty reduction.

Security arguments. The UN's High Level Panel report provides a comprehensive justification for international engagement in fragile situations and difficult environments. It goes beyond traditional concerns and includes in the threats to national and international security "economic

44 The concept appeared in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 as a new people-centred concept that included economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political aspects of security. For more recent bibliography, see for instance, Human Security Brief 2006, University of British Columbia, Canada (available at: www.humansecuritycentre.org); **Kaldor, Mary; Martin, M.; Selchow, S. 'Human security:** a new strategic narrative for Europe.' *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007), pp. 273-288., or *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*, 2004.

45 UN (2004), High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, "*A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*", 2, 14-16.

46 *World Bank (2007), Global Monitoring Report* 2007.

and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons proliferation; terrorism; and transnational organized crime"[47]. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security also underlines an often forgotten dimension in such contexts. In many cases the threat posed by fragile or failed states is not urgent or acute, neither is the principal serious direct threat to international peace and security; but all the above mentioned threats are more likely to emerge in fragile environments and must be taken into account in any analysis and policy.

In fact, disengagement theoretically disappeared as an option after September 11, when Western nations and the US in particular became aware of the close links between their own national security and stability in the world's poorest regions. Security and development came to be complementary goals, not just in fragile states, but regionally and globally as well.

Financial arguments. Many studies provide compelling evidence that the price of disengagement is too high to be a serious policy alternative. Thus, analysis by Chauvet and Collier includes direct costs (such as investment in post-conflict reconstruction) and indirect costs associated with fragility (such as regional destabilisation) and concludes that the total costs of state failure are huge at local, regional and global levels[48]. Evidence has already demonstrated the cost-benefit ratios of investments in conflict prevention: on average €1 spend in conflict prevention generates over €4 of savings to the international community. So, what is new is not so much the phenomenon of 'fragility' per se, but rather the *securitisation* of the problem.

The reasons for engaging are not exclusively at the donor side, being even more important for the regions where a fragile state is located. A country that is submerged in a situation of fragility or instability can easily become highly contagious and have spill-over effects to neighbouring countries, affecting development and security in the whole region. Likewise, 'islands of good-performance' cannot be sustainable over time, if they are surrounded by conflict-affected countries and poor performers. Regional neighbours of fragile countries also have strong reasons to engage, and the efforts being pursued by African continental and regional organisations on this issue is a case in point (*see 2.5.2*).

1. The EU approach towards situations of fragility and difficult environments should build on the *main features of fragility*, taking into account the variety of situations that this definition entails.
2. The EU should make a *strong statement on the need to engage in fragile situations*, based on *moral, legal, development and security arguments*. The EU aim to build a better and more secure world presupposes an adequate response to the main security threats, including state failure (identified in the European Security Strategy as "an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability"). As poverty alleviation is one of the main goals of EU external action, the EU intervention also needs to be based on a moral obligation to provide assistance to the most needed countries and populations, even if they don't represent a direct threat to the EU.

47 UN (2004), *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*.
48 Chauvet. L. and Collier, P. (2004), *Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds*, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.

3. In the context of international commitments towards the increase of ODA, it is desirable that the EU strategy includes a strong commitment to raise funds *targeted to development and long-term actions* in countries that face situations of fragility or are conflict-prone or conflict-affected. Some *predictability of funds and long-term engagement* has to be ensured, focused on development cooperation actions that are *conflict-sensitive* (having conflict prevention as the main focus).

1.4. Donor Strategies

The international community is increasingly aware of issues particular to fragile situations and has been considering alternative approaches tailored to the characteristics of specific countries. However, policy and practice are still at an early stage. Some recent donor efforts are presented in *Annex* C.

In general terms, *two broad approaches* currently dominate responses to state fragility, each driven by different motivations and policy recommendations.

a) 'Security first' approach: security concerns and short-term responses

This approach is grounded in the assumption that fragile and failed states are a threat to national security and international order. As stressed by USAID and the US National Security Strategy, the central aim is to create a new world order that favours democracy (Bush's Freedom Agenda) and defeats terror at the same time. Embedded in national and international security concerns, the responses are based in short-term security policies that can provide immediate stability – such as strengthening domestic military and police forces, limiting opportunities for international terrorist activities and suppressing transnational crime. Most responses are reactive rather than preventive and coordination efforts are at internal level, in order to quickly mobilise and coordinate American response to any emerging conflict or unstable situation. The main focus are states deemed to be most at risk of instability, that pose the greatest risk of regional destabilization and that can impact most seriously on American national security. The USAID Fragile States policy suggests that the method and level of internal coordination will likely depend on the country's strategic importance to American security interests. In its extreme, this security approach can lead to a militarised approach.

b) Development concerns and long-term assistance

This approach is based on a development-oriented perspective and emphasises the significant challenges posed by state fragility to alleviate poverty and achieve the MDGs. The OECD Learning Advisory process on Difficult Partnerships and the DfID strategies are examples that mainly address aid related issues, such as its effectiveness, coordination among donors and actors at all levels, programming flexibility and aid impact. In this perspective, policies and external assistance must create conditions to address the basic needs of citizens, enhance opportunities for education and employment, reduce disease and malnutrition and increase the partner country's performance in several social and economic indicators. Geographically, it also tends to have a strong focus in Sub-Saharan African, since many poor performers are located in this region.

The two perspectives define 'fragile states' according to different criteria, result in a different list of unstable states and prescribe different policy approaches. Sometimes, the pursuit of one has undermined the efforts of the other, as in Afghanistan, where the activities to neutralise terrorism and organised crime included campaigns to eradicate poppies, that also provided much

of the income of poor Afghans. Being the dominant mainstay of the economy, the efforts to combat drug production has serious consequences for economic development, if they are not accompanied by other measures and programmes to address employment and agricultural production issues.

The *two approaches can also be complementary* in many aspects, and attention should be paid to bring them more in line with each other, in a manner that serves both ends. Terrorism can only be prevented by concentrating on its root causes – such as poverty and inequality – security is also a prerequisite for development (as stated in the ESS). Most findings and lessons on international engagement in situations of fragility argue that combining the two perspectives is not just possible, but highly recommended through PCD and WoG approaches.

In conceptual and strategic terms, one way to combine the two approaches is the *Human Security*[49] paradigm, which pursue both 'freedom from fear' (the goal of public safety) and 'freedom from want' (the goal of human development). It is based in six basic principles[50]:

i) The primacy of human rights, including economic and social rights as well as political and civil rights.
ii) The goal of establishing a legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security (which applies both to physical security, where the rule of law and a well functioning system of justice are essential, and to material security, where issues of employment, provision of infrastructure and public services require state policies).
iii) The promotion of multilateralism, through a commitment to work with other international institutions (particularly within the UN framework), sharing tasks with regional organisations (NATO and OSCE in Europe) and reinforcing partner countries institutions (e.g. AU, and SROs in Africa). It also includes creating common rules and norms and coordination between different policy areas.
iv) The implementation of a bottom-up approach, that integrates the concepts of 'partnership', 'participation' and 'ownership' not only to development but also to security policies. Communication, consultation and dialogue are essential tools for this.
v) Regional focus.
vi) Emphasis on the importance of legal instruments, through the establishment or restoration of the rule of law in partner countries (legal frameworks, civilian capabilities for law enforcement such as the police, court officials and judges).

The human security paradigm also involves a strong commitment to peace-building[51]: a willingness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the basic conditions for making sustainable security and development possible.

1. The EU response towards situations of fragility must be grounded in a *multidimensional approach* that combines instruments from different policy areas – going beyond the direction

49 The Commission on Human Security uses a broad definition of human security: "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment".

50 (2004): *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.* Independent Study Presented to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, Barcelona, September.

51 The term "peace-building" entered the international lexicon with the 1992 Agenda for Peace (UN) and has gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle; thus, conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building are currently considered two sides of the same coin. Tschirgi, N. (2003*): Peace-building as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?*, IPA.

that the ESS sets out. It must emphasise *multilateralism and law-enforcement* as concepts that can be beneficial to development.

2. The EU strategy can be *distinctive by being based in a Human Security Approach*, focusing on protecting the safety and livelihoods of individuals. This has greater potential to address the new challenges posed by fragility as it combines security, conflict prevention and development in holistic principles that can promote structural stability.

1.5. Challenges and Dilemmas to Donors

Because the factors creating state fragility are diverse, because it is manifested in a variety of forms and because the needs of these countries are multifaceted (encompassing simultaneously short-term and long-term needs), international responses tend to be *dispersed and poorly coordinated*. Actors that have a 'fragile states agenda' are working in humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and peace-building, DDR, post-conflict reconstruction, responses to small arms proliferation, anti-terrorist activities, combating organised crime, alleviating poverty, reinforcing state institutions and promoting good governance, service delivery, containing diseases (such as HIV-AIDS), addressing trade and economic issues, etc. This raises important issues about *priority setting, coordination and coherence*.

Furthermore, acting in situations of fragility and difficult environments is still a *recent area of knowledge*. While there is a growing theoretical thinking and production, there are weak linkages with field action. On the one hand, field delegations and development workers have few practical orientations that can help them respond quickly and effectively to the challenges that these countries represent. On the other hand, field experiences are also being lost (by the constant turnover in donor staff) and are often not mainstreamed into development cooperation strategies and policies. This highlights the need for better information exchanges between field delegations and headquarters, between conceptualisation and implementation phases, and between donors.

Engaging in fragile situations is difficult, it entails risks and poses important policy dilemmas. A study for the Canadian government shows *virtually no correlation between levels of fragility and aid per capita*, therefore raising important questions about aid effectiveness and commitments followed by the international community[52]. If poverty alleviation is not the only goal of development aid in fragile countries, but also includes issues such as conflict prevention or improvements in human rights, then some adjustments to the aid paradigm have to be made. It is currently recognised that ODA is only one of several instruments to address state fragility and experience shows that impacts are not related to the amount spent, but to the use of an appropriate combination of instruments. But how can the available instruments be combined to reach better results?

The main challenges posed to donor engagement can be summarised as:

Addressing short and long-term needs

Fragile environments usually entail several short-term and long-term needs, which have to be addressed jointly. Particularly after a crisis, and before capacity-building measures can show results, it is important to ensure "quick wins" about peace and democracy, which are only possible

52 CIFP (2006); *Failed and Fragile States 2006: A Brief Note for the Canadian Government.*

by addressing the bottlenecks of construction/reconstruction (basic infrastructure, education/health, productive activities and livelihood conditions) through the implementation of an effective LRRD strategy. Reality on the ground often shows that there is no rigid separation or border line between humanitarian, development and security-related actions, or between conflict and post-conflict phases.

This theoretical delimitation actually inhibits actions dealing with the specific needs and the rapidly evolving environment of fragile situations, as it does not reflect realities on the ground. However, many donors, including the EC, still have rigid mandates and fixed programming timeframes that can hamper the ability to adapt the responses to these multiple needs. For instance, the different mandates on humanitarian and development structures and actions, or the separation between development and security/peace-related activities (DDR being a case in point) often result in 'grey areas' that are not fulfilled, or in delayed transitions from one type of action to the other, or simply in inadequate actions when other types of action directed at deeply interrelated aspects are not addressed.

Immediate results versus sustainability

Donors are frequently more interested in concrete results and therefore target most of their assistance towards electoral support and monitoring, humanitarian interventions and other short-term actions. However, quick-fix palliatives to structural problems do not work. Although humanitarian aid can save lives, it does not address the causes and characteristics of chronic state fragility; election support doesn't ensure that the elected government is supported through a process of strengthening state institutions. State-building is inherently difficult and it entails a long-term process (often with advances and setbacks), with no quick, visible or quantifiable results. Taking into consideration the programming timeframes, mandates and ways of operating (including the pressure for measurable results and visible impacts), external agencies face severe limitations in pursuing this goal. In this regard, the EC process of awarding contracts for implementation of projects and programmes does not always encourage such long-term engagement.

Disengagement versus pro-active engagement

Disengagement from a fragile situation may avoid the risks of compliance with dubious regimes, but will not promote reform and can reinforce a decline in human development (the case of Sudan in past years). Although disengagement is increasingly regarded as a bad option, sometimes agencies are forced to suspend cooperation in face of severe incompliance with international or agreed criteria. On the other hand, uncritical engagement with repressive or authoritarian regimes can equally serve to reinforce them (e.g. Rwanda before the genocide). The use of strong conditionalities (e.g. holding elections) can also delay the disbursement of funds that are essential for post-conflict reconstruction or for state capacity-building. This is also linked to the legitimacy of foreign intervention, since the dilemma between the responsibility to protect and national sovereignty is currently very present in the debates with the developing world.

While there are many dilemmas on the ways and level of engagement that donors should pursue, there is a growing consensus on the need to engage in a proactive manner and from the earliest stages (with a strong focus on preventive strategies). These can be combined, if necessary, with ad-hoc responses once the crisis has occurred.

Donor capacities versus political will

The question of donors' political will to engage is crucial. Very often, windows of opportunity were missed because there was a lack of strategic interest in a given country (e.g. US interest in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, versus disengagement in other Sub-Saharan African conflicts). This leads to inconsistent allocation criteria that are usually contested by the partner countries and regions and also to timing discrepancies, since the political timeline is usually not the same as the operational timeline. Even where there is a political will to implement an integrated approach towards a situation of fragility, the issue of capacity inevitably comes up: donors face institutional and operational constrains that undermine their ability to respond in a timely and adequate manner (the EU not being an exception). Therefore, issues of political will and capacity need to be addressed if one is to engage in situations of fragility.

Combining democratisation with peace-building

Holding elections or the existence of 'acceptable governance' is often a donor's preferred form of conditionality, but not necessarily or always the most effective one or the best starting point. Other elements, like government commitment to good economic governance and accountability for the well-being of its people are often disregarded as a valid yardstick for donor assistance. Elections are almost universally regarded as helpful in reducing conflict; if they are rigged, conducted at the very early stages of post-conflict transition, or attract a low turnout, they can also be ineffective or even harmful to stability. In fact, electoral democracy appears to have only a modest impact on the stability of countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, Kenya, Venezuela, Nigeria or Indonesia.

One should distinguish between the normative connotations of democracy and the practical implications a democratisation process may have for the human security and livelihoods of people in a given context. This is a very sensitive issue that has resulted in intense and complex debates among donors on the links between democratisation and conflict, mostly biased by political interpretations. How to balance the pursuit of democracy with the need for short-term stability to enable consolidation of the peace-process and prevent social conflicts continues to be one of the main challenges.

Promoting reforms versus ensuring stability

External efforts to strengthen states with institutional reforms, whether national or local, are often destabilizing because of the political implications of the reforms for local actors. The plurality of actors involved in external assistance also tends to impose a huge, unmanageable list of demands on weak governments and to treat outcomes considered unsuccessful as a matter of 'political will' rather than local capacity and resources to implement the demands or the genuine political conflicts they provoke. Fragile countries are particularly vulnerable to external shocks, either because the response must be faster than its institutions can manage or because different institutions are required and the transition can be highly conflictual. Any institutional change – including reforms in governance demanded or supported by external assistance – has direct distributional consequences, therefore instigating dispute among those who will lose privileges. This is particularly evident in sensitive areas such as the military or politics. The challenge is to find the right timing and sequencing of reforms that can contribute to state-building without fuelling social and political tensions. In such contexts, particular attention should also be given to the issue of job creation.

With whom to work? Alignment versus direct actions

When donors engage in fragile situations, they often establish parallel systems because government systems are weak. This approach can ultimately undermine capacity and state-building goals. A particular issue in the social sectors is the potential gaps in service delivery in the so called 'transition phase' between the end of a humanitarian crisis or violent conflict and the beginning of longer-term recovery and reconstruction programmes. Aligning with national policies and systems is particularly problematic in states with weak institutional capacity and even more in 'unwilling' states where the government is unresponsive to the international community. Being a mere spectator of a donor-driven show, the local population and even some politicians may start to look to external agents as the providers for services, rather than to their own national government. Finding ways to deliver services quickly without harming long-term state capacity development is a major challenge.

The question of ownership also has sometimes problematic implications for the design and implementation of cooperation strategies. In many situations of fragility, reformers or local government actors and civil society groups often have other agendas than central government representatives. How to deal, for instance, with situations in which major political actors are still fully engaged in their power struggle and the government leadership is contested (e.g. Nepal)?

This does not mean that donors cannot work through partners at a more micro-level with local communities and actors. A variety of options might be considered, depending on the case and the context, the government is not necessarily always the main collaborator in the short-term. Considerable demand from communities for resources and rapid implementation of infrastructure and income generation activities often confirms the validity of working through local communities[53]. The role of the private sector should in this respect not be disregarded. However, the long-term objective should be to mainstream these projects into regional or national planning and programmes; otherwise they can create duplication, tensions among actors and social imbalances (between communities or regions).

Combining national with regional and sub-national approaches

Where sub-national fragility is involved (e.g. Northern Uganda, Darfur), or where cross-border issues are critical (e.g. Great Lakes, Manu River area), analysis and engagement need to be sufficiently flexible to move to these levels. This poses organisational challenges for donors geared to working at national levels and within the 'nation-state' framework. Regional or "situational" approaches (which refer to crisis that include parts of different territories or a specific part of the country, such as the Curds issue or the Eastern Congo' conflicts) are many times essential to address specific issues, such as drug trafficking, crime, rebel alliances, refugee flows, illegal exploitation of resources and others; however, their coordination with national programming and actions is still difficult. At sub-national levels, supporting civil society can sometimes be the only possible intervention, but working with local authorities can also be an option in other situations. In some cases, agreements by national authorities with international donors do not necessarily engage the political will of sub-national actors, which results in implementation gaps. How to include this sub-national focus into national programming and how to link all these actions and priorities into a comprehensive strategy of state-building is a further challenge and an important task of an inclusive and enlarged policy and political dialogue.

53 UN Quick Impact Projects are one example of possible means to address immediate needs at the local community level and through local actors. This is also one potential area for LRRD activities.

Linking security and development

It is widely recognised that security and development are interlinked: Security is a pre-condition for development and development will not be possible without a minimum level of security. This is particularly true in fragile environments, where the capacity to fulfil basic functions of governance – such as preserving law and order and ensuring access to basic services – is often weak. The need to make security and development interventions work together more effectively, without undermining each other and while sharing the same objectives, is currently recognised by most donors. However, there is a strong disconnect between the policy rhetoric about integrated approaches at the international level and policy realities at sectoral and field level *(see also 2.6.)*.

Moreover, countries are usually on different security and development trajectories that require different mixes of security and development policies specific to their needs. It is critical that interventions be tailored to the needs of the country. International actors tend, nevertheless, to rely upon a standard set of policy tools that are not necessarily compatible[54].

There is currently little common understanding on how these two spheres can be combined at the operational level. This is due to several factors: The cultural and institutional differences between security/military and development institutions are considerable; there is a discrepancy of mandates, variance in time horizons and mission frameworks (military and security interventions tend to focus on short-term actions and limited timeframes while development is regarded as a long-term quest); there are often tensions between development goals and foreign policies; and the suspicion with which some parts of the development and security community regard each other is still a stumbling-block[55]. For instance, some within development organisations are concerned that the involvement of defence and security organisms in development work might lead to a subordination of development to security objectives in the post-9/11 international context, or that attention is diverted from countries where there is no evident security challenge. Therefore, little progress has been made towards proper integration and complementarity of military and development objectives and methods within donor strategies and actions. This collaboration will nevertheless be necessary, given the increased donor engagement in tasks that comprise these several dimensions – such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) or Security Sector Reform (SSR)[56].

A positive note is the debate within the EU promoted by the Portuguese Presidency on the linkages between security and development as part of the on-going efforts to strengthen EU policy coherence. Commission and Council services have recently produced a joint working paper on the issue, proposing concrete suggestions to strengthen coherence between these two areas of EU external action, on the basis of recent experiences and focusing on specific areas where such links are more evident and needed (e.g. strategic planning, SSR, EU-Africa partnership on peace and security, and humanitarian aid and security)[57].

54 IPA (2006); *The Security-Development Nexus: Research Findings and Policy Implications*. Program Report, International Peace Academy, New York

55 Cravinho, João (2007): *The EU's development policies are still out of step with its security role*. Europe's World, Summer 2007.

56 SSR extends well beyond the narrow focus of more traditional assistance on defence and security; security systems include: the armed forces, police, intelligence services and similar bodies, judicial and penal institutions, as well as elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. parliament). See OECD-DAC (2005); *Security Systems Reforms and Governance*, DAC Reference Document and the *OECD (2007), Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*.

57 *Joint Council Secretariat – Commission Services Working Paper on Security and Development – Food for thought to strengthen EU policy coherence*; 2 October 2007.This issue was also on the agenda of the joint development and defense ministers meeting at the GAERC in 10-20 November 2007; see External Relations Council (Provisional) Conclusions, 19-20/11/2007, on this issue.

1.6. Addressing Fragility

The general consensus about engaging in fragile situations can be summarized as follows:

1. *Each context is different.* Each situation of fragility is complex and its particular problems unique, which presents difficult policy challenges for donors. Each donor strategy must entail a profound political and social analysis of each specific context. Some states might have the willingness to engage but are incapable of doing so, while others might have the capacity but not the necessary political will. This requires differentiated approaches. There is no single approach or 'one size-fits all' prescription, but rather differentiated strategies that have to focus on context and policy objectives, combined with flexible use of various instruments.

2. Despite the progress made in theoretical approaches and thinking, *the causes of state failure* are still overlooked in donor activities. Addressing the causes is far more cost effective than having to undertake remedial action by way of military intervention once failure actually occurs. Despite this, donor interventions still mainly react to symptoms. Therefore, donors should move away from isolated, self-standing political aid projects towards a more comprehensive approach that addresses the political causes of state fragility (history, power relations, 'rules of the game' and the relationship between these and formal institutions, social discrimination, blurred distinction between political and military dimensions, etc). Taking into account the causes of fragility and the conflict impacts in every development strategy is essential to ensure its success – *conflict analysis* should be a pre-requisite for programme development and policy formulation.

3. Countries move in and out of a fragility situation as they can also move from conflict to post-conflict and then regress, walk forward and backwards in a highly volatile environment. Frequently, there are no clear 'beginnings' or 'endings' (e.g. Israeli-Palestinian conflict, South Caucasus). The *'conflict-cycle' terminology is misleading* and does not reflect the reality of situations on the ground, where multiple stages may be present at once. It also creates a false distinction between 'conflict prevention' and 'country rehabilitation' or 'reconstruction', which are mainly the same activities in different contexts and should be carried out inside a *broader goal to stabilize the country and manage of the risk of crises*[58]. However, donor structures and programming cycles are still very rigid, applying response models accordingly to the category (e.g. 'conflict' / 'post-conflict'), mainly due to institutional and management factors. Donors should move from a project approach – based on expected precise and quantifiable results – to a *framework or process approach* – based on a general goal to be achieved and focused in the dynamics and quality of the process itself –, allowing for a regular review and reorientation of funds/activities whenever necessary (rolling programming or interactive approaches).

4. Fragile situations involve *simultaneous short-term and long-term needs, emergency and development needs*. The dynamics of conflict and fragility are discontinuous and sequential approaches are far less effective than 'joined-up' strategies that combine all policy tools in a coherent package. The links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development need to be ensured in the same timeframe, that is, simultaneously. Timings and flexibility are fundamental in responding to fragile environments, and require a mixture of approaches and instruments (including political, security, humanitarian and development instruments).

58 The EC states that conflict prevention activities should be "designed before a conflict (preventing the outbreak), during a conflict (preventing its spread) and after (preventing its re-emergence"). *Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Conflict Prevention*, January 2006.

5. A main focus of donor interventions should be to *help national reformers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions*. However, donors are compelled to use resources in 'traditional' development sectors', often for reasons of accountability, quantitative performance criteria and results assessments. The specific needs of fragile situations have shifted development actions to areas such as state-building, conflict prevention activities or reconciliation initiatives, which require a long-term engagement, not always with identifiable or quantifiable measures of success and impact. These areas should not be neglected for bureaucratic and procedural reasons; they should be the main focus of donor action in fragile countries. This also means that donors should intervene only when they will add value to the peace-building process.
What are some other key issues?

1.6.1. Democracy

Donors often focused on the rapid establishment of democracy and government legitimacy, particularly in post-conflict situations, presuming it to be a central issue of state (re)building and peace consolidation. Several recent studies conclude that democracy-peace relations are not linear or cause-effect. In fact, while established democracies and entrenched autocracies tend to be relatively stable, countries experiencing transition phases towards democracy are more likely to degenerate in conflict and instability[59]. Though democracy is a valuable ultimate goal that has the tendency to promote peaceful states over the long-term, fragile states often have short-term vulnerabilities that can make transition to effective democratic governance problematic and destabilising, particularly in those with strong social (e.g. ethnic or religious) cleavages[60]. Rather than expecting the 'right' outcome straight away, elections have to be viewed as a process, the choice being usually between bad and less bad alternatives[61]. The side effects of rapid democratisation in volatile environments may include the strengthening of radical groups or an increasing willingness of socially or politically disadvantaged groups to resort to violence. Some donors therefore emphasise that external actors should not wait for all the conditions to be met or try to build an 'ideal' government, but rather support the minimum institutions and capacity that exists to start promoting changes, and be realistic about what and how much can be achieved according to each specific context – the so-called 'good-enough governance' (a basic level of commitment)[62].

Chauvet and Collier demonstrate that the risk of a post-conflict country reversing to conflict is significantly higher in the period following post-conflict elections than in the period preceding elections. This risk may have important implications for the sequencing of electoral, peacekeeping, and development assistance. It is important to ensure that electoral assistance in fragile

59 Goldstone, J et al.(2000), *State Failure Task Force Report, Phase III Findings*, University of Maryland.
60 Holding elections in DRC without making significant progress in establishing integrated armed forces and effective policing or in delivering economic opportunities to an impoverished population has not removed the sources of violence. Likewise, the successful recent democratic transitions in South America, Eastern Europe and South Africa have had many preconditions of democracy in place before voting started. See, for instance, ID21 (2007); *Retaining Legitimacy in Fragile States*. Id21 Insights 66, Communicating Development Research, Institute of Development Studies, May.
61 Batt, Judy (2004); *Failing States and the EU's Security Agenda*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
62 Grindle, Merilee. 2004. "Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*. Vol. 17:525-548. The author suggests that a good enough governance agenda would be based on "a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what's working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously, and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country" (p.525). See also Grindle, Marilee (2005): *Good Enough Governance Revisited*. A Report for DFID with reference to the
Governance Target Strategy Paper, 2001. Harvard University, February.

transitions is properly sequenced with decisions to maintain or draw down peace-keeping troops, and with aid-financed efforts to support measures to generate growth and employment and other initiatives that may mitigate the risks of reversion to conflict.

Some studies also argue that donors should act slowly and cautiously, concentrating on developing the political culture and principles for democracy over a wide range of actors, rather than the specific structures. In fact, the imposition of institutions that match donors' own pluralistic democracies might trigger rejection or increase instability in the short-term. Local expectations about the state functions and local decision-making processes should be taken into account (such as traditional local leaders, gatherings of elders, traditional conflict-resolution methods, and other infra-state structures). The promotion of locally grown traditions can further enhance domestic acceptance of newly created leadership structures (e.g. through elections).

1. The EU has often been criticised as being incoherent in promoting democracy, since conflicting national interests of MS and complicated procedures have limited the visibility and effectiveness of many programmes. While having democratisation as a valid long-term goal for peace and state consolidation, the EU should be particularly *cautious on post-conflict settings about the timing of elections, pursuing an analysis of all the fragility and instability factors*.
2. While traditionally the EU has put most of its direct 'democracy-building' efforts into election support, it increasingly recognises that this is a much *broader concept* that requires a variety of approaches. On the one hand, any electoral funding should be embedded in a *wider governance or state-building programme*. On the other hand, EU engagement should not be exclusively dependent of the establishment of an electoral democracy, but rather focus on the *promotion of a culture of democratic politics* over a wide range of actors.
3. Compliance with a range of universal human rights can be combined with respect for local ownership and traditions. EU approaches should therefore promote *linkages between high-level political process and grass roots democracy-building measures*.

1.6.2. State-building and Governance

Most lessons learned point to the crucial importance of state-building in fragile situations. However, the demand for quick results often leads the international community to substitute domestic structures rather than support them, which ultimately might lead to weaker state capacities. The issue of local ownership is fundamental for successful state-building actions, including technical assistance. Most studies conclude that these are more successful when they support activities within a nationally defined and nationally owned programme. How soon to transfer responsibilities back to local institutions is still an important dilemma of external action.

Institutions establish and embody the rules and procedures for how a state is governed. There needs to be a broader understanding of institutional support than has been recognised up until now, which includes a long-term engagement. Withdrawing support and funding to institutions before their capacities have been built up sufficiently can sharply increase the likelihood that a country will face political instability[63]. This broader understanding must also include a shift from purely technical solutions supported by individual champions of reform, to donor approaches that address state-society relationships and the political incentives and institutions that really

63 Vallings, Claire and Moreno-Torres, Magüi (2005); *Drivers of fragility – what makes states fragile*, p.22.

affect prospects for reform. For instance, support for financial reform has to be a part of a wider strategy to promote good governance and administrative capacity across a state's civil service (and this should be as coordinated as possible between donors). Capacity-building programmes have to target the root causes of fragility and not just the symptoms. Institutional change matters more than organisational change[64].

Table 1: **Comparison of Capacity Development in 'Fragile' and 'Non-fragile States'[65]**

Similarities	Differences
> Need to consider sustainability and reinforcement of endogenous capacity. > Long timeframe. > Change agents and champions, political will and ownership. > Importance of adaptation of intervention templates. > Systems perspective to capture complexity and interconnections.	> Pressure to restore services and security quickly. > Short timeframe. > Limited capacity to build on. > Often not simply rebuilding, but creating new capacities. > Little 'margin of error' (e.g., lack of: trust and social capital, institutional resilience, etc.). > Hyper-politicized environment.

Not all governance concerns need to be addressed at the same time[66]. Facing a wide range of capacity problems, donors have to be clear on selectivity (which agencies or institutions to target), priority (which capacity issues and reforms are most urgent) and sequencing questions (what is the most suitable process of reforms)[67]. Support for targeted reform that does not overwhelm governments with unrealistic demands has proven to be more effective. This can be critical to the legitimacy and political will that is necessary to carry through further reform. Priority should be given to the reinforcement of the rule of law (e.g. SSR programmes), which includes the reform of the 'core five' institutions: military, police, civil service, system of justice (formal and informal), and leadership[68]. In countries that are unwilling to cooperate, donors should try to identify champions or drivers of change (such as moderate and progressive people within government or leaders of civil society organisations).

Governance is also a home-grown process that is interlinked with state-building and should not be led by donor agendas. There is no particular institutional model for governance, but a broader strategic approach should be developed on the basis of partnership and ownership, avoiding a narrow and technical perspective (e.g. fight against corruption, which is an outcome of weak governance). Such a holistic approach should involve the essentials of efficient and effective governance, namely: adherence to the rule of law, competent and fair judiciaries, effective police services and criminal justice systems, and professional civil service with an ethos of democratic governance.

64 DfID (2007): *Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID's work in building more effective states*, p.6-7.
65 Brinkerhoff, D. (2007): *Capacity Development in Fragile States*, p.15.
66 In Afghanistan, the reforms covered by donors are wide ranging and have led to more than one hundred pieces of pending legislation, ultimately resulting in an institutional blockage and ineffectiveness.
67 World Bank (2006). *Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress*. Washington, DC: World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group.
68 For instance, in Afghanistan the police and the judiciary have been woefully neglected in reconstruction efforts, contributing to increase insecurity.

Special attention must be given to the partner country's own mechanisms (even at informal level – such as traditional conflict mediation practices) and organisational and institutional culture. Models based exclusively on western institutions often disregard the local dynamics and can be disastrous. For instance, in the Solomon Islands, there is a tension between efforts to re-build the western model of state-building with efforts to address some of the causes of the 1998-2003 conflict. The inappropriateness of the Westminster parliamentary system was one of the causes for instability, but the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands is reinforcing it through capacity-building measures.[69] In other words, it is important to match new systems, procedures and capacities with positive aspects of what exists on the ground. This will reduce divisions within societies and ensure that all parts of the society feel included[70].

This also implies that existing national, regional and continental mechanisms and structures with a role in promoting good-governance in situations of fragility should be adequately supported and reinforced – such as the good-governance national programmes or the AU APRM.

1. Building a state that can maintain security and provide for the needs of its people should be the *central focus* of EU engagement in fragile situations and difficult environments. The EU should recognise that all its activities have implications for long-term state-building.
2. EU state-building actions must have *realistic goals*: instead of engaging in ambitious and comprehensive plans of reforms that will inevitably frustrate expectations, the focus should be on creating a decently functioning state, starting with *basic, targeted and priority reforms*. Instead of building a 'strong' but flawed from the outset state, the aim is to build resilience and enable states to operate in a long-term perspective. This implies using *political dialogue mechanisms to create openings for reforms and an approach that goes beyond technical solutions*. It should address political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform.
3. Capacity-building and governance initiatives have to based on a *stronger and profound understanding* of the context (including power, state-society interactions, role of different forces, etc), and, in doing this, try to increasingly use local expertise and knowledge.
4. A key objective of state-building is to strengthen *national capacities*. Technical assistance personnel should be combined with other ways of building capacities such as on-the-job training, exchanges and structural and attitudinal changes. State-building activities should take into account the partner country's own mechanisms, organisational and institutional culture, rather than focusing on western institutional models. It is preferable to begin such programmes with no preconceptions about the 'right' types of institutions.
5. The EU must ensure that the principles established in the 2006 EC Communication on Governance[71] have a *practical implementation* at field level by mainstreaming them into cooperation programmes. Multi-levels of political dialogue can provide for effective means to engage with fragile situations: the EU engagement at a national, regional and continental level in Africa illustrates such approaches.

69 Baser, Heather (2007): Provision of *Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands: What can we learn from the RAMSI experience?*; Discussion paper no. 76, ECDPM, September.
70 Brinkerhoff, D. (2007): *Capacity Development in Fragile States*.
71 *Governance in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonised approach within the European Union;* COM(2006)421.

1.6.3. Aid Modalities

The predominant current approach to fragile situations and difficult environments tends to favour the use of projects rather than budget support, use NGOs and other non-state actors[72] rather than state implementers, invest less money over shorter time periods and rely on humanitarian aid more that in development approaches, although humanitarian aid can be no substitute to political solutions.

We must acknowledge that the objective in these situations is threefold: meeting immediate needs and delivering basic social services to rapidly address civic needs; building sustainable systems within and outside government to formulate policy and deliver services; and supporting pro-poor domestic political reform. A combination and flexible use of various instruments at the same time is highly recommended. The selection and design of instruments must be made according to the objectives and the specific context, rather than having preconceived notions of suitability.

Humanitarian aid is frequently expected to contribute to objectives that are not the core purpose of these actions (which is to reduce suffering and save lives), sometimes tending to become the catch-all solution in fragile situations, and particularly during violent conflict. It is sometimes used as an instrument to by-pass the state in poorly-governed countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Zimbabwe), but it is by definition a short-term intervention and not a crisis management or state-building tool. Therefore, is has to be coordinated and complemented with long-term development approaches towards capacity-building. Much humanitarian aid is still fragmented; greater use of pooled funding and trust funds could potentially enhance the quality of the responses and donor coordination, if more transparent, quicker in the disbursements, more reliable and predictable (commitments are not always fulfilled and often made on a yearly-basis) and if involving local partners[73].

Projects offer a way of working in difficult development partnerships that provides access to public goods and basic services and can also be very useful in situations of state collapse, to compensate for the total inefficiency of central structures. In unwilling or illegitimate governments, shadow alignment is one possibility to be explored[74].

Various types of *pooled funding* – such as Social Funds or Multi-Donor Trust Funds have strong potential to increase harmonisation. *Social Funds* are a useful way to get funds directly to communities for small investments and have a higher degree of design flexibility that allows adaptation to local contexts. Case-studies show that they tend to be more successful when aligned with priorities of the respective ministries or linked to government structures in the development of service delivery systems (e.g. Yemen). Like national programmes, social funds can also help to enhance state legitimacy in that grants are seen as coming from the state. However, when some minimum conditions are not met – such as basic administrative infrastructure – implementation tends to be slow.

72 Non-state actors encompass diverse groups and sectors, including the business sector, religious groups, women's and youth organisations, NGOs, professional associations and the media.

73 On a critical analysis of lessons from experience in using trust funds see namely *Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace*. Annexes to COM(2007) 643 final, 25/10/2007, SEC (2007) 1417, pp 15-16.

74 This means that donors are compatible with national systems without subjugating them to government priorities or policies (for instance putting aid "on budget" but not "through budget"). Christiansen, K., Coyle, E and Lockhart, C. (2004), *Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States*, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, Report prepared for the OECD-DAC.

Multi-donor trust funds have been used in fragile situations as tools for humanitarian response (e.g. OCHA in Angola and DRC), for post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, East-Timor, Afghanistan) or for specific issues, such as SSR and DDR (e.g. DDR in Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes). They can have the advantage of raising more funds, enhancing coordination among donors and ensuring a more predictable and equitable resource allocation, if the identified shortcomings in the commitment they entail and in the way they are managed are addressed. Global Funds to address specific issues at a wider geographic level can also contribute to a common development goal, but they carry the risk of creating separate planning, financing and delivery channels that distort national priorities. The linkage with country-led processes is again one condition for success.

Budget support has been used with some positive impacts via Trust Funds in the early stages of state formation (e.g. Afghanistan, East Timor) and directly to the government in post-conflict settings (e.g. Rwanda, Sierra Leone). Such programme aid instruments, although depending on the efficiency and effectiveness of government policies, have a greater potential than other aid modalities to develop local capacity and systems in the medium-term, and support the principles of good donorship[75]. The ultimate goal is that the state can gradually exercise its most important functions: Setting priorities, making hard choices and managing expenditures. They tend to reduce demands on already limited government capacity, much of which often gets diverted to fulfilling individual donor requirements.

In short, research and experience in a number of countries suggest that:

- Where the state has the capacity to govern (in terms of a functioning political, bureaucratic and judicial system) but no commitment to poverty reduction ('unwilling states' or 'difficult partnerships'), donors should consider off-budget, joint, national or regional programmes with pooled funding and should use humanitarian projects only in response to needs. Sectoral programmes in social areas like health and education can also be an option.
- Where there is both little capacity and little commitment, donors should follow a similar pattern, but also with a focus on relationships with civil society and strengthening vulnerable communities though appropriate resources, training and transfers.
- Where there is commitment, but little capacity, donors should establish an arrangement between national governments and donors which would cover political, security and development strategies; create multi-donor trust funds for budget support and investment; and provide technical cooperation for developing local skills and capacity[76].

An EU strategy to address fragile situations and difficult environments should prefer *aid instruments that promote local ownership and accountability*. In that regard, social funds and joint programmes with multi-donor trust funds tend to be the most promising; they are often parallel systems to the government, but they are national and can be moved back to state control more easily than fragmented project approaches.

Budget support (with few conditionalities) is one of the possible tools for success in transition periods and in 'weak but willing states', since it can help countries meet short-term needs that

75 In Rwanda, budget support has strengthened the incentives for government departments to work together and has improved public financial management systems and government reporting and monitoring. DfID (2007): *Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DfID's work in building more effective states*, p. 52

76 See Leader, N. and Colenso, P. (2005); *Aid Instruments in Fragile States*, PRDE working paper no. 5, DfID, London.

can otherwise be destabilising factors (e.g. public officers and military salaries arrears), stabilise transitional governments or give important boost for elections. In some countries, the EU has played an important role in motivating other donors to provide this kind of support (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, Burundi. See Part II). This support can be done in a *step-by-step approach*, gradually laying down more stringent indicators for budget support – e.g. commitment and progress on financial management reforms, justice system and SSR, good governance and peace consolidation measures, or government investment in service delivery.

1.6.4. Aid Effectiveness

Adapting the DAC Principles[77]

The DAC Principles for Engagement in fragile states and situations[78] were developed and agreed by a joint process that involved several multilateral organisations (OECD-DAC, UNDP, WB, EC) and bilateral donors. This represents a concerted effort to coordinate approaches and find common responses, rather than pursuing independent agendas. However, the adoption of the principles and the piloting exercises were sometimes excessively theoretical (with no practical implementation consequences) and donor-driven (since a list of principles was presented to partner countries with no prior discussion). They also lack a clear statement of objectives and they do not include several dimensions that are considered fundamental by partner countries, particularly in Africa.

These principles have strategic, policy and organisational implications for donor agencies. At a strategic level, the principles need to be integrated in donor strategies. At policy level, international actors need to adopt 'whole-of-government/organisation approaches' that can foster close collaboration across the economic, development, diplomatic and security fields (the UN Peace-building Commission is an important step in this regard). At institutional and organisational levels, donors will have to create internal capacity to assess state fragility, to respond quickly to volatile environments, to build an adequate local presence and attract skilled staff to work in these countries. These are positive aspects for a more effective donor response in situations of fragility.

Generally, the EU should base its engagement in the adopted DAC principles, with several adaptations that were suggested by partner countries in the DAC piloting exercise:

> Establishing clear objectives for the agreed Principles, namely that they should contribute to poverty reduction;
> Debating the principles with partner countries on a case-by-case basis, to jointly select the most relevant and adapt them to specific realities;
> Actively implement the most relevant principles in EU programming;
> Expanding them to work in broader sectors, such as trade and environment;
> Including an additional regional dimension, by integrating regional approaches and supporting existing regional and continental structures to address fragile situations.
> supporting existing regional and continental structures to address fragile situations.

77 Annex D.
78 OECD-DAC (2006a); *Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, DAC Senior Level Meeting, 5-6 December 2006.

Engagement and Aid Absorption

Sustainable changes require a good fit between the intervention and the absorptive capacity of the partner country[79]. They also require engagement in the activities and a commitment to make them succeed on the part of the partner. The tendency of donors to allocate huge amounts of aid in a short-term period following the end of a violent conflict or elections holding, and to pull out in the medium-term when absorption levels are increasing, is highly counterproductive. Most studies highlight the necessity to:

- Adopt a more practical approach with smaller commitments of external funds that can be sustained over a longer period of time. The pace of resource commitment should be in line with the evolving capacity of the partner government.
- Invest in human capacities (there is some evidence that long-term investments in human capital can increase absorptive capacity even prior to government-wide reform).
- Initially focus aid on areas where capacity is least weak and try to remove barriers to effective use of future support. Plan reforms on a gradual basis in order to ensure sustainability[80].
- Complement government actions with capacity-building in the private sector and civil society.

The EU should ensure a pro-active long-term engagement that is focused in preventive strategies. At the same time, it must be aware of the absorptive capacity in fragile situations. A sustained and consistent commitment of financial resources must be ensured, with adaptations determined by the evolving capacity of the partner government. Any strategy must be based in a proper sequencing of reforms, as part of a gradual approach.

Coordination Issues

Uncoordinated and incoherent interventions in fragile situations and difficult environments can exacerbate tensions or undermine state-building efforts.[81] These countries are especially vulnerable to donor fragmentation and its potential burden on government capacity, since they are also less capable of leading donor coordination themselves. Furthermore, they are often unable to refuse aid. High poverty levels and a huge variety of needs tend to push the governments to accept all donor proposals, regardless of their conditions or their relevance to the country's own priorities, thus increasing the possible negative impacts of aid. This makes implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness[82] particularly important in fragile situations.

79 At the macro economic level, Mark McGillivray of the United Nations University in Helsinki showed in a presentation to AusAid on aid effectiveness (December 2006), that efficient aid is in the range of 20% of GDP for stable states and probably only 13% for highly fragile states because of their weaker institutions and hence smaller absorptive capacities.
Baser, Heather (2007): Provision of *Technical Assistance Personnel in the Solomon Islands: What can we learn from the RAMSI experience?* Discussion paper no. 76, ECDPM, September.

80 Chauvet and Collier state that trying to push policy reform on post-conflict states does not work and that policy reform should only be undertaken about 7 years after peace is restored. Before that, there is likely to be little ownership on the part of the government and thus no sustainability. In many cases, we have to distinguish between what works on a short-term basis and what is sustainable (and many of the things done in fragile states are not sustainable).

81 We can generally distinguish four levels of coordination: (i) intradepartmental, which calls for coordination of all development programmes targeting a given country within each donor department, in order to ensure that they share complementary objectives and methods; (ii) whole-of-government, which highlights coordination between aid and non-aid departments and ministries within donor governments; (iii) inter-donor, which refers to coordination among aid agencies and between aid and non-aid approaches across donors; and (iv) donor-partner, which calls for alignment between donors and the partner countries' needs and priorities. Picciotto, Robert et all. (2005); *Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence and Development Cooperation in Difficult Environments*, Background Paper for the Senior Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, DAC, January.

82 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness tracks progress of 12 indicators, in accordance with five partnership commitments: *ownership* of the partner country, *alignment* of the donors on the countries' national development framework, *harmonisation* of donors' actions, *management for results*, and *mutual accountability* of donors and partners for the results. The EU has argued for higher targets and has taken four extra-commitments: (a) to provide capacity-building assistance through coordinated programmes; (b) to channel 50% of government-to-government assistance through country systems; (iii) to avoid the establishment of any new Project Implementation Units; and (iv) to reduce the number of uncoordinated missions by 50%.

Developments in the last few years point to a general shift towards new experiences such as joint assistance strategies and co-financing between donors. However, donor coordination cannot be successful without a minimum level of common vision and purpose among donors about the fragility phenomenon. When donor activities cannot be harmonised, it is important to ensure that they are at least complementary.
The question of division of labour – that seeks to rationalise the number of donors present in a country or across sectors, accordingly to their comparative advantages – is central to the coordination debate. In fact, donors tend to be cautious on this, because of their competing interests, quest for visibility or disagreement over the main priorities. Lack of coordination often results in duplication of efforts (programmes that address the same issue), in regional imbalances (actions are concentrated in a few provinces), sectoral imbalances (some sectors can have dozens of donors –e.g. health, education – while others are clearly under-funded –e.g. environment, employment). These elements further undermine the possibility of a sustainable and harmonious development.

Although the DAC principles are meant to concretise the philosophy of the Paris Declaration in its application to fragile situations, the EU can go beyond the established guidelines on coordination and try to actively implement the Paris Declaration in fragile situations. It could focus on the central aims of state-building and conflict prevention/peace consolidation (as interrelated aspects). In this context, harmonization of donor intervention, promotion of the country's ownership and a gradual alignment with national priorities, are important elements to ensure a sustainable impact of development actions.

The EU should work both with Member States and with other international partners to develop common approaches and operating principles in fragile states. In particular this should focus on efforts to improve coordination and division of labour with organisations leading peace-building efforts, such as the United Nations and regional institutions.
The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy should be actively promoted and implemented to avoid duplications and increase complementarity and coherence within the EU actors (EU institutions and bilateral donors) – *see Part II, 2.4.3.*

Coherence among Donors

Evidence has shown that several policy areas can have strong impact in poverty reduction and development. The Policy Coherence for Development initiative promoted by the OECD seeks to promote policy coherence in support of the internationally agreed development agenda. The OECD Learning Advisory Process has made progress towards harmonizing and aligning donor agency actions in fragile environments, and in enhancing coordination between development agencies and security forces operating in the same territory. However, much progress still depends on particular political momentums: progress with multilateral debt relief was rapid after the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, but there was a lack of progress with multilateral trade reforms in the Doha Round. These two examples demonstrate how strong or weak international commitment can determine changes and progress.
The EU defines PCD as "ensuring that the EU takes account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries and

that these policies support development objectives." Having identified 12 areas in PCD[83], the debates on these issues have evolved to the promotion of PCD through 'whole-of-government' responses, as a necessity to overcome the particular difficulties faced by situations of fragility and difficult environments. Development alone cannot succeed in stabilizing a failed state, any more than a military intervention can rebuild political infrastructure. Therefore, according to the OECD definition, the WoG approach intends to promote "policy coherence within the administration of each international actor"[84].

Such whole-of-government/organisation approaches demand high coordination levels for an extended period of time, which has proven very difficult to attain. Within bilateral donors, policies are usually generated separately by ministries, each having different goals, languages, methods and approaches. Often, donors also support projects that do not add up to support a coherent strategy. The same happens between departments or bodies in multilateral agencies. There are many examples of incoherence at a strategic level, for instance between arms exports and conflict resolution efforts; trade and development objectives, etc.

Examples of Bilateral Whole-of-Government Approaches and Innovations

In 2004, the *US* established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation within the Department of State, which intends to coordinate all civilian government efforts to address state fragility and failure, including the State Department and USAID. It also draws resources from the Department of Defence, the intelligence community and other relevant government departments. It has also created a Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund.

The *UK* government has created two Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) to improve departmental coordination and priority-setting. One is focused on Sub-Saharan Africa (ACPP) and chaired by the Secretary of State for International Development; the other has a global scope (GCPP) and is chaired by the Foreign Secretary. The CPPs are jointly funded and administered by three departments of state: the Ministry of Defence (MOD), DfID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Pools receive specific funding from the Treasury and report separately to Parliament. An inter-departmental steering mechanism and a process for joint priority-setting for each conflict contribute to ensure coherence between departments. The CPPs brought together budgets for programme spending and peacekeeping costs, including all aspects of reconstruction, from security to economics, participation and social development. Recently, a decision was taken to merge the two geographic pools and create a separate fund for stabilisation, since many solicitations for stabilisation activities emerged within the CPPs.

The UK has also established a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit with specially trained civil and military personnel to integrate civil and military responses. Sierra Leone is an example of trying to establish a joined-up UK government support, where DfID, FCO and MOD have been working closely in the post-conflict phase (after UK military intervention). The UK cooperation is trying to go beyond the country-approach and investing in situational approaches, the Darfur being a case in point (e.g. it is the Sudan office that funds and coordinates humanitarian aid to Chad).

83 The 12 areas are: Trade, Environment, Climate Change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of Globalisation and employment, Migration, Research and Innovation, Information Society, Transport, and Energy.

84 OECD-DAC (2005b); *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Paris.

The policy coherence efforts at internal level are combined with strategic joint action in international forums; for instance, DfID, FCO and MOD developed a joint Security Sector Reform strategy, and the UK chaired the OECD task team on SSR.

In 2003, the *Netherlands* established an integrated policy framework that combines diplomacy, political dialogue, security, trade, and market access and development cooperation. It created a Stability Fund to enable rapid decisions on allocations for the promotion of peace, security and development in low and middle-income countries that are affected by conflicts; it combines resources drawn from aid and foreign policy budgets.

Canada pursues the '3D' model of coordination across the domains of Defence, Diplomacy and Development at a strategic level. It launched a Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (START) in order to facilitate a joint approach to crises and conflict prevention.

In 2003, *Sweden* adopted a bill which requires all major policy areas to contribute to sustainable global development and to promote the same goals internationally, especially within the EU.

Japan has established several cross-organisational task forces, consisting of representatives of several government departments (foreign affairs, international cooperation, Japan Bank for International Cooperation and Japan External Trade Organisation).

The EU should select the most relevant policy coherence areas in fragile situations and difficult environments (e.g. security, trade or migration, are clearly more relevant than 'transport' or 'information society') and invest in stronger linkages among these selected areas. A set of guidelines on how to ensure a security-development nexus in fragile situations and difficult environments should be elaborated.

The pursuit of a Whole-of-EU approach is not a goal in itself, but but rather a useful tool to promote the ultimate goal of encouraging development in partner countries, particularly when they are poorly equipped to lead or coordinate donors' activities.

PART II: THE EU RESPONSE STRATEGY

2.1. Policy Framework

In recent years, the EU has adopted a number of important documents and issued various policy statements stressing the need to address state fragility and improve the EU response[85].

However, the development of EU approach towards situations of fragility and difficult environments is not about creating another policy – to add to the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (2001), to the European Security Strategy, to the Action Plan for the Civilian Aspects of ESDP (2004), the European Consensus on Development (2005), the EC Communications on Governance or to the upcoming European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – but rather to bring all these policy commitments together into *a comprehensive framework* to address situations of fragility.

The EU is an economic world power and, although financial resources are not unlimited, it does have the economic, financial and, in some cases, the political clout to make a difference, even more so if its actions are coordinated 'in-house' (EC, Council and MS), as well as with local and international stakeholders. As a group, the EU and its Member States is the world's largest aid donor (with some 55% of total ODA), it is active in over 160 countries and is engaged in a political dialogue at national and regional levels with many of them. It has a wide range of policies and instruments that are critical when engaging in fragile situations: states that are affected by problems of weak capacity to deliver basic services (including law and order), have a very poor governance record, are affected by conflict or just coming out of a conflict, and in some cases are deliberately unwilling to play the role of an effective state. The EU has, therefore, the *potential* to effectively address some of the main security and development problems involved in these states. It can also *contribute to structural stability* in many of these states with whom it has a long-standing relationship and where it is engaged in a variety of forms.

The EC is generally recognised and praised for having and making use of a wide range of policies and for the improved flexibility of its instruments. However, and despite progress, it is far from having a 'whole-of-Commission' approach[86], not to mention a 'whole-of-EU' approach, which would be the most advanced stage of EU coherence and coordination (including EC, Council and MS policies). EU action is often fragmented and uncoordinated. This is due to several factors: the institutional structure and disconnect between pillars; lack of coherence in donor policies among the EU and its Member States; the gap between military crisis management capabilities and longer-term civilian, development and peace building programmes; and inefficient coordination among instruments. It also lacks an overall strategy and direction that can refine the existing policy instruments and seize windows of opportunity created by recent changes in EU external action. Another challenge is to ensure that technical and political means to coherently address the causes and consequences of state fragility are mainstreamed through EU policies, financial regulations and practice.

Therefore, when it comes to the EU ability to play a more effective and positive role in helping affected states and societies cope with – and reverse – the causes and effects of fragility, *the issue is not so much whether the EU has the means and the necessary tools, but rather*:

85 See Annex E.
86 OECD-DAC (2007b)

- *how these* wide-range of policies and various instruments *inter-relate and mingle* to make a coherent, needs-based and well-informed strategy and a clearly guided policy, supported by coordinated efforts and adequately and timely sequenced actions;
- *how best they can be optimised and adapted* to fit the specific requirements of complex and often volatile and unpredictable situations, where a continuous reassessment of the situation and impact of on-going policies and approaches may be needed, and where EU forms of engagement in that specific country/region may need to be revised and adjusted consequently.

One may also argue, legitimately, that beyond means and tools available, there is also the fundamental question of *political will and leadership* to commit to long-term engagements in more complex and sensitive contexts – where the 'returns on investment' are less obvious or immediate, though by far less costly and less risky than trying to heal situations of conflict, rebuild countries, and contain spill over effects in neighbouring countries.

Africa as the Starting Point

Although geographic proximity puts neighbouring countries/regions high on the priority list of EU external action, globalisation also has an impact on the logic of the proximity/priority tandem; e.g. countries like Afghanistan, who were not a major priority for the EU, are now high on the priority ranking of EU foreign and security policy. Long-standing history of political and economic cooperation and socio-cultural ties also matters. This can certainly be argued in relation to the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and Africa in particular, with whom the EU has been engaged for most of its institutional existence and, in 2000, renewed that commitment for another 20 year period (under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement). That long-term commitment has been reinvigorated by new regional dynamics in Africa and in particular the revival and strengthening of pan-African institutions (NEPAD, AU). The internal dynamics that has led the EU to assert its role as a global player in the political and security arenas also plays a part[87].

Africa can testify of these changes in the EU. The political dimensions of the EU-ACP relationship have been substantially reinforced, in particular with the Cotonou agreement (compared to the earlier partnership that was largely dominated by aid and economic cooperation). In 2003, Africa staged the first fully autonomous (without recourse to NATO assets) EU crisis management military operation outside Europe (operation Artemis in the DRC)[88]. Again in 2006 it hosted three different CFSP/ESDP missions and another one is currently under preparation (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic), providing the EU with continuous engagement in situations of fragility. These countries and Africa in general, remain at the top of EU development efforts and humanitarian aid. They are also framed by a political dialogue and cooperation that is more inclusive both in terms of the issues and policies it covers, and in the actors it engages (or intends to). It illustrates the policy mix the EU can apply, although not always a successful one – where there are many lessons to be learned (e.g. Zimbabwe, which is a particularly divisive issue between the EU and its African partners),

The EU Strategy for Africa, adopted in December 2005, also reflects this evolution in relations and provides a comprehensive policy framework for relations with Africa. It also includes the issue of

87 In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 1999, the European Council in Cologne decided to operationalise a European Security and Defence Policy, to provide the EU with the means and capabilities to engage in conflict prevention and crisis management tasks (the Headline Goal at the Helsinki Summit in late 1999).

88 Faria, Fernanda (2004): *La Gestion des Crises on Afrique Subsaharienne: Le rôle de l'Union Européenne*, Occasional Paper 55, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, December

fragile states and the need to develop and foster a culture of prevention in such environments.
State fragility is also an issue in the agenda of the ongoing dialogue, public consultation and negotiations towards a Joint Africa-EU Strategy to be adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007. As mentioned in the draft of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting of 31 October, the parties acknowledge that concrete and coordinated action needs to be taken in several inter-related areas, including in the areas of peace and security, and of democratic governance and human rights. The draft Strategy refers namely that "in the context of situations of conflict, crisis, instability, severe democratic deficit, and/or institutional weakness, and on the basis of discussions in various international *fora*, Africa and the EU will also hold a dialogue on the concept of fragility of states aimed at reaching a common understanding and agreeing on steps that could be taken."[89] It acknowledges the need to tackle differences in perception and understanding that are necessary for the EU and Africa to join and optimise their efforts in tackling the problems of fragility.
Africa is not the only region with situations of fragility or where the EU can draw lessons from its engagement in difficult environments and fragile situations – in Europe itself (e.g. Kosovo) as well in Afghanistan, East Timor, Nepal, Haiti, Burma, Middle East, among others, there are lessons to be drawn from EU experience. However, the dialogue on an Africa-EU joint strategy provides a moment of opportunity. Both the EU and the AU are trying to define strategies to deal with such situations and environments[90] and they have pledged to cooperate and are indeed cooperating to tackle them (e.g. Darfur, Somalia, CAR, Comoros).

2.2. The Actors

The EU works with a *wide-range of actors* in the design and implementation of its policies, also with whom it engages in its decision-making process. Beyond States and State institutions – these are EU 'natural' and primary counterparts – it also works with local administrations (decentralised state actors) and local and international NSAs (NGOs, community-based organisations, private sector, media, etc.). The EU has also established partnerships with other donors and regional and international organizations (see 2.5).
Under the EU commitment to effective multilateralism, coordinating with other donors and international organizations in upholding shared efforts is an obvious need and an increasing common practice (to be further improved) in many countries where the EU is engaged, as well as in international *fora*. Among these, the UN (and its agencies) is the prime EU partner (and the EU a major contributor to the UN system), to whom the EU recognises the legitimacy and leading role in world peace and security. EU external relations activities and in particular its foreign and security policy is informed by and meant to reinforce international principles upheld by the UN. Unlike many donors, the UN is generally always present in situations of fragility and of crisis and post-crisis. It often has the role of coordinating other donor assistance, particularly when it comes to humanitarian aid. It is therefore a nearly constant interlocutor of the EU, both in the field and at the different policy levels (see 2.5.1).

89 *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. Draft presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting of 31 October 200, p. 9. See also the *First Action Plan (2008-2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*, endorsed by the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, Accra 31 October 2007.
90 The African Development Bank proposed in late 2006 a framework for enhanced bank group assistance to fragile States in Africa. The African Union Commission (AUC) has a Conflict prevention policy and is in the process of operationalising a continental early warning system supported by the regional early warning mechanism that exist or are being put in place in the African RECs. In mid-2006, the AU has adopted a policy framework on post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Regional organisations are an increasingly important partner for the EU, from political dialogue to the definition and implementation of strategic approaches to address issues of common interest. Regional Organizations, in Africa and elsewhere, have often taken matters in hand and faced difficult situations when the international community shied away (e.g. ECOWAS in West Africa). Many regional organisations and partner countries have developed mechanisms and strategies to address structural problems (governance-related problems included) and are trying to develop capacities to address short and long-term needs, including early warning, crisis management and peace-building. They do look at the EU to take their perspectives on board, complement their efforts and provide them with much needed support (see 2.5.2.).

Structural fragilities affecting many countries are not just home-grown and the regional dimension is often among the causes, the trigger or the consequence to deteriorating situations and increased fragility. Regional problems also need regional solutions. That is very much the 'motor' that drives EU cooperation with the AU and SROs in Africa, like ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS or SADC. Advancing on the local/national agenda for peace-building is likely to have limited impact if the regional dimension is ignored or downgraded, as is well illustrated by the conflict in Darfur and the descent into deepening crisis and potentially looming conflict in Chad[91]. Regional partners can be important at all stages of a process: from understanding the regional context and societal linkages across borders to finding the best approaches and solutions to the problems. They are also likely to be the most suited and best placed to exert pressure on unwilling governments and their voices more likely to be heard than those of the EU or other international actors.

Beyond States and international and regional organizations or other donors, the EU also works with a large variety of NSAs at different levels and in a variety of settings and types of activities. In some areas, like humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict or crisis, the EC relies largely on NGOs, the Red Cross movements and the UN, and often does not engage at all with governments, as these are often involved, too weak or non-existent. In some instances, though, it has governments as the counterpart particularly when these are coordinating relief efforts, as was the case in Pakistan. In the DIPECHO programme, the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO) engages with both NSAs in the field and State actors to enhance capacity-building for disaster risk preparedness.

The design and decision-making of development programmes supported by the EC is in principle a relatively *participatory process*, involving a wide range of non-state actors through dialogue and financial support. Dialogue between state and non-state actors and support for civil society capacity-building are the main tools for implementing participatory approaches and ensuring that the priorities and concerns of stakeholders are integrated into development strategies and programmes. Although participatory processes are a well established principle of EC development policy, their application and 'quality' varies significantly from one country to another. They depend on the EC engagement in pushing forward the process and conditions in each country, the capacity of NSAs to engage effectively (capacity-building of these actors is an important aim of the process), and the openness of State authorities to involve them beyond pure implementation tasks. The revision of the Cotonou Agreement in early-2005 provides new opportunities by facilitating direct access of NSAs to indicative programme resources, provided the actors and activities to be supported are identified in the overall strategy for the country agreed with the Government. Local authorities are also explicitly recognised as actors in the ACP-EU partnership. Saferworld experience in Somalia

91 See Marchal, Roland (2007): *Chad: Towards a Militia State?* March 2007 (mimeo).

(see box below) is an interesting example of promoting participatory approaches in so-called 'failed states', where no central government exists or has lost control in parts of the State.

One of the thematic programmes within the DCI regards non-state actors and local authorities in development, opening therefore the possibility for the EU to directly finance these actors without need to prior approval of the country's government or having to channel EU support through the government. This also applies to the ACP countries. This thematic programme will provide financial support to initiatives from non-state actors and local authorities in the EU and partner countries at three levels:

- supporting interventions in developing countries and regions where geographic programmes do not support non-state actors and local authorities;
- raising public awareness of development issues and promoting education on development in the EU and acceding countries;
- supporting activities to strengthen coordination and communication between civil society and local authority networks.

In the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management, the EU also engages in partnerships with these actors. One well-known example is Aceh where political mediation between the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was done by an NGO, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), with financial support and backing of the EU. In November 2006, CivCom in the Council adopted a set of recommendations to enhance cooperation with NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the framework of EU civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. This includes: taking into consideration NGO and CSO expertise, when appropriate, for fact-finding or pre-planning missions; exchange of information and views at the Brussels level as well as in the field, training, and use of their expertise for deployment in civilian crisis management, with the aim of increasing the operational effectiveness of ESDP missions.[92]

Under the Instrument for Stability, a Peace-building Partnership is foreseen to be established, to strengthen operational links with MS, specialist non-state actors and multilateral actors (including regional and SROs). It will include and join EC staff (e.g. regional desks and Relex), and expertise from rosters, which can include individuals, NGOs, MS experts, etc). It is meant to be a support tool for assessment (hopefully preparatory and impact as well), programming and implementation of peace-building strategies.

The EU also finances the Conflict Prevention Partnership, a group of international NGOs with expertise in peace-building, crisis management and conflict prevention, with the aim of strengthening EU and MS capacities in these areas.

There is also recognition of the vital role played by civil society in promoting democracy, social justice, human rights, and in delivering security and justice, which in situations of fragility is hardly ever the monopoly of the State. In some situations, the State is actually the main source of insecurity and human rights violations. In fragile countries and even more in collapsed states, State and NSAs are important actors – positive and negative – and donor approaches to deal with these will need to consider the roles of both of these actors, although this may imply that donors may need to make tough and risky, but hardly avoidable, political choices[93].

92 Council of the EU, *Recommendations for enhancing co-operation with NGOs and CSOs in the framework of EU Civilian crisis management and conflict prevention*, Presidency note, Brussels, 20 November 2006

93 On this issue, see the recent OECD/DAC (2007a), *Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery*.

NSAs also provide an entry point to engage in cooperation and support to key areas in development, as well as in governance and, justice and security in countries where State institutions are basically non-functioning or have collapsed, or in unwilling countries where political dialogue and official cooperation are reduced to a minimum or halted. This is a proven comparative advantage of the EU with regard to other institutional donors. It is, however, important to stress that cooperation with NSAs and supporting their capacity is not meant as an alternative to governments but rather aims at critical complementarity to State action and role, whether in terms of the provision of services and in creating checks and balances for improved governance. Even in situations where governments are often absent from the partnership relationship, and NGOs are the main interlocutor and implementing partners (e.g. in humanitarian assistance), there should be an effort, whenever conditions in the country/region allow for it, to engage with and reinforce the capacity of local and central administrations in providing and managing relief and rehabilitation. This could be done directly through technical assistance or indirectly through the implementing NGOs. State-building in countries in fragility, and particularly in those prone to disasters, should also include this critical capacity. Ideally, building capacity in situations of fragility ought to encompass a critical engagement with both State and NSAs and in promoting constructive partnerships between these actors.

Finally, NSAs also play a role in political dialogue, both in willing and unwilling states. They convey local perspectives and they are a key source of information and local knowledge that donors can't always fully grasp and state administrations/ruling elites are either unaware of, are not open to, or are unable to take account of. They are also valuable as a 'barometer' and 'evaluator' of the impact of international assistance. In difficult partnerships, NSAs can also be the only window of opportunity in a country to provide feedback on the needs, concerns and expectations of the population, although in such situations a dialogue with non-governmental players is also likely to be made more difficult because of resistance by the government and of the political charges it entails for all those involved.

EC support to Non-State Actors in Somalia[94]

Since 2004, the EU has financed a programme in Somalia implemented by Saferworld. This offers an example how the EU can actively promote development in fragile contexts by supporting NGOs that are present at field level and by strengthening the capacity of local actors.

Somalia has long been a state where there is no functioning and effective central government, with varying degrees of de facto autonomy in its three regions. NSAs therefore fill many of the traditional roles of the state, such as the delivery of basic social services. With the collaboration of three well-established Somali NGOs, the programme aims to strengthen the capacities of NSAs to *engage in dialogue with national actors and international donors*.

The programme has helped to develop legitimate and representative NSA structures – that serve as platforms for dialogue – as well as awareness activities on international policy processes. It is creating a bridge between the authorities and several communities, through unprecedented consultations that have enabled Somali civil society to voice their priorities, concerns and needs to policy-makers, internally (parliamentarians, government authorities from the three Somali regions) and internationally (e.g. EC, UN, WB).

94 Saferworld; *Policy Dialogue between non-state actors, governments and the international community in fragile contexts: The Somalia experience*. Briefing for "Partners in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: EU and NGO Cooperation" Berlin, June 2007.

2.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of EU Instruments and Policies

EU instruments and policies for external action range across the EU pillar system of competence and financing and extend from diplomatic (namely political dialogue and mediation) to economic cooperation and trade, energy policies, humanitarian aid and development cooperation that goes beyond the usual social, and agriculture and environmental policies or infrastructure, or technical assistance for institution-building, including the strengthening of administrative capacity, macro-economic and fiscal management. It also includes technical and financial support to conflict prevention mechanisms and other conflict-related activities, like DDR, SSR reform and SALW.

These instruments face limitations in terms of their internal organization and decision-making, capacity and ability to fully respond to the specific needs and requirements of upstream and preventive policies, and ability to take early action to address situations of fragility and difficult environments. Under recent reforms to EU policies and financial instruments for external action, there are ongoing efforts to improve linkages between these policies and instruments, to make them more flexible, conflict-sensitive, development-friendly, needs-based and integrated in holistic and comprehensive strategies. Progress has been achieved, namely within the EC. It can claim credit for the increased volume of aid, quicker disbursement rates, and better quality of assistance, while also trying to tackle critical but sensitive issues as governance, from which it often shied away in the past.

However, much of the EU's latest efforts have focused on the need to better respond to and address situations of crisis and post-crisis, often meaning situations of fully fledged conflict and post-conflict where peace is fragile and the risk of reverting back into conflict is very high. These are definitely important, and help the cause of addressing state fragility. But they address only part of the problem and in its most advanced states of fragility or indeed when the situation is already beyond fragility and into collapse. Working effectively at the preventive level remains probably still the major weakness of the EU, where the stimulus to adapt EU policies and engagement in time and upfront is curtailed by lengthy and complex procedures and by the awareness and conviction that EU decision-making processes are only (and even then not always) mobilized by a sense or urgency that is generally limited to a fully-fledged crisis[95].

2.3.1. The Policies

Development cooperation policies are a fundamental cornerstone of EU external action. It is a long and well established policy within the EU that, despite criticism as to its accomplishments, remains the most visible and widespread form of EU engagement in partner countries/regions and is key to fulfil EU international commitments and foreign policy objectives.

EU *development policies* have a strong focus on social sectors (education and health in particular, integrating also gender considerations in budget support and sectoral approaches[96]), infrastructure (including water, transport and energy), and rural development and the management of land issues. Increasingly they also encompass issues like institution-building, the rule of law, democratic

95 There are some laudable exceptions, and the interposition force in Macedonia in 2003 (Operation Concordia) is probably the best one, although again this action was very much on the edge of a fully fledged conflict and a follow-up to other international missions aiming at stabilising a potentially explosive situation.

96 'Gender' is often wrongly understood as empowering women only. Gender refers to both men and women in their different roles in a society (that may differ substantially from one society/culture to another or from one group to another). Gender mainstreaming means taking account the concerns and experiences of women and men in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, the ultimate goal being to achieve gender equality (e.g. in rights, resources and voice). See ECOSOC Conclusions 1997/2 and the World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2007.

institutions, human rights, justice and migration. It is a fundamental tool to address the root causes of fragility and potential conflict and has the powerful advantage of having significant financial resources. However, development cooperation alone is unlikely (and has proved to be unfit if isolated from local and other stakeholders policies) to meet those goals, particularly in the complex situations that characterise fragile states. Integrating other dimensions into traditional areas of development cooperation, calling attention to their role in addressing conflict prevention (and their potentially damaging effects if blind to the particular local context), and rethinking aid management and mechanisms is part of the 'identity crisis' that development cooperation is undergoing.

Development policies are also having to link more and more with *ESDP* missions (civilian and military crisis management) – and vice-versa – particularly in situations where cross-cutting issues (e.g. human rights, rule of law) and activities (e.g. DDR, SSR) are likely to be as important (or even more so) as traditional areas of EU foreign policy engagement. The EU is trying to adapt its mechanisms and tools, and deepen its knowledge through an analysis of lessons learned from experience in a number of situations where various EU instruments were/ are at work, to develop a more coordinated response and integrated approaches, bringing together security and development[97].

The EU has reinforced its commitment to tackle issues related to peace and security beyond developing its civilian and military capabilities for crisis management, and trying to make its development policies more conflict-sensitive. It has also been supporting or developing initiatives aimed at controlling and regulating activities that directly or indirectly impact on security and development efforts, such as in anti-personnel landmines, illicit trade in SALW, the illicit trade of rough diamonds through the Kimberley Process[98], illegal logging and associated trade of conflict timber which is the purpose of the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT); and the conduct of extractive industries companies in resource-rich countries (the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative)[99].

These initiatives are also related to economic global governance and conflict-sensitive economic policies and trade. The EU (including its MS) is often criticised for not moving fast and far-enough to 'put some order in the house' and putting in place tighter controls over the transfers of arms and military equipment to fragile environments, taking action against money laundering and a proper regulation of EU companies that invest in countries with poor governance records and accountability systems. Initiatives like the Kimberly Process, IETI, and FLEGT are a response to that. However, these initiatives alone, albeit positive, cannot solve many of the problems related to illicit trade and poor governance and accountability in the management of these resources. This is particularly true with regard to essential and highly demanded energy resources like oil, specially if compliance with such initiatives is on a purely voluntary basis, as is the case of IETI, and other energy-avid countries like China feel no need or obligation (or not yet, at least) to abide by human rights or good governance considerations. No effective sanctions are put in place to enforce IETI and the monitoring and control capacity of civil society in the signatory countries, and especially of poor oil-rich countries is often too weak and divided to effectively push for transparency.

97 See the Joint Council Secretariat – Commission Services Working Paper on Security and Development and the 19-20 November GAERC Conclusions.

98 As is the case of EU assistance to Ghana to strengthen the control of conflict diamonds exported through the country, with the aim of supporting the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, where the diamonds originate.

99 EITI supports improved governance and government accountability through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. Since its launch in 2002, the initiative has attracted more than 20 member countries as well as the support of leading NGOs and corporations.

The EU has the economic and in some cases the political clout – if able to stick together, speak with one voice and coordinate at the international level – to push for greater transparency and accountability of European and western companies active in these oil-rich countries[100]. The call for mutual accountability applies to these issues and not just to the management of aid.

The EU also has a strong and established policy of *humanitarian aid*, and is present in most humanitarian crisis (as a consequence of conflict or natural disasters) around the world, through NGO's and the international humanitarian organizations it funds. At times, the EC, through ECHO, is about the only donor in 'forgotten crises[101]. ECHO has its own assessment capacity and mechanisms (including 200 field experts and various offices in third countries all over the world), and has the capability to react quickly to humanitarian crises. Humanitarian aid can not be considered a crisis management tool – it is neutral, impartial and independent and thus separated from political engagement –, but is present in situations of fragility (e.g. in post-conflict) and can play a role in the prevention of potential crisis by helping local communities and states prepare for natural disasters[102], which may trigger or fuel conflict in countries or regions already affected by extreme poverty, with poor governance, and prone to natural or man-induced disasters[103].

The irony of humanitarian aid is that it often ends up continuing well beyond the usual timeframe for humanitarian assistance, either because the crisis situation continues (when war or low-intensity conflict endure and rehabilitation and development is not possible) or because no sustained rehabilitation and development activities have followed or accompanied the relief work. LRRD activities are often the missing link whether because of poor planning, lack of funding channels for these bridging activities, or lack of political will to engage beyond emergency situations.

Economic and trade policies are a cornerstone of poverty reduction strategies. Economic growth is essential to a sustainable drive out of poverty, and trade and regional integration are considered to be effective tools to foster growth and, in the process, creating stronger regional linkages and interdependencies that can also promote political 'rapprochement' and confidence (like in the EU success story). Trade and regional integration are thus considered priorities in the European Consensus on Development.

Economic policies, trade and trade related reforms can have a long-standing impact (positive or negative) in a society. In this context the State's ability and willingness to regulate economic activity in the country in a transparent way and to put it to the benefit of all and not just a few is of particular importance. Corruption is a problem both in developing and developed nations, but for many developing countries it is more serious – the management of natural resources should be an asset in the fight against poverty, it can also be the 'curse' of prolonged conflict.

The EU is currently negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to support development in the ACP countries, their gradual integration into the world economy, and the development of regional integration and regional markets through the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the parties and enhanced cooperation in all trade-related areas. In this context

100 Thorsten Benner and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira propose in their article "*Getting tough with the petro-elites"* (IHT, April 10, 2007) concrete action in specific key areas. For a thorough analysis of the political economy of oil in the Gulf of Guinea, see also Soares de Oliveira, Ricardo (2007), *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*, Hurst, London.

101 The identification of forgotten crises is undertaken by a specific method taking into account: a high level of vulnerability (vulnerability index), low or no coverage of the crisis by the media, a low level of interest from the international community and donors as indicated by the aid given, and a field evaluation undertaken by the experts and geographical units of the Commission/ECHO.

102 DIPECHO programmes mainstream disaster preparedness action in relief operations and through specific interventions such as the drought preparedness decision for the Horn of Africa, launched in 2006.

103 EC COM (2007), 317 final, *Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*, 13.6.2007.

and of the WTO Doha Development Agenda, trade related assistance like the Aid for Trade initiative is presented as a 'new' (or rediscovered) solution to support developing countries cope with the impact of globalization and develop their capacity to trade. Some observers are worried that Aid for Trade may be used to push ACP countries to sign up to a trade deal that may not benefit them, and indeed that these agreements might further harm their economic, social and environmental development [104].

Although the aim of EPAs is to integrate and support the development strategies and objectives of the ACP countries, and take into account the special situation of the least developed and most vulnerable ones, the trade agenda is often perceived as de-linked from, and at times contradictory with, other EU development-related policies. Some stakeholders even mention that if not designed properly, EPAs, through their possibly negative economic, environmental and social impacts could exacerbate the root causes of conflict[105]. Furthermore, in general, the institutional, financial and human resources capacities in many of the EU's developing partner countries are too weak for them to push their own agenda and concerns beyond what the EU trading negotiators are willing to listen to and integrate into the EPAs.

Taking into account the weak capacity and negotiating power of most developing partner countries engaged in trade negotiations with the EU, it becomes even more important that the EU adequately monitors and assesses the impact of such policies on these countries and regions, including from a conflict prevention perspective, a dimension that has not been sufficiently addressed according to the last conflict prevention report[106].

Another relevant policy area is *environment*. The sustainable management of natural resources and the impact of climate change are also a cross-cutting issue and a coherence element in the EU policy framework, namely with regard to development objectives as well as to humanitarian considerations (e.g. health impact, internally displaced persons). Scarce vital natural resources like water or land can impact on the stability of a country or indeed a region when coupled with other drivers of conflict (e.g. Darfur). A country's vulnerability to environmental disasters (natural or man-induced) or to climate change (e.g. small islands) can have an even greater impact in situations of fragility and ought therefore to be taken into account in the EU strategic approach to State-building and support to local communities and other NSA.

Migration and the increasing global mobility for different reasons is also a challenge for development and stability. For host countries, particularly in the developing world and even more so in the case of already fragile states, the impact of a flow of refugees can be extremely destabilizing in economic, social, political and even security dimensions (e.g. Great Lakes), and its impact is likely to endure. For countries who 'provide' the migrants, there can be both positive (e.g. remittances) and negative impacts (e.g. 'brain drain'), not to mention other concerns related to human trafficking (including forced labour).

104 See "*Aid for Trade": another missed opportunity to make trade work for development?*, Contribution from the Fair Trade movement to the EU debate on Aid for Trade, April 2007. For more information on this, see also *Can Aid Fix Trade?: Assessing the WTO's Aid for Trade Agenda*, The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, September 2006; and Trade Negotiations Insights, From Doha to Cotonou Vol.6 No.1, January-February 2007, ECDPM and ICTSD.

105 For instance, it is acknowledge that trade policy reform and liberalization can exacerbate production, employment and income losses and thus impact also on social and inter-group/ethnic relations within a country. An increased interest of EU/international investors in certain natural resources may lead some groups within a country to try to take control of that sector thus fuelling tensions within a country/society, particularly when no proper accountability systems exist.

106 (2007); *Presidency Report on EU activities in the framework of prevention, including the implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*. Council of the European Union, 10158/06, 13 June 2007.

2.3.2. Assessment and Programming Tools

Currently, the EU does not have an assessment tool specifically for state fragility, nor does it necessarily need to create a specific one, provided it adapts some of its existing tools and makes an effective use of these. Some existing tools within the EC and the Council Secretariat could inform and help to develop a comprehensive methodology, where qualitative assessment of structural weaknesses (e.g. institutional capacity to deliver basic services, inclusiveness of political system, economic governance and accountability – especially in resource-rich countries, embedded mechanisms for managing change and differences, etc) are included alongside the identification and evolution of conflict trends, development needs and society expectations. Such a comprehensive development, governance and security analysis should not be limited to a mere exercise – albeit very important – of fostering a common understanding within the EC and with MS on the identification of the problems. If it is to trigger an effective EU response it should include possible ways to address these problems and help identify opportunities to act preventively.

From an overview of the assessment tools (see annex F for a non-exhaustive list), the general impression is that there is no lack of tools according to specific areas of concern – situations of fragility cut across most of these – but they are scattered, some seem to duplicate others, some have been dropped or simply ignored (e.g. check-list of root causes of conflict, preventive strategies), and only a few of them seem to have the potential to bring together the different areas of concern and translate these into policy programming and action. Many tend to be 'owned' by the EC or the Council services from where they emanate, which is positive on the one hand, but not necessarily good to promote 'whole-of-EC' or 'whole-of-EU' approaches. Some of the tools cut across the institutional divide (e.g. Country Conflict Assessments/CCAs, joint fact-finding or pre-planning missions, Country and Regional Strategy Papers), but they are either too weak, too political or too specific (e.g. too conflict oriented, not addressing other relevant issues to an assessment of structural fragilities) to be owned by the EC and Council as a whole, particularly if there is no prior minimum shared understanding and sense of priority.

Tools that have the potential to become this comprehensive tool, if refined to include other actors and areas of concern and trigger preventive targeted action, are the CCAs, the preventive strategies (the latter, elaborated in the Council, have not as yet triggered the action they were meant to), and especially the Country and Regional Strategy Papers which are a Commission-led tool to implement development policies. CSPs can be instrumental in developing a strategic, joined up approach if effectively built on joint ownership with the recipient country, as they are meant to be. Although CSPs/RSPs are supposed to integrate all dimensions of external relations in a coherent framework to guide political dialogue and policies in a given country or region, they are sometimes weak in political and security analysis[107] and do not always include a discussion of conflict elements or address structural causes of instability. They are often weak in guiding priority action in sensitive areas like governance. In some cases, CSPs are aligned with Joint Assistance Strategies (JAS) agreed by the donors engaged in a given country, and because JAS can be poor in assessing and guiding activities in sensitive and potentially blocking issues, CSPs tend to inherit those weaknesses and gaps. When there is an obligation to elaborate CSPs jointly with the partner government, as is the case in ACP countries (under the principle of partnership of the

107 Often as a consequence of lack of qualified human resources with expertise and political sensitivity, and of limited and restricted assessment processes that do not integrate local or experts views, particularly if they dissent from the official and/or generally accepted views.

Cotonou agreement), the EU often shies away from addressing politically sensitive issues or the partner country simply refuses to put such concerns on the agenda (e.g. Angola). The EU governance initiative (the governance profiles being its assessment tools) is meant to address those shortcomings, although criticised for not being participatory (implying little or no ownership by local state and non-state actors) and taking little or no account of local specificities.

Even when CSPs/RSPs assessment and analysis is good and comprehensive, it remains unclear how well they translate into effective policies and practice. Given the gap between strategic and policy design, and between the latter and programming, evidence seems to suggest that CSPs/RSPs have a weak record of taking on board relevant assessments and of triggering comprehensive and consistent approaches to policy implementation. Furthermore, as the recent DAC peer review of the Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of the European Community highlights, there are, among other weaknesses[108]:

- no means to feed lessons into the programming process, thus stressing the need to improve knowledge-sharing processes;
- no mainstreaming (e.g. the systematic application) of conflict sensitivity and prevention in CSPs, thus emphasizing the need for a more systematic use of conflict analysis in the programming process; and
- an overlap of units – DG Relex, Development, AidCo – dealing with these issues and no horizontal regular involvement of these units, thus highlighting the need to rationalize this multiplication in order to better provide inputs to delegations, from where much of the CSPs exercise emanates.

The Inter-Service Quality Group (IQSG) is where mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (e.g. conflict prevention; linking relief, rehabilitation and development) and quality checks can be done within the EC programming process by bringing qualified human resources from different relevant areas. It is not clear, however, how much and how systematically cross-thematic programming fiches are being used or what the main constraints are to making effective use of these. Human resources are a frequently highlighted problem, particularly in such qualitative-demanding processes as these ought to be.

These existing assessment tools need to be refined and revised within the EC and the Council, to make them more qualitative-oriented and to channel some of these specific assessment tools into a comprehensive assessment and programming tool that can guide both the EC and the MS and ideally also be owned by partner countries. First and foremost is the need to create a common sense of joint work and shared objectives and priorities, which partly already happens, but they are the exception, rather than the rule. In this perspective the upcoming creation of a European External Action Service[109] could provide a window of opportunity if quality prevails and if not (seriously, at least) affected by the 'in-house allegiance bug'.

Many EU tools could be merged into a single 'whole-of-EC' exercise that feeds into a 'whole-of-EU' exercise to assess root causes and of fragility and potential conflict. The CSPs/RSPs have the greatest potential to play this role. This implies:

i) the existence within the EC (headquarters and delegations) of capacity to effectively use these tools (more and qualified human resources);

108 OECD-DAC (2007b); *Review of The Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of The European Community*, Peer Review, 26 June 2007.
109 Lisbon Treaty (draft) amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, October 2007.

ii) a more systematic and improved sharing of information within the EC, with the Council and with MS;
iii) quality assessments based on participatory processes, engaging different stakeholders on the ground (local and non-local) with experience and relevant knowledge and understanding of the socio-economic and political dynamics of the country/region;
iv) integrating lessons learned from experience, impact assessments as well as assessments from other relevant tools (e.g. early-warning systems) and mainstream relevant cross-cutting issues.

Existing early-warning tools could be refined to better focus on situations of fragility, through the inclusion of additional indicators that monitor the long-term, proximate and structural causes of instability, and the qualitative evolution of context relevant political and economic trends. The EC and MS should be more engaged in the elaboration and follow-up of preventive strategies.

EU early-warning mechanisms should improve their links with other international organizations and their early-warning mechanisms as well as with local and regional mechanisms. The EU should support the latter in building up their capacity and developing their own compatible assessment and monitoring tools.

2.3.3. The Financial Instruments

The EU recently reformed its financial instruments for external action to allow greater flexibility and more rapid funding decisions. It builds on a simplified political and administrative structure, which has been one of the recognized bottlenecks of its ability to deliver timely assistance and to implement integrated approaches[110].

As of January 2007, the *Instrument for Stability* (IfS) replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) which had provided support for SSR (DRC, Liberia, Kosovo, Afghanistan), to peace processes or national reconciliation (Sudan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Philippines, East Timor), DDR (Aceh, Colombia) and to electoral/referendum support (Madagascar, Mauritania, Serbia and Montenegro). The new IfS is praised for its aim to allow quick EC interventions in situations of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis (but not humanitarian aid, funded under a different instrument)[111]. It can also fund activities in stable contexts aimed at mitigating threats and risks that could fuel conflict or lead to crises (e.g. threats to law and order, to critical infrastructure, to public health etc) and thus support prevention, including pre- and post-crisis capacity building (e.g. in early-warning, mediation, confidence-building, emerging inter-community tensions, post-conflict and post-disaster recovery)[112]. It combines short-term and long-term programmes and aims to improve the effectiveness of EC crisis management by ensuring a rapid, flexible and adequately funded initial response to situations of political crisis or natural disaster in third countries. It also aims to contribute at a strategic level to efforts to address certain global and trans-regional threats, notably the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the trafficking of people, drugs and arms, terrorism and cross-border organised crime, as well as major threats to critical infrastructure and public health.

110 The previous geographic and thematic financial instruments were often criticized for having different and complex comitology and programming rules, some external assistance programmes being financed by more than one instrument.
111 Its interventions can last up to 18 months, with interim response programmes. Longer-term measures under the CSPs or Indicative programmes financed by the IfS will also be subject to comitology.
112 EC Regulation no. 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability, 15 November 2006.

Its total budget for the period 2007-13 is €2,062 billion (€100 million for 2007) and covers all third countries, except industrialised ones. This amount is not so significant when you take into account the likely requests it may need to support. About 70% of the assistance is targeted towards country based crisis response interventions and can be triggered in support of an ESDP mission, when a window in an existing area of instability opens up, or when a new crisis appears (e.g. tsunami). Initiatives that are currently planned/being implemented with support of the IfS include support to SSR in DRC and conflict resources work; accompanying measures to AMISOM in Somalia; support for the Juba Peace talks in Uganda and possibly SSR reform in Guinea-Bissau. A Strategy and annual indicative programme to implement the IfS have been prepared. Activities financed under the IfS will be managed by the delegations where these activities will be implemented. It therefore includes support to EC delegations in the form of additional human resources for the duration of the activity, thus avoiding further strain on the capacity of delegations.

Many questions also remain as to how it will actually operate, especially regarding the prioritisation of its funding, how demand driven are the interventions it finances, and how it connects with or complements other CFSP, EDF and community financial instruments and engagement by and with other actors. The EC manages and triggers the use of the IfS and it has no legal obligation to respond to a request from the Council. However, it is quite unlikely that such decisions would be de-linked from political interest and decision-making in the Council. One of the conditions for deployment of the IfS, besides urgency, opportunity and effectiveness, is *political priority* and priority is largely defined also by the degree of engagement of the EU (MS included), and not of the EC only. It is therefore likely to dovetail CFSP, despite the absence of a formal link with the latter.

The IfS has also been criticised for not responding to the need of a coherent, consistent, rapid and effective response by the EU to crises, creating further confusion between development and security objectives and funding, as well as between humanitarian and development mandates[113]. How the short-term actions financed by the IfS integrate into a long-term response and strategy remains unclear, as well as to what extent the IfS can promote consistency between Council and Commission activities. There is little experience yet to evaluate on that, but if is likely to help in the process of greater coordination and consistency of EU engagement and that is also what is intended. However, it cannot by itself alone provide all the answers on how programmes can be better integrated and sequenced when they are financed by different financial instruments. That is part of the whole purpose of enhancing EU policy coherence, and the reform of the financial instruments is just one element within a wider process of change that is on-going within the EU.

Other geographic and thematic instruments are also relevant for an effective EU assistance to promote structural stability. These include the European Development Fund (EDF, for the ACP countries), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – together, EDF and DCI represent more than 50% of the total ODA by the EU –, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR along with the already existing humanitarian aid, the macro-financial assistance and the IfS form the group of horizontal instruments issued from the financial reform. Other geographic instruments finance regions not covered by EDF, ENPI and DCI[114]

113 EPLO & CONCORD Joint Statement on the IfS (August 2005).

114 Geographic instruments are the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI, that excludes ACP countries as these are funded by the EDF), and the Instrument for Co-operation with Industrialised Countries (ICI).

The *DCI*, which replaced the former ALA (Asia and Latin America), part of TACIS and 10 thematic budget lines, funds Asia, Latin America, some countries of Commonwealth of Independent States, South Africa, sugar restructuring in ACP states and includes five thematic budget programmes[115], namely one on "Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development". Its overall amount for the current financial perspectives period is €16,897 billion.

The *ENPI* will target sustainable development and approximation to EU policies and legislation, and support cross-border cooperation along the EU's eastern and southern external borders. It will replace MEDA, TACIS and other existing instruments. EC funding for ENP countries for the budget cycle 2007-2013 is nearly €12 billion.

Cooperation with ACP countries continues to be funded under the *EDF*, which remains outside the EC budget, as decided by the European Council in December 2005. The EDF, like other community financial instruments, is known for its complex and lengthy procedures. Yet, there are emergency provisions within the EDF regulations and the Cotonou agreement (articles 72 and 73) that allow adaptations in agreed programmes (provided these do not imply a significant shift in the overall design of the programme or have major financial implications), and authorise decisions to be taken without comitology – up to €10 million and for a maximum duration of 6 months. In some of these cases, a request is needed by the partner government. The EDF also provides significant flexibility in the allocation of funds into envelope A (pre-defined and programmable funds that are generally the largest bulk of the funds allocated to a country) and envelope B (the more flexible one, for emergency or other unforeseen situations), subject to regular review and for a limited period of time (renewal is possible when justified). In some cases, the full amount of envelope A was transferred into B (e.g. Togo, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire) as much of the support needed was for unforeseen situations and was difficult to programme in advance. Such flexibility is generally linked to specific programmes (e.g. LRRD in Eastern Congo), but it can also apply to all programmes in a country for a period of time (e.g. Afghanistan). The EC is currently preparing a set of guidelines clarifying the eligibility criteria for accessing and for managing funds under articles 72 and 73 of the Cotonou Agreement[116].

These special rules provide enough flexibility to adapt to volatile situations where the impact of programmes needs to be continuously monitored, assessed and adapted in light of local/national/regional developments and of local and international actors' engagement. However, it is not clear how often are they invoked or why this isn't a more common practice. EC clarification on these procedures can contribute to an optimal use of opportunities provided by the existing flexibility in the EDF. There is also no clear evidence of whether and how the EDF impacts on situations of fragility (negatively or positively) as compared to other budgetary instruments. There are some cases where the EDF programming cycle (5-year programming with a mid-term review, where significant programmatic and financial adjustments can be made) is perceived to be a constraint to aligning EC assistance (e.g. in Burundi, the health sector programme of the EC will have to wait for the mid-term review to be aligned with the government programme).

On the other hand, the EDF does provide an integrated framework to fund development and security-related activities (with limitations, as EDF can not cover military costs). It has been used to

115 Thematic programmes included in the DCI are: (i) non-state actors and local authorities in development; (ii) food security; (iii) environment and sustainable management of natural resources, including energy; (iv) "investing in people"; and (v) migration and asylum.

116 For more information on flexibility in the EDF, see Annex 14.2. to the EC Communication on *Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace*. Annexes to COM(2007) 643 final, 25/10/2007, SEC (2007) 1417, pp. 34-36.

fund activities like DDR (e.g. Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia), SALW, SSR, rule of law, policy planning, mediation, early-warning, electoral observation, peace processes and capacity-building (in the DRC, all of these are being funded by the EDF), both at the continental level (AU), as well as at the sub-regional and national level. It has also been shown to have significant flexibility, as when financing the African Peace Facility[117]. Although the decision to fund the APF out of development funds remains controversial and does not provide the envisaged long-term sustainability for the AFP, it brought upfront the need to integrate peace and security issues into the EU-Africa dialogue and cooperation. As of 2007, the EU has also added an *incentive tranche* under the 10th EDF to 'reward' and promote good governance in ACP countries, based on an assessment of present level and future reform in the area of governance. This governance initiative has recently been included also on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership agreements.

The terms of comparison between the EDF and other instruments will change when experience develops on the way the new financial instruments are used. These, and especially the IfS, are meant to complement geographic instruments by allowing for more immediate and short-term forms of assistance that cannot be covered, or at least not in the desired timing, by the geographic instruments.

The EIDHR aims to strengthen the development and consolidation of democracy and respect for Human Rights in third countries, and it integrates conflict prevention and resolution priorities. It provides support for the development of early warning, mediation, reconciliation and confidence-building measures implemented by grassroots and international NGOs, and strengthening the capacity of international, regional or local organisations involved in conflict prevention.

Legal constraints have limited the possible role of the DCI and other regional instruments in conflict prevention and in addressing some relevant problems in situations of fragility. The legal services in the Council refused to allow the DCI to finance conflict prevention and peace-building efforts, arguing that these are pillar II competences, despite the fact that non-CFSP community instruments have been financing these types of activities. This weakens or may undermine the ability of the IfS to effectively link short-term and long-term efforts, and of geographical instruments to give continuity to efforts initiated under the IfS, particularly in areas that cut across the pillar competencies and are both short- and long-term in nature like DDR and SSR.

The EC and the Council are currently in legal battles about matters of competence and who could do best in what. Hopefully a European External Action Service would provide some answers to these, but the essential work is much deeper; allowing those in the field (e.g. the delegations) to take the lead in some of these processes may contribute to a better understanding of the need to overcome such battles and agree on an effective division of labour. This reality-check may have the positive impact of bringing upfront the really important priorities concerning who can actually have a positive and visible impact on the ground. The ability to pass on the message to policy-makers in capitals and in Brussels is equally important.

There should be provisions in the financial regulations to link funding and the timing of funding decisions across the pillar structure, for instance in situations where one financial instrument cannot fund all the aspects of a programme. This could contribute and further support efforts to bridge the institutional divide, allow for timely sequenced activities and promote integrated approaches.

117 Under the 9th EDF the African Peace Facility was financed with €300 million. The same amount was committed under the 10th EDF for the period 2008-2010.

2.3.4. Political Dialogue

Political dialogue is the most determining of the EU's various tools for external action. It sets the pace of cooperation and very much determines the quality of it. Political dialogue reflects realities on the ground and it is often affected by negative dynamics. It is a good 'sensor' of a country situation and helps to identify potentially negative (early-warning) or positive trends in the making. Being able to seize 'windows of opportunity' in difficult situations and trigger positive action at the right time is the ultimate 'art' of political dialogue.

With the rise of the EU into a more political entity, political dialogue became more important, not only to resolve internal disputes, forge minimum consensus and common positions within the EU itself, but as a foreign relations tool. The EU increasingly recognises it as a fundamental one, as a result of its own experience. Political dialogue is the tool that can best allow the EU and partners to reach and share a common understanding of situations, problems and priorities of common concern. It provides a framework to develop and agree joint strategies for joint or supportive complementary action. In less positive contexts, when cooperation between the EU and partners countries deteriorates, political dialogue provides a platform to discuss differences and ideally try to sort them out before any other means are considered; the ultimate step being the use of sanctions.

Despite the recognised value of political dialogue as a foreign relations tool, the EU has not always used it to its best potential and even neglected it, namely in relations with the ACP states[118]. Although regular political dialogue was put at the core of EU-ACP relations with the Cotonou agreement in 2000 (art. 8), sometimes it just served as an intermediate step towards consultations (art. 96 of the Cotonou agreement). If these failed, they would lead to the imposition of sanctions.

Political dialogue under the Cotonou Agreement is meant to be regular, flexible, at various levels and formal or informal according to the need. It can address all issues of common interest and range from development matters to migration or peace and security, and address the essential and fundamental elements of the agreement (e.g. respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and good governance). The broad definition of what article 8 was supposed to entail also led to some confusion. ACP states did not immediately see the potential benefits of political dialogue and tended to dismiss the emphasis on the political dimensions of the Cotonou agreement as a politicization of aid, a means to impose hidden conditionalities, and political dialogue its implementing tool. On the other hand, the EU did not use the opening offered by article 8 extensively nor consistently, and often too late, when the situation was deteriorating rapidly[119]. Both the EU and ACP countries now acknowledge the importance of taking a more proactive and open-minded attitude towards political dialogue. The revised Cotonou agreement (annex VII) sets more detailed modalities for the conduct of formal, structured political dialogue, which ought to include jointly set benchmarks and targets for the essential elements.

Political dialogue is a preventive tool and, for that matter, a long-term one. It is a platform to discuss differences and ideally tries to sort them out before any other means are considered. Sanctions are the ultimate tool when all political dialogue fails, but it is increasingly acknowledged

118 Laakso, Liisa; Kivimäki, Timo; Seppänen, Maaria (CTS – Conflict Transformation Service), (2007): *Evaluation of coordination and coherence in the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, Triple C evaluations no.6, EU, April.

119 See the findings and recommendations of: Evaluation **Services of the EU (2007),** *Evaluation of coordination and coherence in the application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, by Liisa Laakso, Timo Kivimäki, Maaria Seppänen, (CTS – Conflict Transformation Service), Triple C evaluations no.6, EU, April.

that sanctions and the 'shut down' of political dialogue hardly ever have the quick desired effects, if any positive ones at all. It often radicalises the situation and can cause additional suffering on the society. Constructive engagement is seen as a better alternative, but how to go about it, is not always easy and clear to see.

The EU has been investing more in its capacity to engage more effectively in political dialogue. It is trying to make it a flexible and multi-actor exercise, entailing greater coordination and consistency among MS. Being able to speak with one voice is seen as a necessity – certainly not an easy-task in an EU of 27 nations. Yet, progress is being made and the reformed EU Treaty could further consolidate ongoing efforts, namely the creation of the European External Action Service to assist the High Representative of the Union in his/her role of external representation.

Besides the Presidency and the High Representative, the EU can make better use of other actors in political dialogue and in preventive diplomacy and even mediation. That is the case of the Special Representatives, who are generally appointed to situations of conflict or situations with a high potential to develop into conflict, and who inevitably play a role in political dialogue (whether formally or informally). Special Representatives have a political mandate and respond to the High Representative and the Council[120]. It is important that the Council sticks to a common position and supports them; also that MS positions and efforts in a situation or country of concern are consistent and supportive of EU efforts undertaken in the person and role of the Special Representatives.

Other important actors are EC delegations. Commission delegations, together with representatives of the future Presidency, are fully associated with the Presidency as part of a 'local troika', carrying out 'démarches' to third countries and establishing joint Heads of Mission reports on political developments. As the network of Commission delegations is wider than the foreign embassy system of many of the Member States, they are sometimes the sole representative of the EU in a country and in their representative role for the EU as a whole increases. However, the delegations respond to the EC and have no political mandate from the Council. There are two laudable exceptions to the rule: the EU representative in Macedonia and the future representative to the AU who are 'double hatted'. Depending very much on the political qualities and willingness of the Head of the Delegation, and of the existing support capacities in the Delegation, it can play an important role in 'quiet diplomacy', in early-warning, in providing qualitative information about the country, etc. Delegations often do play that role, but their political clout is often weak as they are perceived as one among various EU interlocutors.

The Reform process may provide a solution to some of these shortcomings. With the devolution process, EC delegations gained in powers, competences, and human resources (although not always in a relative proportion), but they still lack a political mandate that could provide their activities with a stronger political backing. A possible solution could be 'double hatting' the Delegation Heads with a joint EC and Council mandate. However, the effectiveness of a 'double hatted' role goes beyond the legal aspects of the status quo of Delegations; it requires effective backing by the whole of the EU, institutions and MS.

As the nomination of a double-hatted representative to the AU testifies, continental and regional organisations are an increasingly important partner in political dialogue for the EU. In many

120 There are currently nine in place: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Macedonia, African Great Lakes, Middle East Peace Process, Moldova, Southern Caucasus and Sudan.

fragile situations, problems – and solutions – are also regional in nature. In difficult partnerships, regional organizations and neighbouring governments are often the only voice unwilling governments may be willing to listen to. An open (to criticise and to criticism) political dialogue with these organizations can possibly de-block some situations or be the only possible indirect form of dialogue with unwilling governments. As the experiences of political dialogue under the Cotonou agreement have shown, an engaged participation of the ACP group and of SROs within the ACP proved to be positive (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, Togo).

Political dialogue is a platform that also allows difficult and often divisive issues like political and economic governance, impunity, human rights, or the impact of economic and social policies to be brought to the table. Provided these are effectively integrated into the dialogue process, at its different levels and with various actors, and take into account other efforts at the international level to address these problems or difficult issues this can be an opportunity. This may be a particularly difficult task in dialogue with unwilling governments, who are often reluctant or resist engaging other actors, particularly NSAs. Regional partners may be more acceptable and provide a good opening to address difficult issues. That does not mean that the EU should not engage in such situations with NSAs. On the contrary, it should seek the best means to do it in a supportive way and without putting such actors in even more difficult positions than they may already be. In these circumstances, human rights can often be a good (and sometimes the only) entry point into a dialogue with these actors.

The use of political dialogue mechanisms is fundamental to create openings for reform and an approach that goes beyond technical solutions. By addressing political incentives and including the institutions that really affect prospects for reform, it can create and strengthen *ownership*. Ownership can best be strengthened by engaging in dialogue with various national actors (state and non-state), at various levels (local, national or regional), and by promoting dialogue in between the different national actors. It provides a means for them to convey their needs, views, perspectives and expectations. Ownership can also be reinforced by giving special attention to the partner country's own mechanisms (even at informal level) and organisational and institutional culture – which could contributed to greater ownership – instead of pursuing a state-building model that is based exclusively in western institutions and often disregards local dynamics.

Political dialogue is the most effective means to engage fragile states[121] and promote ownership. It is often an effective preventive tool. It is multidimensional and multi-actor, giving space to engage in such environments at different levels: local, national, regional and continental.

There is much scope to improve EU political dialogue mechanisms, namely by supporting other partners roles and efforts (e.g. regional organisations, AU), and empowering EU/EC institutional actors best placed to engage effectively in dialogue on the ground (e.g. Special Representatives, double-hatted Delegation Heads). This implies a common understanding of the political agenda and unity among MS and EC, ideally one that can be shared and supported by/in support of international actors like the UN, with whom the EU often works alongside in situations of fragility and difficult environments.

No matter how huge may be the potential of political dialogue, it is fundamental that it is supported by consistent and timely action, at both Community and MS level.

121 Saferworld and IA (2005).

2.4. Policy Coherence

"Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.(...) Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states"[122].

Acknowledging that poor coherence and coordination reduces (at its best) the effectiveness of EU external action, efforts are underway to improve coherence within EC policies (the right 'policy mix'). These efforts also aim to bring on board MS bilateral policies and interventions through increasing coordination at various levels and stages of EU action in a country or region.

The European Consensus on Development is an important benchmark and provides the backstage for EU efforts towards greater coherence. It formulates a common EU vision of development, shared by all EU institutional players: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, EU Member States, and the European Parliament. It links EC and Member States' aid (that used to be little more than just mathematics for the ranking of global ODA), and provides a common policy vision and a guiding tool for both Member States and EC development cooperation activities in all developing countries. It also provides a specific policy framework for the Community.

Overarching and comprehensive strategies for EU external action in certain regions or joint concept for EU activities in specific areas have been adopted in the last few years. These can be potentially important instruments to promote greater policy coherence within the EC. Together with policies and actions of the Council and MS, they can also overcome shortcomings of the institutional divide and the lack of coordination between the EC and MS, and guide the action of EU Special Representatives. EU policy coherence can build on these existing positive examples that combine military and civilian actors as well as development and security policies and actors, to promote joint plans of action in development and peace and security areas, and ensure that these are implemented in an effective way (see point 2.6). The PCD Work Programme for 2007 is a joint effort of the EC services and relevant Council bodies, identifying common priorities for 'horizontal' (organisational) and 'thematic' (policy) action on the 12 PCD commitments[123].

Significant steps have already been taken by the EU to achieve greater coherence and better coordination at the level of strategy and policy framework design at the EU level (intra-institutional, inter-institutional and with and within, Member States). However, the gap between adopted strategies and programming, and between capacity/policy design and practice remains wide. PCD is particularly difficult in the EU due to its complex institutional setting as already mentioned before. Security policy is clearly dominated by the MS and although the office of the High Representative for CFSP plays an increasing role in these issues, its role is not comparable to that of a supranational entity, nor does it reflect or bring on board EC perspectives or activities.

122 European Security Strategy, 2003.

123 This work programme promotes adequate follow-up to the GAERC conclusions of May 2005 and the Council conclusions on the PCD Work Programme 2006-2007 of April 2006. It sets out some guidelines and priority actions to increase the inclusion of development concerns in different policy areas, including security. It is to serve as a reference point for all levels of decision making involved in the implementation of the PCD commitments (Council, MS and EC)

Coherence is also a problem at the MS level. It must therefore be a two-track approach, where MS put some coherence in their external relations, which can better inform also a coherent and coordinated approach at EU level.

However, the EU is already engaged in several activities where a minimum coherence and coordination is required between several policy areas and actors, and across the pillar structure such as security and development (e.g. DDR) or trade and development (e.g. Aid for Trade). Efforts are being made to improve dialogue between the security and development communities within the context of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and at ministerial level. The EC is engaging more and more in rehabilitation activities and in DDR programmes, to ensure that the 'R' becomes a stronger component. There has also been a considerable amount of joint Council/Commission work on other security issues with development aspects, for instance on security sector reform in Africa.

The joint-evaluation of intra-governmental mechanisms that promote PCD in the European MS and EU institutions[124] concludes that there are several obstacles to this process, such as the lack of adequate political support, the lack of clarity on the mechanisms' precise mandates on PCD, insufficient information and in-depth knowledge, and the lack of resources, capacity and specialised skills in arguing complex cases in different disciplines. There are also natural limits to PCD, chief among these is that other policy areas will also seek policy coherence from their side.

2.4.1. Institutional Issues

Some of the acknowledged obstacles to greater policy coherence and coordination within the EU derive from the institutional set up and pillar structure that define the roles and competences of each EU organ.

At the Commission level, there are often differences of views and priorities between the various Directorate Generals and their services (e.g. Development, Relex, Echo, Aidco, Trade). Some issues are dealt by various units in different services (e.g. conflict prevention in Relex, DEV and Aidco), which may be positive as it ensures that these are taken into account in different geographical areas. But this does not necessarily contribute to a mainstreaming of lessons learned into that specific policy area. Lengthy and complex procedures and namely the comitology rules[125] which, while ensuring the political control and ownership by MS, often mean that funding decisions may take various months. There are means to ensure that this process goes quicker, but those are the exceptions rather than the rule, which does not provide an incentive to change or correct policies and commitments '*en cours de route*'.

There is a recognised institutional disconnect between the Commission and the Council: ESDP being Council-led under Pillar Two, while trade, environment, development, humanitarian aid, conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction are supported by the EC under Pillar One. This means that it is very difficult to fully integrate the programming of complementary development and peace-related activities into the strategic and operational planning of crisis management operations (civilian and military)[126], and in terms of effective sequencing of funding decisions.

124 ECDPM (2007): *Evaluation Study on the EU Member States' and Institutions' mechanisms for promoting Policy Coherence for Development*. Final Report, May.

125 EC funding decisions above a certain financial threshold (normally €10 million) are overseen by Committees composed of MS representatives.

126 This is one of the issues addressed in the *Joint Council Secretariat – Commission Services Working Paper on Security and Development – Food for thought to strengthen EU policy coherence (*2 October 2007), and discussed in the November GAERC meeting.

ESDP decision-making can be swift but is not necessarily well informed of all EU action in a given country (or potential EC action). These missions are therefore likely to be poorly linked and articulated with other ongoing activities of the EC, or MS activities in areas other than security and defence. Although the EC also sits in Council Committees and Working Groups and is therefore informed of Council activities and planned decisions, the opposite is not true. Nor is there always the political will and interest in the Council to take into account what the perspective of the EC is, or what activities it has planned.

With the devolution process, EC Delegations have a greater role in the programming and management of EC country support, and are also responsible for the CSPs that inform that process. They also play a role in the coordination with MS on the ground and in the many improvements the EU is intending at operational level that include enhanced donor coordination up to the stage of joint programming, transparent division of labour, and a further shift from project to programme approaches, from programme approaches to sector-wide approaches and to budget support implementation modalities. However, while EC delegations role in programming and coordination has been considerably boosted, they still lack the political clout and adequate expertise to support that enhanced role.

The outcome of the last European Summits (June and October 2007), and the decision to establish a European External Action Service in the framework of the institutional reform can be a step forward, already for its symbolic meaning, but it needs to be implemented and backed up by more meaningful changes in the way the EC and Council/MS operate and interact. Possible ways of cementing that could be:

> To improve coordination mechanisms (or eventually fuse different departments into new administrative structures) by increasing the frequency and regularise the participation of development ministers in the GAERC; encourage Trade, Development and External Relations (e.g. Africa) working groups to meet more regularly with a broader agenda; transform COARM into a forum where development objectives are also part of the discussion[127]; ensure that ECHO expertise, knowledge and understanding of specific crisis situations is taken into account in the planning of crisis management operations by attending planning meetings at the Civil-Military Cell.
> All these institutional sharing mechanisms could be best supported by joint training and awareness raising activities, joint assessments and analysis, and better information-sharing by MS.
> EC delegations could be given a political mandate and clear guidelines on how to move forward on key issues and on a case-by-case basis, and effective communication and dialogue mechanism established between the Delegations/EC geographic desks and the relevant Council working groups.

Key to all of these is the necessity to develop human resources quality and capacity at all levels – in the field, in Brussels, as well as in MS capitals – and in the various areas of the strategic and planning process: in assessment and analysis, strategic planning, policy design including in peace-building related areas (e.g. DDR and SSR processes, human rights monitoring, dialogue and mediation, transitional justice, conflict analysis), communication, management and implementation, policy and political dialogue and mediation/facilitation.

127 Christian Egenhofer and al. (2006): *Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council. Strategies for the Way Forward,* Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, pp. 96 and 102.

2.4.2. Programming

The programming process is an intermediary stage between the strategic and policy-design and the effective implementation. It ought to be informed by overarching and comprehensive regional and thematic strategies and be able to translate these into programming. It is the closest indication of the future engagement of the EC until practice gets under way. However, there are significant gaps between these different stages. Programming appears sometimes as if disconnected from the strategic planning, and effective practice does not always reflect what was programmed. Why are there these gaps and how could they be addressed? What could be improved?

Unpredictable and volatile situations (e.g. crisis or post-conflict) can make long-term programming difficult or just not adequate. Programming gives cooperation an element of predictability, particularly in cooperation with the ACP countries with a programming cycle of 5 years. This is a very positive element in most situations, but not necessarily possible or useful in situations of fragility, and even more so in situations of conflict, collapsed states or post-conflict. The element of flexibility in programming is therefore of particular importance. Such long-term programming is likely to be most adequate to address structural problems and root causes of fragility by ensuring predictability and long-term engagement (although in many situations 5 years is not long enough and longer commitments would be desirable, subject to the effective will of the partner country to move forward).

Despite the fact that participatory process should inform the elaboration of CSPs/RSPs, there is often poor local and national ownership of the process and outcome of the programming exercise. Under the Cotonou agreement, programming should be a participatory process where State and non-State actors are normally consulted, as well as EU MS and other donors. Ownership and comprehensive approaches are brought together in the CSPs/RSPs. However, the extent and quality of consultations and analysis that inform the CSPs/RSPs is very unequal. This is partly related to the lack of capacity of local stakeholders and in some cases the resistance of the political leadership in a country (under Cotonou, ACP governments are the EC counterpart in the elaboration of the CSPs) to involve other non-state actors. It is also due to the way the process is conducted locally and in Brussels (e.g. short time frames, inadequate mapping of local stakeholders, lack of qualified staff to conduct such human resources-intensive processes, resistance to move out of the usual templates that make the process easier for Brussels but not necessarily fit to a specific country situation). Too often insufficient consideration is given to local mechanisms and institutions, but budget support is a positive trend, to be decided on a case-by-case basis and accompanied by effective control and accountability mechanisms.

Mainstream cross-cutting issues, lessons learned and impact assessments into programming. Conflict prevention, gender, peace and security-related issues are not always mainstreamed into programming, and analysis of these cross-cutting issues is often poor or does not translate into identification and prioritisation of related activities. Furthermore, programmes in partner countries are not systematically assessed (and how they should be assessed also requires attention) in view of their implications for other policy areas and as tools to pursue a wider goal. Lessons learned are not shared across the EC and with MS.

Address the shortcomings of effective programming (and implementation) of transitional policies and issues. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) is a case in point. It is defined as "the design of integrated transition strategies, which gradually take over the relief/emergency

aid towards sustainable development and self reliance. The transition strategy should fill the gaps resulting from the difference between humanitarian aid and development cooperation in terms of objectives, procedures, partners and type of actions. It should aim at rebuilding institutional capacities, essential infrastructure and social services, increasing food security and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced persons and the general security"[128]

The EC recognizes this must become an integral part of the CSP in countries where crises and emergencies, or the potential for them to exist are high, particularly where ECHO is active or has planned an exit strategy. Integrating this perspective ought to start at the very design of emergency interventions and involve, as early as possible, country institutions and all actors concerned (in joint planning and coordination), whenever the country situation allows it to. In that sense, LRRD is very much about a continuous planning process rather than just effective sequencing. The MDGs should also be systematically integrated into post-conflict recovery strategies by coordinating security and humanitarian operations with long-term development efforts. The MDGs provide outcome objectives that countries can use as benchmarks for the transition from relief and recovery to long-term development[129], provided they are not taken in a purely quantitative way or in detriment of quality.

Another important issue of primary importance to countries in transition is transitional justice, not always addressed in country analysis and programming. Although it can be considered part of SSR programmes, it is not always addressed in SSR. DDR is also, along with SSR, an area where the linkages across areas of intervention and funding mechanisms are key. For instance, ESDP activities should be regarded as part of a wider peace building strategy and should not be implemented in an ad-hoc or individual basis (e.g. reform of the army or police) but rather integrated in multifunctional packages (e.g. including reform of the judiciary and others that are interlinked). DDR programmes, are not purely military processes, but a wider political process with long-term development implications – DDR is a tool for securing the peace process by facilitating ex-combatants' return to communities and must also be one part of a broader post-conflict recovery programme. By considering its other external assistance activities (on security, development, governance and justice) and their relation to DDR, the EU would be able to maximise the effectiveness of its interventions. This requires an improved information exchange and collaboration from planning to impact assessment between different bodies within the EU (MS included) and other international actors involved (the UN being almost always present in such situations).

Thus, EU programming should *move towards integrated approaches and take into account MS and other donor programmes and activities* and vice-versa. The Country and Regional Strategy papers could become more comprehensive instruments to guide EU external action in a given country or region, addressing several issues of policy coherence and types of assistance, and integrating existing international norms and regulations for good governance and accountability mechanisms on areas that have strong impact on fragile situations (e.g. Kimberley process, UN norms on responsibilities of transnational corporations with respect to Human Rights, good governance in relation to extractive industries activities, etc).

128 EC (DEV) programming guide for Strategy papers(2006), *Transition strategy: The Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach.*
129 UN (2007): The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007

A good means to address some of the shortcomings of the programming exercise, and to advance with the policy coherence agenda and improved coordination among donors would be *joint EC/MS programming*. This is partly under way in some partner countries with one or a few MS strongly involved in that country (e.g. UK and EC in Sierra Leone) and is being envisaged in others (it was mentioned with regard to DRC, although France and Belgium have in the meantime signed their national cooperation programmes separately).

On the EU side, advantages seem to be quite obvious if MS are serious about joined-up strategies and actions towards greater EU effectiveness, particularly in countries in fragility. On the other hand, national interests may need to be somewhat downplayed, which may lead some MS to view it as a less attractive option.

For partner countries, it would mean reducing the strain on the already weak capacity of national stakeholders. However, partner governments may also view this option with some discomfort as it may reduce their bargaining power and '*margin of manoeuvre*' (e.g. donor coordination in DRC was not always seen positively by the government).

Resistance to joint programming exercises can also be explained by the fact that the partner government does not identify with it and feels no ownership of the process; it would then be important to evaluate how other national stakeholders would perceive it and identify with it, and try to readdress the issue in an inclusive dialogue process where different national stakeholders can confront their views and agree jointly on priority areas and activities.

In difficult partnerships, where programming is already reduced to a few less controversial areas, it ought to be considered as the 'only' valid option for the EU and preferably within a joint effort with other regional partners.

2.4.3. EU and Member States Coordination

The EU has also to strengthen cooperation with the MS to promote the mainstreaming of EU guidelines into bilateral policies (such as the EU code of conduct on arms exports or the User's Guide published in October 1998). This cooperation is also important to ensure that short-term crisis management, which is implemented under European security and defence policies and falls within the competence of the MS, can be smoothly coordinated with long-term reconstruction for which the Commission is mainly in charge. Moreover, in fragile situations or conflict-affected countries the EC is sometimes present even when MS have withdrawn. The EC can then act as an impartial 'honest broker' between the sometimes divergent interests of MS.

Contributing to pooled funds, adopting more efficient aid mechanisms according to the situation, and agree among donors to delegate authority to leading donors in specific sectors, could help reduce transaction costs and improve aid effectiveness in fragile situations. *Joint programming and joint actions* are one way of promoting coordination. In this context, the 2006 EC Communication on Governance states that "dialogue with individual partner countries on governance reforms should be conducted jointly by the EC and those MS represented on the ground; this dialogue should be translated into coherent approaches to aid programming and coordinated support for governments' reform programmes". The reality is still far from this: support for institutional reform, for capacity building and for governance issues are usually defined earlier (in the bilateral and EU cooperation programmes), with no previous coordination and according to donor priorities. In fragile situations the capacity for countries to lead coordination and set their

own priorities is usually weak, which can lead to situations where several EU MS are doing the same thing, at the same place and time (e.g. technical assistance to a given Ministry).

Division of labour is a way to improve complementarity and coherence between the EU and MS. The 'EU Code of Conduct on Complementary and Division of Labour in Development Policy'[130] sets up processes in which each EU donor should develop a vision of its 'comparative advantage' with a more limited focus. Complementary (in-country, cross-country and cross-sector) implies that each actor is focusing its assistance on areas where it can add most value, given what others are doing. It calls for an optimal division of labour in which the number of EU donors present in a country or across sectors are reduced and rationalised. If this is a huge challenge on sectors (since some sectors are usually more appealing than others – e.g. health and education versus environment, culture, etc), it is even more difficult relating to geographic rationalisation, which is linked to bilateral foreign policy interests. In fact, some MS have already started to rationalise their foreign presence, such as the UK or Sweden, but this is mainly due to political and foreign policy priorities, rather than to complementarity reasons.

The progress on EU donor coordination is still too slow and some MS perceive it as an EU process interfering in national policymaking. Division of labour implies a long-term commitment and may lead to reduced visibility or loss of opportunities and, therefore, needs to be addressed carefully. In sum, expectations may need to be downgraded on this issue, because it depends always on MS willingness to fill the gaps on a *voluntary* basis. Delegated cooperation arrangements – in which one donor acts with authority on behalf of one or more donors – is not the most common situation, although it is increasing in countries where budget support is the preferred aid modality (e.g. Mozambique) and between donors that have a history of common cooperation (e.g. Nordic countries). In some partner countries, delegated cooperation is also increasing at field level from the MS to the EC, which is regarded as a more impartial multilateral donor.

The contribution of the division of labour to increase the quality of donor support and the real effects on poverty eradication remain unclear. Although it foresees dialogue with the partner countries, the division of labour can result in a reduction of choice for them in relation to sector focus and modalities (and on the choice of who should be present there) and can lead to a lowest common denominator approach. This can even be more dramatic in fragile states, where engagement is more complex and local capacities are usually weaker.

However, there are also some recent potentially *positive developments* on EU-MS coordination, such as:

- The EU increasingly funds projects led my MS, as is the case for instance in Afghanistan with projects to be implemented by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), where EU member states run 9 of the 25 PRTs. Although the idea is in principle a valid one, the results of this particular case do not seem to be an example to follow in the future.
- Training requirements for civilian crisis management operations were identified. The MS agreed to ensure better quality among EU training providers and better interoperability with EU key partners in crisis management.
- The EC is working with MS in the OECD-DAC framework to develop better evaluation criteria for conflict prevention and peace-building activities.
- Joint programming with MS that have a strong presence and interest in a given country is the

130 (2007): *EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy*. Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament, COM(2007) 72 final, 28/02/2007

main goal. However, results are mixed: a joint road map for EU cooperation has been developed in Ethiopia and signed by 9 of 12 EU donors present, but refused by Ireland and Sweden, and signed by the UK while retaining its bilateral programmes; likewise, there were some attempts to establish joint programming in DRC, but France and Belgium signed bilateral programmes.

- Regarding the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, an ad hoc working group has been set up within the Council of the European Union to coordinate EU member states' positions on the wide range of issues covered by the Strategy. The establishment of this group could facilitate a more systematic interaction with EU non-institutional actors. The group consists of experts from interested member states and will meet regularly, probably before each EU-Africa expert troika meeting.

EU in the DRC: Instruments, Coherence and Coordination Issues[131]

The EU is trying to integrate different types of action in the DRC, in the field of stabilisation, democratisation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The EC, Council and MS have invested significant financial resources in the country in the last few years. The main activities can be summarised as follows:

> In April 2006, following a UN request, the EU deployed a military mission to DRC (EUFOR DRCongo) in support of MONUC during the Congolese election process, which ended in 30 November 2006. The EU Police Mission in DRCongo – EUPOL Kinshasa (July 2006 to March 2007) – developed a close coordination with EUFOR. Beyond the short-term objectives of election monitoring, it also assisted in reviewing police legislation and the doctrinal framework in order to lay the groundwork for longer-term capacity-building. As of July 2007, a new ESDP mission is assisting the Police Nationale Congolaise in its restructuring process and supporting the interaction of the latter with the Justice sector.

> The EU and the WB led the international efforts to create a Compact on Governance with the DRC authorities, based on a structured dialogue with the Government. This compact was approved by the DRC and has a strong security component (police, armed forces and justice sector). The EC has also engaged in technical assistance in almost all key ministries and government institutions.

> In 2006, the EC and the Council Secretariat jointly prepared a comprehensive approach to SSR in DRC to promote coherence between actions undertaken under the first and second pillars. The mission EUSEC DRCongo has been active in the field of SSR since May 2005, with a mandate to integrate the various armed factions in the DRC, as well as supporting Congolese efforts to restructure and rebuild the Congolese army. SSR includes a further package to support core judicial reforms as part of a large governance programme. The EU support to the DDR process is linked to the overall support to the Great Lakes Multi-country Demobilisation and reintegration Programme.

> ECHO has continued its humanitarian work in the country – although on smaller scale than during the 1998-2003 conflict. Short-term and long-term needs are being addressed simultaneously and LRRD in the health sector is considered to be a positive example of good planning and coordination. DG Dev support is mainly targeting public service delivery sectors, including justice and health, as well as infrastructure.

131 For a more profound analysis of EU action in DRC, see Vaillant, Charlotte (2006): *Peace-building in the Great Lakes: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU in the DRC.*

> Another element of the EU's conflict prevention work of direct relevance to the DRC is the focus on the role natural resources play in financing and perpetuating conflict. The EU is actively supporting several international rules on this regard (Kimberly process, EITI) and trying to implement its own initiatives (e.g. EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade – FLEGT)

These actions illustrate the positive aspects of a more comprehensive approach that aims to coordinate security, governance and development dimensions. However, the question remains: is this the beginning of a joint holistic approach or is it simply because the EU is present in many sectors? There are also some *weaknesses* in the EU approach:

Coordination with MS on the ground is insufficient. Even in the DRC, where there is the political will to act, MS foreign policy priorities have an important role and have undermined attempts towards a more coherent approach. Some MS therefore signed bilateral programmes while the general goal was to achieve joint programming with the EC.

Security sector reform is still a new sphere of action for the EU and entails complex challenges, particularly in the DRC. To sustain improvements in the security sphere, concrete advances with reforms of the security and justice sectors have to be achieved, but these can also trigger tensions and increase instability. One factor that determines the success of SSR is currently lacking: the effective political will of the partner country. This raises the question of ownership, (which is considered a crucial condition for success in SSR programmes) and the dilemma of pursuing visible results in short timeframes while SSR programmes must rely on locally owned processes that inevitably take time.

Furthermore, time-bound SSR and DDR can only generate sustainable results if they are integrated in a broader process of national reconciliation and combined with development measures, such as employment generation, greater access to income opportunities, etc. This entails important ongoing debates over the institutional competencies within the EU, since SSR and DDR entail both security and development components.

The competing demands of transitional contexts like DRC may undermine progress and lead donors to focus only in one dimension of a much broader problem. For instance, the electoral process became an immediate and urgent priority for donors (including the EU), while it is questionable if the government's legitimisation was more important than other state-building measures.

Finally, the regional dimension of insecurity in the east is not fully covered by these initiatives. A Peace, Stability and Development pact for the Great Lakes Region was locally established by these countries and the EU is trying to pursue a regional approach (through instruments such as the special representative for the Great Lakes, support to mechanisms set up by the Economic Community of Central African States – ECCAS, etc) but the EU's national actions in DRC, Rwanda and Burundi are still largely uncoordinated.

Achieving coherence inside MS governments is a difficult task because different ministries are responsible for different aspects of programmes in fragile states. It is desirable that the EU promotes 'WoG' approaches in the bilateral cooperation of each MS, encouraging MS to establish within their administrations:

- mechanisms for shared assessment and early warning;
- common conceptualisation of the problems and causes of fragility;

- joint strategies for intervention (common agreement on a hierarchy of objectives, including short-term and long-term priorities and actions);
- coherent policy implementation mechanisms (to delineate who has what function to perform);
- some degree of common pool of resources;
- integrated analysis and monitoring mechanisms, to examine interactions between interventions in different domains and assess them against their impact on goals.

2.5. Coordination with Other Donors and Developing Partners

2.5.1. Donor Coordination

In countries affected by fragility, where the government is usually not in position to take the leadership, coordination and complementarity between donors are even more important to avoid duplications, maximise impacts and avoid overloading the already weakened state with donor requirements and procedures. As stated in the Council conclusions of April 2006, the EU should become the leading force in promoting harmonization, in particular in difficult partnerships and other cases where other leadership does not exist. To achieve this goal, the EC can take advantage of its reputation as an 'impartial actor' and 'honest broker' in several partner countries.

The international context for donor harmonization has never been so favourable: donors have committed to the Paris declaration targets, have agreed to a number of principles and standards for Humanitarian Aid[132], are increasingly aligning their aid policies and objectives with internationally agreed development goals (MDGs) and, finally, the emergence of budget and sector support as preferred modalities for improving aid effectiveness and ownership offers an additional opportunity to further promote coordinated and joint actions.

However, these commitments have only partially been translated to the field. More than coordinating actions, state-building in fragile situations and in conflict-affected countries has required the creation of special organisations, bodies and funds at all levels of planning, coordinating and implementing joined-up security-development-governance programmes (e.g. Afghanistan, Cambodia). However, these new structures often result in parallel donor-driven programmes that have limited ownership and linkages with local actors and priorities.

The examples of uncoordinated actions and lack of common understanding in planning and priorities of donors are frequent, particularly in fragile situations and difficult partnerships, where there is often also an insufficient political analysis and understanding of the profound causes and features of fragility. In situations where peace-building, State reconstruction, development and security are desperately required, it is vital but also very hard for donors to collaborate effectively. This is due to multiple factors: urgency, donor goals, ongoing insecurity, multitude of actors, agendas and mandates, etc. Somalia, Afghanistan or Nepal can offer some examples of uncoordinated actions that lead to increased instability[133].

132 Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. In a meeting held in Stockholm in 2003, donor countries, United Nations agencies, NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement agreed on a set of 23 principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship.

133 For instance, in Nepal, "Some donors, most notably the UK and the US, continued to supply military aid to HMGN until the usurpation of power by the King and his suspension of democratic institutions in February 2005. The US's military aid programme was explicitly intended to help the Nepalese government fight the Maoist insurgents, whom the US Department of State has classified as an Other Terrorist Group (Vaughn, 2006). On the other hand, the UK's military assistance (mostly in the form of equipment) was meant to be used for medical, logistical and humanitarian purposes only – but it is also clear that this assistance allowed HMGN to free up some of its own resources for its military campaign against the insurgents. The availability of this military assistance undoubtedly contributed to the escalation of conflict and violence in Nepal (International Crisis Group, 2003)"; Cammack, Diana et all (2006); *Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice*, Report submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Overseas Development Institute, March, p.76

Beyond the coordination within the EU, getting multilateral organisations like the World Bank, Regional Development Banks, UNDP and the EU to harmonize their approaches is one of the toughest challenges. Multilateral development banks seem to start to deal with this issue in a more serious way than before, and the EU should also work on this basis in a more systematic way. A good point to start would be to analyse where concrete comparative advantages of the EU are located in order to advance a division of labour among multilaterals.

EU-UN Coordination

"The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority" (European Security Strategy).

"The EU will undertake to carry out this agenda in close cooperation with partner countries, other bilateral development partners and multilateral players such as the United Nations and International Financial Institutions, to prevent duplication of efforts and to maximise the impact and effectiveness of global aid. (...) EU action will take place in the framework of multilateral efforts including the UN Peace-building Commission, and will aim to re-establish the principles of ownership and partnership". (European Consensus on Development)

The EU approach in fragile situations and difficult environments should be embedded by EU's overall commitment to effective multilateralism. Fragile situations require a greater reliance on multilateral channels to deliver policy coherence at field level, and this calls for better coordination among (and stronger capacities within) the EU, the UN, the WB and OECD. Similar to the EU, United Nations agencies are often present in fragile situations. In many cases they are both delivering humanitarian assistance, and are simultaneously a security and development actor.

The implementation of the outcomes of the UN World Summit of September 2005 is one of the EU's main priorities. The EU is strongly engaged in contributing to reforms to the system of collective security and peace-building in the UN, including the creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peace-building Commission, both of which have required the EU to adapt to the new institutional set-ups of these fledgling UN bodies. It has also established a strategic partnership with UNDP.

Some examples of EU-UN coordination include:

- The EC started to deploy planning and assessment teams and is establishing stand-by arrangements with the UN and the WB to elaborate joint post-conflict and post-disaster damage and needs assessments.
- The EU is actively supporting the establishment of the UN Peace-building Commission as a way of bringing together actors and resources to implement post-conflict peace-building and recovery programmes, as well as to promote sustained international attention to address the institutional gap in the transition period between the end of an armed conflict and the resumption of sustainable development.
- Several complementary actions are been undertaken by the EU and UN in the field of peace operations, such as the EU operation that succeeded a UN peacekeeping force to assist national authorities put in place a professional police force in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the EU military and civilian support to electoral process in the DRC (assuming a complementary role to MONUC, through EUFOR and EUPOL); support to the implementation of the UN support

package to the AU Mission in Darfur; EU Member states' contributions to the reinforcement and deployment of UNIFIL; and cooperation between the EU Planning Team in Kosovo since May 2006 with UNMIK. The deployment of the first AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force in Sudan is a new opportunity for coordinating efforts.

- In terms of military capacity, the EU battle-group concept opens the possibility of EU-led Crisis Management Operations being deployed in response to requests from the UN Security Council, under UN mandate where appropriate.
- The UN is the primary partner of EU support to SSR, DDR and other peace-building tasks (e.g. implementation of the DDR programme in Liberia through the UNDP Trust Fund; the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan covering police and justice reform through EC support to UNDP; amongst others).
- Regular meetings are being held of the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management, as well as the 'desk-to-desk' dialogue in conflict prevention with integrated UN teams.

The need for increased cooperation in crisis management has led to an agreement in which the two organisations cooperate on the following measures[134]:

- Regular senior-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat and the EU Troika on broader aspects of crisis management.
- Regular exchange of views between senior UN Secretariat officials and the Political and Security Committee of the EU.
- Continued meetings of the UN-EU Steering Committee including ad hoc meetings in crisis situations as required.
- Consideration of further steps to enhance cooperation in areas including, but not limited to: support to African peacekeeping capacity-building; cooperation on aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform; exchanges between UN and EU Situation Centres; and cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre.
- Pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the UN and the EU are jointly engaged.
- Systematic UN-EU joint lessons learned exercises following cases of joint operational cooperation.

Most EU-UN cooperation takes place in the fields of crisis management and post-conflict activities. In fragile states, conflict prevention and addressing the causes of fragility at the earliest stages are crucial. The EU's Action Plan on Civilian ESDP (2004) already identified 'conflict prevention and resolution in Africa' as an area with considerable potential for cooperation with the UN. Currently, this necessity is even stronger, since the EU and UN are both supporting the reinforcement of African capabilities, mainly through the AU and SROs, having also engaged in tripartite cooperation in peace-support operations. The focus on prevention implies that the EU and UN further engage in other levels of coordination, namely by enhancing political/diplomatic coordination and trying to invest, whenever possible, in a clear single voice. This is particularly important in difficult partnerships, where the international community often sends mixed signs to the government, further undermining the prospects for stability (e.g. Sudan).

The EU can also draw on the UN's experience with integrated policy units in selected countries (the UN Peace-building Offices and Political missions, such as the UN Integrated Offices in Sierra

134 *Joint Statement on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management*, June 2007.

Leone or Burundi, UNOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau, etc), in order to ensure a more holistic approach to the wide challenges of fragile situations. Being increasingly engaged in multidimensional activities such as SRR, internal coherence – within the EU – and external coherence – with other donors – will have to be promoted at field level by the EU.

One serious limitation at the global level is still the lack of an international common peace-building framework that can guide multiple external and internal actors. This can also be an important theme for EU-UN cooperation in the near future. Within this goal, one possible issue for further discussion may be the establishment of 'security goals' that can complement the MDGs by addressing the missing dimension of governance and obstacles to human security.

The EU should also be actively involved in the Peace-building Commission activities, bring together the actors that are important in each crisis and foster common understanding on how to work jointly to promote structural stability. The EU's participation in the Peace-building Commission can also build on several recommendations that have already been issued in order to achieve better effectiveness in tackling the root causes of conflict. These include: (i) making funding to governments contingent on political commitments and benchmarks as an incentive to encourage political consensus; (ii) rethinking the timeframe (the period for implementation, one to two years, should be lengthened, as sustainable peace cannot be achieved, nor impact evaluated, within the current timeframe); and (iii) better involving communities in peace-building, particularly those who are most vulnerable and conflict-prone, and those in rural areas[135].

2.5.2. Working with Regional Organisations in Africa

"Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows" (ESS).

Since 2000, a new dialogue between the EU and the African continent has started[136], and despite the difficulties in holding the second EU-Africa Summit (initially foreseen in 2003 but due to take place in 2007 during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU), this dialogue has continued on the form of ministerial, troika and expert meetings. This translated into an increasing convergence of interests, with several positive developments – mainly in peace and security aspects – and also some difficult issues – such as the return of cultural goods or migration. The emergence of the African Union in 2002 brought a strong determination to formulate pan-African answers to the major problems of the continent and gave a significant boost to EU-Africa partnership.

The EU institutional setting is itself one of the obstacles in implementing the strategy in a coherent and effective manner. There are currently three agreements that translate into three different financial instruments reflecting different EU priorities: (i) the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (that covers Sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa), the European Neighbourhood Policy (with Northern Africa countries) and the EU strategy for South Africa (that followed a Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement). These fractured relationships are reflected at institutional

135 For example, in Sierra Leone, the Commission should invest in new ways to reach young ex-combatants living in squatter settlements. In Burundi, communities felt that more should be done to include all ethnic groups in the peace process. Actionaid, CAFOD, and CARE international (2007): '*Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peace-building Commission.*'

136 The Cairo EU-Africa Summit in 2000 launched a framework for political dialogue between the EU and African sides and approved an Action Plan that covered several fundamental areas, such as regional integration and integration of the African continent into the world economy; human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law; peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; and several development issues (including environment, food security, debt, amongst others).

level – even within the EC, with DG Dev dealing with Sub-Saharan Africa and DG Relex covering North Africa – which further adds to the complexity of the relation between the two continents. Moreover, it also can be argued that Cotonou is also a fragmented framework, due to an increasing lack of cohesion between Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions (with the EU formulating regional strategies for each of these regions).

The EU Strategy for Africa (2005) aims to provide a common coordinated and coherent European initiative and response to the development, peace and security challenges faced by the whole African continent in the 21st century and, as such, is it the first practical example of the implementation of the European Consensus on Development. Since it was approved, it became a useful instrument to boost the dialogue between the EU and pan-African institutions (towards the approval of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy at the end of 2007) and a starting point to programme relevant EU aid instruments. It intends to be a platform for both Community aid and the bilateral aid programmes implemented by EU member states, although its implementation is still not clear in practical terms. It is hoped that the Joint Africa-EU strategy can ensure a stronger ownership of all stakeholders on both sides, including the definition of a shared agenda, the role of all actors concerned and the practical mechanisms for implementation and monitoring[137].

What does this means for fragile situations, since many of them are in Africa? Both sides agree on the need to "hold a dialogue on the concept of fragility of states aimed at reaching a common understanding and agreeing on steps that could be taken"[138]. This does not need to be done from scratch: state fragility is already being addressed by several African instruments, with EU support.

For African sub-regional and continental institutions, it is clearly a priority to address the instability points that have negative consequences on neighbouring countries and represent a threat to the stability of entire regions, increasing fragility and conflict. Much of what African leaders expect from EU players is related to *respect, complement and support the work AU and the regional organisations are already doing to engage with fragile neighbours*. This is after all the key political shift in the AU Constitutive Act in comparison with the OAU Charter: from the principle of 'non-interference' in internal sovereignty matters, to the principle of 'non-indifference'[139]. This is not just a message in the field of conflict, it also provides the basis for engagement with situations of fragility.

EU support to the AU and SROs aims both at strengthening urgently needed capacities to tackle conflict management and resolution, as well as at supporting continental and sub-regional mechanisms and capacity for conflict prevention, early warning, mediation and peace-building. Evidence shows that EU support works better where and when there is capacity of partner countries/institutions/actors, making the case for the EU engagement in strengthening the partners' institutions and capacity.

Cooperation with the SROs is fundamental, since they are the building blocks of the new African Peace and Security Architecture. The idea of the *EU working with regional neighbours to engage*

137 For more information on the EU-Africa partnership and strategy, see ECDPM (2006); *The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective*, *Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy*, Issue Paper I for public consultation; and *Setting the Agenda*, *Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy*, Issue Paper II for public consultation, Maastricht, December 2006.

138 *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. Draft presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting of 31 October 2007, p.9

139 The AU Constitutive Act states in Article 4 "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".

together with a country in situation of fragility could become a cornerstone of EU policy on this issue, provided there is a cautious approach on the neighbours agenda and involvement in cases whenever fragility is associated with violent conflict. In practice, there are already some examples: the EU realises it has to turn to the SADC group of countries to be able to work with Zimbabwe. Regional dimensions could also become one of the key issues in the Africa-EU Strategy. In the draft of the joint strategy document it is already present in many ways but is not developed as a core strategy. Yet this is precisely the core approach of the EU to its own problems of development and stability and probably its most important key competence and added value.

The regional focus is also important from an EU perspective, but the establishment of common regional political frameworks to guide EU external action in the several sub-regions is not yet accomplished (e.g. regional strategy for the Horn of Africa, adopted by the EC in October 2006 with no follow-up). These regional strategies can be a useful tool for combining security, governance and development challenges, provided that they are fully mainstreamed in the formulation of CSPs and RSPs, as well as in other programming instruments and actions.

For African partner organisations it is also important to implement the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework that provides simultaneous short-term and long-term measures to address post-conflict situations, in which weakened capacities, destroyed institutions and the absence of a democratic culture and respect for human rights are usually serious obstacles to peace consolidation. The PCRD established human security as the basis for all activities and states that rebuilding a legitimate State authority and enhancing national ownership of that process are the central concerns of this policy. Therefore, all PCRD activities need to have a capacity-building component. The EU can draw most of its post-conflict actions from this framework, using the objectives/priorities/benchmarks established for each of the six core areas: Security; humanitarian/emergency assistance (including LRRD); socio-economic reconstruction and development; political governance and transition; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender. This can be done through alignment with the partner country's government in situations of fragility and through 'shadow alignment' and increased cooperation with other local actors in difficult partnerships.

In conflict management and resolution, the APF has been instrumental in supporting African organisations (financially but also at other levels) to run African Peace Support Operations. It is the most important source of funding for this support and ensures the necessary predictability of funds. To pursue the implementation of actions proposed by the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts[140], some flexibility is also being promoted, by developing short term support instruments for specific missions (e.g. the recent establishment of an EU fund to support AMIS) that can bypass AU financial weaknesses.

Through the APF, the EU is also helping in capacity building and the strengthening of capacities of the AU Commission, the creation of an African Stand-by Force, support to SROs' liaison officers to the AU, and establishment of an early warning system. By the development of RECAMP into a European instrument, the EU will also be able to support the full establishment of the African Stand-by Force and national training and exercises programmes that might be offered by

140 European Union concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; General Secretariat of the Council and European Commission, Brussels, 07.07.2006.

EU Member States. The financing source of APF has, nevertheless, raised some criticism and concern over the fact that funds initially allocated for development (EDF) are being used to support peace and security needs. However, one should always recall that security and development are closely interlinked and ensuring peace in African countries is certainly part of the development objective.

Although the support for peace operations or for the establishment of early warning mechanisms at regional and continental level are clearly important to address conflicts and fragility, a stronger effort needs to be done towards an effective *conflict prevention approach*. Conflict prevention is still a weaker dimension in pan-African action (comparing to reactive measures) and the EU can play a major role on this area. Some positive developments can be highlighted: in West Africa, the EU is supporting ECOWAS in the elaboration of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy, as well as activities to reduce the availability and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons[141]. Conflict prevention experts are supporting the organisation in managing its operations, including studies, meetings and training activities.

At the continental level, the reinforcement of Africa *governance initiatives* can also have indirect positive reflections on conflict prevention. In this context, the EU assessments on fragility and choice of the most appropriate reforms or EU support measures should mainly be based in these self-assessments, whenever they exist. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the current EU support to the APRM is not only directed to support the process itself (by supporting the APRM secretariat, reviews, missions and dissemination of results) but also to fully integrate the aid for reforms identified by reviews into the existing cooperation instruments – mainly via the National Indicative Programmes.

It is also a positive development that the EU and AU are engaging in a dialogue to discuss ways in which the EU can support African-owned human rights and democracy-building efforts on the basis of *inter alia* the African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections[142]. Joint initiatives such as the EU-Africa Plan of Action on the Trafficking of Human Beings are examples of coordinated strategies that can help to address cross-cutting issues that are crucial to prevent fragility and conflict, provided they are followed by adequate implementation and monitoring mechanisms.

2.6. Enhancing the Security-Development-Governance Nexus

The EU recognizes that security, development and democratic governance (without implying an endorsement of any particular model, but encompassing all relevant areas of public domain) are closely linked and that integrated approaches would be a major leap forward in consolidating the EU role both as a major donor as well as an important player in the global security sphere.

It also recognizes that ensuring closer linkages between these fields is even more fundamental in conflict-affected countries and in fragile environments. As stated in the last MDGs report, "insecurity and instability in conflict and post-conflict countries make long-term development efforts extremely difficult. In turn, a failure to achieve the MDGs can further heighten the risk of instability and conflict. Yet in spite of a technical consensus that development and security are mutually dependent, international efforts all too often treat them as independent from one

141 Adoption of an ECOWAS-EU Joint Declaration on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons on 24 April 2007.
142 (2007): *Final Communiqué, 8th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting*, Brussels, 15th May 2007.

another"[143]. Part of the resistance for this derives from the mistrust and fears that mixing development and security objectives and priorities may lead to a confusion of roles and subordination of the former to the latter, which most agree would not serve the purposes of any[144]. However, the growing pressure on both civilian and military actors working alongside in the same scenarios is increasing the need for greater dialogue and cooperation between these actors. There is a recognized need to improve policy and practice on how the different goals can be pursued in a mutually reinforcing way[145].

While many causes can trigger State failure and fragility, 'bad' governance is often at the heart of them, both as a direct cause or amplifying negative effects of other State fragilities. When countries have a long history of political rights violations, rent-seeking, economic and political exclusion, non participatory decision-mechanisms, or political systems that are not well equipped to face economic/ethnic/cultural challenges that might trigger State fragility, these can lead to a radicalisation of groups within a country/region and ultimately lead to conflict and State failure. Nepal and Chad, for instance, are examples of countries where poor political governance is fuelling instability and conflict and affecting development efforts.

The need for a security-development nexus is also upheld by partner countries and organisations[146] with whom the EU is engaged in supporting local and regional efforts to promote peace and security, alongside sustainable development and good governance.

Bridging the cultural and institutional divide

Many of the problems that emerge in combining these different dimensions are the result of tensions between development, humanitarian and governance goals on the one hand, and foreign and security policy objectives and priorities on the other. Despite the recognition of the close links between security and development, the development and humanitarian communities tend to fear that their goals will become subordinate to political and security agendas that may not (directly or indirectly) best serve their mandates, and that their roles is often not taken sufficiently into account in the making of foreign and security policy decisions and actions.

There are many scenarios where development and in particular humanitarian actors work side by side and where the security actors mandate includes providing the minimal conditions for humanitarian aid to resume or expand their reach (e.g. Artemis in DRC, AMIS in Sudan) and where their 'co-habitation' has actually worked well.

Among the key conditions for a positive and cooperative relationship is *clarity of mandates* and rules of engagement, *openness and collaborative efforts* to tackle problems/situations of common interest, *quality of human resources and good communication skills* on both sides that can strengthen dialogue, sharing of knowledge and *understanding of each other roles* and constraints, which can forge good cooperative efforts.

This does not mean mixing up humanitarian and security actors on the ground – humanitarians tend to keep as much apart as they can for fears of blurred perceptions of who's who and who

143 UN (2007): The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007

144 On this issue, see namely VOICE (2006): *The strengthening of EU crisis capabilities. What impact on humanitarian aid?* Briefing paper, October 2006.

145 DfID (2005b), p13.

146 For instance, the AU PCRD framework states that in most post-conflict reconstruction settings these paradigms co-exist side-by-side in external interventions instead of coming together to form an integrated post-reconstruction system, and adds that this is a major obstacle to a coherent and effective response.

does what. They argue that military assets should only be used when no other means are available as stipulated by international guidelines. Otherwise, this can have a negative impact on the security of humanitarian workers[147]. Good collaborative efforts in early phases, starting with assessment and planning, with involvement of humanitarian experts, can address from the outset some of these concerns and improve cooperation on the ground between ESDP missions and humanitarian assistance. The UN international framework for the use of military/civil defence assets in natural or man-made disasters (Oslo and MCDA guidelines) ought to inform EU activities with implications for humanitarian assistance.

Between the development and security community the gap tends to be even wider, for the same reasons just mentioned. Even when there are shared goals, the divergences between the security and development communities highlighted in the challenges of engaging in fragile contexts are very present at the EU level. This is also due to the different time frames. Development activities tend to be generally long-term while security-related activities often aim at immediate results. However, not all security activities can fit adequately into short-time frames. Thus the formation of a capable army, respectful of its constitutional role and duties, endorsed by its people is likely to take much more than a few months or even take years and is in itself an incremental process, linked to other political, economic and societal factors, and thus to development work.

Governance intends (or hopes) to be a guiding 'motto' informing and bridging political attitudes and development policies and practice to make them consistent, complementary and thus more effective. Upholding good governance principles can collide at times with economic interests and concerns losing out to other partners who tend not to link economic cooperation with human rights, political pluralism, freedom of expression or other governance aspects (e.g. the oil-rich Angola has not hesitated in playing the 'Chinese card' when dealing with the EU). The risk of isolation may also imply losing political leverage on unwilling governments, which may be perceived by many, as negative and counterproductive. If there is no shared understanding and agreement on governance principles and objectives among the various EU actors, and a constructive and gradual approach towards upholding governance in a partner country – an approach that takes into account the specificities of the local/regional context and feeds into locally owned initiatives or structures – the governance agenda is likely to be perceived as another form of conditionality alien to those who are meant to be its primary beneficiaries and in the process alienate also complementary development, political and security efforts.

In the framework of PCD, security and development are to be dealt with as complementary agendas, aiming at creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. There are also 'technical' problems to a more effective linkage between security and development communities and activities, which derive partly from the institutional divide within the EU.

The EU Treaty requires that the Commission be 'fully associated' with the CFSP work, where it enjoys, along with Member States, a right of policy initiative, manages the CFSP budget line and brings to the CFSP debate the EC policy areas where it has a clearly defined role. The Commission also has a role as external representative in all the European Community areas. This involves the Commission both in policy formulation in Brussels, and in the representation of EC interests throughout the world by means of its extensive network of delegations. The Commission is, how-

147 Voice (2006), point 5.1

ever, solely responsible for a number of external policies of the EU, such as trade. It also has sole responsibility for Community actions in the areas of development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions regulations, while it has a shared competence on humanitarian aid. The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring consistency of EU external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. Yet, Commission and Council/MS have often tended to work separately in line with the different roles and competences attributed by the EU Treaty and not taking enough into consideration what the other was already doing in a country or region. It is important to ensure that the EC has a stronger presence and role in the Council relevant working groups or committees from the very early stages of the debate in the Council (although a not-enough measure to guarantee coordinated and complementary action), and in a possible CFSP/ESDP action in a country where the EC as a long-term presence and an important role.

What is generally a problem at the Brussels level – because of the institutional divide – is often less of a problem and more easily overcome on the ground. Coordination and complementarity is often best achieved and easier at local level (as in the case of DRC). On the ground, necessity and reality drive attitudes, not so much (or as much) the concern of being overtaken by someone else's role or ambition. Brussels is very wary of not crossing border lines, not mixing security and development, development and military actors, not creating 'blurred situations' where institutional competences and legal arguments can be used. There is still also a certain 'malaise' in Brussels as to the development of EU military capacities, often perceived in detriment of civilian and development efforts, although efforts to develop EU civilian crisis management have been significant in the last few years.

There are conflicting perspectives on what ought to be the priority areas for international support in situations of fragility (including post-conflict). Security is very often felt by locals as being the major problem and restoring law and order the most pressing priority to be addressed in order to allow for progress in other policy areas. On the other hand, it is also acknowledged that focusing on immediate security only does not contribute to long-term security and stability. There is a need to focus on economic and political governance to uphold the benefits of tackling immediate security problems. Examples from the Solomon Islands, DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone[148] ought to inform a more constructive approach towards development and security communities working together.

Reinforce short-term and long-term linkages in EU action

In situations of fragility, and even more so in conflict or post-conflict situations, upholding a minimum of security is necessary for the pursuit of more medium and long-term security – and development-related efforts and to engage in State-building. ESDP missions tend to have clearly defined mandates and milestones and are necessarily short-term, namely because of financial and capability reasons. Effective as they may be in their limited timing and purpose, they need to be followed-up – or shouldered – by more sustainable and long-term efforts within a comprehensive strategy, where all concerns are continuously monitored and assessed by staff with different expertise, including in the security sphere.

Because engagement at a security level is much more political and MS capabilities and funding is

148 See Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2007). *Capacity Development in Fragile States*. Discussion Paper 58D, Maastricht: ECDPM, and OECD – DAC (2007a).

limited, and public opinion support not always easy to get or is conditional (e.g. Germany's leading role in EUFOR DRC in 2006), EU engagement at this level will not be based solely on need and few of those in need are actually likely to be the subject of such a form of engagement by the EU. Prioritization is likely to be subject to considerations of EU added-value: the greater the EU overall engagement and political influence in a country/region/situation, the greater is likely to be its impact. ESDP missions are most unlikely to take place in countries or regions where the EU is already engaged through other means and policies. The planning of these missions should therefore take into account and be planned accordingly with the timing and scope of other EU actions. It must also take into consideration other donors/actors engagement and its own capacity to best plan and deliver on commitments made.

There is a growing effort within the EU to articulate civilian and military crisis responses through the Civil-Military Cell and enhanced military and civilian capabilities for crisis management[149]. This is because these operations become more complex, multi-faceted, more involved in the lives of the local populations, dealing not only with very specific military objectives (e.g. securing specific facilities or infrastructure, etc), but also with law and order (e.g. justice, police, etc) and with deeply social issues like child soldiers and the role of women in armed conflict[150]. There is a recognised need to coordinate security with long-term development efforts and the adoption of strategies and concepts on cross-cutting issues like DDR and SSR is an indication that the EU should move into that direction.

The problem is how to implement such integrated approaches. Why are there still so few examples of such integrated approaches? Why is the gap between strategies and practice still so wide? How can short-term and long-term policy linkages be improved?

A starting point could be to *promote joint assessments and analysis* of situations of fragility, and not just limit them to situations where conflict is imminent, has already erupted or in post-conflict situations. EC, Council and MS experts with knowledge and understanding of local dynamics, and from different relevant policy areas, ought to be involved in analysis and assessment of those situations. That could allow for the early inclusion of conflict-sensitive analysis, structural weaknesses and long-term activities from the outset and for mainstreaming of lessons learned in relevant policy areas (e.g. conflict prevention, human rights, gender, transitional justice, DDR, SSR). Shared analysis and assessment can also be improved with more and better *information exchange* among MS and with the EU institutions, thus contributing to a common sense of priority and understanding of a situation or issue.

Also in *planning* EU activities in situations of fragility, including ESDP missions, the EU should

149 On the development of military capabilities, within the Headline Goal **2010 and since January 2007, the EU declared it has reached the full** operational capability to undertake operations of Battle-Groups size in situations requiring a rapid response (including simultaneous missions). By 2010, it should be able to respond to crises with rapid action using a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, including peacemaking, and might incorporate joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. Its Civil-Military Cell, created in 2005, is meant to play an enhanced role in coordinating civilian and military aspects of EU crisis management and once the Operations Centre is fully operational it can work as an Operational Headquarter for a military operation, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required, or can reinforce national Operational Headquarters and assist in the planning, support and conduct of civilian operations. Efforts are also being made for the fast transition of rapidly deployable police elements – the Integrated Policy Units (IPUs) and the Formed Police Units (FPUs) – into a civilian chain of command, and also on the coordination of these with rule of law elements.

150 Work has been taken forward on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution concerning women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325) in the context of ESDP. This resolution calls for the increased involvement of women at all decision making levels in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as in areas such as DDR and promotes women as advocates for peace. It further acknowledges the need to take special measures in terms of protecting women and girls and to respect the different needs of men and women. On this issue, see namely Valenius, Johanna (2007): *Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions*, Chaillot paper no. 101, EU-ISS, Paris, May.

have access to a pool of different expertise from the development, humanitarian and security and defence areas, with backgrounds or tested knowledge of the regions and issues. They can participate in planning and programming of EU actions to best integrate all possible dimensions that are likely to impact on policy implementation and assess the impact of these policies. Complementary conflict prevention and development programming should be taken into account in the strategic and operational planning of crisis management operations.

The EC and MS ought to envisage doing *joint programming* in situations of fragility (e.g. Afghanistan). It would put less strain on already weak State capacity, avoid creating multiple systems for donor assistance, and would be a greater guarantee of common understanding of the country/region situation and of joined-up action, thus avoiding different diplomatic discourses and policies. It would also be particularly important that the EU programming links up with policies in support of good governance and mutual accountability (EU arms exports, corruption, organized crime, etc).

Donor engagement in fragile situations ought to be *supportive of regional efforts* and explore synergies with other donor stances and activities: a multitude of donor discourse and policies could damage these efforts and reduce the overall impact of international efforts.

Complementarity and sequencing of financial support is also important to ensure effective and timely linkages between short-term and long-term activities, particularly in cross-cutting issues as DDR, SSR and LRRD, but also within EC funded programmes and activities. For instance, the EC has often had problems ensuring greater cooperation and supporting a clearer role of CFSP in relation to conflict prevention and rehabilitation. Especially where rehabilitation programmes are financed using EDF resources, the flows can be disrupted in cases of disagreement amongst members of the intergovernmental EDF Committee[151].

There is a growing number of activities and strategic thinking where the EC and the Council are working closely together. It is particularly the case with SSR missions. In many situations, restoring law and order is undoubtedly the main priority, but how to go about it in a sustainable way is the major challenge even when regional partners are leading the efforts (e.g. the lessons learned from the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands[152]). The EU has endorsed the DAC guidelines on SSR, but implementation is going to be a major task.

Seizing the opportunity provided by EU 'joint' Strategies and Concepts

The EU takes account of the security-development-governance nexus through various policy statements (see Annex E), strategies and concepts[153], action plans, codes of conduct (e.g. on arms exports), which generally result from joint Council and Commission work.

The 'EU Strategy for Africa' (December 2005) for instance is an integrated European political framework aiming at improving coordination and coherence of EU and Member State policies, instruments and activities in Africa, encompassing different areas including development, governance and peace and security. In October 2006, the EC adopted an EU Partnership for Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa that sets out a comprehensive approach to

151 Higazi, Adam (2003): *Dilemmas and definitions in post-conflict rehabilitation*. ECDPM

152 **Baser, Heather (2007).**

153 The EU SALW strategy and the Strategy for Africa in 2005, the strategies for Latin America, the Pacific, the Caribbean and for neighbourhood countries. In 2006 the EU adopted the concept for support to DDR, a joint policy framework for SSR, and the concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, which has led to the adoption of an Action Plan and recommendations for its implementation in May 2007.

this sub-region, thus recognising the need for differentiation and for tacking into account the specificities of a region and particular context. It introduces a regional programme for action to enhance cooperation and regional integration. However, the Horn of Africa 'strategy' has not as yet been adopted by the Council.

Some concrete examples of joined-up EC-Council Secretariat work and integrated approaches include the paper on EU support to SSR in the DRC, as an outcome of the EU policy framework for support to SSR adopted by the European Council, bringing together the Concept of ESDP support to SSR (2005) and the EC Communication (2006). The Aceh Monitoring Mission, which was the first ESDP Mission to be involved in DDR in line with the joint EU concept on DDR that calls for an integrated approach and cooperation between pillars and with other stakeholders, also provides a good and positive example.

Other efforts are also being developed to reinforce links between civilian and military instruments (e.g. EU Exercise Study 2006 that provided for an exchange of views), although much remains to be done towards a comprehensive and coherent approach that integrates these two elements in a more effective way. There are also efforts to set up frameworks for joint EU action, namely to prevent children's rights abuse in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations, following previous initiatives (the 2003 EU Guidelines on Children and armed conflict and the 2006 EU Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict into ESDP Operations). Also in the area of capacity-building to deal with conflict situations, the EU has adopted an action plan for the implementation of proposals relative to the EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This is to be developed with the AU and African SROs under African ownership, namely by supporting AU/SROs conflict prevention structures and the implementation of the AU policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development[154].

Joint Strategies and Concepts are a good step in the right direction to promote integrated approaches and greater policy coherence and coordination within the EU institutions and with MS. It is also a good dialogue tool to coordinate with other donors. However, as the EU often underlines and knows well by experience, ownership of any strategy or programme is fundamental to sustainable positive achievements.

Consequently, it is desirable that EU strategies take account of the needs and perspectives of the countries and regions concerned, are informed by their own strategies and policy frameworks, ideally are designed jointly, and support 'home-grown' initiatives that have the potential to effectively address the problems. Some of this is already happening and can be further developed as a joint process. In this area, much is to be hoped from the future Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

2.7. How to Mobilise? What Drives Early Action?

There are no ready-made recipe's to trigger timely preventive action, but some positive patterns can be observed as more likely to trigger action, although not necessarily (and rather rarely) early action, despite evidence that acting preventively is far less costly than reacting to full crises.

Major human rights abuses or natural disasters, countries coming out of conflict or quickly degenerating into situations of fully–fledged conflict are the most likely scenarios for ESDP missions

154 (2007) Recommendations from the PSC to the Council and Action Plan on the implementation of proposals relative to the *EU concept for Strengthening Africa Capabilities*. 8551/2/07, EU Council, 7 May 2007.

and integrated approaches (still an exception within the EU). The potential for EU to take timely preventive action, particularly in situations of fragility that have a lower risk of degenerating in the immediate future into crisis situations, is very high and can potentially be improved with a reform of the decision-making procedures and with the planned European External Action Service.
When it comes to foreign policy, the EU does not necessarily differ from other international actors with the aggravating difference that triggering early external action by all EU-27 governments, in absence of an immediate threat or perceived threat, is a daunting task.

Political will and leadership

Despite its complex and lengthy decision-making processes, the EU has proved it can act swiftly. Generally, behind such swift action is the determination of a MS supported by/or a group of nations with a strong political will and diplomatic skills to swiftly activate political and diplomatic negotiations. Having the backup of an important and qualified group of MS is important to accelerate the process and overcome likely procedural obstacles to quick decision-making and quantitative and qualitative action. Having the EC on board is an important asset. So far, Council decisions leading to ESDP missions have always been taken under the lead and interest of a MS or a group of MS, who have the capabilities to implement it and are also prepared to take a large part of the financial and logistical burden[155]. This implies that the decision to take action is always subordinate to a specific interest of a member or group of MS and will never be coherently applied to all situations in need. It is also likely to happen in areas of interest of countries that have the capability to implement such actions, which can have a negative impact on EU cohesion and solidarity. More equitable funding of such operations could lead to more engagement of the EU most capable nations, but it would not weight decisively on the decision to act.

Agreement among EU MS to engage in more robust CFSP actions (that may include ESDP military missions or civilian crisis management) is likely to be on a minimum common denominator which can be sufficiently high to produce substantial efforts by the EU as a whole and by some MS in particular (e.g. when it comes to contributing to ESDP military operations). But how long can it be sustained? Engagement in the DRC is illustrative of the difficulty in keeping up with a 'well-glued' international effort beyond the short-term target of the presidential elections, although the current and future challenges are no less important than before. The EU is continuing its engagement in the DRC, and it is still the subject of significant political attention, but eroding, as pockets of conflict prove to be difficult to eradicate and there is no agreement with key stakeholders on key reform processes like SSR.
Engagement by a particular MS is not a pre-condition, nor a guarantee that it will push for or lead to a more committed engagement by the EU (e.g. the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Côte d'Ivoire). It is not necessarily in the interest of that MS to involve the EU, or of interest to the EU to be seen as supporting the particular interests of a member country, particularly if that MS has the means and capacity to engage alone and its engagement is perceived differently by other MS.
Development activities generally represent an important asset for sustained engagement. Agreeing on governance principles like respect for human rights is less of a problem, but economic and

155 ESDP missions have so far been organized under the framework of a leading nation (e.g. Artemis in 2003 and EUFOR in 2006 in DRC) and most of the costs are distributed according to the rule of 'costs lie where they fall', meaning those who are more involved are those who borne most of the costs, with only part of the operation costs being eligible as 'common costs' and therefore borne by all MS.

political governance is likely to erode MS and EC cohesion as well as diminishing the chances that the donor community could remain united under an agreed common stance.
How much CFSP, development and governance related efforts can be integrated in long-term joint approaches is a major challenge. It may be more likely by a EC-one/few MS which are particularly active in a given country (e.g. UK in Sierra Leone, Belgium and France in DRC), but sustainable support by ESDP activities is likely to remain limited to 'picks' of engagement. It is however important to underline that its support can and should continue on the basis of joint work in analysis, assessment, planning and monitoring. It should not require a 'champion of the cause' to continue with that type of support.

Having the means and capacity to deal quickly and effectively with the situation
Mobilising 27 governments with different interests and priority areas when it comes to foreign policy is quite unlikely if there are no 'guarantees' or conviction that the EU can actually do it in a swift mode and with well calculated risk. In the EU, such conviction translates often into strict time-frames for external action, particularly when it implies the mobilisation of military forces and of crisis management activities in general, mainly for budgetary reasons (who will bear the costs). This may be a needed compromise to be able to take such action, but its implications must be properly weighted both in terms of effectiveness and credibility.

A drive by the international Community
EU external action is largely informed by universal principles upheld by the United Nations. The UN and its agencies are a major EU partner in developing countries, and the EU a major contributor to the UN system. Under the principle of effective multilateralism, the EU will seek to frame its external interventions within a UN framework, legitimised by a UN mandate, in support of UN activities and at its request. Without it, agreement among the EU MS is quite unlikely. With it, it is not guaranteed if not supported and sustained by other triggers, political will above all.
The EU is also likely to support efforts by other international organizations like NATO or OSCE as has been the case in the Balkans, but again under a UN mandate. The same is valid for other international organizations, like the AU, that the EU is actively supporting, both institutionally and in support to peace operations conducted by the AU (e.g. AMIS, AMISOM).

An invitation by developing partners?
Another trigger to early action and more robust engagement can be a specific request by partner countries or regional organizations like the AU or African sub-regional organizations, again subject to UN approval or within a UN framework. The EU is very engaged with the AU and African sub-regional organizations in supporting efforts to strengthen their capacity to address many of the challenges they face, from governance to economic and social development, and peace and security. Such commitment is likely to be reinforced with the future Joint Africa-EU Strategy. However, not all EU MS are so committed to engage in Africa, nor do they all share the same views of what Africa needs and how best to engage. A drive by African organisations and actors could make a difference.

PART III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to address the problems and needs of fragile situations. These range from political instruments to crisis management instruments, from Justice and Home Affairs instruments to military capabilities, from trade cooperation to humanitarian aid and development. The objective of this study is *to suggest ways to bring these instruments and the existing policy commitments together into an integrated and comprehensive framework to address fragility and promote structural stability*. It is not to formulate a new policy on fragile situations and difficult environments.

The report recommends ways to make better use of, and adapt existing policies and instruments and improve the process of assessment and policy analysis, prioritisation and strategy design, programming, implementation and dialogue. The objective is to contribute to an improved EU response strategy that can be supported by partners, especially regarding the security/development/governance nexus of EU external policy and action.

The study is deliberately focused on political and strategic issues, although some references are made to more technical aspects of financial and aid instruments. The conclusions and recommendations propose a quite ambitious EU strategy, particularly in light of the challenges of implementation, and particularly as far as well-informed and participative analysis of each context, combined use of assessment tools, coordination, policy coherence and WoG approaches are concerned. Capacity issues and operational and political constraints are an almost constant refrain, and some proposals to address these are made.

The recommendations are divided in *three parts*:

3.1. *General Recommendations* on approaches to fragility, including:
- The use of the 'fragility' concept to promote stronger and better engagement
- The need to stay engaged, but differently, by addressing structural causes and conflict risks
- The promotion of Democracy, Governance and State-building
- Adopting international principles and working more with others

3.2. *Policy and Operational Recommendations* on how the EU should improve processes of:
- Policy Analysis and Assessments
- Priorisation and Strategy Design
- Programming and Implementation

3.3. *Specific Recommendations on the Security-Governance-Development Nexus*

3.1. 'Handle Fragility with Care'. General Recommendations

The EU strategy should be based in the following *general conclusions*:

> There is no consensus on the *concept* of 'fragile states' – neither on the terminology nor in the substance. An intense dialogue is needed with partner countries on issues of fragility and of adequate cooperative responses. Political sensitivities require the careful use of terminology. This should not lead to a situation where facts and trends as well as established interrelations would be kept out of the debate.

> In contrast to the strategic importance and political relevance given to State fragility and failure in world politics, *statistical facts* point to a decrease of aid to these countries, as well

as complete withdrawal of donors in some cases, frequently unpredictable aid allocations and either a concentration of aid on a few of these states – leaving many fragile 'aid orphans'. Furthermore, about half of the aid that they do receive is targeted to debt relief and humanitarian assistance.

> The contexts of fragile situations and difficult environments are *substantially and qualitatively different* from other developing countries and have unique features that require new policy responses and approaches.

> The concept is broad and entails very different situations within the 'fragility spectrum' (weak/fragile, failed and collapsed states). These require *differentiated and incremental approaches*. The difference between a state's capacity/ability and willing/legitimacy issues is also important in order to distinguish between fragile states with weak capacity and difficult partnerships/unwilling states, thus requiring differentiated approaches.

> Each fragile State is *complex* and its particular problems are *unique*, which presents difficult policy challenges for donor approaches. Each donor strategy must entail a profound political and social analysis of each specific context.

> Common to most concepts and approaches to address State fragility is the mutually reinforcing nature of *poverty and State failure*, entailing *a higher risk of instability and violent conflict*, and the issue of a State being incapable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its population. Yet, the *profound causes of State failure are still overlooked in donor policies and early action is hardly ever the donor way* to tackle it.

> The *'conflict-cycle' terminology is misleading* and does not reflect the reality of situations on the ground where multiple stages may be present at once.

> Democratic governance that prioritises the holding of elections or the existence of 'acceptable governance' may not be the best entry point to prevent situations of fragility. Other elements, like a government's commitment to good economic governance and accountability for the well-being of its people, are often disregarded as a valid yardstick for donor assistance. Elections can be helpful in reducing conflict. If they are rigged, conducted at the very early stages of post-conflict transition, or attract a low turnout, they can be ineffective or even harmful to stability and should, therefore, be regarded as part of a much broader *'democracy-building'* approach.

> Most lessons learned point to the crucial importance of *state-building* in fragile situations under *local ownership*. Technical assistance and other capacity-building efforts are more successful when they support activities within a nationally defined and nationally owned programme. Institutional support needs long-term engagement and a shift from purely technical solutions supported by individual champions of reform to a multi-donor approach that address the state-society relationships and the political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform. Moreover, not all governance concerns need or can be addressed at the same time: support for targeted reform that does not overwhelm governments with unrealistic demands has proven to be more effective.

1. Use the 'fragility' concept to promote stronger and better engagement

- The EU should stress that the utility of the 'fragility' concept is to identify the most difficult situations in order *to increase EU attention and engagement, as well as to be able to better*

respond to their specific problems. The concept is useful as a way to promote more active engagement and serious attention to these situations.

- The EU should make a strong statement on the *need to engage in fragile situations*, based on moral, legal, development and security arguments.
- In the context of international commitments towards the increase of ODA, the EU strategy should include a strong commitment to raise funds *targeted to development and long-term actions* in countries that face situations of fragility or are conflict-prone or conflict-affected.
- A *sustained and consistent* commitment of financial resources is necessary. There needs to be the flexibility to adapt support according to the evolving capacity of the partner government. Avoid 'stop-and-go' financial decisions based on government short-term performance; avoid imposing conditionalities linked to past performance on governance; and integrate 'fragility' into aid allocation criteria.
- The EU should discuss *development aid allocation criteria* to fragile situations in a similar way to what was already agreed on humanitarian aid (in the framework of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative).
- Acknowledge the existence of a fragility spectrum that requires differentiated responses. *Distinguish between situations* where there is a lack of political commitment (difficult environments) or weak capacity (situations of fragility), or both, with the necessary policy implications.
- Use this terminology carefully. A *working definition* can be "Situations of fragility and difficult environments are those where the State is unable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including security and basic public services, and where the mechanisms within the political system to manage change and inclusion without resort to violence are insufficient or inadequate, therefore entailing a higher risk of instability".
- To promote participation and ownership, the EU must *start a dialogue with partner countries* on the concept of fragility and agree on steps forward. This means moving from a donor-driven perspective to *jointly owned agendas and processes*.

2. Stay engaged, but act differently: address structural causes and conflict risks

- Prioritise activities that address the *structural causes of fragility*, taking account of the variety of situations that this definition entails.
- Combine responses to short and long-term needs in a *simultaneous* timeframe, with particular attention to timings and flexibility. Disregard the conflict cycle and promote 'joined-up' responses that avoid sequential approaches and combine all policy tools in a coherent package.
- Move from an approach based on precise expected results to a *framework or process approach*, based on a general goal to be achieved and more focused on the dynamics of the process itself. Isolated actions or programmes such as elections holding, DDR or SSR have to be a part of a broader, comprehensive strategy towards state-building, stability and development.
- Develop a *sound political analysis* of the sources of fragility and of the impact of the policies and politics of external actors (regional and international). This will help to create a clear understanding of the root causes and dynamics of the problem. Involve MS, EC Delegations, State and NSAs in the country and region concerned as well as local and international experts, academics, think thanks, and appropriate policy makers with expertise on the country or region.

- *Align* activities with the partner country's plans and procedures and work through its systems, institutions and staff as soon and as much as possible. This avoids creating parallel structures and further undermining the State capacity. Where alignment is not possible, 'shadow alignment' could be an option.
- Move beyond the 'no harm' approach, by investing in *proactive, early and preventive* engagement
- Link *conflict prevention* with fragile situations at strategic, policy and operational levels. An effective strategy must start with an effective EU strategy and capacity to implement conflict prevention. Much, although not all, of what can be said to improve EU action in situations of fragility is valid to improve EU conflict prevention policy. One way to operationalise this is to implement preventive strategies for fragile states. This requires clear guidance on how the different policy instruments will work together to address instability (as was already suggested in the 2001 Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict adopted in Göteborg)
- Implement development cooperation actions that are *conflict-sensitive*; include *conflict analysis* in all policies towards these countries.

3. Promote Democracy, Governance and State-building

- Building a State that can maintain security and provide for the needs of its people should be the *central focus* of EU engagement in fragile situations and difficult environments. The EU should recognise that all its activities have implications for long-term state-building.
- The EU approach to '*democracy-building'* requires various approaches. Any electoral funding should be embedded in a wider governance or state-building programme. EU engagement should also not depend exclusively on the establishment of electoral democracy, but rather focus on the promotion of a culture of democratic politics across a wide range of actors.
- EU state-building actions must have *realistic goals*. This implies:
  > Basing capacity-building and governance initiatives on a stronger and profound understanding of the local context (including power, state-society interactions, role of different forces, etc);
  > Using political dialogue mechanisms to create openings for reforms;
  > Paying careful attention to prioritising and sequencing of interventions – including governance reforms – with clear benchmarks or timelines for completion of the tasks needed in a state-building process, while maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable in fragile contexts;
  > Promoting an approach that goes beyond technical solutions to include political incentives and the institutions that really affect prospects for reform.
- A key objective of state-building is to *strengthen national capacities*. Technical assistance personnel should be combined with other ways of building capacities such as on-the-job training, exchanges and structural and attitudinal changes. State-building activities should take into account the partner country's own mechanisms, organisational and institutional culture, rather than focusing on western institutional models. It is preferable to begin such programmes with no preconceptions about the 'right' types of institutions. Compliance with a vast range of universal human rights can be combined with respect for local ownership and traditions. The EU approach should promote *linkages* between high-level political processes and grass roots democracy-building measures.

- The EU must ensure that the principles established in the 2006 EC Communication on Governance have a practical implementation at field level by mainstreaming them into cooperation programmes. *Multi-levels of political dialogue* can provide for effective means to engage with fragile situations: the EU engagement at a national, regional and continental level in Africa illustrates such approaches.

4. Adopt international principles and work more with others

- Development programmes in fragile situations should conform to the same principles governing development programming anywhere – ownership, partnership, mutual accountability, sustainability, etc.
- EU support and approaches towards situations of fragility and difficult environments must be informed by *international rules of engagement and agreed principles*, promoting coordination of strategies and consensus between donors. The EU should:
  > Adopt DAC principles as a basis for its engagement, with special attention to (i) establishing clear objectives for the agreed principles, namely that they should contribute to poverty reduction; (ii) debating the principles with partner countries to jointly select the most relevant and adapt them to specific local realities; (iii) actively implement the most relevant principles in EU programming; (iv) expanding the principles to work in broader sectors, such as trade and environment; (v) integrating regional approaches and supporting existing regional and continental structures to address fragile situations.
  > Implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness also in fragile situations, focusing on the central aim of state-building.
- The EU approach should seek strategically to *work with others*, by:
  > Strengthening multilateral responses through a reinforced collaboration with the UN;
  > Cooperating closely with the private sector, including helping to create conditions in which partner countries can attract greater flows of beneficial inward investment;
  > Strengthening support for progressive elements within civil society;
  > Reinforcing continental and regional organisations that can influence the partner country's stability and development;
  > Conceptualising, organising and prioritising policy responses accordingly with the existing partner countries/organisations frameworks (e.g. AU PCRD, APRM, etc);
  > Increasingly work with regional neighbours to engage together with a fragile country, namely by promoting joint regional approaches;
  > Including cooperation in tackling fragile contexts as an item in dialogues with middle-income partners and 'emerging' donors, such as China, India and South Africa.

3.2. Operationalising the Concept

Discussing conflict prevention, the recent DAC peer review of the Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of the European Community notes that there are no means to feed lessons into the programming process (knowledge-sharing processes need improvement), no systematic application of conflict sensitivity and prevention in CSPs (the programming process should make more systematic use of conflict analysis), and an overlap of units – in Relex, Dev, Aidco – dealing with this issue and no horizontal regular involvement of these units (some ra-

tionalisation is needed to better provide inputs to delegations). The same can be applied to the EU's approach to fragile situations and difficult environments.
Across the whole policy process, *human resources quality and capacity needs to be developed at all levels* – in the field, in Brussels, as well as in MS capitals – and in the various areas of the strategic, planning and implementation process.

General Operational Recommendations:

1. Policy Analysis and Assessments

- EU strategies and policies to address fragile situations must be grounded in an *ongoing systematic process* of risk assessment and monitoring capable of identifying countries at risk of impending crisis.
- The assessment should establish baselines, set out indicators, and provide both quantitative and qualitative information for an adequate assessment of causes and impact of fragility as well as *progress*.
- The EU should identify which of its various assessment tools can be merged into a single *EC-wide exercise* that can also feed into *an EU-wide exercise to* assess causes of fragility with a strong conflict prevention focus. Such exercises would contribute to a common understanding of the situation, needs and priorities, and promote joined up efforts across the EU and other actors.
- That assessment should draw on the *widest range of possible sources of instability* (including political, economic, social and external factors, including vulnerability to natural disasters/climate change).
- The EU assessments should provide information, analysis and guidance on *key changes and reforms* that are needed, mapping actors and stakeholders, identifying suitable interventions as well as progress and evaluation milestones and indicators, and guarantee that action is taken as a result of the analysis.
- It should be a *joint EC, Council and MS effort*, requiring a more systematic and improved sharing of information within the EC, with the Council and with MS.
- It implies *strengthened EU capacities* in Brussels and in Delegations to be able to provide quality assessment based on participatory processes, engaging different stakeholders in multi-actor processes on the ground.
- Any EU assessment of fragile situations should be elaborated with *strong participation of the partner country*, namely through dialogue with the government, civil society and others (e.g. Parliaments, local authorities, local experts, independent researchers, etc). Where 'self-assessments' exist, these should be one of the main bases for EU analysis.
- The *CSPs/RSPs*, if adapted to some of those requirements, could become effective assessment and programming tools, namely by including additional indicators that monitor the causes of instability and the qualitative evolution of context relevant political and economic trends. *Ownership* of CSPs/RSPs is an important existing feature of these tools, ownership should also be sought beyond 'official' stakeholders.
- Following joint and participatory assessment of the CSPs/RSPs, the *Council's preventive strategies* could become a more effective tool for early action.
- EU *early-warning mechanisms* should improve their links with other international organizations and their early-warning mechanisms as well as with local and regional mechanisms. The EU should support the latter in building up their capacity and developing their own compatible assessment and monitoring tools.

2 Priorisation and strategy design

- *Use differentiated approaches.* Disaggregate EU approaches to fragile situations through targeted strategies for different phases of the 'fragility spectrum' (weak, failed, collapsed; conflict situations) and for different kinds of weaknesses (economic, military and political).
- *Think regionally.* This means both elaborating regional strategies *and* working with regions to jointly address the problems of countries that are fragile or conflict-affected. It also implies investing in long-term support strategies (e.g. the APF has been crucial to plugging a short-term gap, but is not enough for long-term needs) that can reinforce the capacities of regional and SROs.
- Give EC delegations a *political mandate* and clear guidelines on how to move forward on key issues and on a case-by-case basis. Establish effective communication and dialogue mechanisms between the Delegations/EC geographic desks and the relevant Council working groups. A possible solution could be to *'double hat'* the Delegation Heads with a joint EC and Council mandate. The effectiveness of a 'double hatted' role goes beyond the legal aspects of the Delegations; it requires effective *backing* by the whole EU, including the Institutions and MS.
- *Select, prioritise and sequence capacity-building actions and reforms*: While all governance concerns can be addressed at the same time, the EU should not overwhelm fragile governments with a wide range of simultaneous demands. It is important to be realistic on what is possible to achieve in a fragile context. Facing a wide range of capacity problems, the EU has to be clear on selectivity (which agencies or institutions to target), priority (which capacity issues and reforms are most urgent) and sequencing questions (what is the most suitable process of reforms).
- *Rely, as much as possible, on home-grown processes.* EU approaches should build on existing structures in the partner country, take account of local dynamics and existing organisational and institutional frameworks, make use of any existing mechanisms for conflict management (formal and informal), and seek to follow local priorities and other features that can promote ownership.
- *Make better use of political dialogue.* There is much scope to make better use of the several actors involved in political dialogue and preventative diplomacy, namely by empowering those EU/EC institutional actors best placed to engage effectively in dialogue on the ground (e.g. Special Representatives, double-hatted Delegation Heads).

3 Programming and Implementation

- *Adopt special programming rules for situations of fragility*. Greater flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances will be needed to match the evolving capacity and willingness of the government to address certain issues or areas of engagement where other donors are active or where NSAs are filling gaps. This will help avoid 'aid darlings' or 'aid orphans' or an excessive concentration in one specific sector or area of support.
- *Reinforce Policy Coherence* within the EU approach, by:
  > Selecting the most relevant policy coherence areas in fragile situations and difficult environments (e.g. security, trade or migration, are clearly more relevant than 'transport' or 'information society') and pursuing stronger linkages between them.
  > Give special attention to diplomacy, security, private investment and trade in fragile situa-

tions, by addressing the development and stability impacts of these actions. Simultaneously, provide sufficient aid to make these other instruments effective.
  > Within the EU, draw on the skills, perspective and expertise of each institution and department.
- *Engage in joint programming with MS*. The EDF may prove to be an advantage in this sense as MS already participate in the decision-making of aid allocation.
- Promote implementation of The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and *Division of Labour* in Development Policy. Create *incentives* for those who engage in greater coherence is one way to actively promote the division of labour.
- *Prefer aid instruments that promote local ownership and accountability*. Social Funds, Joint programmes with multi-donor trust funds, and Budget Support are useful tools but their utility should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Support should follow a step-by-step approach, gradually laying down more stringent indicators for budget support e.g. commitment and progress on financial management reforms, justice system and SSR, good governance and peace consolidation measures, or government investment in service delivery.
- Promote *consistency i*n strategy design and programming, by:
  > Combining short-term rehabilitation, security sector reform and other priority actions with long-term development assistance within a single package.
  > Drawing on the experience of several types of actors. Promote dialogue and assessments with active collaboration of partner country governments and civil society actors. Also assess the role of other donors to promote better coordination and coherence. In difficult partnerships, it is important to identify moderate and reform-oriented interlocutors and interact with them during the formulation of the country strategies and programmes.
- Include *conflict-sensitivity criteria* in all areas of engagement, including poverty reduction papers and programmes, macroeconomic policy advice, fiscal policy, public expenditure reforms, and others. Mainstream *cross-cutting issues, lessons learned and monitoring/impact assessments* into programming.
- *Articulate and link financial instruments and funding regulations*. There should be provisions in the financial regulations to link funding and the timing of funding decisions across the pillar structure, for instance in situations where one financial instruments cannot fund all the aspects of a programme. This could contribute and further support efforts to bridge the institutional divide, allow for timely sequenced activities and promote integrated approaches.

3.3. Enhance the Security-Governance-Development Nexus

The security-development nexus is *particularly important in fragile contexts*, where security actions are unlikely to be short-term interventions. Tasks like the formation of a capable army, reform of the security sector, or reinforcement of law and order (e.g. justice, police) are likely to take several months or even years. These actions are part of an incremental process to promote structural stability and are, therefore, linked to political, economic and societal factors, and thus to development work.

The main objective is to inform a more constructive approach in which development and security communities work together more often and in a more integrated manner, at strategic, policy and operational levels.

The EU increasingly takes account of the security-development-governance nexus through its policy statements, strategies and concepts, and action plans and codes of conduct. These generally result from joint Council and Commission work. Such joint strategies and concepts are a step in the right direction to promote integrated approaches and greater policy coherence and coordination within EU institutions and with MS. It is also a good dialogue tool to coordinate with other donors. However, as the EU often underlines and knows well by experience, *ownership* of any strategy or programme is fundamental to sustainable positive achievements.

This is particularly important regarding governance issues. While many causes can trigger State failure and fragility, 'bad' governance is often at the heart of the problem, both as a direct cause or as an amplifier of other weaknesses. Without *shared understanding and agreement* on governance principles and objectives among the various EU actors, and a constructive and gradual approach towards upholding governance in a partner country – based on local specificities and locally owned initiatives or structures – the governance agenda is likely to be perceived as another form of conditionality. It may threaten the success of development, political and security efforts. Likewise, donors and domestic actors need to agree how to prioritise and sequence interventions (including governance reforms) while maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable in fragile situations and difficult environments.

Linking security and development is particularly difficult due to a set of institutional constraints (the pillar structure), discrepancy of mandates, variance in time horizons of missions, and the suspicion with which some parts of the development and security communities regard each other. Thus, little progress has been made towards proper integration of military and development objectives and methods within EU strategies and actions. Among the key *conditions* for a positive and cooperative relationship is clarity of mandates and rules of engagement, openness and collaborative efforts to tackle problems and situations of common interest, quality of human resources, and good communication skills on both sides that can strengthen dialogue, sharing of knowledge and understanding of the each other roles and constraints.

Strategic Recommendations:

- Ground EU responses in a *multidimensional approach* that combines instruments from different policy areas. The EU strategy can be distinctive by being based in a *human security* approach, focusing on protecting the safety and livelihoods of individuals. This has greater potential to address the new challenges posed by fragility as it combines security, conflict prevention and development in holistic principles.
- Promote a *more integrated and common understanding* of how security and development work together, translating this into practical implementation by agreeing on a set of *guidelines* at the EU level to bring together security and development perspectives and actions.
- Inform development policy discussions with foreign policy and diplomatic/political know-how, linking the Paris declaration to *other international agendas*.
- Ensure that EU strategies and 'joint' concepts take into account the *needs and perspectives of the countries/regions concerned,* that they are informed by local strategies or policy frameworks, and ideally design them jointly so that efforts are coordinated and do support high-potential 'home-grown' initiatives.

Operational Recommendations:

- *Start early:* Promote good collaborative efforts in the early phases, starting with assessment and planning where qualified Commission representatives should be involved (e.g. ensure that the EC has a stronger presence and role in relevant Council working groups or committees from the very early stages, on a possible CFSP/ESDP action in a country where the EC as a long-term presence and an important role).
- *Take into account other actions, means and policies*: The planning of ESDP missions or development programmes should take into account and be planned alongside other EU actions. It must also take into consideration the engagement of other donors/actors and its own capacity to plan and deliver on engagements made. There is also a need to strike a balance between civilian and military instruments.
- *Improve short-term and long-term policy linkages*, by:
  > Promoting joint assessments and analysis of situations of fragility, not just situations where conflict is imminent, has already erupted, or where a country is in a post-conflict situation.
  > Investing in more and better information exchange among MS and the EU institutions, thus contributing to a common sense of priority and understanding of a situation or issue.
  > Encouraging joint programming between the EC and MS: this puts less strain on already weak State capacities and is a greater guarantee of common understanding of the country/region situation and of joined-up action. It is particularly important that the EU programming links up with policies in support of good governance and mutual accountability (EU arms exports, corruption, organized crime, etc).
  > Sequencing complementary financial support, to ensure effective and timely linkages between short-term and long-term activities, particularly in cross-cutting issues as DDR, SSR and LRRD, but also within EC funded programmes and activities.
  > Link up EU early-warning mechanisms with other existing mechanisms at local, regional and international level.
- *Promote cross-institutional participation*. At Brussels level, greater coherence and complementarity could be achieved by increasing the frequency and regularising the participation of development ministers in the GAERC; encourage Trade, Development and External Relations (e.g. Africa) working groups to meet more regularly with a broader agenda; transform COARM into a forum where development objectives are also part of the discussion; ensure that ECHO knowledge and understanding of specific crisis situations is taken into account in the planning of crisis management operations by attending planning meetings at the Civil-Military Cell.
- *Improve communication/information and expertise*. Set up mechanisms to pool and disseminate information, involving staff from a wide range of different backgrounds. Deploy and train a new generation of staff with an holistic understanding of the range of developmental and security challenges and the international community's responses.
- *Increase intervention in multilateral level* on this issue, by:
  > Starting a dialogue to elaborate some 'Governance and Security Goals' that can complement the MDGs, since these lack a strong governance/security dimension, without which development in fragile situations will be impossible to attain.
  > Pushing in international fora (e.g. OECD-DAC) for a reconsideration of the basic premises of the aid allocation protocols – which tend to neglect the benefits of conflict prevention that

aid can facilitate – and create a non-ODA fund to facilitate funding of non-ODA activities that may foster combined security and development activities, with the final aim of promoting structural stability (e.g. training of a professional army).

- *Within Member States, promote the inclusion of security within the global development* agenda of all major ministries, building on the experiences of those who are already doing it (UK, Netherlands, Nordic countries). The creation of special funds/pools dedicated to conflict prevention, post-conflict or fragile contexts, which are jointly managed by different departments within the government, can be a useful tool to combine the two approaches.

Annexes

Annex A: Examples of State Typologies

Table A.1 – Simplified Typology of Fragile States in Africa

Countries in impasse or under Sustained Deterioration in Performance • No sound economic and financial management • Unabated corruption and bad governance • Prone to exogenous shocks and • Usually no common consensus between donors and government on development programs.	**Failed States/States in Conflict** • Absence of legitimate government • Some countries experiencing civil disturbances and/or domestic political impasse. • Under sanctions by the International Financial Institutions owing to accumulated arrears and have poor relationship with development partners.
Post-Conflict Countries (countries in early post-conflict phase) • Countries emerging from protracted civil conflict after concluding a peace or national reconciliation process.	**States marginally transited from fragility** • Characterised by presence of some government reform in the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, but have entrenched systems where change is often difficult, slow and liable to periodic setbacks. • Include some post-conflict countries.

Source: African Development Bank, 2007

Table A.2 – State Categories

		Willingness	
		Weak	Strong
Capacity	Weak	At risk or failed	Weak but willing
	Strong	Strong but unresponsive	Good performer

Source: DfID, 2005

Annex B: Assessment Tools of State Fragility

World Bank definition of fragile states is based on a measure of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates and governance scores, which is used to allocate lending resources, shape policy directions and establish debt relief targets. Since 2003, it considers fragile states as the ones scoring 3.2 and below on the CPIA. It is an aggregate quantitative indicator to address the quality of macroeconomic management and of structural and poverty-reduction policies, focusing on the performance of the government and the public sector. This ranking has been criticised for its static nature and for its failure to take structural handicaps into account.

UNDP adopts a broader typology. It commissioned a review of country classification grounded on a needs-based assessment and this study proposes eleven indicators of State weakness: negative economic growth, natural resource dependency, excessive debt, low human development index, severe political disruption, HIV prevalence, armed conflict incidence, literacy level of less than 50%, and low levels of democracy, corruption, and regional conflict. Out of 46 countries that fall below four or more of these thresholds, 27 are classified in the 'special development need' category. The countries that meet six or more criteria are subject of particular mention. In order to fight chronic poverty in fragile states, UNDP has also recently established what it calls the Top Priority and High Priority Countries that are countries which experienced decline in the Human Development Index since 1990 and which, on present trends, are not likely to meet the MDGs.

USAID is focused on the intended result of the monitoring and assessment to be undertaken with primary attention being given to a state's political legitimacy and effectiveness in extracting and distributing resources. It refers to the intention of drawing on multiple and external sources of information but it doesn't specify on how these different sources and analysis are being integrated into a comprehensive assessment. USAID also has a specific conflict assessment framework (CAF), that groups the causes of conflict in five broad categories: (i) motives and incentives for violence (including ethnic divisions, demographic pressures, etc); (ii) means or access to conflict resources (political leadership); (iii) opportunity or institutional and social capacity for managing violence; (iv) regional and international dynamics; and (v) windows of opportunity and vulnerability (triggers). The main focus is how these different factors interact to generate conflict.

In *UK,* the Prime-Minister's Strategy Unit have published policy and strategy document to respond to countries at risk of instability, in which it establishes an assessment model that intends to identify the causes and dynamics of instability in a country or region. The framework of analysis looks at the interaction of three sets of factors: (i) a country's internal capacity and resilience (e.g. State capacity and legitimacy, strong/weak civil society; (ii) underlying factors associated with instability (e.g. poverty, natural resources, regional neighbourhood); and (iii) external stabilisers (e.g. international security guarantees, membership of regional organisations, etc). It also includes the process for assessing UK interests in intervention and the potential impact of action (or inaction)[156]. DfID Fragile States team also uses this risks analysis framework to design new interventions and several other bilateral agencies – such as Sweden – have used it to analyse State effectiveness. DfID stresses the need for improved early warning and better political analysis and has recently development a 'drivers of change' approach, in which reports are produced

156 Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (UK, 2005). *Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response*. A Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report to the Government, February 2005, London.

to assess a given country developments regarding political change, economic change and civil society issues[157].

The Netherlands Institute of Foreign Affairs (Clingendael) has prepared an assessment tool for the *Dutch* Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The methodology is based in a Stability Assessment Framework (SAF), which is done in several stages by various stakeholders but the central component is undertaken by researchers that develop 'trend lines' in twelve indicators[158]. Political actors are subject to particular attention, analysing their agendas, strategies and support bases for the impact they might have on the country's trends. This methodology also includes a workshop component to bring together policy-makers, staff members, and local partners, in order to improve information sharing and consensus-building.[159]

The *Canadian* International Development Agency (CIDA) relies mainly on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) to monitor, forecast and evaluate failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the challenges they represent. CIFP is drawn at Carleton University from a variety of open sources, including the WB, UNDP, UNHCR, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, among others. The assessment is based on the assumption that authority, legitimacy and capacity are fundamental properties of State functioning, being inextricably interlinked. The dataset includes dozens of indicators that are grouped in six broad indicators' cluster: Governance, Economics, Security and Crime, Human Development, Demography, and Environment[160].

Similar to the indicators used by Clingendael and CIFP is the *Failed States Index* that is compiled using the Fund for Peace's internationally recognized methodology, the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST). It assesses violent internal conflicts and measures the impact of mitigating strategies. In addition to rating indicators of State failure that drive conflict, it offers techniques for assessing the capacities of core State institutions and analyzing trends in State instability. Countries receive their classifications on twelve main indicators (with sub-indicators) that include:

Social Indicators	- mounting democratic pressures - massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies - legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia - chronic and sustained human flight
Economic Indicators	- uneven economic development along group lines - sharp and/or severe economic decline
Political Indicators	- criminalization and/or de-legitimisation of the State - progressive deterioration of public services - suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights - security apparatus operates as a 'State within a state' - rise of factionalized elites - intervention of other states or external political actors

157 DfID (2005a).
158 The indicators are: legitimacy of the state; public service delivery, rule of law and human rights, leadership, security apparatus (control by civilians), regional setting, demographic pressures, forced migration and flight, group hostility, group economic opportunities, and state of the economy.
159 Clingendael (2005), *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development*.
160 See CIFP (2006).

In the final ranking, the countries are divided in Alert, Warning, Moderate and Sustainable situations[161]. Analysing the most clear early warning signs of a failing state, this assessment tool concludes that two of the indicators consistently rank near the top: uneven development and criminalization or de-legitimisation of the state.

161 See www.fundforpeace.org. It is interesting to note that the ranking resulting from the analysis of the 12 indicators seems to produce very sustainable results that correspond to real trends in the ground. For instance, from 2006 to 2007 Index, DRC is considered less fragile (from the 2nd to the 7th position) while East Timor, which did not appear in the first 60 states, is in 2007 rated as the 20th more fragile country.

Annex C: Donor Innovations

Many key multilateral institutions as well as certain bilateral donors have developed theoretical thinking and practical approaches to engage in fragile states. These are some of the main most recent developments in selected donors:

UN

United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are present in virtually all fragile states. Since Boutros Ghali introduced the concept of 'post-conflict peace-building' in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, a long path has been taken. A Peace-building Commission was recently established in order to implement a holistic, coherent and coordinated approach for peace-building initiatives. The UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is engaged in preventing armed conflict, reducing the risk of disasters and facilitating early recovery in conflict-affected countries: this Office is working on its new strategy for supporting fragile states.

OECD-DAC

In 2005 the Fragile States Group drafted the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which were tested in nine pilot case-studies and then approved by donors. The DAC is further involved in developing a well-sequenced and coherent framework that cuts across political, security, economic and administration domains, having developed recent work on Policy Coherence for Development and Whole-of-Government/Organisation Approaches, in order to produce guidance on good practice for engagement in fragile situations. OECD is also preparing a common analytical framework for examining service delivery in fragile states and involved in monitoring resource flows to these countries.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

In March 2007, the heads of MDBs agreed to set up a working group on fragile states to identify common operating principles for engagement in fragile situations, enhance partnerships and coordinate the division of labour within the MDBs and other partner agencies.

- The **African Development Bank** identifies 25 countries in its region as fragile, of which 16 were designated as 'core fragile states'. The AfDB is in the process of improving its assistance to these countries, either in operational response or in resource mobilisation capacity. The AfDB's envisaged strategy focuses on the following categories of engagement: (1) catalytic role; (2) strategic partnership; and (3) areas of minimal engagement. Where the AfDB undertakes a catalytic role, it proposes to engage in rebuilding State capacity and accountability and in rehabilitating and reconstructing basic infrastructure. Where it builds strategic partnerships, the AfDB intends to support economic and structural reforms and economic integration and regional projects. The AfDB will also step up its efforts in generating knowledge with respect to fragile states; to streamline and simplify the AfDB's procedures in these states; and strengthening its field presence by opening field offices in countries like Chad, DRC, Sierra Leone and Sudan. It has established a Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF) to help countries emerging from conflict to clear arrears on their debt.
- The **Islamic Development Bank** (IsDB) has developed policy notes on assistance to regional

member countries experiencing fragility, with a strong focus on humanitarian assistance. It also utilizes simple and flexible procurement and disbursement procedures for its work in fragile states, in line with procedures proposed for emergency response (e.g. Haiti)
- In 2005, the **World Bank** changed the objectives and scope of the Low-Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, from general aid effectiveness to peace building and state-building goals. The LICUS Unit was renamed 'Fragile States Group'. The WB has developed specific guidance on assistance strategies and transitional results frameworks in fragile states and has established the LICUS Trust Fund from a series of grants from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) surplus. In February 2007, approved a 'New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies,' which provides quicker and more effective responses to emergencies and crises through accelerated and streamlined review and implementation procedures; and clarifies the objective of its engagement to include adequate focus on the social aspects of recovery and peace-building. The WB has proposed an increase of at least 50 percent in its field positions in fragile states over the next two years.

UK

DfID produced a policy paper in 2005 regarding fragile states that includes commitments to review aid allocations; provide more staff to work on fragile states; invest in understanding when states are at risk of instability; find better ways of delivering aid; aim to provide longer-term more predictable aid; ensure policy coherence across the UK government; harmonise with other donors and align assistance to government strategies and systems where possible, and better link humanitarian and development aid[162]. It also published a policy on security and development, which commits to promoting the security of the poor as part of the DfID poverty reduction mission[163].

US

The US has published National Security Strategy in 2002. USAID has published in January 2005 a Fragile States Strategy and US development assistance was elevated to become the third pillar of US Foreign Policy, along with defence and diplomacy

162 DfID (2005a)
163 DfID (2005b)

Annex D: DAC principles for Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

The basics

1. **Take context as the starting point.**
It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different constraints of *capacity, political will and legitimacy,* and the differences between: (i) *post-conflict/crisis or political transition* countries; (ii) countries facing *deteriorating* governance environments, (iii) countries demonstrating *gradual improvement, and;* (iv) countries *in prolonged crisis or impasse*. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blueprint approaches.

2. **Do no harm.**
International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.

The role of state-building and peace-building

3. **Focus on state-building as the central objective.**
States are fragile when state1 structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between State and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the *legitimacy and accountability* of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peace-building. Secondly, strengthening the *capability* of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens confidence, trust and engagement with State institutions. Civil society has a key role in both these areas.

Demand for good governance from civil society is a vital component of a healthy state, and reinforces its legitimacy and accountability. Civil society may also play a critical transitional role in providing basic services, particularly when the government lacks will and/or capacity.

4. **Prioritise prevention.**

Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of State fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peace-building capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

5. **Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.**

The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peace-building in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a .WoG approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

6. **Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.**

Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between State and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

The practicalities

7. **Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts**.

Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible

due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

8. **Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.**
This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.

9. **Act fast. but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.**
Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and coordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.

10. **Avoid pockets of exclusion.**
International actors need to address the problem of '*aid orphan'* states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.

Annex E: Addressing situations of fragility – Main EU statements

European Consensus on Development (2005)

Addressing State fragility (p.9-10)

"The EU will improve its response to difficult partnerships and fragile states, where a third of the world's poor live. The EU will strengthen its efforts in conflict prevention work and will support the prevention of State fragility through governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable State institutions in order to help them fulfil a range of basic functions and meet the needs of their citizens. The EU will work through State systems and strategies, where possible, to increase capacity in fragile states. The EU advocates remaining engaged, even in the most difficult situations, to prevent the emergence of failed states.

In transition situations, the EU will promote linkages between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development. In a post-crisis situation development will be guided by integrated transition strategies, aiming at rebuilding institutional capacities, essential infrastructure and social services, increasing food security and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced persons and the general security of citizens. EU action will take place in the framework of multilateral efforts including the UN Peace Building Commission, and will aim to re-establish the principles of ownership and partnership.

Some developing countries are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, climatic change, environmental degradation and external economic shocks. The Member States and the Community will support disaster prevention and preparedness in these countries, with a view to increasing their resilience in the face of these challenges".

Conflict prevention and fragile states (p.27)

"The Community, within the respective competences of its institutions, will develop a comprehensive prevention approach to State fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises. In this, the Community will assist partner countries' and regional organisations' efforts to strengthen early warning systems and democratic governance and institutional capacity building. The Community will also, in close cooperation and coordination with existing structures of the Council, improve its own ability to recognize early signs of State fragility through improved joint analysis, and joint monitoring and assessments of difficult, fragile and failing states with other donors. It will actively implement the OECD principles for good international engagement in fragile states in all programming.

In difficult partnerships, fragile or failing states the Community's immediate priorities will be to deliver basic services and address needs, through collaboration with civil society and UN organisations. The long-term vision for Community engagement is to increase ownership and continue to build legitimate, effective and resilient State institutions and an active and organised civil society, in partnership with the country concerned.

The Community will continue to develop comprehensive plans for countries where there is a significant danger of conflict, which should cover policies that may exacerbate or reduce the risk of conflict.

It will maintain its support to conflict prevention and resolution and to peace building by addressing the root-causes of violent conflict, including poverty, degradation, exploitation and

unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality. It will also promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation with a view to promoting peace and preventing outbreaks of violence".

Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a harmonised approach within the European Union (EC Communication, 2006)

"There is also a growing awareness on the part of all donors that they need to promote innovative and more effective cooperation methods, even in fragile states, and to coordinate their approaches better". (p.6)

"All development partners must be able to assess the quality of governance in a country and gauge the ambition, relevance and credibility of a government's reform commitments on the basis of suitable indicators. The indicators must be adaptable to the specific circumstances of fragile and post-conflict states". (p.7)

A preventive approach to fragile states (p.9)

"New, complementary approaches must nevertheless be explored, especially in fragile states. In fragile states, especially difficult partners, a lack of political legitimacy is often compounded by very limited capacities. Addressing governance in these states demands a step-by-step approach aimed at gradually raising standards. Many countries must first achieve basic stability and a minimum of institutional development before they can start implementing a long-term development policy. If EU aid to fragile states is to be made more effective, lessons must be learned from past mistakes: 'stop and go' financing decisions based on a government's short-term performance leading to fluctuations in aid flows and uncertainty as to future financing; the imposition of conditions linked to past performance in matters of governance; inadequate harmonisation between donors; the marginalisation of certain fragile states; a lack of coherent external action in matters of governance, security and development. Post-crisis situations also call for integrated transition strategies to rebuild institutional and administrative capacities, infrastructure and basic social services, increase food security and deliver lasting solutions with regard to refugees and displaced persons and, more generally, the security of citizens. The need to prevent states becoming fragile and a concern not to marginalise the most vulnerable countries and peoples are an integral part of the EU approach; this is as much in the interests of solidarity as of international security and aid effectiveness".

A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

"State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability". (p.4)

"The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet (...). Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU". (p.6)

"In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations". (p.7)

EU Policy statements on the security-development nexus:

- "Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty. (...) Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens". (ESS, 2003)
- "To contribute to coherence between security and development, synergy between EU development assistance activities and civilian crisis management under ESDP should be elaborated and better developed, including in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction". Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 2004
- "Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. (...) Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur." (European Consensus on Development, 2005)
- "Development, human rights, peace and security are indivisible and mutually reinforcing. In an increasingly globalised and interdependent world, peace and security hang to a great extent on the political will and ability of governments and institutions to pursue policies geared to the rule of law, the protection of human rights, democratic governance, eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable development and reducing the inequalities that lie at the root of the main challenges facing the world". (EC Communication on Governance, 2006)

Annex F: Main EU Assessment and Programming Tools

The following is not an exhaustive list of EU instruments and programming tools. It lists some of the most relevant tools the EU has at its disposal for addressing the structural causes of fragility and instability, and provides some brief information and analysis on the effective use of these tools.

- *The Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict* provides a range of indicators against which Desk Officers and Delegation staff can undertake contextual analysis of the potential/actual conflict dynamics of a third country/region. It is an annual exercise undertaken by EC delegations and serve as early warning indicators designed to help identify areas of risk and changes in the conflict dynamic and thus increase awareness within EU decision-making of potential conflict, but it does not identify possible solutions or ways of addressing these risks and negative dynamics. It is also very conflict-specific, not addressing some of the main features of State fragility (e.g. the capacity of delivering social services). Although considered useful as a 'training' tool for delegations to sensitise and help them identify possible dynamics of conflict when done for some years on a row, these check-lists seem to have had little practical use including in the elaboration of the CSPs/RSPs and have not been used since 2003.
- *The Programming Fiches* for the Inter-Service Quality Group (IQSG), namely the one on *Conflict Prevention* goes further than the checklist in identifying opportunities to act in different areas from political legitimacy, to rule of law, human rights, civil society and media, dispute-resolution mechanisms and economic management, to include also a socio-economic regional and geopolitical dimension.
- *Specific EC services early warning and other assessment tools*, such as the open source information monitoring via the new EC Crisis Room, the ECHO's disaster monitoring system ICONS (Impending Crisis Online News System); also used by ECHO, the Global Needs Assessment – to rank countries according to their overall vulnerability (vulnerability index) and as to whether they are undergoing a humanitarian crisis (crisis index)- and the 'Annual Forgotten Crisis Assessment'; and by DG Environment, the Strategic Environment Assessments which inform country and regional policies and programming.
- *Country Conflict Assessments (CCAs)* provide a detailed and comprehensive analytical document. They look at actors, structural problems, political and socio-economic context. Elaborated by Desk Officers and Delegations, sometimes in collaboration with other donors, this type of analysis is done for many EU partner countries, but on a rather irregular basis. They are designed to encourage a culture of prevention and to inform the country strategy papers.
- *Governance Profiles* are part of the Governance Initiative launched in 2006 and provide for an overview of the ACP countries' situation regarding governance, on the basis of a series of questions. These profiles are not necessarily done jointly with the partner country, since it is foreseen that the assessment is made by the EC with participation of MS and afterwards shared with the partner country's government. There is no mention of other consulted stakeholders. Intended to be a means for the EC to integrate and address an often divisive issue such as governance (and sometimes perceived as intrusive), both between donors and with national government, despite the general acknowledgement that it is a critical one[164]. Governance Pro-

164 The EC is sometimes accused of blocking the process of harmonization between donors under JAS, by bringing up the governance issue, particularly when recipient governments are adamant in refusing to discuss it with donors or donors are too interested in the economic and

files have received a somewhat lukewarm reception from various stakeholders. Although it can provide good and accurate information, and besides fostering a common understanding among EC and MS on the situation of the country – undoubtedly a positive note for that matter, but could not that be the case for the CSPs as well? –, is it not clear how relevant the governance profiles are. They could be potentially more useful if the information provided would be more analytical and aimed at pinpointing key changes that would be needed to promote better governance in the specific country context, and if it would lay down indicators for measuring progress. Others also point out to the fact that it remains another donor exercise, with no concern of bringing in local views and understanding of local dynamics. Furthermore, it is not clear how useful is this tool for a comprehensive analysis of the country situation and trends: the security dimension in the governance profiles is seen as too weak and too development-oriented to make it a valuable tool for an inclusive analysis.

- *Conflict prevention teams* are Commission-led, multi-disciplinary teams deployed with the aim to assess potential conflict issues and propose medium-term conflict prevention strategies to be integrated into planned co-operation activities (in the framework of country/regional strategy papers).
- *Joint Council/EC fact-finding or pre-planning missions* are becoming a more common practice. These generally include civilian and military personnel, under the resources of the former Rapid Reaction Mechanism and now the IfS, generally in preparation to a decision and/or launching of an ESDP mission (e.g. SSR). An illustration of countries where joint missions were organized are Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, DRC, Chad, CAR. The *Civilian Response Teams* (CRTs), operational since 2006, were created within the process of developing civilian crisis management capabilities and designed to strengthen the needs assessment capacity of the Council. Although a Council tool, it can include EC staff as it is acknowledged that both institutions "should seek to undertake joint assessment missions wherever possible and appropriate"[165]
- *Watchlists* are the primary early warning tool within the Council. These are Council-owned, confidential documents, reviewed every six months and only seen by Heads of State and Foreign Ministries. They are elaborated in close collaboration with the Ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs of the MS, EC delegations in the field and the Situation Centre in Brussels. Watchlists provide a global security risk assessment for various countries from different parts of the globe. Their objective is to provide short, succinct information on countries either in or with the potential to fall into crisis and/or cause regional instability to encourage joined-up actions within the European Council of Ministers, and across Member State foreign policies. They provide the basis for joint strategies (EC and MS) for early action. They are however criticised for being very much a political exercise and for putting too much emphasis on feeding the working groups in the Council and not taking a more inclusive, 'whole-of-EU', EC included, view.
- *Preventive strategies* are designed by the Council Regional Working Groups with input from the Commission to assess how best to use the EU full range of policy instruments (diplomatic, development, trade) to prevent instability at a country level. The strategies include three levels of analysis: a holistic assessment of root causes of conflicts; a comprehensive evaluation of

investment side of the relationship. Since CSPs are often based on JAS that tend to have a stronger economic focus, they too tend to shy away from the political dimensions. That's when the Governance "Incitative Tranche" could in principle play a positive role.

165 Quoted in Gourlay, Catriona, "Civil-civil Coordination in EU crisis management" in **Nowak, Agnieszka ed. (2006);** *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU way,* Chaillot Paper 90, June 2006, p. 114.

possible EU leverage to address those root causes; and a prioritisation of policy options. A few strategies have so far been proposed and none was actually adopted. By the same token, none of the ESDP missions undertaken so far by the Council were the result of preventive strategies, and are in general reactive and 'by invitation'.

- *Country and Regional Strategy papers (CSP/RSP)* are the EU primary programming documents for allocation and implementation of external aid at the country and regional level. Developed in collaboration with Delegations, the partner State and civil society, they have made major steps in developing a strategic, joined up approach that is built on joint ownership with the recipient country. Conflict prevention is integrated as a 'non-focal' co-operation area[166]. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD approach) is also to be included in those countries involved in conflict, in a transition phase or likely to be entering into a transition phase (as well as those emerging from a major natural disaster). Very often, in practice, CSPs are weak in political and security analysis[167] and do not always include a discussion on conflict elements or addressing structural causes of instability. Even when they do, it is not clear how this has influenced or informed the programming process, namely the definition of strategic priorities for EU assistance and programmes in key economic, social and political areas[168]. When there is an obligation to elaborate CSPs jointly with the partner government, as is the case the ACP countries (under the principle of partnership of the Cotonou agreement), the EU often shies away from addressing politically sensitive issues. RSPs not only duplicate, but seem to even multiply these weaknesses, tending to focus foremost on trade and regional integration and, although this dimension is in itself a key confidence-building measure, it is not always integrated into a wider perspective and comprehensive approach, particularly within the ACP regions with whom the EC is in the process of negotiating EPAs.

166 Adapted and updated from International Alert / Saferworld; Developing *An EU Strategy to Address Fragile States: Priorities for the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005*.
167 Often as a consequence of lack of qualified human resources with expertise and political sensitivity; of limited and restricted assessment processes that do not integrate local or experts views, particularly if they dissent from the official and/or generally accepted views.
168 Saferworld, *Improving the impact of CSPs and programming on peace and stability. Lessons learned, best practice and recommendations from Saferworld's 3-year project in the Horn of Africa.*

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