

Effects of Institutional Commitment

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Portugal's decision in 1977 to apply for membership of the European Community was closely associated with the domestic process of democratic consolidation. "After the favourable outcome of the 1974-75 crisis, Portugal affirmed European integration as a political project designed to consolidate the democratic regime." As the Portuguese prime minister Mário Soares stressed, in applying for EC membership Portugal was also seeking a European and democratic identity. Moreover, Lisbon showed total readiness to accept the obligations derived from this new status. Already in 1976, foreign minister Medeiros Ferreira emphasised the Portuguese choice of a European identity:

"The defence of our land borders commences at the frontier of Western Germany, and the Atlantic Pact guarantees our security... The government now in office believes it should take the European option... " From the late 1970s onwards, this "European option" has acquired the top position in Portuguese foreign policy. In 1980, the government headed by the Partido Social Democrata, the other major political party, considered as its main goal, "the full integration of Portugal in the EC, as soon as possible." Portugal finally became a member of the European Community on 1 January 1986. Likewise, after having applied for membership of the WEU in October 1984, Portugal became a member state of that security organisation in 1988. Therefore by the end of the eighties, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy was completed. This turn to Europe and to its political and security institutions was, domestically, associated with democratic stability and, externally, signified Portugal's integration in the Western European security community .

To understand the impact of such an integration on Portuguese security policy, it is necessary to discuss a few points on the concept of a pluralistic security community and how it applies to Western European security. Here, the focus is on two defining principles of such a community: pluralistic democracy and state sovereignty.

The nature of political relations between pluralistic democratic states. In a seminal study, Michael Doyle has argued that liberal and democratic institutions change the nature of political relations among sovereign states: "for almost two centuries liberal countries

have tended and, now, liberal democratic countries do tend, to maintain peaceful relations with each other." Indeed, pluralistic democratic states tend to follow policies of non-provocative defence" in their mutual relations. That is, national defence policies result form a balance between specific national interests and other states' security concerns. Moreover, the emergence of liberal democratic states is closely associated with institutional processes of interstate cooperation which produce an "Internal transformation" in the structure of the Western European political system itself: from a Hobbesian anarchy with Western European states facing a "security dilemma" to a democratic "mature anarchy" with a high level of institutional links among Western European states. In a region marked by two great wars, both caused by extreme forms of nationalism, the spread of democracy has deeply changed framework interstate relations.

The principle of state sovereignty. Since the Second World War, shared democratic values and international institutions have turned the traditional vicious and aggressive circle of relations between Western European states into one of trust and peace. How do those elements affect state power sovereignty? In the European case, despite common interests and common institutions, states retain a substantial part of their sovereignty. According to Andrew Moravcski, EU member states "avoid granting open-ended authority to central institutions that might infringe on their sovereignty, preferring instead to work through intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Ministers, rather than through supranational bodies such as the Commission. "This is particularly noticeable in the domain of common foreign and security policy where, since the times of European political cooperation, the protection of sovereignty has been a fundamental goal shared by all member states. In fact, as Keohane and Hoffmann put it, first the European Community and then the European Union have been an "exercise in the pooling and sharing of sovereignty." The practice of pooling sovereignty means that EU member states share the capability to make decisions among themselves. According to the same authors, when sovereignty is pooled, "authority to make decisions is removed from individual states." This does not mean that sovereignty is transferred from the state to the European Union, what happens is that sovereignty is shared in the EU decision-making process by the member states. In this sense, the term "supranational" signifies more a process of common decision-making than the emergence of a federal institution.

Despite all the supranational talk, the state sovereignty continues to be a fundamental norm in European politics and is recognised as such by the security institutions. Two

centuries ago, Kant asked what effect domestic democratic institutions have on states' international behaviour. Post-war Western Europe has provided a satisfactory answer: democratic states produce peaceful and institutionalised relations among each other and thereby alter the traditional character of the international system. Now, we could add another question, what is the effect of the principle of state sovereignty on relations between democratic states? Despite the idea of common security, divergent and competing interests continue to exist within European institutions, originating what one could describe as benign power politics under an institutional framework. Institutional realism accepts that democratic values and international institutions play an essential role in the peaceful relations among Western European states, but considers that "there are only more-or-less benevolent processes" and "no problem-free end points ." Even in cases where cooperative institutional processes are far more important than a warlike anarchical structure, those processes have a great deal of benign power politics.

According to the concept of institutional realism, relations among EU member states reveal two defining elements. Firstly, intergovernmentalism; European Community politics has always revealed a great deal of interstate bargains based on states' national interests. Secondly, benign power relations; although power relations do not mean the use or threat of military force, distribution of power is still an important element in relationships among EU member states. Indeed, political negotiations within the European Union reflect the power positions of member states. Institutional realism, therefore, has two dimensions: a liberal dimension of how democratic regimes and international institutions influence states' behaviour, and an intergovernmental dimension of how national interests and state power affect multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the idea of institutional realism enables us to comprehend how international institutions may be a source of states' power in relations with third states; indeed they function as "trump cards" for member states' strategies. In this vein, the concept of institutional realism seems to be adequate to analyse Portuguese security policy, both its political strategy within the European security institutions and the way it uses international institutions as a source of power in its relations with third states or towards other regions.

Portugal's view on a common foreign and security policy

The CFSP is a development of the process of European political cooperation. According to Section III of the 1986 Single European Act, European political cooperation had three essential features: it remained outside the Treaty framework, it was an intergovernmental

mechanism and finally it was subject to individual veto. From the Hague summit in 1969, EPC has followed an intergovernmental model with few effective instruments (limited to economic sanctions and to diplomatic actions), thus reflecting a distinction between supranational low politics and interstate high politics. The Maastricht Treaty has kept the intergovernmental model. Of EPC: CFSP constitutes the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council has the key role in the formulation of CFSP and the states maintain the right to exercise individual veto. But the Treaty on European Union has also introduced room for further integration: "the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. " For the moment, the one certain prediction for the next few years is the continuing presence of uncertainty and unpredictability. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage two potential future models for CFSP: a pluralistic intergovernmental model and an hegemonic intergovernmental model.

Before examining Portuguese positions regarding the evolution of CFSP, it is important to mention that, from Lisbon's point of view, the institutionalisation of a CFSP, as an instrument of European coordination in foreign position policy issues, is a positive development. For two main reasons: it reflects a common European political identity (democratic pluralistic political regimes) which, due to its recent history, Portugal is eager to assume; and common European positions in international politics, enhancing member states' power, represent 'trump cards' in relations with third states. Therefore, the support for CFSP, on the one hand, is consistent with the democratic rationale that was behind the country's integration into European institutions; and, on the other hand, it derives from calculations on national power. Yet, Portugal has a cautious attitude regarding CSFP. In the words of the foreign minister, "the scope of joint actions is already a bit too ambitious " for the present European Union.

The Portuguese government favours a gradual intergovernmental approach in CFSP, one that respects national identities. Recently, the prime minister pointed out the danger of a possible centralisation of powers within EU supranational institutions: "It would be a mistake to distinguish between major powers and smaller states ". Portugal is firmly against increasing the power of larger states in the decision-making process which could involve the constitution of a European directorate. The maintenance of the formal equality between major and smaller states is a crucial national interest. Such equality, from the government's point of view, is closely related to two essential principles: member states'

veto power on fundamental issues and the Council presidential system. Regarding the voting system in CFSP, Lisbon stands for two key rules. Firstly, the rule of unanimity to choose the questions to be the subject of joint actions. This position results from the belief that joint actions must be confined to the areas and domains where member states share common interests. Or, to put it in another way, the mechanism of CFSP shall not in any case affect the specific interests of national security policy. The Portuguese government accepts however the majority voting principle in some cases, but, and this is the second rule, on one condition: the principle of one-state/one-vote according to the sovereignty criterion ought to continue. As for the presidential system, the government would have liked it to remain basically in the current form, with a minor change: to concede a greater role to the troika after enlargement to the EFTA countries. In short, both the rule of unanimity and the Council presidential system respect and guarantee the principle of equality among EU member states.

There is another point worth mentioning regarding the Portuguese position towards the development of CFSP. A European Union dominated by the major powers is identified with a supranational European Union: "a supranational Europe wherein large states are hegemonic and in which therefore smaller states are submerged is unacceptable as it would disrupt the political balance." This reveals both an extreme reluctance in transferring decision-making powers in the realm of security from the Council to the Commission and a refusal to admit an hegemonic role of the larger states in the CFSP process. Rather strangely, the Portuguese government associates a supranational European Union with a European Union dominated by the big powers. It is a totally different position from the one taken by other small states such as Holland, Belgium and even Ireland which consider a supranational structure as a means of limiting the power of the major states. In fact, it seems clear that a supranational model of actions of CFSP is quite distinct from an hegemonic model of CFSP. To transfer powers in the domain of the CFSP to the Commission is not the same as to reinforce the power of the larger states in the CFSP decision-making process.

Yet, associating the two, the Portuguese government emphasises its opposition to both. Persisting in such a position, Portugal will surely face a major dilemma concerning the development of CFSP. Larger states, particularly emerging Germany and France, are starting to complain about the inefficiency and the inability of the European Union to act as an unitary actor in the international system as a consequence of the

exaggerated power held by the smaller states in the CSFP decision-making process. Therefore, it is possible to anticipate that Paris and Bonn might propose a "two-speed" Europe in the CFSP domain during the intergovernmental conference in 1996. According to recent government declarations, Lisbon is expected to continue to affirm the validity of the present model. Whether the Portuguese government will be able to achieve its goal remains to be seen.

In conclusion, the Portuguese government bases its views on CFSP on five key-points: it must be pursued gradually, it ought to respect national identities, it rests on the principle of unanimity, it has to remain outside the powers of the Commission and it is complementary with WEU and Nato. This last point, the principle of complementarity, is well expressed in Portugal's views concerning the relationship between CSFP and other security structures (particularly WEU and Nato).

The relationship between CFSP and other security institutions

The Maastricht Treaty stipulates two principles regarding relations between the European Union and other security institutions: the principle of "complementarity" with WEU and with Nato (article JA) and the principle of "conformity" with CSCE (article J1). For their part, WEU and Nato also subscribe to the principle of "complementarity" with the European Union. The WEU ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, in November 1993, adopted a declaration which places great emphasis on the principle of "complementarity" between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, according to WEU secretary-general, William Van Eekelen, "complementarity is to be achieved at all levels of the inception of common actions, in the framework of the CFSP". The Atlantic Alliance, in its November 1991 Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, has stated that the Alliance is "working toward a new European security architecture in which Nato, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU... complement each other." To this end, appropriate measures will be developed in order to facilitate "the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process." Therefore, complementarity is accepted by the European security organisations as a fundamental principle in their mutual relations.

The Portuguese government entirely agrees with these two guiding principles, as it is recognised in the CEDN. Indeed, the strategic document stipulates that a European identity in the field of defence and security ought to be complementary with the role of

the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the Portuguese prime minister in the Alliance summit in Brussels in January 1994 also defended the principle of complementarity between Nato and the WEU and the European Union. Furthermore, still according to the CEDN, these three security organisations shall act in conformity with the CSCE principles. Yet, the fact that there is a full agreement on those two principles does not signify that Lisbon does not favour some security institutions over others. In fact, preferences regarding international institutions signal government views on the new European security architecture, and its interests and its strategies on security issues. To put it in simple terms, although complementary with the WEU, Nato must preserve a central role in European security.

Western European Union. The Maastricht Treaty considers the WEU as the defence arm of the European Union and as "an integral part of the development of the Union" (article J4, 2). At the European summit in Maastricht, the WEU member states adopted a declaration on the role of the WEU and its relation with Nato: "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." WEU is thus meant to have a twofold role: the defence arm of the European Union, and the European pillar of Nato. This is also the Portuguese position. According to the CEM, a new dynamism of WEU shall aim at both reinforcing the European pillar of Nato and constituting a defence arm of the European Union. In the government's view, it is important to stress that WEU shall remain closely linked with Nato. The reactivation of WEU is to be seen as a means of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, and never as a means of undermining Nato's role in Europe, that is: European security cooperation is conceived as an Atlantic necessity. Such a position undoubtedly places Portugal on the Atlantic side of the in current European security debate. Yet, there is for Lisbon room for specific functions for WEU. Considering that exclusive "European efforts out of area should be incumbent upon the WEU", "the Portuguese government is policy is inclined to give this security organisation a particular role. Especially, as the defence minister has recently affirmed, when it comes to the Mediterranean area.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Since it guarantees the continuation of the transatlantic security community, which is perceived as a vital ship in the national interest, Portugal favours a key role for Nato in European security. As it is stated in the CEDN, it is essential to preserve the transatlantic links between Europe and the United States, with Nato being the privileged channel to do so. Recently, the foreign minister has reaffirmed

the vital importance of keeping the Americans in Europe, through the Atlantic, otherwise all the efforts to create stability would be put in jeopardy. But such a concern with the European order, although genuine, is not the only reason to support Nato and thereby the American presence in Europe. The fear of marginalisation also explains the commitment to an Atlantic Europe where Nato plays a key role. In fact, a Europe without Nato would stress Portugal's peripheral position in Europe and would increase its security dependence on the interests of the European continental states.

For Lisbon, Nato is a crucial factor in maintaining an inter-European equilibrium; and, more importantly, pushing the core of European security to the Atlantic gives Portugal a more central position in the European security system. Accordingly, "during the intergovernmental conference's discussion over the development of a common defence policy, Portugal allied with the Atlanticist group, arguing that the Atlantic Alliance remained the fundamental pillar of European defence." Paradoxically, integration into the European Community has contributed to rethinking Portugal's role within the Atlantic Alliance. As I mentioned earlier, until the 1980s, the country's relationship with Nato could be characterised as a Luso-American affair. According to Thomas Bruneau, "despite joining Nato as a charter member in 1949, the main contribution of Portugal in the Alliance was the provision of facilities on the mainland and access to bases and other facilities in the Azores by the United States in accordance with the terms of a bilateral agreement first signed in 1951 ." On the other hand, due to "the outbreak of the colonial conflict in 1961", Portugal "remained only a nominal Nato member until the end of these colonial wars " in 1974. This means two things: firstly, Portugal was in Nato mainly because of the American interest; secondly, its foreign policy was deeply criticised by most of the other member states. Hence, a Luso-American affair. With the end of the colonial wars and its integration in European institutions, Lisbon is now able to abandon the Luso-American affair. Being a post-colonial and democratic country, its behaviour is fully legitimate in the eyes of all Nato members, which means that membership in the Atlantic Alliance has become a multilateral affair. But, in order to consolidate such an evolution, Portugal is obliged to cast in a new light its membership in Nato. More than anything else, this is closely related, as I shall argue below and as it is indeed recognised in the CEDN, with an effective participation in the mechanisms of the combined joint task forces. In other words, to take up for once a military role within the Nato structure.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Here, Portugal is also in total agreement with the terms of the Maastricht Treaty. As the European Union does, Lisbon also considers the CSCE as a European collective security organisation. Attempting to create among European states (plus the United States and Canada) a consciousness of common interests and values, with a consequent commitment to common rules, the CSCE clearly reveals collective security thinking. Indeed, its comprehensive conception of security includes: common security in interstate relations, military confidence-building measures, arms control procedures, regimes on human rights and humanitarian cooperation. In a similar way, and in accordance with the Helsinki Document of 1992, Lisbon considers that the CSCE has an important role in human rights issues (including the rights of national or ethnic minorities), peaceful conflict-resolution, crisis management and more or less peacekeeping operations. Summing up, in the Portuguese view, the CFSP has to evolve in complementarity with WEU and Nato's security roles and in conformity with CSCE normative principles. Nato enjoys a prominent role in European security and further European integration in security and defence matters should not occur at the Atlantic Alliance's expense. The reinforcement of WEU powers is seen as a means of creating a European defence identity, but it has to take place within the Nato framework in order to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Portuguese strategy within European security institutions

Coalition-building. After centuries of a quasi-dogmatic policy of alliance formation, it is becoming a common belief in Portuguese policy-making circles that there are no specific and permanent criteria to form political coalitions within the European Union. Concepts such as "Southern European countries", "Atlantic European countries" or even "small states" are not an appropriate basis for lasting alliances. As some now claim, Portuguese coalitions within European security institutions, particularly in the European Political Union, must permanently shift in accordance with specific interests. EU member states are all partners, as for that matter Nato member states are all allies, but none of them are "special allies." Above any "special relationship" is the national interest, and only this must guide Portugal's search for coalitions. The key rule is to develop "functional alliances": a policy of alliance-formation according to the specific interest at a given moment on a particular policy issue. That is, Lisbon is moving from a dogmatic policy of coalition-building towards a more flexible one.

In the context of accepted principles behind policies of alliance-formation among members of security institutions, it is in Portugal's interest to avoid a policy that gives rise to more or less permanent sub-regional entities. Sub-regional entities would give rise to a permanent form of collective leadership, the so-called *directoire*. This in turn would create a "two-speed" Europe, which is harmful to small states such as Portugal. As the Portuguese foreign minister recently stated, Portugal cannot accept the creation of a European *directoire*. The principle of functional alliances also applies to strategic options, namely whether it is in Portugal's interest entering into foreign and more or less permanent regional blocs. Being part of a permanent bloc, as the ones referred above, Portugal will tend to follow of other more powerful states. For example, it is in Portugal's interest to adjust its policies to other Southern European states to avoid a return to the European periphery of the "Southern European caucus", but the formation of a permanent "Mediterranean bloc" within the European Union in which Lisbon would probably be constrained to follow Spain's or France's lead is clearly not interest. Likewise, to overrate lasting bilateral alliances, as some in Portugal still do, is a harmful policy. It is mistaken to believe that lasting bilateral alliances within security institutions reinforce Portuguese autonomy; on the contrary, they make Portugal more dependent on other powers. For instance, a permanent bilateral alliance, as the one with Great Britain, might make sense in an anarchical system where small states are bound to "bandwagoning" with great powers, but it cease to make sense when both belong to the same international sections. At the institutional level, Portuguese diplomacy has to work mainly the multilateral level. This brings us to a second element o strategy within security institutions: to increase its political and diplomatic initiative.

Political and diplomatic initiative. To take political and diplomatic initiatives within security institutions, especially in the framework means of CFSP, is a means of reinforcing Portugal's position in the European Union while benefiting from the power given by institutional membership. Rather unfortunately, only now is this important issue starting to emerge in the portuguese polilical agenda. In fact, to learn low to use institutional membership (not only in the European Union, but also in Nato and in WEU) to its own advantage, how to use the power acquired by virtue of institutional membership is a matter of crucial importance to Portuguese foreign policy. With a strong tradition of quasi-isolationism, the country has little experience in institutional policy. Indeed, this is one of the most e enduring heritages from the geopolitical culture that has dominated

foreign policy making in Portugal. Nevertheless, as the CEDN clearly indicates, the government shows signs of a new attitude towards international institutions. In the particular field of diplomatic initiatives, Lisbon is willing to enhance its role in the context of CFSP. According to the Maastricht treaty, "any member state is able to submit to the Council any question regarding foreign and security policy and to present political proposals." That is, EU countries shall use their right of diplomatic initiative. Accordingly, the foreign minister stated that Portugal should have a more positive and active role within the European Union. But Durão Barroso went even further and, abandoning traditional political orientations, declared that Portuguese vital interests lie in Europe.

Of course, this requires the recognition that in some situations European interests are Portuguese interests as well, especially in matters related to central and eastern Europe which affect the security of the whole continent. Yet, as the foreign minister also recognises, it is important to convince public opinion that political developments in conformity central and eastern Europe influence Portuguese security immediately and directly. To believe that political crises in remote places in Europe do represent a threat to Portugal is a rather dangerous illusion. Membership in the European Union has added the concept of common interests to the classic idea of national interests (both tend to be convergent and not exclusive). In this vein, the first step to have a greater role in the CFSP process is to assume that there are common interests and to act accordingly. Furthermore, following the rule that institutional membership strengthens national power, active participation in areas of common interest will enhance Portugal's capacity to pursue its exclusively national interests.

Active participation in security structures. According to the CEDN, involvement in military missions in the areas of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations, whether in the WEU and Nato context or in the UN framework, is one of the most pressing national security issues. Whatever doubts and uncertainties about the definition of humanitarian or peacekeeping missions we might have, one thing seems to be clear: their significance in contemporary international security. As UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali has stated in the introductory note to "An Agenda for Peace", the most urgent questions for "enhancing the capacity of the organisation to respond to the challenges of the post-Cold War world" are humanitarian actions and peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.

For the Portuguese government, an active role in multinational military missions enables Portugal to reinforce its political position, not only in the European security institutions but also in the international system at large . Lisbon is in complete agreement with the two general guidelines stipulated by WEU and Nato concerning humanitarian and peacekeeping missions: the principle of a UN hat, and the principle of double-hatting in relation to forces usable by the two European organisations. According to defence minister Fernando Nogueira, the Portuguese government stands for the interlocking principle regarding the relationship among the United Nations, CSCE, Nato and WEU in humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions, which should translate into complementarity, coordination and cooperation between the four organisations in humanitarian and peacekeeping activities.

For the Portuguese government, it is essential that in every occasion peacekeeping and humanitarian actions occur under the UN hat, i.e., be in conformity with the UN Charter and have a political legitimacy conferred by the Security Council. Lisbon also thinks the CSCE has a key role in preventing conflict in Europe. Following the collective security philosophy, the Portuguese government considers the political and diplomatic mechanisms of CSCE as a first resort to guarantee stability and security in Europe. Portugal also recognises to CSCE a primary role in arms control and entirely supports the organisation's action in issues such as the reduction of conventional forces and the building of confidence and security measures in Europe, which Lisbon sees as instruments of European law. Portugal is taking part in the verification process of arms control and reduction, integrating the CFE monitoring units.

Although the Portuguese government stands for interlocking, Lisbon also maintains that it is necessary to clarify the respective areas of intervention of the United Nations, Nato and WEU. Arguing for geographical boundaries of some sort for institutional interventions, Lisbon would like to see, at least in practice, the emergence of what one could call an international division of labour between the security organisations in humanitarian actions and peacekeeping operations . For instance, Portugal is firmly against interventions of Nato and WEU multinational forces in Southern Africa. Wishing to maintain its historical influence in the region and thus pursuing bilateral policies, Lisbon sees its European partners and allies as rivals in its struggle to enhance political influence in Southern Africa. Therefore, in Angola and Mozambique, Lisbon's policy in the domain of humanitarian and peace-keeping interventions is to value its own capability

to play a stabilising role under the auspices of the United Nations. Accordingly, Portuguese forces are participating in the UN blue helmet forces in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Already in 1992, Portuguese armed forces were involved in the verification of the cease-fire terms in Angola and in the formation of the national army, and the defence minister has confirmed that Portuguese forces are ready to participate in UNAVEM III, the UN force due to be placed in Angola. Furthermore, the Portuguese government considers a possible military collaboration with Brazil, intending to constitute a bilateral force to work under the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, mainly in Southern Africa.

In Europe and the Mediterranean, contrary to Southern Africa, the value of the Atlantic Alliance and WEU play an important part in peacekeeping activities, security policy albeit under the UN hat. One of the main questions faced by Portuguese security policy, which, as it is stated in the CEDN, is viewed as a priority by the government, is the participation of national forces in WEU and Nato multinational military mechanisms. After the sad and rather damaging experience in the Gulf War in which, in accordance with the "non-belligerence" stance taken by the government, Portuguese participation was the lowest among European allies, Lisbon seems to have learned that political influence within security institutions is the result of active participation in its security instruments. In this sense, although in small numbers, Portuguese forces are contributing to peacekeeping and humanitarian UN operations in the former Yugoslavia. More importantly, it is the Portuguese government's intention to involve its military forces in WEU and Nato multilateral military mechanisms, respectively, the forces answerable to WEU and the combined joint task forces. Particularly, "the participation of the Independent Airborne Brigade in the non-permanent land forces of the Air-Naval Mediterranean Union Force, along with involving the marines in the WEU's Anglo-Dutch amphibious brigade" are being considered.

Bilateral relations with the United States

As it was argued earlier, the strategic logic of the Cold War and the consequent relevance of Portuguese-American relations, especially during the early eighties, made some people in Portugal believe in a "special relationship" between the two countries. Such a perception, strongly reflecting the geopolitical culture, gave rise to one of the most pressing dilemmas of 1994 facing Portuguese security policy today. On the one hand, mainly due to the end of the Cold War, the government recognises that the era of a

"special relationship" based exclusively on strategic motives is over. For instance, although the CEDN states that Portugal must "develop and consolidate bilateral alliances which might contribute to strengthening Portugal's position" in international politics, there is no specific mention of a bilateral relationship with the United States as a political priority. On the other hand, the United States is still seen by many important sectors of security policy-making, especially amid the military, as a natural ally in security and defence matters. Moreover, from the American standpoint, the strategic value of the Azores, even after the Soviet collapse, is still important for US security policy and thus emphasises the need for a continuing bilateral relationship. Yet, with the recent transformation of the international order and with the change in Portuguese security policy, its terms have to be thoroughly redressed.

It has been argued that the new terms of Portuguese-US relations are to be understood in the context of "Euro-Atlantic multilateralism." Firstly, membership in the European Union will be felt in relations between the two countries: it is likely that Portugal, aligning its positions with other EU member states, might have in the future different attitudes in particular questions from those of the United States. Secondly, in order to proclaim a its specific identity within Europe, Lisbon will certainly seek to maintain special relations with the United States which enable Portugal to serve as a bridge between American and European interests. Here, the assumption is that, given the "Azores factor", keeping a special relationship with the United States will reinforce the country's position within the European Union. As the prime minister has claimed, relations with the United States "represent trump cards which increase our country's influence in Community fora." This assumption needs, however, further consideration, particularly in regard to the impact of Portugal's bilateral relations with the United States on European politics. Today, there is a growing tendency in American policy towards Europe to privilege Bonn and Brussels, with traditional American Atlantic allies in Western Europe, like Portugal and even Great Britain, having a secondary place for Washington. Despite the "Azores factor", the "trump card" assumption seems to be far from present reality.

The defence and cooperation agreement due to be signed until the end of 1994 is the result of the changing nature of relations between Lisbon and Washington. In the context of such an agreement both the existing terms under which Portugal provides facilities and the American economic and military aid are being altered. On the one hand, reflecting a more equal bilateral relationship, the new agreement is based on new fields of cooperation

such as technology transfers, scientific research and greater cooperation in the arms industry. In short, the new terms of the bilateral relationship have abandoned the economic assistance pattern.

On the other hand, the terms of the military facilities granted in the Lajes air base suffered some relevant changes. Since the 1971 defence agreement, economic assistance was linked to granting out-of-area facilities. The new arrangement regarding the use of military facilities is more centered within the Atlantic Alliance framework. As the prime minister has affirmed, "the Azores should not be used in a US action launched against a Middle East country: that is not their purpose. " Undoubtedly, European integration has altered the terms of relations between Lisbon and Washington: within Nato, from an exclusively "Luso-American affair" to "Euro- Union, the Atlantic multilateralism"; and bilaterally, from a "third-world pattern" of relations to a more equal relationship.

Security policy towards the Maghreb

After the Cold War, the Maghreb has become an important focus of attention for both European states and institutions. In general, the international participation observers refer to the possibility that the growing conflict between praetorian elites and Islamic fundamentalists, plus the international institutional vacuum in the region, both in societal crises and in interstate conflicts, thus producing a scenario of political instability and disorder. In this sense, both European states and institutions are bound to play the role of international stabilisers and to guarantee a minimum of regional order. Yet, this role is closely connected with the interest of the Southern European countries to recenter European politics after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with national strategies designed to enhance political influence related to both within institutions and in relation to other states. Leaving aside European economic policies towards the Maghreb, which are not the direct concern of this essay, it is worth asking what are the strategies of response from European security institutions to the political crisis in the Maghreb. Moreover, what are Portuguese primary interests and strategies or which institutional policies does Lisbon favour?

After the events of 1989 in the former Soviet bloc which culminated with a deep change in the European order, Southern European states, mainly Portugal and Spain, perceived the possibility of greater marginalisation within the European Community. For its part, France felt the need to balance German's growing influence in Central Europe. This

southern concern led to a debate about whether there is a "Southern Europe caucus" as a sub-region within the European Community and to what extent it is capable of shaping Europe's external action. The rationale behind "the shaping of a sub-regional identity" was the willingness to achieve an East-South equilibrium in the European priorities. Portuguese focus on the Maghreb has to be analysed within this context.

The Portuguese defence minister, instead of considering only Portuguese interests, affirms that potential conflicts in the region would affect European interests as a whole. During the Portuguese presidency of the European Union, the Maghreb was considered as a top external priority, and in international fore Portugal has continuously defended the need to develop processes of institutional cooperation with the Maghreb in the security realm. Although Portugal agrees in principle with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean initiative, it favours specific approaches to the Western Mediterranean. In, this sense, the WEU role in accordance with the Petersburg declaration and the Five + Five process are most favoured by Lisbon. In this context, the government defends the participation of military forces from at least the Central Maghreb states in common exercises with the WEU Mediterranean naval force. Such a confidence-building measure would be the first step to build an area of collective security in the Western Mediterranean. Moreover, the Portuguese defence minister also proposes a role for Nato in the security of the region, arguing that in the context of its new strategic concept, Nato should expand to the South the instruments of stability created in relation to the East.

Beyond the institutional responses, Portugal also pursues bilateral strategies. However, in the case of the Maghreb, unilateral action is closely related to multilateral positions since the main rationale is to contribute to regional stability. It is rather improbable that because of specific national interests Portugal will enter into deep political disagreement with other European allies. Towards the Maghreb, Lisbon stands above all for multi-lateral policies. Although the government is well aware that being a EU member gives Portugal political weight in the region, and even shares the southern concern for an East-South equilibrium in the European priorities, it considers that the emergence of a sub-regional bloc is limited in terms of institutional cohesion.

Mediterranean instability requires above all multi-lateral responses and not renationalisation of security policies which might be related to tendencies of sub-regionalisation within the European Union. Lisbon thinks bilateral strategies ought to be in conformity with the emergent EU logic of maintaining international order. In this vein,

the government has recently signed both a Defence Cooperation Agreement and a Political and Security Cooperation Agreement about migrations control with Morocco. Therefore, considering that national security is intertwined with that of Europe in the case of the Maghreb, Portugal adopts the concept of domestic common interest towards the region. Hence, the multilateral and the bilateral level are complementary.

Security policy towards Southern Africa

Tending to act towards the United States and the Maghreb from a European perspective, a special role in Southern Africa regional security seems to be the major "trump card" to affirm Portuguese identity in European and international politics. Indeed, this African vocation was recognised by the European Community at the time of Portugal's accession. Of course, the value of this special role in the region, and particularly its effect on Portugal's position in Europe, rests on the belief that Southern Africa will not be a forgotten area in world politics in the near future. In order that a special Portuguese role in regional security will enhance the country's country prestige and status within security organisations, not only the European Union but also Nato and the United Nations, one has to assume that such a belief holds true. And for Portugal, this is an important issue. A positive contribution to Southern Africa stability, particularly in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, is perceived almost as a moral obligation. Moreover, it would be difficult for public opinion to accept an active Portuguese participation in European institutions without seeing a commitment from those institutions to African problems. Significantly, a majority of the soldiers from the Independent Airborne Brigade that answered a questionnaire declared that they "would not mind going to Angola or Mozambique under UN command", whereas in the case of Bosnia they would go "because 'we are Portuguese volunteers' but 'not with the same enthusiasm'.

According to the CEDN, to increase relations and cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African states is one of the primary objectives of Portuguese security policy. Likewise, a seminar organised by the Foreign Ministry in January 1994 to discuss foreign and security policy has concluded that one of the future priorities is to reinforce political links with Portuguese-speaking countries. In the security domain, Portuguese strategy to retain its traditional influence in the region implies the development of a bilateral military cooperation with those countries. Such a strategy is well exemplified by the recent signature of a number of bilateral treaties and agreements. Portugal also plays a significant role in the political solution of the domestic conflicts in Angola and

Mozambique. Since the creation of a troika along with the United States and the Soviet Union in 1990 during the Angolan peace process, Lisbon has had a major role in the processes of conflict-resolution in the region. Likewise, as it was stated above, Portugal is actively cooperating with the United Nations in regional peacemaking actions. In Mozambique, for example, there is a communications battalion as a part of the UN force, and, according to the prime minister, more troops might be sent to both countries in the context of UN operations there. It is also important to note that in its approach to conflict-resolution in Angola and Mozambique, Portugal has always declared that the peace process should be the strengthening of national identity and the consolidation of the existing borders.

Another point stressed by the Portuguese government is the linkage between the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique and the democratic transition in South Africa. A peaceful domestic transition in this country was, and still is, a fundamental condition for regional stability. Portugal was one of the most supportive European states to De Klerk political reforms and "was particularly active in EPC as an architect of common positions" towards Pretoria. The foreign minister, after visiting South Africa in March 1994, asked the EU members to take up a more active and effective role in supporting the democratic transition. Likewise, in a recent meeting between the Portuguese and the British prime ministers, both decided to define common positions towards the reform process. Portuguese supportive policy towards South Africa results from two motives.

On the one hand, concerns towards South African domestic politics are obviously related with the fact that there are just under a half million Portuguese citizens living in the Republic of South Africa. But, on the other hand, Lisbon accepts, and even stimulates, a more active role from post-apartheid South Africa in regional security, thus considering Pretoria as a regional partner.

While this commitment towards the region shows Lisbon's desire to play a more active role in Southern Africa's security, it also seeks to enhance Portugal's position within security organisations. Promoting order and stability in the region is perceived by Portugal not only as a moral duty, mainly due to its colonial past, but also as a means to strengthen its influence in the international system. In order to achieve that, Lisbon is ready to work with the United Nations and to use the prestige given by EU membership.

This shows that active participation in security institutions and an effective role in the region are not exclusive but complementary. In sum, four principles guide Portuguese policy in the region: national reconciliation in Angola and Mozambique, leading role of the United Nations in conflict-resolution processes, the close links of the various peace processes under way in the region and an awareness of the important regional role played by the Republic of South Africa. Furthermore, in contrast to the multilateral approach followed towards the Maghreb, Lisbon favours unilateral policies needs to adapt towards Southern Africa.