

## The United Nations and the Peace Process

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Besides cease-fire and election, monitoring, the mandate of ONUMOZ included important elements of peace-building such as the demobilisation and social reintegration of ex-combatants, the clearance of land-mines, and the collection and destruction of weapons. Moreover, ONUMOZ was responsible for the provision of humanitarian assistance to millions of Mozambicans in critical need: returning refugees, internally displaced people and the victims of drought and famine in vast areas of the countryside.

The peace accord

Mozambique's transition began with the signature of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique between the government and Renamo, in Rome on 4 October 1992, and culminated in the general elections of 27-29 October 1994. The GPA determined the procedures, organisation and timetable for the concentration, disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces from both disputant parties; the selection, training and establishment of a new, unified Mozambican Defence Force; the organisation and conduct of presidential and legislative elections; and the provision of humanitarian assistance to distressed population. The GPA also made provisions for the United Nations to monitor the implementation of the accord. All these actions should take place within a period of twelve months.

Four multilateral commissions were established to implement the GPA, comprising representatives of the government, Renamo and the international community. Those were the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission - CCS, an overarching political body responsible for the management of the entire peace process, the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force - CCFADM, the Cease-fire Commission - CCF, and the Reintegration Commission - CORE.

Responding to a request by the Mozambican government in the aftermath of the Rome agreement, the UN Security Council established ONUMOZ in December 1992, with the general purpose of facilitating the implementation of the peace accord and monitoring the country's first democratic elections.

The mandate

The operation's mandate included political, electoral, military and humanitarian components, and its structure comprised a multinational military contingent, police monitors and international civilian staff.

In the political sphere, ONUMOZ was responsible for providing an impartial supervision of the implementation of the peace accord. To this end, it assumed the chair of three commissions: the CSC, CORE, and CCF. The National Elections Commission which was established to organise and conduct the elections also benefited from ONUMOZ logistic support and UNDP technical assistance.

In the military field, ONUMOZ was mandated to monitor and verify the cease-fire; the concentration and demobilisation of armed forces; the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; the disbanding of irregular and private armed groups; the complete withdrawal of foreign troops; to provide security for UN personnel and installations, as well as for other international agencies involved in supporting the peace process; and to provide security in vital transport corridors in order to guarantee the free circulation of people and humanitarian assistance. This latter element was central in determining the size of the ONUMOZ military contingent.

Initially, and according to the peace agreement, there were no provisions for ONUMOZ's involvement in the creation of the new national defence force, FADM. This task was to be undertaken by the government and Renamo, assisted by representatives of the countries they had previously selected: France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. However, in order to help overcome the differences between the government and Renamo speed up the process, at the request of the two parties and the supporting countries, ONUMOZ was integrated into the CCFADM and assumed its chair at a later stage. The UN Security Council authorised ONUMOZ to assume an exclusively facilitating role "on the strict understanding that this would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing the new armed forces.

The humanitarian mandate of ONUMOZ included the coordination of humanitarian assistance operations. This was put under the responsibility of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in Mozambique.

To undertake this complex set of tasks, ONUMOZ at its peak comprised 5,914 military personnel among military observers, staff officers and formed units , and 1,068 civilian police . The general elections were monitored by approximately 2,300 UN observers provided by individual UN member states, a range of UN offices, ONUMOZ, the European Union, the diplomatic community in Maputo, NGOS working in Mozambique, the Organisation of African Unity and the Association of European Parliamentarians for

Southern Africa . The cost of the operation in 1994 was estimated in 294.8 million dollars, with outstanding contributions as at 15 November 1994 amounting to 105.9 million."

An important and innovative feature of ONUMOZ was the establishment of a trust fund to help Renamo become a political party. The UN Secretary-General stated that "The transformation of a guerrilla force, experienced only in war, into a political force with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the most significant legacies of the United Nations operation".

What also needs to be stated, though, is that Renamo's war experience was in fact one of the most brutal campaigns of systematic terror against civilian populations since World War. In spite of that, one of the foundations of the peace process, in Mozambique was the understanding that there would be no investigation of allegations about war crimes. In other words, justice was the price to pay for peace.

Normally, in wars which end with the unconditional defeat of one party, the victors invariably exert the right to judge and punish the vanquished for the human and material cost of the war. The victors' abuses are conveniently underrated or ignored and the defeated carry all the blame. Peace comes with a measure of justice, however partial and biased.

In the case of Mozambique, however, the war ended without a clear winner and the only losers were the anonymous people of the land. Their quest for justice failed to stimulate the 'CNN effect'. Under these circumstances, the human rights abuses committed by both parties during the war tend to be ignored for the sake of national reconciliation. 'National reconciliation', though, simply translates the political compromise between the new partners in the peace process, i.e., the government and Renamo, rather than the re-establishment of harmony and justice among all Mozambicans.

The transformation of the rebel movement into a political party became thus a critical pre-condition to make this partnership work and ensure that there was something in the peace process for Renamo. For this reason, Protocol III of the General Peace Agreement states that "The Government undertakes to assist in obtaining installations and power means so that Renamo may secure the accommodation and transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities in all the provincial capitals and in other locations to the extent that the available resources so permit. For these purposes, the Government shall seek support from the international community and, in particular, from Italy".

Thus, at the request of the Mozambican government, in May 1993 the international community established a trust fund to receive and channel voluntary contributions to Renamo. The fund was administered by ONUMOZ according to the UN standard rules and procedures. The government's initiative was determined by Renamo's delay in sending its delegation to Maputo alleging lack of logistical conditions to operate. Whether or not Renamo would have resumed war if it were not bought out of the military option remains an open question. What is clear, though, is that not only Renamo was not held accountable for its massive violations of human rights during the war, but it was also somehow rewarded with international community funds. And, sad irony, this was done in compliance with the peace accord, and in the name of peace, reconciliation and democracy.

### The challenges

ONUMOZ initiated its activities on 15 October 1992, when Aldo Ajello, then Interim Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, arrived in Maputo leading a team of twenty-five UN observers. From the outset, the leadership of ONUMOZ was confronted with the fact that the timetable for the implementation of the GPA was highly unrealistic since it did not take into account three critical factors: the political implications and the logistical impact of ONUMOZ's presence in Mozambique; the delay, inevitable in a complex bureaucracy such as the United Nations, between the decision to establish ONUMOZ and the actual deployment on the ground of its civilian and military personnel; and the high level of mistrust between the government and Renamo. These factors, which determined the extension of ONUMOZ until December 1994, are briefly examined below.

By virtue of its considerable resources and on the strength of its supervisory role in the conduct of the peace process, ONUMOZ soon filled the power vacuum left by a state dramatically weakened by the war. This led the operation's leadership to assume a highly interventionist character. Some observers have criticised ONUMOZ's activism arguing that it impacted negatively on Mozambique's national sovereignty.

The dispute over the status-of-forces agreement between the government and the United Nations, in early 1993, provides an example of the above. The United Nations presented the Mozambican government with the standard text applied in all peace operations. This proposal of agreement suggested that ONUMOZ should be granted exemption from all local taxes and duties and total freedom of movements for its staff and goods; the Mozambican authorities, in turn, required that ONUMOZ paid taxes and duties in accordance with national laws, obtained authorisation for its flights from the air traffic

controlling organs, and provided information in advance of all movements of UN military personnel.

The government was concerned that ONUMOZ's unrestricted freedom of movement into the areas still under Renamo control (in violation of the peace accord) would contribute to maintain a dual territorial administration in Mozambique. Government officials argued that ONUMOZ should rather put pressure on Renamo to comply with the accord and integrate its areas in the state administration. "Ajello is treating Mozambique like Somalia, like a country without a functioning government", said one government source. The government, having difficulty to discern between its roles as a sovereign authority and as a party to the peace agreement, wanted an exceptional treatment; and the United Nations was not prepared to open a precedent.

After lengthy discussions conducted in New York between the Mozambican Permanent Mission in the United Nations and the organisation's Divisions of Political Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations and the Legal Department, the government finally accepted the standard status-of-forces agreement, granting ONUMOZ diplomatic immunity, unlimited freedom of movement and exemption from all taxes and duties except service charges.

According to UN sources quoted in press reports, the delay in responding to the decision to establish ONUMOZ was due to both international and internal UN reasons.

Since Mozambique was a relatively marginal international concern compared to Yugoslavia and Somalia, it was given low priority. Thus, it was only on 16 December 1992, three months after the signing of the Peace Accord, that the Security Council approved ONUMOZ (resolution 797); and it took another three months, until mid-March 1993 to approve its initial Mozambican budget of 140 million dollars for the period until June 1993. Of that sum, only 9.5 million were made immediately available; this led to delays in the procurement and acquisition of equipment, leasing of aircraft and office lack of guarantee, space and deployment of staff.

Additionally, the UN peace-keepers only reached their full strength in early June 1993. All this delayed the effective operationalisation of ONUMOZ and, consequently, the implementation of the peace accord. As was described earlier, the long peace negotiations had revealed that neither party had much confidence in the other's good faith; this deep mistrust between the parties led the mediators to engage in an exercise 'shuttle diplomacy' which eventually resulted in the signing of the Peace Accord but failed to build enough confidence between the government and Renamo, Mutual mistrust

remained a central characteristic of the transition period considerably slowing the whole process, and in particular, the assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of troops.

In early March 1993, realising that it did not have enough personnel adequately prepared to deal with the complex machinery of the peace agreement, Renamo decided to suspend its participation in the commissions. Renamo's representatives returned to the rebels' headquarters in Maringue, in central Mozambique. Although the real purpose of this move was to effect a better selection and training of such representatives, the reasons given were the lack of adequate accommodation for the personnel needed to staff the peace accord commissions, and the need for funds to transform itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party.

At the same time, Renamo maintained an independent administration of the areas it controlled preventing freedom of movement and the presence of government and UN officials. The rebels interpreted the peace agreement as authorising the existence of two administrations until the elections, which was evidently wrong.

Since ONUMOZ itself was not yet in a position to effectively undertake its responsibilities for the reasons discussed earlier, it suited them to have Renamo offering an excuse for the delays. On his report to the UN Security Council, on 2 April 1993, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged the impossibility of holding the elections in October 1993.

By early June, when the UN full contingent was finally in place and ONUMOZ was ready to start the implementation of the Rome accord, the Mozambican parties were unwilling to cooperate. Renamo presented a variety of reasons for not concentrating its forces in the designated assembly areas: the unacceptable logistical conditions in most of these areas, the lack of guarantees of the personal safety of Renamo's leaders, and the lack of funds to transform itself into a political party.

Clearly, Dlakhama, who had refused to move to Maputo on safety grounds and remained in Renamo's stronghold in Maringue, was using his military power as a bargaining tool to force the government and the international community into concessions.

To overcome this impasse, the Special Representative employed a 'carrot and stick' strategy. The carrot was the promise to make available to Renamo the necessary funds for its transformation into a political party; and the stick was the threat that the United Nations would terminate its mission in Mozambique even before the elections, if Renamo did not move speedily into the assembly areas.

Apparently, Ajello succeeded in convincing Dlakhama of three things: first, that Renamo had better chances of surviving as a political party in a peaceful Mozambique, rather

than as a military operation; second, that the international community was prepared and willing to assist Renamo's transformation. To that effect Renamo had to give clear indications of its commitment to the peace process and the elections; and third, that the presence of the United Nations was a critical guarantee of free and fair elections. Thus, in early June Renamo resumed its participation in the peace accord commissions.

However, by September 1993, the implementation of the peace accord showed little progress: at the political level, there was no agreement on the draft Electoral Law and the composition of the National Sections Commission; and in the military sphere, troops from both sides were not moving to the assembly areas, and, consequently, the processes of demobilisation and collection and destruction of weapons could not start. At this stage, Renamo issued a declaration reaffirming its commitment to the peace process and raising the possibility of holding elections in October 1994 even if demobilisation were not completed. The United Nations could not accept the risks involved in this option:

With the situation in Angola offering clear evidence of the dangers of this approach, my Special Representative reasserted ONUMOZ's determination to hold elections only after full demobilisation had taken place. He publicly warned Renamo that it could no longer try to preserve both a political and a military option. In view of this lack of progress the UN Secretary-General visited Maputo from 17 to 20 October 1993. His main concern was to make it clear to President Chissano and Mr Dlakhama that unless they both showed real political will and took urgent steps to overcome the impasse, the international community would seriously consider withdrawing ONUMOZ. Addressing the Mozambican nation on national television, Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned: "Time is short. Solutions must now be found. While the international community continues to show a willingness to assist in the process of building peace, peace cannot be imposed from the outside, nor can it be built where there is not sufficient political will to make peace".

The Mozambican leaders seemed to have understood what was at stake. In the three days of Boutros-Ghali's visit, compromise was reached on the issues that had prevented progress. Thus, the government and Renamo accepted new principles for the deliberations of the Cease-fire Commission. They agreed that the National Elections Commission would include 10 members appointed by the government, 7 by Renamo and 3 from other political parties. It was also agreed that the parties would hold technical meetings to discuss the draft electoral law which would then be submitted to the national parliament (Assembleia da República) by the end of November 1993.

It was also decided that President Chissano would appoint the chairperson of the National Police Affairs Commission, while Mr Dlakhama would select the chairperson of the National Information Commission; and the National Commission on Administration would operate under two rotating chairpersons, one selected by the government and one selected by supervision of the Renamo. Moreover, the parties undertook to start moving their troops to the assembly areas in November 1993 in order to guarantee that demobilisation would be completed between January and May 1994.

On his departure from Maputo, the UN Secretary-General expressed optimism with regard to the peace process: "(...) I just want to say that this morning we have been able to produce a breakthrough. This new momentum will help me convince the Security Council to continue to give me a mandate to maintain the United Nations presence in Mozambique. This will help me obtain from the different financial institutions all over the world and from the donor countries, from the European Community, more assistance for Mozambique, because Mozambique has reached an agreement and Mozambique is activating the peace process".

Contrary to the promises of 20 October 1993, the troops from both sides only began to arrive at the assembly areas in late January 1994. This delay was due to disagreements on the final list of assembly areas and the poor logistical conditions in many of them. More importantly, both sides were reluctant: to dispose of their best operational units and senior officers, and were unable or unwilling to give reliable numbers of troops to be demobilised. Thus, it was only by late February that all assembly areas were operational, and by mid-April around 49,000 soldiers were concentrated in the assembly areas, of which 14,000 were Renamo guerrillas and 34,000 from the government.

The process of demobilisation comprised four distinct phases: the identification and opening of assembly areas; cantonment, registration, disarmament and selection; demobilisation; and return home.

A Demobilisation Technical Unit, comprising civilian experts from the United Nations Volunteers and a number of bilateral and multilateral agencies, was created in the office of the Special Representative to coordinate and supervise the entire process. DTU staff were deployed in all assembly areas to provide technical and administrative skills. They collaborated with the Military Observers, the International Organisation for Migration and the Mozambican Ministry of Finance in the preparation and equipment of the assembly areas; the registration of soldiers; the preparation of demobilisation documents; the establishment of a data base; the planning and supervision of the resettlement of demobilised soldiers; and the selection of soldiers to join the FADM.

After the initial delays referred to earlier, demobilisation started in early March and was concluded in late August 1994. Basic amenities such as water, food, health care and entertainment were to be supplied by the international community, with government participation in certain cases. The International Organisation for Migration was to provide transportation for the demobilised soldiers and their families.

The first serious problem in this process had to do with the selection and approval of the assembly areas. From the outset it was agreed that 49 the assembly areas (29 for government troops and 20 for Renamo's) should be set up to accommodate a total of 82,000 soldiers (61,000 from the government and 21,000 from Renamo), plus their close relatives (another 38,000 people). Since neither party wanted to give the other strategic advantages, assembly areas were often chosen in places with no living riot conditions and of difficult access, creating serious logistical problems.

The issue of territorial administration also came into play as a delaying factor in the process of cantonment. Renamo interpreted the GPA text as giving the rebels the right to conduct the administration of the territories they controlled, and demanded some provincial governorship. The government, in turn, refused to accept this principle of dual administration. They claimed that what the GPA meant was that Renamo's administrators could perform their duties within a single overall administration.

This issue was resolved during the first summit meeting between Chissano and Dlakhama, where the principle of a single administration was established and Renamo given the possibility of appointing advisors to the provincial governors. At the same summit it was decided to request ONUMOZ to introduce a civilian police contingent to monitor the activities of the Mozambican police and ensure the respect for human rights and democratic liberties.

The process of demobilisation was marked by incidents within the assembly areas and disputes between the government and Renamo. Upon arrival, soldiers were to be registered, surrender their weapons and choose between demobilisation and joining the new armed forces. The slow pace of cantonment and the even slower pace of demobilisation determined that some camps soon became overcrowded with the attendant deterioration of living conditions.

Most soldiers and guerrillas had stayed in the cantonment sites for much longer than initially planned, under the stressful conditions described above, inactive and uncertain about their future. This resulted in a number of violent incidents between January and March 1994, with government soldiers demanding the payment of arrears in their salaries, and Renamo combatants demanding a better demobilisation package than

what was being offered. At this stage, Renamo troops were flowing in substantial numbers to the assembly areas, while the government sent relatively small contingents.

ONUMOZ and Western diplomats believed that Frelimo's military high command were resisting being dismantled. The reason for this, it was argued, was that for the previous year the government military had enjoyed the use of the defence budget without any real accountability; delaying the move of troops to the assembly areas and the process of demobilisation would lead to a postponement of the elections scheduled for October 1994; in turn, would allow for the maintenance of the status quo.

In the assembly areas, frustrated soldiers continued to demonstrate and riot to press their demands for pay or quick demobilisation. Incidents like road blocks, looting of food and other supplies, and hostage-taking multiplied. By early August, the situation was getting out of control.

In response, Aldo Ajello increased his pressure on the Mozambican parties and, in particular, on the government, to honour the compromises they had taken. In this effort, the Special Representative had the firm support of the ambassadors from the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the representative of the Organisation of African Unity. The government issued a strong protest, claiming that ONUMOZ was being partial since it was not putting the same pressure on Renamo.

Be it as it may, this pressure finally led the government to accelerate the process of demobilisation and to dismantle the FAM. On 15 August all assembly areas were formally closed. Demobilisation of non-assembled troops continued for some time, and by late November 57,540 government and 20,538 Renamo soldiers had been demobilised, from a total of 91,691 registered troops.

#### Creation of the FADM

The Rome peace accord established that the formation of the Mozambique Defence Force would be supervised by a Joint Commission for the Formation of the FADM. CCFADM would be composed of representatives of both sides and representatives of Portugal, France and the United Kingdom, countries selected by the parties to advise in the process of establishing the new force. However, in view of the difficulties the parties experienced in establishing dialogue, they agreed to request the United Nations to chair the commission.

The FADM was defined as a non-partisan, volunteer and professional force, comprising 30,000 personnel in three services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. The government and

Renamo were each to contribute 50 percent of the total strength of the defence force. Contrary to the expectations of the parties, CCFADM found it difficult to identify volunteers to join the new defence force. Thus, by the end of ONUMOZ's mandate in December 1994 the FADM comprised a total of 11,579 troops.

Many observers have raised concerns about the quality of the integration soldiers and their training provided to senior officers and generals of the new force. The officers were appointed to attend 'leadership courses' by their respective political masters, without much attention to criteria & academic or military technical qualification, years of experience, etc. Apparently concerned with avoiding conflict with any of the signatories of the peace accord, the Portuguese instructors who provided that training did not challenge that position Renamo had rep and accepted all candidates. Moreover, these leadership courses lasted for 6 to 8 weeks, which was clearly not enough to overcome the handicaps of most candidates. On the other hand, all candidates qualified and received senior officer and general ranks without any form of evaluation.

It may be argued that Portugal could have done a job more in accordance with its own military traditions and the prestige of its Armed Forces. However, it is probable that Portugal did its best, in the complex conditions of the displaced people Mozambique peace process. In any event, what matters is that the new Mozambican defence force is led by an officer corps which, at least in part, does not meet some of the basic requirements of military professionalism.

What matters now is to acknowledge such deficiencies and undertake the necessary additional training and orientation in order to raise the general level of technical expertise and promote an organisational culture in line with the new political system.

#### Humanitarian assistance

Although there were tensions between the government and Renamo, the cease-fire held throughout this period. This, coupled with a good rainy season allowed subsistence farmers to resume production in the fields and achieve fairly good harvests in many areas. It also led government and non-governmental organisations to undertake the reconstruction of rural hospitals and schools, while the humanitarian assistance agencies were able to initiate their activities, now that the main transport corridors were under UN military protection. This general improvement in the security situation, in turn, encouraged refugees and displaced people to begin the long-awaited journey back home.

The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination was responsible for coordinating the humanitarian mandate of ONUMOZ. This entailed the resettlement of refugees and displaced people, and demobilised soldiers and their relatives; mine-clearance activities; rehabilitation of roads, schools and rural hospitals; distribution of seeds and agricultural tools; improvement of access to safe water; and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

To perform its coordinating role, UNOHAC established provincial and local humanitarian assistance committees where both the government and Renamo had representatives. These were units which planned food distribution and the construction and improvement of basic social services. More importantly, through these committees UNOHAC promoted a degree of dialogue and confidence building between the government and Renamo at provincial and local levels.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees specifically undertook the resettlement of the 'vulnerable groups' (refugees, displaced people and ex-combatants and their dependants) with the assistance of the government's relief agency and various NGOs. Although it formally operated under UNOHAC coordination, UNHCR was in fact locally subordinated to the head of ONUMOZ.

It is estimated that UNHCR supported the resettlement of approximately 1.6 million refugees and 200,000 demobilised soldiers and their dependants between October 1992 and December 1994. Most observers agree that UNHCR action contributed to averting a major humanitarian tragedy in Mozambique.

A controversial aspect of the humanitarian operation was the provision of emergency assistance to Renamo-controlled areas. This was undertaken following the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance set in a joint declaration by the government and Renamo, signed in Rome on 16 July 1992 and subsequently incorporated as an integral part in the Peace Agreement. To implement the declaration, both parties agreed to establish a supervisory and coordinating committee chaired by the United Nations and including representatives of the two parties, the mediators and observers to the Rome negotiations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The supervisory committee decided that the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the government-controlled areas would be the responsibility of the Direcção de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais, a government relief agency, while the World Food Programme would oversee the distribution of humanitarian aid in Renamo-controlled areas.

When UNOHAC was established, the above committee was absorbed into the CORE and continued its activities according to the principles set in the joint declaration. Thus,

a number of NGOs operating in Renamo areas were involved in the rehabilitation of health and education infrastructures and in training and supervising Renamo staff in these areas.

The controversy emerged when local Renamo officials, in the areas still under rebel control, began to circulate the idea that food, clothing, health care and education services were provided by Renamo and not the government. The government insisted that ONUMOZ should force Renamo to open such areas to free circulation, in compliance with the peace accord; however, like in other instances when Renamo dragged its feet, the ONUMOZ leadership adopted a strategy of patient negotiation.

In the government's perception, this approach allowed Renamo to perpetuate a dual territorial administration and use humanitarian assistance as a propaganda tool. ONUMOZ, which had no enforcement powers, requested the UN Secretary-general to raise the issue with the Security Council which addressed it in its resolutions. In addition, the Special Representative made it clear that Renamo's interpretation of the peace agreement was wrong, both publicly in his weekly press briefings and privately in numerous meetings with Renamo's leader Dhlakama. As a result of this pressure, Renamo abandoned the theory of dual administration and gradually started opening the areas it controlled.

#### Social reintegration of ex-combatants

UNOHAC was also responsible for planning, organising and supervising the process of reintegration of demobilised soldiers. To do so, its representative assumed the chairmanship of CORE and guaranteed a permanent dialogue and consultation between the government and Renamo on matters pertaining to this critical aspect of the peace process. The local UNDP office, in turn, implemented a reintegration support scheme for demobilised soldiers. This was a trust fund to provide the demobilised soldiers with eighteen months salary, in addition to the six months severance pay from the government.

The demobilised troops were also eligible to benefit from training through an occupational skills development programme and had access to a fund to support small-scale business ventures. Additionally, UNOHAC set up a country-wide information and referral service. This was a central element of the CORE/UNOHAC programme and sought to provide institutional support to revive the Mozambican Ministry of Labour's vocational training and employment network.

UNOHAC considered it unrealistic to believe that former combatants would quickly stop feeling like soldiers. For that reason, UNOHAC felt it was important to create a government mechanism which would continue to implement the donors' programmes once they stopped assisting the process of reintegration.

In the donors' opinion, however, UNOHAC should have limited its activities to the short term, i.e., the implementation of the peace accord, and leave the long term programmes to be covered by the permanent agencies of the UN system.

While reporting to the Special Representative in Mozambique, UNOHAC was also answerable to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in New York. In the view of some members of the diplomatic community in Maputo, this led to excessive bureaucracy, slow decision making and duplication of efforts. With regard to mine-clearance and demobilisation, these sources argue, UNOHAC was mistaken in trying to promote a long-term developmental approach aimed at empowering the Mozambican government of the day. This would have required much more time than what was available, thus endangering the successful completion of ONUMOZ within the agreed schedule.

#### The electoral process

The organisation and conduct of the electoral process was regulated by an Electoral Act and managed by a National Election Commission. The preparations for the elections were undertaken in three phases: voter registration, voter education and electoral campaign.

Since multiparty democracy and elections were new to most Mozambicans, voter education covered both electoral education (how to vote) and education for democracy (why vote). Whereas for the majority of the population the election of a leader did not raise doubts, the role of political parties and the parliament had not been fully understood by the electorate. The relationship between voting for a party and electing representatives for parliament was not clear in the minds of many voters.

The high rate of illiteracy amongst Mozambicans and the lack of good foreign communications networks (both in terms of access roads and mass media) substantially hampered the effectiveness of voter education campaigns. Innovative methods such as dance and theatre were often employed with good results. However, voter education received a higher profile in the urban areas where voters were more exposed to all sorts of vehicles of information. The rural areas were much less targeted by voter education campaigns.

A major issue surrounding the electoral campaign was the funding of the so-called 'non-armed' opposition. These parties claimed that they needed support from both the government and the international community in order to compete with Frelimo and Renamo, who had access to considerable funding and resources. Eventually the non-armed political parties received each 100 million meticaís (approximately 15,000 dollars) from the government and an additional 100,000 dollars from the international community.

Freedom of political activity was another problem. In Renamo-controlled areas, political activities by parties other than Renamo itself were not allowed until the end of the concentration of troops in the assembly areas which happened very late in the overall peace process. Some opposition parties also accused the government of harassment in the areas it controlled. All in all, the electoral campaign was often free but seldom fair, particularly for the non-armed parties. Their lack of a strong party machinery and the fact that they were 'new faces in the game' without a convincing discourse undermined their campaigns.

The opposition parties based their campaign on the mistakes made by of Frelimo, during its 19 years in power and on the need for a more even distribution of power and resources to the central and northern regions of the country. Frelimo emphasised continuity and its experience in governance, and the opposition preached about the need for change. Backed by the international community, most of the opposition parties, including Renamo, called for the establishment of a government of national unity after the elections. Frelimo never accepted to discuss this option arguing that the election results should determine the composition of the new government. Among the opposition parties, there was no consensus on the criteria for the formation of a government of national unity. In the end, the issue was dropped altogether, but not before an intense and virulent exchange of points of view in the media. This affected certain foreign embassies perceived as favouring power-sharing and therefore 'interfering in the internal affairs of Mozambique'.

Sections took place on 27-29 October 1994, with twelve parties and two coalitions running for parliament, and twelve presidential candidates. Elections were held in a peaceful and orderly manner and the only serious hiccup occurred when Renamo threatened to withdraw from the voting on the eve of the elections alleging preparations for widespread fraud on the part of the government. The crisis was solved after nerve-wrecking negotiations between Renamo's leader Afonso Dlakhama and the representatives of the international community. The incident did not affect the casting of

votes or the course of events: voter turn-out was very high at around 87.4% and 91.4% of ballots cast were counted as valid.

Frelimo (44.33%) and its president Chissano (53.31/6) won the elections and Renamo (37.78%) and Dlakhama (33.73%) came second. Only a third political force, the União Democrática coalition managed to pass the 5% threshold and elect members of parliament. Interestingly, Chissano proved more popular than his party, whereas Renamo is stronger than its leader.

Both Frelimo and Renamo showed that they are the only parties with national outreach, although both feature regional strongholds: Frelimo in the south and far north and Renamo in the centre and centre/north. Having resisted the pressure from ONUMOZ and some western diplomats for a pre-election deal on 'power sharing' or a government of national unity to guarantee that Renamo had a place in the executive, Frelimo adopted a winner-take-all position. The argument was that the electoral results had given Frelimo the right to govern alone and that one of the central tenets of democracy was precisely the existence of a loyal opposition. It would therefore be non-democratic, the argument went, to absorb the opposition into the government.

This argument ignores the fact that there have been instances of coexistence of opposing parties in the same government in democratic states. The Great Coalition in Germany and the Government of National Unity in Italy are cases in point. Closer to home, the Government of National Unity in South Africa seems to be a fairly efficient formula, so far, of accommodating former enemies in a process of post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building.

In any event, Renamo seems to have accepted Frelimo's choice and is playing the role of the main opposition party. This may be a strategy dictated by the conviction that during its five-year mandate, Frelimo will fail to meet the expectations and lose credibility, while with the passage of time, the memories of Renamo's cruelty during the war will fade away as the organisation builds a new image.