



State and Anti-System Party Interactions in Turkey and Lebanon: Implications for European Policy

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Executive Summary

This project assesses the feasibility of applying the concepts of securitization and de-securitization in understanding state and anti-system party interactions in Turkey and Lebanon. It aims to contribute to the debates on different formats and methods of state interaction with anti-system parties (i.e. the parties that exert a radical form of opposition *politically*) and their implications for the “securitization of policies” in the Mediterranean by analysing two case-studies. The first is Turkey, where Kurdish politics, driven out of the legitimate boundaries of the political system, emerges as an issue of security. The second case is Lebanon, where the Shiites’ impending need for political participation, combined with Hezbollah’s lingering armed status, creates a widening sectarian rift and crisis of legitimacy, thus securitizing Lebanese politics. State actors’ securitization of policies strengthens the state’s “security-first logic”. Anti-system politics, on the other hand, has its own style of securitization: it uses securitization to mobilize support among its constituency and the international community. In both cases presented, such securitization narrows the limits of ‘normal politics’ and negatively influences other political processes like democratization, citizenship, and political reforms.

Securitization theory establishes that the elected political or military elites declare and define the parameters of a “security problem” in order, eventually, to reproduce a national identity and to reaffirm their own vitality and centrality in tackling the said problem. Consequently, shifts in the security agenda, or the adoption of mediation sequences to combat security problems, are expected to deliver de-securitization. Turkey presents a peculiar case whereby the process of securitization occurs through the interaction among system actors – an interaction producing securitizing moves that are further reinforced by the problematic communication between system and anti-system actors. Moreover, these anti-system actors engender a process of double-securitization. Thus, the persistence of securitizing moves by system and anti-system actors renders de-securitization tedious.

The way in which the Turkish state and the Kurdish actors deal with their security concerns and exert their own forms of securitization reveal a great deal about the securitization of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The three most important securitizing issues are: (1) the conflict between the state and representative / armed forms of anti-system actors, namely the DTP and PKK; (2) the cultural and language rights demanded by the Kurds; and (3) Turkey’s foreign policy towards Northern Iraq.

Turkish state actors treat Kurdish politics as a security issue and reflect this perspective in public speeches. They also aim to securitize the ground in a way that will present Kurdish politics in this light. As a result, Kurdish politics is being driven out of the legitimate boundaries of the Turkish political system. Although the target here is Kurdish politics, such securitization also constrains the limits of “normal politics” and negatively influences other political processes, such as democratization and political reforms. Kurdish politics, on the other hand, has its own form of securitization, with multiple layers. Kurdish politics may also securitize its policies and use this securitization to mobilize support among its constituency and the international community. This double-sided securitization is what constitutes the major blow to democratic consolidation and widening of the political system in Turkey.

In the case of Lebanon, the state and anti-system party interaction - based on power sharing between different sects - and relations with Hezbollah reveal a mutual securitization of the issues at stake. In Lebanon, this interaction has always been difficult to assess or measure because it is difficult to identify the primary actors. At the same time, one cannot discuss anti-system actors without considering the problem faced by the country since the formation of greater Lebanon in 1920. This problem is, simply, the fragility of the Lebanese state. It was formed as a summation of sectarian and religious communities, whose interests the Lebanese state is supposed to protect. The various civil wars and successive social upheavals were the result of specific communities suddenly finding themselves out with the state-managed scope of benefits. Over the years, these communities have simultaneously acted as elements of the state *and* as anti-state actors. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s dominance over the Shi’a community and its ability to perform the duties of the state (and perhaps even replace it), as much as the fragility and failure of the Lebanese state, as well as the internationalization of Lebanese affairs exemplify how securitization can occur. The four most securitizing issues throughout the contemporary political and economic history of Lebanon are: (1) the feeling of an uneven share in Lebanese consensual democracy, which excluded the Shi’a political identity, and Hezbollah’s Shi’a orientation, versus the need for national conciliation at the state level; (2) Hezbollah’s connection with foreign powers, versus state sovereignty; (3) the undermining of the state’s legitimacy by the Hezbollah economy, and (4) Hezbollah’s armament and the failure of the state to guarantee security.

Lebanese political actors' strong sectarian overtones and differing visions for Lebanon's future securitize the political space and often lead to political paralysis and governmental deadlocks. Hezbollah, on the other hand, by securitizing its actions and policies, is able to justify its armed status and military operations (including kidnappings) in south Lebanon. This multi-faceted securitization not only further excludes and marginalizes the Shiites in Lebanon from the national political and social space, but also brings the country to the brink of civil war, while political assassinations and armed clashes among government and anti-system actors proliferate. Just as in the Turkish case, the securitization of Lebanese politics also narrows the limits of "normal politics" and negatively influences other political processes, such as democratization and political reforms.

The problems here addressed that emerge from the interaction among state and anti-system actors become regional issues with wide-reaching effects for regional and international politics. Thus, the policy recommendations proposed in this study are directed at European policy-makers. The EU has an indispensable role as an external actor in enhancing or diminishing this securitization trend. The EU must strengthen its foreign and security tools and mechanisms to urge a comprehensive political reform and disarmament strategy both in Turkey and Lebanon. It must seek to establish a common EU strategy and to build individual member state foreign and security policy strategies that are capable of responding promptly and efficiently to the various challenges faced in these countries. Such a strategy should include a human-focused security agenda, better and more coherent civil-military coordination when addressing complex crises, arrangements that do not undermine civic liberties, and an attempt to reverse the effects of militarism at the domestic, regional and international levels.

Part I Securitization and De-securitization: A Conceptual Framework

This study assesses the feasibility of applying the concepts of securitization and de-securitization to understanding state and anti-system party interaction in Turkey and Lebanon. It aims to contribute to the debates on the different formats and methods of state interaction with anti-system parties¹, and their implications for the “securitization of policies” in the Mediterranean, by considering two case-studies. The first is Turkey, where Kurdish politics, driven out from the legitimate boundaries of the political system, emerges as an issue of security. The second case is Lebanon, where the Shiite impending need for political participation, combined with Hezbollah’s lingering armed status, creates a widening sectarian rift and crisis of legitimacy, thus securitizing Lebanese politics. The securitization of policies by state actors strengthens the “security-oriented logic” of the state. Anti-system politics, on the other hand, adopts its own style of securitization: using it to mobilize support among its constituency and the international community. In both cases, this securitization narrows the limits of “normal politics” and negatively influences other political processes, such as democratization, citizenship, and political reforms.

Securitization theory, developed by Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, and their colleagues, has become a broad research agenda within constructivist approaches to security studies. Avoiding an extensive review of the wide and rich literature on securitization studies, we will instead simply introduce the key concepts from this literature that will constitute the conceptual framework for our analysis.

From the perspective of securitization theory, security is not framed as an objective and material condition, but is rather seen as a “speech act”. “Something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Weaver, 1995: 47). Issues become securitized not just through speech-acts that describe an already existing security problem, but are brought into being as a security problem by being presenting as one. Obviously, security, from this perspective, is understood as a socially-constructed concept. What makes a particular issue a security matter is its presentation as an existential threat that demands extraordinary measures. This is a call for “breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). By labelling something as a security issue, an actor claims a need for the use of extraordinary means, emergency measures, and other actions outside the bounds of normal political procedures.

Far from being objectively defined concepts, security discourses are “rather the products of historical structures and processes, of *struggles for power* within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them” (Lipschutz, 1995: 8, *emphasis added*). At this point, it is necessary to touch upon the link between securitization and domestic power-domination games. Not all political actors are in a position to securitize issues as they see fit. Securitization is structured by actors’ differential capacities to make socially effective claims about threats (Williams, 2003: 514). Therefore, this can be seen as a power play, in which securitizing actors point towards a security issue in a bid to obtain support for a certain policy or course of action. In this struggle, public officials are in an advantageous position to securitize an issue because they hold influential positions in the security field, as well as having privileged access to information sources and the mass media. What kind of actors might fulfil this role? This largely depends on institutional and cultural contexts. As Weaver (2000: 253) suggests, the securitizing actor should have social capital and should be in a position of authority. In some countries, this may be members of the elected political elite, while in others the description may best suit the military elite.

In the case of Turkey, the civil-military bureaucratic elite traditionally had the popularity, authority, and credibility to make successful securitizing moves. In Lebanon, the weakness of the state and the neutrality of the Lebanese army between the main political blocs from 2005 to 2008 led to the anti-system actors’ securitization of the political space. These actors’ position of authority was further enhanced by their acts of securitization. As Lipschutz (1995: 8) notes, “winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources, but also the *authority* to articulate new definitions and discourses of security as well” (*emphasis original*). From this perspective, the established definition of national security in Turkey (including the perceived threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism) can be seen as a successfully securitized collection of state-centric notions of security, rather than an objective and neutral definition. On the other hand, in Lebanon, given the lack of a national security agenda, the main focus of the army and its leadership has been to prove its neutrality in cases of domestic polarization.

Successful securitization is also dependent on the forms through which securitization claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relative audience (Williams, 2003: 514). Hence, the audience’s psycho-cultural orientation is an

¹ “Anti-system party” in this research refers to parties that exert a radical form of opposition politically. It is important to acknowledge, however, that there are strong allegations against anti-system parties, i.e. DTP in Turkey and Hezbollah’s political wing in Lebanon, of their direct link and cooperation with armed resistance movements or terrorist groups, i.e. PKK in Turkey and Hezbollah cells in Lebanon. While this research refrains from endorsing these allegations, it will nevertheless study these armed groups because they are key variables in understanding the securitisation of Turkish and Lebanese policies and in clarifying the state and anti-system party interaction in both Turkish and Lebanese contexts.

important factor. When the securitizing actor attempts to frame an issue as a security issue, this must resonate amongst the target audience. The audience's response also depends on the linguistic ability of the securitizer. The audience looks for "emotional intensity and logical rigour" (Balzacq, 2005: 191) in deciding whether there is a security threat or not. The success of any attempt to securitize an issue is contingent upon the existence of an audience that accepts this claim and is willing to grant the actor the right to violate rules that would otherwise be binding (Weaver, 2000: 251). This acceptance can be a product of open and free discussion, or can occur as a result of media manipulation or more direct forms of repression.

In Turkey, toward the end of the 1990s, the military, as one of the most successful securitizing actors, developed a practice of appealing directly to public opinion regarding Turkey's domestic and external threats by giving briefings to high-level bureaucrats, academics, and leading journalists. In Lebanon, given the plurality of actors behaving as a state within the state, each has its own way of appealing to public opinion. The public themselves, through their security analyses informed by the military, become part of the securitization process given that they use the same language and logic, thus transforming them from mere observers of a certain policy to advocates of it (Eriksson, 1999). By issuing press releases and making public statements, the military not only announces its own position regarding certain foreign policy issues, but more importantly, manages to frame certain political/foreign policy issues as vital security matters. The military has no difficulty in convincing the Turkish people since it enjoys a high degree of trust and respect among the general public. The existence of a robust civil society might be expected to act against this kind of excessive securitization. However, in certain circumstances issues can be dramatized in such a way that the voices of civil society become seen as threats to the state.

That said up to this point does not intend to suggest that any issue can be securitized at any time. There must of course be certain factors (historical problems, hostile attitudes, etc) to which the securitizing actor can refer. When times are particularly critical, the securitizer has a better chance of convincing the audience of the existence of a real threat by drawing on contextual clues. Therefore, although security is understood as a "speech act", this does not imply that it emerges from nothing. In most cases, existing political problems are dramatized and presented as security issues. The greater the amount of evidence the securitizer can identify (a hostile statement from a neighbouring country, historical problems, etc), the more likely s/he will be successful in securitizing. As Balzacq (2005: 183) notes, this kind of evidence or context makes the masses ripe for persuasion.

Although security as a speech-act has become almost a slogan of the so-called Copenhagen School, this conceptualization of security creates some methodological problems in applying the theory to particular cases, i.e. foreign policy analysis. As Balzacq notes, this conceptualization of security overlooks the objective context in which security agents are situated. He subsequently argues that "securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction" (2005: 172). Williams (2003:528) also suggests that:

"The presentation of security as a speech-act is potentially too narrow to grasp fully the social contexts and complex communicative and institutional processes of securitization at work in contemporary politics".

This represents a significant contribution to securitization theory, and one that guides the analysis outlined in this report, helping to contextualize the instances of securitization and de-securitization within the wider parameters affecting the process. From this perspective, securitization is understood here not simply as a speech-act, but as a "situated interactive activity" (Balzacq, 2005: 179) that takes into consideration the role of external objective developments in securitization/de-securitization processes. Securitization is a power-laden process that is structured by the differential capacities of actors to make socially effective claims about threats (Williams, 2003: 514). Therefore, this can be seen as a field of power struggle, in which securitizing actors point towards a specific security issue to obtain the support of society for a certain policy or course of action.

De-securitization is understood here as the broadening of the boundaries of normal politics. In other words, de-securitization refers to the process of "moving issues off the 'security' agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and 'normal' political dispute and accommodation" (Williams, 2003: 523). Defining de-securitization in this way

sounds relatively straightforward. What is more challenging is to suggest a methodological framework for analysis. What kind of evidence is needed to clearly suggest that an issue is de-securitized? The answer is *nothing*. If securitization is a speech-act, de-securitization should be the *lack* of it (Behnke, 2006). Declaring that a particular issue or actor no longer constitutes a security threat simply leads to prolonged debate on the correctness of the declaration in question (Behnke, 2006). Therefore, de-securitization occurs not through further speech, but through the absence of it.

As regards the theoretical framework employed in this project, we believe that certain particularities in the Turkish and Lebanese cases simultaneously facilitate and hinder the use of the securitization theory. The strength of this theory is its ability to reveal the socially constructed nature of national security in Turkey, which is often perceived instead as 'objective and neutral'. Its weakness, however, is the theory's tendency to reduce security to mere speech acts, neglecting the social context in which objective and external developments take place – in other words, why and under which circumstances do security speech-acts occur? In order to compensate for this weakness, we have also applied second-generation literature on securitization/de-securitization, which emphasizes the role of social context. The Turkish case also presents a challenge to securitization theory by swinging between securitization and de-securitization processes. While certain issues are becoming increasingly de-securitized (such as relations with Syria and Iran), others (such as relations with northern Iraq) are climbing up the securitization ladder. This can be explained by the issue-specific nature of securitization and de-securitization trends. We agree with Behnke (2006: 4), who argues that "in a sense, de-securitization can never really happen", and continues:

"States continuously securitize issues and actors in order to produce a national identity. De-securitization is perhaps best understood as the fading away of one particular issue or actor from the repertoire of these processes. At some point, certain 'threats' might no longer exercise our minds and imaginations sufficiently and are replaced with more powerful and stirring imageries".

One of the merits of securitization theory is that by explaining the processes through which a certain issue becomes securitized, it also provides us with clues about de-securitization. As Roe (2004: 282) argues, if an issue can be shifted away from the realm of normal politics to assume a status that requires emergency measures, then it can also be shifted back again – i.e. it can be de-securitized. This may encourage a move from a discourse of danger towards a discourse of difference based on discord–mediation sequences, rather than threat–defence sequences (Jæger, 2000).

Part II State and Anti-System Party Interaction in Turkey

Securitization theory establishes that elected political or military elites declare and define the parameters of a “security problem” in order to reproduce a national identity and to reaffirm the vitality and centrality of these elites in tackling the identified “security problem.” Consequently, shifts in the security agenda, or the adoption of mediation sequences to combat security problems, are expected to deliver de-securitization. Turkey presents a peculiar case, whereby the process of securitization occurs through the interaction among system actors and the securitizing moves produced by this same interaction are further reinforced by the problematic communication between system and the anti-system actors. Moreover, the anti-system actors engender a process of double-securitization. Thus, the persistence of securitizing moves by system and anti-system actors renders de-securitization tedious.

The first section of this report begins by establishing which system and anti-system actors interact at the outset with regards to the “securitization” of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The aim here is to put the actors/individuals at the centre of debate and mutually address both how the Turkish state deals with its security concerns and the Kurdish actors’ own sense of what represents a security problem, not only in national-local politics, trade and economics, and civil society, but also in their daily and intellectual lives. Secondly, having identified the range of methods and instruments used by the state and by anti-system actors in exerting their own differing forms of securitization, this report will analyse the web of relations among these actors by examining the three most securitizing issues of the Kurdish situation: the conflict between the state and the representative and armed forms of anti-system actors, namely the DTP and PKK; the cultural and language rights demanded by the Kurds; and Turkey’s foreign policy towards northern Iraq. After this identification of the problem areas, we will present policy suggestions towards the de-securitization of Turkey’s relations with its Kurdish citizens. The state and anti-system party interaction in countries where there exist strong anti-system movements, and only a narrow space for legitimate politics, are often “securitized” in character.

The Turkish nation-state was founded on the basis of an “imagined community” called the Turkish nation. Accordingly, and looking at the ethno-political composition of Turkey, it is postulated that the national elite emphasized the centrality of Turkish identity and the homogeneity of the Turkish state by insisting that Kurds and Turks formed an “indivisible entity” (Mango, 2000: 10). The Turkish state refused to recognize the “Kurdishness” of the problem and construed it instead as an issue of tribal resistance, underdevelopment, or terrorism (Yeğen, 1999). Turkish nationalism, and the establishment of a strongly centralized regime, led to the assimilation of the Kurds and suppression of Kurdish nationalist aspirations in Anatolia. By the 1980s, the Turkish political system was unable to accommodate the Kurdish elite, which sought recognition of a separate Kurdish identity.² Consequently, the indivisible unity of the imagined nation, which Turkey had claimed since the foundation of the Republic, was and remains significantly challenged *despite and against* the state.

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish national project of the 1920s and 1930s did not progress without dissent. As a ‘hegemonic discourse’, in Gramscian terms, the Turkish nation-building project faced its share of counter-hegemonic movements, more specifically in the revival of the politics of difference amongst Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. In the 1980s, following the 12 September coup-d’état, attempts were made to integrate Islamists into the system. In the 1990s, the limitations and contradictions of the Turkish identity, as defined by Kemalists, became increasingly visible in public discussions and issues such as ethnicity, nationhood, the territorial state, and secularity more and more debated. The EU-motivated reforms in the early 2000s accelerated Turkey’s democratization, under the framework of the Copenhagen criteria, and strengthened Kurdish identity and civil society, putting forward a different perception of democratization from what had long been understood in Turkey as procedurally preserving the institutions and unity of the state. The State’s interaction with anti-system actors has been crucial in identifying just how genuine and qualified Turkey’s democratization process has been so far. Any improvement in enlarging the political space to allow for the participation of ethnic Kurds (and other religious and ethnic minorities) would be interpreted as a de-securitizing move.

Background

² See Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

The Turkish Political System and its Components

This research addresses the political system in general and the context within which the state and other systemic components (see below) specifically operate in Turkey. It is thus essential to establish at the outset what the Turkish state entails -- especially in reference to the construction and sustenance of the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic/national identities.

a. System parties and the government

In Turkey, the term “system party” refers not to the legitimate ruling party but to the party that aligns itself most effectively and devotedly to the principles of the system/state. While the history of the Turkish Republic has seen the formation of coalition and single party governments by political parties that deviated from the boundaries of the accepted, state-induced principles, these have seldom received the blessing of the state and its institutions. In order to identify the set of principles endorsed by the state in a legitimate ruling party or a system party, the legacy of the Kemalist political tradition must first be uncovered. System parties in Turkey have adhered to a curious interpretation of Kemalism, premised on statist and populist economic policies and a progressive, revolutionary, militant form of nationalism (Insel, 2008: 1). The parent of the Kemalist political parties is the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP). Founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the CHP adopted the principles of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Statism, and Revolutionarism. The emphasis on Republicanism and Statism, as opposed to democracy and liberalism, demonstrates that the political realm within which system parties were expected to operate would be governed largely by an all-encompassing state. Moreover, Kemalism’s replacement of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Ottoman system with the values of Nationalism and Revolutionarism reaffirms the desire to favour and promote Turkey’s imagined national identity in the policies adopted by system parties. As a consequence, the boundaries for the political thinking and action of system parties, or their *archetype*, were largely determined at the beginning of the Republican nation-building project.

The history of political parties in Turkey, at least until the 1980s, clearly demonstrates how the boundaries set in the political field and the state’s expectations of these parties has remained constant even though political parties vary within those limits. Parties that remain closer to the archetype of a system party are considered legitimate while those defying the established principles are denoted as “anti-system”, “radical”, and “marginal”.

The current Turkish political party system is by and large a product of the second major coup in the history of modern Turkey – the 12 September 1980 military intervention. The September 12th period reshuffled power politics in Turkey, yielding two important developments: the resurgence of political Islam and the radicalization of Kurdish politics³. During the 1980 coup, the first blow to the status quo in Turkey’s political party system came in the form of a prohibition of the CHP. In response, “the centre-left has persistently blamed the military regime of the 1980–83 period for supporting extreme nationalism and for preparing the ground for the increase of Islamist activism” (Ayata, 2007). The CHP went on to regain its system party status as it grew closer to the military and the state elite after its reassembling in 1992, having been followed by the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP). The MHP, blending a version of ultra-nationalism with the state rhetoric of “threat from internal and external enemies”, effectively mobilized its electorate in the mid-1990s by countering the rising Kurdish nationalism. Meanwhile, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), which ruled for most of the 1980s, encouraged the proliferation of centre-right parties and the expansion of the acceptable boundaries of the system into centre-right and centre-left. Thus, while the centre-right and centre-left parties were able to accommodate the systemic principles of national security, national unity, and Republican values, their loyalty to the pristine values of Kemalism varied. Consequently, while the system pushed the emergent political Islamist and Kurdish nationalist parties out towards the margins, the political parties at the centre enjoyed almost a decade of power-sharing.

The 1990s is an epoch in Turkish party politics where delineations or deviations from the system party definition became more dramatic. The strongest product of the September 12th process is the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP), which rose to the apex of Turkish party politics in 1995 (Carkoglu, 2007: 257). The Welfare Party’s Islamist foundations and its open rejection of the principle of Secularism trumped the state’s monopoly over determining the parameters of religion-politics-society relations. The Welfare Party’s religious foundation defied the radical secularization⁴ of Turkish state institutions and thereby rendered

³ For the sake of brevity and of maintaining thematic relevance, this section will not include a discussion of the development of Kurdish party politics.

⁴ Radical secularization refers to the adoption of the French form of laicism and the forced expulsion of any “Islamist” or religious elements from Turkey’s nation-building project. For more information, please see Tank, Pinar (2005) ‘Political Islam in Turkey: A state of controlled secularity’, *Turkish Studies*, 6(1) 3-19.

itself illegitimate and anti-system. In response, the National Security Council's decision of 28 February 1997, dubbed a "postmodern coup", toppled the Welfare Party-led coalition government. However, the State's attempts to contain delineations from the archetype or from the governing principles of system parties were not enough to completely suppress the trend of so-called political Islam. Indeed, the hold that the National Vision (*Milli Gorus*) movement, which preached an anti-Western and developmental path of progress for Turkey, held over Turkish party politics was reinforced with the formation and subsequent banning of the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP) and with the founding of the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP).

The Justice and Development Party (*Ak Parti*, AKP) arguably emerged from the *Milli Gorus* movement and redefined the centre-right by reinterpreting its predecessor's social, cultural, faith- and identity-based politics and by introducing a new brand of outward-looking liberal economics. It is difficult to label the AKP as either a system or anti-system party because although the party's leadership and grassroots cadres are collectively harangued by the state and security elite for their dismissal of the system's secular, Kemalist orientation, the AKP promotes – especially during its second term in office – a security-oriented policy with respect to the Kurdish issue and Turkey's dealings with Iraq. Especially in the second half of 2008, the AKP was increasingly criticized for becoming more "state-like" (Çalışlar, 2008).

b. The Turkish Armed Forces and the security bureaucracy

The military is a key political actor in Turkey. It performs constitutionally and legally defined activities that are not only necessary to the provision and maintenance of Turkish national security, but also fundamental to Turkey's nation-building project. Most critically, Turkey is a self-proclaimed military nation, and the centrality of the military as a political institution has strong and lasting implications for political activities in Turkey. In fact, the military's central role, status, and functions are accepted, championed, and endorsed by its nation. "Although the concept of the 'military nation' was actively inculcated, there is little doubt that it found ready acceptance in a society which already extolled martial values and which was – and to a considerable, if declining, degree remains – hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian, with an emphasis on collective rather than individual rights and values" (Jenkins, 2007: 342). Thus, the Turkish military is the definitive system actor: It has social capital; it is in a position of sustained authority; and it enjoys public support for its securitizing moves.

The Turkish Armed Forces is a system actor with high visibility in defining, providing, and maintaining security. Indeed, Turkey has one of the largest and most modern armies in the world and allocates a large proportion of its budget to defence, having recently risen to 14.5 billion YTL in the 2009 budget ("Turkey to increase spending in defence", 2008). The role of the Turkish military in the security realm is not restricted to its legitimate and institutionalized use of force in the provision and preservation of security. The Turkish military directly defines the meaning of national security and the means through which this security is preserved. This enhanced role is institutionalized in the 1961 constitution, which founded the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body to the Council of Ministers that brings together members of the civilian government and high-level military bureaucracy and that "elevated [the Chief of Staff] to rank fourth in the state protocol behind the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament" (Jenkins, 2007: 342).

National security, as defined by the Turkish military, is presently and constantly perceived to be under threat from external and internal forces. As such, and seeking to preserve national security and peace in Turkey, the military intervened four times in the history of the Turkish Republic, not including the more contemporary e-coup of June 2007 when the Turkish Chief of Staff released an online memorandum criticizing the candidacy of Abdullah Gül to be elected as President by popular vote. While there were varied reasons for the military interventions of 27 May 1960, 12 March 1971, 12 September 1980, and 28 February 1997, such interventions in the political process and the establishment of temporary military regimes and constitutions signal a persistent pattern in Turkish history: The military proclaims itself as a stabilizing actor and thus its claims of insecurity are strong and convincing. Throughout the life of the Turkish Republic, the military's securitization was channelled almost exclusively towards the Kurdish question and political Islam. This report will demonstrate how the Kurdish political and armed movements in Turkey featured in the securitizing moves pursued by the Turkish Armed Forces, and in return, how the Turkish Armed Forces became the main target of Kurdish securitizing moves.

c. The judiciary

The Turkish judiciary is not a binary to securitization; rather, it is a direct actor that contributes to the drawing of the political boundaries of system and anti-system parties. The current judicial system in Turkey, in what applies to political parties and policy-making, rests on the military constitution of 1982. This constitution lays the foundations for constitutional rule in Turkey, while the Law of Political Parties set out the framework for legitimate party politics. The Law of Political Parties (LPP):

“forbids activities that threaten the unity of the Turkish state by compromising the integrity of the Turkish language, flag, national anthem and other symbols of nationhood. According to the LPP, a political party cannot organize and mobilize support on the basis of race, family and community, religious or sectarian affiliation, as these types of organization compromise the unity of the nation (Koğacioğlu, 2003: 260)”.

Both the Constitution and the Law of Political Parties make strong references to the securitized state rhetoric of national unity, security, and preservation of the values and doctrine of Atatürk. The post-1980 judicial history of Turkey is filled with cases of political parties being pushed out from the system, closed down, or having had their leaders prosecuted for alleged breach of the aforementioned principles. The prohibition of the Islamist Welfare Party and the Kurdish People’s Labour Party (*Halkın Emegi Partisi*, HEP) are two critical examples of judicial intervention in party politics, having established the two main legal precedents for preventing/limiting political activity in Turkey: namely, separatism and anti-laicism. These cases demonstrate that the judiciary outlines and upholds the boundaries of system parties, where national security and national identity prevail as the definitive categories of constitutionally-approved political activity in Turkey.

d. Civil society and intellectuals

National security logic is often circulated by the so-called “intellectuals of statecraft”, which includes, in Weldes’ terms, the “defence and security intellectuals” of university research centres and think tanks, as well as schools, media and other institutions of civil society (Weldes et. al., 1999). Defence intellectuals in Turkey are predominantly in favour of the system. Turkey’s state and private universities, governed by the Higher Education Council (*Yuksekk Ogretim Kurulu*, YOK) – an institution of control founded by the 1980 military constitution – treat national security and defence as areas where critical discussion and intellectual scrutiny cannot be entertained. Furthermore, security intellectuals in think tanks and policy-analysis organizations, such as the Eurasia Strategic Research Center (*Avrasya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi*, ASAM), employ former security bureaucrats and diplomats and propagate a systemic view of domestic and foreign affairs. Statecraft intellectuals are generally uncritical of the system’s fundamentals, although their take on individual aspects of Turkish national security and identity may vary. The fundamental support shown by intellectuals and civil society members for the concept of national unity, national security, and the role of systemic actors in ascertaining the preservation of these values suggests that there is popular acceptance and backing for state securitization in Turkey.⁵

Systemic civil society, including unions, vocational groups, research centres, think tanks, and other types of interest group organizations, seeks to preserve and protect its own interpretation of the system. As a result, systemic civil society organizations and intellectuals engage indirectly but effectively in defining anti-system actors through their policy choices.

Anti-System Parties in Turkey: Kurdish Politics

“Anti-system party” refers to a party that exerts a radical form of opposition *politically*. This study will observe anti-system parties in Turkey through the example of the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP). As the most prominent actor in Kurdish politics in Turkey today, the DTP is a reference point as *the* anti-system Kurdish political party due to its representative status in the parliament and its relatively larger support base among the Kurds. The last in a long string of political parties advocating the Kurdish political cause in Turkey, the DTP serves as the main variable of analysis in this research for the following reasons: The DTP, in its party program and principles (Democratic Soci-

⁵ Civil society in Turkey is by no means confined to the organizations that promote and seek to secure the system. There are many non-profit civil society organizations in Turkey that strive to sanction the state, question the system, uphold representativeness of the regime, and perform roles that sometimes urge systemic actors to denominate them as systemic actors.

ety Party Program, 2008), claims to uphold values such as democracy, equality, representation, and anti-racism. Although these standards supposedly apply to all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, by referring to this specific set (as opposed to Republicanism, Kemalism, Statism, and other principles advocated by system parties) the DTP addresses those citizens who have been denied their democratic, equal rights. Moreover, as this report will explain in the following section, there exists an alleged link between the DTP and the Kurdish armed/guerrilla movement of the PKK, the existence of which the party leadership has not yet openly denied. Since November 2007, the DTP has been charged for this alleged direct link by the Supreme Court of Appeals and may be closed down. Consequently, the DTP challenges the national security logic of the Turkish state and is therefore categorized and treated by state institutions and systemic political elites as an anti-system actor. This report will discuss the process of securitization and double securitization in Turkey's party politics with reference to anti-system party behaviour across the DTP-PKK axis.

The Democratic Society Party was founded on 9 November 2005 in Ankara and its origins, in terms of a concept, were conceived by a band of Kurdish politicians – notably, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak – who had been prosecuted and imprisoned for their political and alleged militant activity in Turkey. As Turkey's 49th political party, the DTP nominated as its two party leaders Ahmet Türk, a veteran of Kurdish politics, and Aysel Tugluk, notorious for her legal representation of Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the PKK until his capture in 1999. Later, through a popular vote in the party Congress, Ahmet Türk was elected into the party's leading post. Türk was succeeded by Nurettin Demirtaş, who was later prosecuted for presenting a fraudulent medical report in order to evade mandatory military service and thus only served as party president for less than a year before being re-drafted by the Turkish Armed Forces. The DTP did not run in the 2007 general elections because the party leadership was concerned that it would not meet the 10 percent threshold for parliamentary representation. Instead, independent Kurdish MPs who had been elected to parliament in July 2007 joined together to form a DTP wing in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM). The DTP thus became one of the four parties represented in the 23rd term of the TBMM.

The labelling of most Kurdish political parties as anti-system parties predates the DTP. In fact, most Kurdish political parties have been prohibited and closed down. Kurdish political activity has been a source of contestation throughout the history of Turkish party politics. Since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the Republican project tried to assimilate the Kurds under the banner of a unitary national identity – Turkishness.

Since the early 1920s, the Kurdish constituency's relationship with the Republic has been characterized by episodes of unrest and conflict. The initial wave of social and political turmoil was in the 1930s, when the first band of dissenters to the early Republican system of centrist and *statist* rule were defeated by the Turkish security forces. The introduction of the multiparty regime and the propagation of anti-CHP politics by the Democrat Party, especially in the periphery, eventually injected a modest element of recognition and concern about the Kurdish question in Turkey's Southeast region. However, the Democrat Party's outreach towards Turkey's sizeable Kurdish constituency, arguably more in an attempt to fortify the party's electoral base than in an effort to increase democratic representation, was contested by the securitized (and racist) rhetoric of the party leadership. In the aftermath of the 27 May 1960 military intervention, the period leading up to the 1980s was one of politicization and radicalization for the Kurds. In 1969, the foundation of the Revolutionary Kurdish Movement (DDKA) and the first round of protests distinctly placed revolutionary Kurdish nationalism within the "radical" left current in Turkish politics during the 1960s and 1970s. The militarization of the late 1970s and the 1980 coup were designed to suppress or eradicate the intellectual and physical foundations of left-leaning Kurdish nationalism:

"The military regime of 1980–83 brutally cracked down on any sign of Kurdish nationalism along with other ideologies it deemed 'divisive'. In 1984, PKK attacks on the state started a violent conflict between the PKK, security forces and the 'loyalist' Kurds, which cost the lives of over 30,000 people during the 1990s (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Barkey and Fuller, 1998 - cited in Somer, 2008: 221)".

Contemporary Kurdish politics is viewed by the system as homogeneous. Such homogenization eases the denomination and acceptance of Kurdish political parties as anti-system parties. There are, however, diverse groups and voices among the Kurdish political parties and political actors. The Kurdish political scene diversified as a response to the following

developments: the post-1980 State of Emergency regime, under which Kurdish politicians, activists, and intellectuals endured countless ordeals in prisons; the double securitization of the 1990s in Kurdish political interaction with the Turkish state; and the monopoly gained by the PKK over decision-making in Kurdish politics in Turkey. This diversification did not only express itself in the form of alternative political parties or voices among the Kurds, but also in the articulation of a transformed – and possibly broadened – basis of political, social, cultural, and economic demands. Admittedly, throughout most of the 1990s, violent and non-violent Kurdish politics expressed a more “radical” and less “flexible” set of demands, ranging from the secession of the territories that constitute *Kurdistan*, to a federal structure. Calls for self-determination were toned down in the late 1990s, when the Helsinki process and Turkey’s candidacy for full European Union membership introduced a new dynamic to the Kurdish political sphere. The Kurds began to emphasize their long-claimed rights to cultural and social equality, welfare benefits, education and intellectual production in Kurdish, the free formulation and expression of their identity, and access to many other basic rights and liberties that they feel have been denied them for the past 80 years. The EU, a partly supranational structure that enforces a firm set of principles on human rights and democratic citizenship, was seen as a guarantor of Turkey’s advancement away from a security-oriented, militarized regime toward a civilian, democratic, and liberal one. This is why Kurdish politicians of all backgrounds support Turkey’s full membership in the EU.

Interaction Between the Turkish State and the Kurds: Counter-Securitization

Kurdish politics in Turkey has been reduced to separatism and has therefore been the source and outcome of state-induced securitization. Kurdish politics was perceived as collectively preaching a violent reaction against the Turkish state and its nation. This perception emanates from the early and late Republican tendency to assimilate the Kurdish constituency by propagating a firm belief in the unity of the Turkish people, regardless of the different linguistic, religious, ethnic, and national groups in Turkey. The Turkish state securitizes its Kurdish question mainly by associating all Kurdish political movements with the PKK. Evidence for this can be found in the Constitutional Court’s party closure indictments, the condemnation of legitimate Kurdish political actors (parliamentarians and mayors) as “terrorists” by civil and military elites, and the never-ending public pressure on Kurdish political actors to publicly condemn PKK activities and declare their disassociation from the PKK.

With reference to the theoretical framework of this study, in Turkey, state and anti-system actors pursue their own specific forms of securitization in their dealings with one another. The securitized approach of the Turkish state not only drives Kurdish politics outside the legitimate boundaries of the political system, but also denies Kurds their cultural and language rights, encourages a hard security policy line towards northern Iraq, which is governed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and allows little deliberative or democratic discussion regarding any of these policies. On the other hand, the securitization seen in Kurdish politics invigorates the already securitized agenda by choosing not to denounce its links with the PKK, by constructing its own justification for conflict and armed struggle, and by managing relations with its constituency through PKK-oriented rhetoric. By making such moves, the DTP simply enhances the already exacerbated perceptions of insecurity and threat held by the Turkish population.

Comparing these two competing forms of securitization present in Turkey, it seems that the state’s civil and military elite have the advantage of greater popularity and authority in making their securitizing moves, which are usually accepted by the mainstream public opinion, which in turn supports and perpetuates this dominant securitizing discourse. In contrast, the securitization moves pursued by Kurdish actors are easily dismissed by public opinion, which interprets their demand for more rights and freedoms, as well as their position against “anti-terror” military operations as acts of betrayal and separatism. Yet these same securitizing moves, by Kurdish political actors, *do* find great resonance among the Kurdish constituency. The two securitizing trends outlined are usually the result of systemic manipulations of these constituencies (Turks and Kurds), mainly through direct forms of repression or less obvious opinion-shaping through the mass media, public education, and socialization in everyday life.

By reducing the complex Kurdish issue to simply one of terrorism – and accordingly associating the DTP, a legitimate political party, with the PKK, an armed organization labelled by national and some international bodies as a “terrorist group” – the Turkish state deals with Kurdish political participation as a security matter and therefore uses its means to sup-

press any activity perceived to be Kurdish political activism. Suppressive mechanisms are employed by the military, judiciary, and other state institutions, as well as by the national press, through illegitimate instruments and propaganda such as war-mongering headlines, images, and opinion pieces. The displacement of villagers, forced migration, assassination of Kurdish party members, harassment of pro-Kurdish activists and intellectuals, lynching of Kurdish citizens, and the “legitimized” atrocities conducted by the state through its State of Emergency, Anti-Terror Law, Village Law, and Security Zone policies have become common examples of state violence. The Turkish state has also made use of legal and constitutional restrictions, such as the 10 percent electoral threshold and the authoritarian legislation on political parties and elections that makes it difficult for parties and associations based on ethnicity and religion to exist within the system. In addition, this securitized environment has created clandestine, illegitimate organizations and networks, operating within the armed forces, civil bureaucracy, and civil society, aimed at hindering any kind of democratic solutions to Turkey’s problems. These groups – most recently exemplified by *Ergenekon*, a shadowy organization that allegedly includes current and retired security bureaucrats, members of criminal networks, and media professionals – have not only been implicated in the use of violence against anti-establishment forces, but have also attempted a ‘military coup’ as a solution to what they believe to be a threat to state security and integrity. The presence of these illegitimate and illegal networks and policies is deemed very dangerous since their very existence requires that there be insecurity and threats to the State. These illegal “deep state” groups have been known, on occasion, to have created insecurities merely in a bid to retain their position, especially in the predominantly Kurdish south-east region.

The securitization of Kurdish politics, firstly, trumped any potential for conflict resolution by deeming any effort or plan in that direction as a suspicious attempt to disintegrate Turkey’s territorial indivisibility. Secondly, it reproduced (in)security by legitimizing and increasing the base of support for violence among both Turkish and Kurdish populations, and by relying on military solutions to bring an end to what was perceived as the real Kurdish problem. Turkish state identity, which is strictly nationalist, conditioned and influenced what was deemed possible or legitimate, and therefore “secure”, in policy decision-making. As such, the securitization process constrained the organization of peaceful Kurdish political activists and the articulation of Kurdish identity by diminishing their room for manoeuvre in the field of “normal” or “legitimate” politics. Unlike past experiences of the state’s various forms of co-optation and recognition of Islamist movements in Turkey (Kurtoğlu-Eskişar, 2008), in this case, the state’s dealings with the Kurdish movement led to increasing alienation and radicalization, subsequently reducing the Kurdish question to solely a security issue and ignoring the demands of Kurdish identity. The state suppression policy of all Kurdish democratic institutions strengthened the popularity of the PKK among the Kurdish constituency, justified the presence of a strong military in Turkey, and eventually resulted in political violence between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists.

An alternative to securitization is de-securitization, which is instead about broadening the boundaries of normal politics. At times, both state and Kurdish actors have made significant de-securitizing moves, such as the reform of authoritarian policies and structures by state actors, the demilitarization of policy-making, and Kurdish political actors’ renouncement of armed struggle and formulation of strategies to appeal to a wider audience, seeking to adopt a more inclusive political agenda that reached beyond the Kurdish population to also target liberal-minded Turks.

This study highlights the three most securitizing issues in the Turkish state’s interaction with Kurdish politics: 1) The conflict between the state and representative / armed forms of anti-system actors, namely the DTP and the PKK; 2) cultural and language rights demanded by the Kurds; and 3) Turkey’s foreign policy towards northern Iraq. While revealing the patterns and dynamics of this interaction, this report aims to also touch upon instances where this relationship appears on the security agenda, rather than the democratization agenda. Identification of these particular instances gives policymakers – both on the side of the state, and that of the Kurdish politics – an opportunity to de-securitize the national agenda by changing certain patterns of behaviour and attitudes towards one another.

Conflict Between the State and the Representative/Armed Forms of Kurdish Politics

Political scientists and policy-makers often argue that genuine formal channels of political participation is one of the crucial democratic solutions for designing effective democratic governance characterised by peaceful ethnic-sectarian and religious relations, achieving political stability, pluralism, and democracy, and even managing economic development in semi-democratic states. Thus, in Turkey, the representative form of Kurdish politics achieved through nation-wide elections and parliamentary representation was seen to be an important step on the path to democratization. It was also expected to ease tensions between the state and Kurdish actors. However, this opportunity has not been fully taken advantage of due to mutual scepticisms and frustrations amongst the regime and anti-system actors. In contemporary Turkish political history, whenever parties articulating Kurdish identity entered the Turkish parliament, whether as individual MPs or as a group, there has always been widespread distrust of their members' backgrounds and a belief in their alleged links with the PKK. Although the DTP is now represented in parliament, the common current public and policy perception views this democratically elected form of Kurdish politics as tied to the PKK, the armed group that has been in conflict with the Turkish state since 1984, with each respectively being the political and military expressions of the same ideology, leadership, and constituency.

Meanwhile, while a legitimately elected political party cannot be easily forced out from parliament within a democratic framework, which is operative in Turkey even if in a limited fashion, the system has usually resorted to using its overly politicized judicial tools to suppress the presence and activities of Kurdish political parties. The Constitutional Court has banned four pro-Kurdish parties in the past: the People's Labour Party (HEP), the Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), the Democracy Party (DEP), and the People's Democracy Party (HADEP). Accordingly, in November 2008, the Supreme Court of Appeals filed a case against the DTP at the Constitutional Court. The indictment for the closure contained claims that the DTP's activities threaten the "indivisible unity of the state and nation", implying that the party has become a focal point for terrorist activities linked to the PKK, therefore violating Article 68 of the Constitution, which states that "political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state and the indivisible integrity of its territory and nation". It was claimed that the party and its officials have insisted on making speeches and acting against the indivisible integrity of the state ("Prosecutor opens DTP Closure Case", 2007). The 141 events presented as evidence of the DTP's links with the PKK include mostly speeches made by DTP officials supposedly praising Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK ("İşte DTP'ye kapatma davası açtıran 141 eylem", 2007). Mainstream newspapers have been very biased in their coverage of these speeches and very prone to attacking the DTP.

The Court has not yet made a decision regarding the DTP's closure. There are also other court cases against DTP members. One such case considers their alleged violation of Article 81/c of the Law of Political Parties, which outlaws the use by political parties of any language other than Turkish. Another, is a case against 53 DTP mayors, mainly from the South-East, who had written a letter to Danish prime minister Anders Fog Rasmussen opposing the closure of the pro-Kurdish satellite channel *Roj TV*. Those mayors were later convicted for "voluntarily aiding and assisting a terrorist organization", with reference to Articles 314/3 and 220/7 of the Turkish Penal Code.

Looking at how the DTP operates within the system, it becomes clear that a party with 20 members, constantly described as a source of violence and separatism, and subjected to various judicial and legislative barriers, has found it very difficult to concentrate on policy-making. The party eventually became ineffective, both in responding to the demands of its constituency and in creating a more inclusive agenda that manages to reach beyond ethnic politics.⁶ The DTP's calls for peace, multiculturalism, participation and strong local governance are instantly interpreted as or manipulated into a call for "war", "ethnic based politics", "federalism", and "Kurdish autonomy".⁷

In Turkey, concepts like terrorism, separatism, national security, territorial integrity, and national unity are extremely elusive and leave too much space and opportunity for state and military bureaucrats to manage security policies with a free hand. Turkish laws and legal codes consist of numerous security-focused articles that are subjective and flexible, and therefore open to varying interpretations that may eventually allow for serious human rights violations. Turkish history is full of examples of how the state legitimizes the infringement of human rights by justifying its actions on security grounds, as well as of how political problems are reduced to issues of security and public order, all of which consequently create a tense relationship between security and human rights (Ensaroğlu and Balzacq, 2007).

⁶ Interview with Ahmet Türk, co-president of DTP, 30 July 2008

⁷ Interview with Firat Anlı, Diyarbakir mayor for Yenisehir District, 8 August 2008

As regards the current dealings between the AK Party government and the Kurds, we have been witnessing a shift away from a more relaxed and accommodating policy towards a more securitizing attitude, which is reflected in AK Party officials' speeches and policies. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's 2005 speech in Diyarbakır, in which he pledged to address the Kurds' longstanding grievances through greater democratization and social reforms, garnered a lot of support for the AK Party among the Kurds. Contrary to the deep-rooted state tradition of denial, Erdoğan declared that the state had made mistakes in the past and that it was wrong to ignore them. He was subsequently attacked by CHP leader Deniz Baykal, who accused him of "flirting with the terrorists" (Grigoriadis, 2006: 452). The speech, which was perceived as a sign of the state's acknowledgment of past atrocities and ongoing inequalities, earned the AK Party a large base of popular support in the Kurdish South-East region, while other parties, like the DTP and CHP, were associated with the continued conflict and violence in the region. As a result, Kurds in the region voted for a "system" party in the 22 July 2007 elections.⁸ Another reason for the AK Party's popularity in the region was its portrayal "as the only party, of opposition to the 'system', that is 'sensitive' to the Kurdish problem". Because it was consequently perceived as an anti-system party, most of its support came from more pious and conservative Kurds, who, under the influence of Nakshibandi and Nurcu religious networks, aligned politically with anti-state movements (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006: 109).

Right before the elections, at a time when populism trumped idealism, the AK Party decided to postpone dealing with the Kurdish issue until future elections, in order to avoid criticism from nationalist segments within the party cadres and amongst its constituency. After the elections, and now holding a large majority in the parliament, the AK Party began to explicitly promote a security-oriented domestic policy towards Turkey's Kurdish population and foreign policy towards Iraqi Kurds. Although the AK Party leadership has always been characterized by the military establishment as an eminent threat to the secular republic, AK Party leader, and Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan and his cabinet acted in cooperation with the military elite, especially during their second (and current) term. During the military's cross-border operations into northern Iraq in the winter of 2007, Erdoğan acquiesced to the agenda of the Turkish Armed Forces and backed their argument that direct intervention into northern Iraq was necessary to suppress the "terrorist" activities in south-east Turkey ("Erdoğan Kara Harekatı Sorusuna "Ordu Gerekeni Yapıyor" Dedi", 2007). Bearing some resemblance to the previous system parties, the AK Party refrained from a major confrontation with the military (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006: 103). Tayyip Erdoğan also quarrelled with DTP mayors (in the south-east provinces), as well as Kurdish intellectuals and civil society representatives, triggering widespread protests by the Kurds against the Prime Minister that reflected his gradually diminishing popularity. In addition, support amongst AK Party members for cross-border operations into neighbouring Kurdish territories in Iraq and for anti-democratic reforms, such as Article 301 and the Anti-Terror Legislation, added to the AK Party's notoriety in the region. The administration of the AK Party resisted amending or abandoning the application of these anti-democratic laws, which in turn made it possible to label academics, intellectuals, and journalists who spoke about Kurdish rights as terrorists, and also enabled prosecutors to claim that anyone expressing an idea contrary to the official state ideology was guilty of terrorism (Gunter, 2007: 120).

In reality, the political party formation of the DTP allowed the Kurds some access to the political system. It remained limited because the DTP did not succeed in gaining credibility and recognition as a purely political and non-violent organization. This was partly due to the state securitization moves mentioned above, to the fact that the armed conflict has not yet ended, and that the DTP has never altogether rejected its ties with the PKK, a party to the conflict. In fact, it was both the military (pressure from outside) and the Kurdish constituency (pressure from below) that forced the DTP "to maintain a radical tone" and become "a surrogate PKK" (Watt, 2006: 127-129). Once a political movement becomes a political party it commits itself to the workings of legitimate politics. However, in the case of the DTP, since its constituency is burdened by a strong legacy of state suppression and radicalism, such commitment to the system becomes very difficult. Searching for a share of legitimate political space, the DTP is trapped between the demands of its constituency and the authoritarian policies of the state. The mounting pressure from either side reduced the DTP's flexibility and put it in great distress. At times, the DTP even found itself in conflict with the police and gendarmerie during demonstrations such as the Kurdish New Year (*Newroz*) celebrations.

DTP activism has therefore never run smoothly and the party has usually been isolated in

The DTP and Acts of Double Securitization

⁸ Interview with Mehmet Kaya, chairman of the Diyarbakır Chamber of Trade, 07 August 2008.

parliament. The DTP's entry into parliament did not guarantee peaceful relations with the state or other system actors, nor did it normalize the Kurds' relations with the state. DTP leader Ahmet Türk said that the party found it very difficult – and at times did not even attempt – to articulate its stance on macro issues of concern to Turkey at large, restricting itself instead to ethno-politics.⁹

Both the Turkish state and Kurdish political actors seek to construct their own narratives of victimhood and conflict (Biner, 2006: 339). The securitization moves made by Kurdish politicians followed both a defensive and offensive track. The defensive approach emerged when the state's securitizing moves were followed by counter-securitizing moves by the DTP; in other words, when DTP cadres and leadership claimed the violation of their rights and defended the use of violence against the state's aggression. In this relationship, the anti-system actor, namely the DTP, tends to construct its policies solely on the basis of the state-securitized issues to which it is responding. For instance, while fervently supporting the normalization of relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, the party is not keen to comment on or formulate a similar policy as regards Turkish-Armenian relations. There have been times when DTP parliamentarians could easily and readily justify violence in the absence of cultural and language rights. These moves found support and popularity not only among their constituents, but also pro-Kurdish intellectuals and the media. Many Kurds believe that the present deadlock in state policy on the Kurdish question strengthens the conviction of those Kurds who see armed struggle as the only way to fulfil democratic demands and to increase the number of conscripts to the armed movement.¹⁰ This in turn further convinced mainstream public opinion, which already backed the state's securitizing moves against these perceived threats, to more fervently support securitization towards Kurdish actors. The DTP also tended to be quite selective in addressing the grievances of other ethnic and religious minorities, therefore constructing a hierarchy of grievances according to the party's own notions of rights and liberties.

The DTP's securitization moves were confrontational in character when the party was unwilling to disassociate itself from the armed movement and genuinely believed that armed struggle was crucial for its survival. While such an approach frustrated the state, the military, as well as nationalist segments, and stirred public opinion through the media's speculative coverage, it also attracted widespread criticism from liberal-minded Turks. The DTP's unwillingness to unconditionally reject the PKK disillusioned many liberals, who otherwise firmly believed that Kurdish political leaders could make a difference. "Kurdish political leadership failed to adapt to the changing political environment and address the Kurdish question from a liberal democratic perspective, and, thus contribute effectively to the debate on the democratization of Turkey" (Grigoriadis, 2006: 453).

Fuelling with this confrontational trend, the Kurds identified the state with the military and the police, which are both perceived as violent perpetrators aiming aggression against the lives of the Kurds. In this view, the state, with its military and police force, had to be eliminated in order to guarantee the survival of the Kurds. This tendency, together with the state's securitized moves, has led to a fight on both sides over who was the most victimized and the most aggrieved.¹¹

Kurdish parties have not necessarily all been linked to the PKK, yet they have been responsive to the PKK's constituency. Their presence in Kurdish New Year celebrations, funerals, and other cultural festivities has been used to bolster domestic and international support. Yet grievances and demands raised during such events have often been "explicit and confrontational, celebrating Kurdish identity, supporting PKK goals, and offering passionate criticisms of the state" (Watt, 2006: 134). The adoption of this attitude by the DTP has at times been criticized by elements of the Kurdish population. For instance, Ümit Firat, a Kurdish intellectual, believes it is not possible to simultaneously ask for peace and carry arms. Firat says: "In their exposure to the public at home and abroad they would either present PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's health problems as the most important issue for the Kurdish question, or they would participate in those meetings and demonstrations organized by PKK. Therefore, they not only made themselves legally attached to the PKK, but also confined the Kurdish rights movement to the workings of PKK".¹² Firat also recalls that "Kurdish actors did not seize the opportunity and the PKK ended its ceasefire right at a time when Turkey's EU process was accelerating back in June 2004, which signified Turkey's integration to the world and was a decisive step to recover from its authoritarian past. This process was hindered because a democratic Turkey makes neither the status-quo powers nor the PKK happy. They would lose their ground and justification for armed operations when Turkey's problems are solved" (Firat 2008).

⁹ Interview with Türk, 2008.

¹⁰ Interview with Kaya, 2008.

¹¹ Interview with Anli, 2008.

¹² Interview with Ümit Firat, 24 July 2008.

Galip Ensarioglu, another Kurdish politician serving in the mainstream, right-of-centre Democrat Party (DP), says: “There is an obscure structure in Turkey that anticipates and justifies the use of violence and thereby hinders democratization. Those who are supposed to defend rights and freedoms do not want the conflict to end and do not want solutions to be offered, because this conflict [gives] them power, [and] when the conflict ends, there is no more power. Yet, whenever the debates on EU accession, civil constitution, and democratic reform come to the agenda, both the state and the PKK accelerate the conflict.”¹³

Considering the decades-long, and still ongoing war between the Turkish state and insurgent Kurds, the volatile relations between the state and Kurdish actors, marked by mutual securitizing actions and behaviours, seem to suggest the unlikelihood of a resolution.

The domestic and international communities have clearly indicated that the democratic way to tackle the Kurdish problem would be to grant the Kurds their cultural and language rights. These rights have long been a source of tension between the Turkish state, which hesitates to recognize and apply them, and the Kurds, who have become even more conscious of their rights through acquaintance with similar experiences of ethnic groups in other countries. According to the Copenhagen criteria, which determines whether a country is eligible for EU membership, a candidate country must achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Turkey, officially recognized as a candidate state at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, accepted conditionality for the protection of minorities towards the complete fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, which eventually enabled Turkey to begin its accession negotiations with the EU. Turkey’s candidate status unwillingly forced it to undertake constitutional and legislative reforms granting ethnic and linguistic rights to the Kurds.

Turkey’s bid for EU membership has been the main motive behind the steps taken to guarantee the Kurdish population’s cultural and language rights. These reformative initiatives have included the teaching of Kurdish through private courses and allowing radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish. Although these initial reforms have been positive in establishing more inclusive cultural and language rights, in practice, bureaucratic challenges have limited the Kurds’ enjoyment of these rights. Private institutions teaching Kurdish were all closed in 2004, and there are now no opportunities to learn Kurdish (‘Turkey 2008 Progress Report’, 2008). Moreover, mayors faced penalties for providing some of their municipal services in Kurdish. Such is the case of Diyarbakır’s Sur mayor, who ended up being dismissed from office.

For the Kurds, a truly inclusive agenda of cultural and linguistic rights would include changing the National Education legislation to allow the teaching of Kurdish as a second language in public schools; lifting the language bans on freedom of expression and association; precluding the conversion of place names from Kurdish into Turkish, and reinstating the original Kurdish names for districts, villages and streets; giving sermons in Kurdish; performing Kurdish plays in state theatres in the region; and providing public services (such as health) in Kurdish (‘A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question’, 2009). In fact, as a package, “minority rights” comprises all those rights that are demanded by the Kurds in Turkey. Yet it has become an ambiguous term for both Turkish officials and the nationalist Kurds. The state has always refrained from officially confirming that Turkey’s minorities were fully entitled to rights regarding education and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. Kurds were refused recognition as a “minority group” in Turkey, as well as the full extent of the rights granted minorities on the grounds that, according to the Lausanne Treaty (the founding treaty of the Republic), only non-Muslims were to be granted minority status. In Turkey, minority and minority rights are “politically loaded concept[s] with controversial connotations” (Kurban, 2004: 343) and the minority concept “clashes with the monolithic concept of nation and territorial indivisibility” (Oran, 2007: 45).

The state, both in rhetoric and in practice, strictly refutes the EU’s reference to Turkey’s Kurds as minorities. Nationalist Kurds also shun this label because, as Baskin Oran eloquently puts it, Kurds argue that, firstly, they are the founding fathers of Turkey, along with the ethnic Turks; secondly, that the term “minority” is degrading since in the Ottoman millet system minorities (non-Muslims) were treated as second-class citizens; and thirdly, Kurds see themselves as a “people” rather than a minority, offering them greater lee-way in international law for “self-determination (independence)” (ibid). This state of denial, shared by the state and the Turkish Kurds, has propelled the issue into another realm of

Cultural and Linguistic Rights

¹³ Interview with Galip Ensarioglu, Diyarbakır provincial chair for the Democrat Party (DP), 07 August 2008.

conflict, this time related to the long-established state paranoia of ethnic politics. The so-called “Sevres Treaty Paranoia” opposes EU reforms based on an underlying belief that “minority rights imposed by the EU will undermine Turkey’s national sovereignty (NS) and will eventually disintegrate the Turkish state, as was the case during the end of the First World War” (Oran, 2003:1). Thus, the main reason why both sides refrain from using the term “minority” when defining each other’s position, is the fact that this is a highly securitized term in Turkey. In the eyes of the Turkish state, minorities are reminders of the many obstacles faced by the “founding fathers” during their struggle to create a nation-state and an ethnically and religiously homogeneous national identity – hence their treatment as a security problem. Minority policies of the early Republican era resulted in the harsh treatment of Turkey’s non-Muslims, such as the imposition of wealth taxes, confiscation of their properties, exclusion of citizenship, and violent attacks.

In Turkey, progress in recognizing and protecting minority rights was jumpstarted thanks to EU demands for reform. When the EU demanded that Kurds be granted cultural and language rights, along with many other reforms – including amnesty for PKK members, a decrease of the electoral threshold to enable Kurdish parties entry into parliament, social and economic reforms, and improvements in the situation of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) – anti-European sentiment reached its peak among the Turkish population. Many people who oppose Turkey’s EU membership regard these reforms as a security issue and claim that they will disintegrate Turkey by compromising its national security. This has led some authors to argue that “democratization within the framework of the Copenhagen criteria did not help to improve the relations between the Turks and the Kurds; it further polarized and radicalized their relations” (Yavuz and Özcan: 2006, 10).

Turkey’s Relations with the Iraqi Kurds

Another issue that has been securitized is Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq. Following the first Gulf War (1990-1991), the Kurdish region in Iraq gained basic autonomy when the US established a no-flight zone to prevent Saddam Hussein from attacking the Iraqi Kurds. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominant regime, a new government was formed in Iraq, comprised of different sects and ethnic groups from around the country, including the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. In April 2005, Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader, Jalal Talabani, was elected president of Iraq. Consequently, in June 2005, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Mesud Barzani became the president of the autonomous region known as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and soon after, the Kurdish parliament held its first session. Iraqi Kurds gained a considerable amount of autonomy and access to important political posts in post-Saddam Iraq. Meanwhile, those Turkish policy-makers and security bureaucrats uneasy and anxious about this Kurdish repositioning in Iraq directed Turkish foreign policy towards maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and thwarting any attempts to create a federated Iraq. After the invasion, Turkey maintained its military forces along the Iraqi border, in order to prevent PKK militants from entering the country, and occasionally raided the Northern Iraqi territories to target PKK activities (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006: 106).

The general trend in Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurds has been one of “lingering suspicions and disappointments” (Altunışık, 2006: 184). Turkish policy circles, as well as the military, are very uncomfortable with the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK’s presence in northern Iraqi territory, which facilitates the launching of attacks on Turkey, and the US government’s closeness to the Iraqi Kurds. In addition to these suspicions and disappointments, a large proportion of the Turkish public believed that the existence of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region would motivate Turkey’s Kurds to align themselves with the Iraqi Kurds – eventually leading to the establishment of an irredentist Kurdish state encompassing the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Moreover, the possibility of a wealthy and powerful Kurdish autonomous region just across the border, in which Iraqi Kurds possessed the rich oil fields in Kirkuk, also led to a great deal of discomfort among these circles. The presence of PKK camps within the borders of northern Iraq tainted the image of the Kurdish leadership in Iraq in the eyes of the Turkish public. In an attempt to counter the PKK camps based in Northern Iraq, Turkey has deployed cross-border operations using military power, despite Iraqi Kurds’ rejections, which eventually proved Turkey’s refusal to resume its traditional policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. A security-oriented attitude thus took precedence over diplomacy in Turkey’s foreign policy towards northern Iraq.

In November 2007, and without much public discussion about alternative forms of action, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution authorizing the Turkish Armed Forces to conduct cross-border operations against PKK militants in northern Iraq. The majority of deputies from the ruling AK Party, the CHP, the MHP, and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) voted in favour of the motion, while deputies from the DTP opposed it. In December 2007, Turkey launched air strikes on PKK rebels from inside Iraqi territories. This was followed by a more forceful ground operation. In 2008, these operations, which clearly reflected the Turkish Armed Forces' confrontational policy with respect to the Kurdish question, laid bare two of the military's endemic reflexes: its tendency to resort to securitized rhetoric in a bid to legitimize the use of force, and the portrayal of national security interests as superior and eminent. In fact, the Turkish Armed Forces assumed that a militarized approach to the Turkey-Iraq relationship and the use of force inside Iraq to stifle the PKK would benefit the long-term stability and security of Turkey and Iraq (Press Statement, 2008).

These operations dominated the public agenda from December 2007 to March 2008, owing to the extensive coverage by newspapers and television channels. The Turkish media proved highly provocative, publishing strong warmongering headlines that strengthened the unquestionable popular support for the operations. They were celebrated by the opposition parties, who voiced harsh criticisms of the governing AK Party for the operations' limited scope and length. Having opposed these operations, DTP officials also attracted criticism from politicians and the military. While the reactions, especially from trade and industrialist associations, were in favour of the operations and the military solution to end PKK presence across the borders,¹⁴ other voices from the region and from the human rights associations across the country were not sufficiently heard.

In an ideal democracy, it is normal to hear diverse opinions from different segments of society over an issue concerning the well-being or survival of individuals or communities. The public space usually provides a peaceful and constructive arena to promote such discussions and deliberations. Once a political, social, or economic issue becomes "securitized", however, it is harder to abide by the rules of a democratic dialogue and decision-making process. A securitized issue immediately becomes the concern of security bureaucrats and policy-makers, who are more willing to deal with it outside the political realm and who are prepared to take any precaution, regardless of whether it is detrimental to citizens' interests and well-being. The conflict between Kurdish anti-system actors and the state is one such issue. Within the context of the conflict between the state and the PKK, both inside and outside Turkey's borders, new security measures were implemented by the state. For instance, in October 2007, villages on the Turkish-Iraqi border were emptied, and two months later, three security zones (covering the provinces of Siirt, Hakkari, and Sırnak) were established by the Turkish Armed Forces ('Ordu 3 ili Geçici Güvenlik Bölgesi İlan Etti', 2007).

Such feelings of suspicion, fear, and disappointment are partly the result of a highly securitized environment and unfortunately lead to a rupture between Turkey's Turkish and Kurdish communities. Obviously, the alternative to securitization is democratization, participation, and equal citizenship. Democratization de-securitizes otherwise political and policy-related issues and broadens the political space. Thanks to EU-led democratization efforts, the Kurds were allowed greater political visibility, they have been granted some cultural and language rights, and policy-making changes, which may be considered "de-securitizing" efforts, were implemented through civilianization. However, these reforms have been very limited in scope and have not thwarted the perception held by the civilian and military bureaucracy, as well as the public at large, that the Kurdish problem is a matter of (in)security, rather than a matter of democracy, participation and cultural diversity.

14 See "TIM: 'Operasyon is dünyası için olumlu' (TIM: Operations are positive for the business world)," Zaman, 22.02.2008 and "MUSIAD'dan operasyonlara tam destek (Unconditional Support for the Operations by MUSIAD)," Zaman, 23.02.2008.

Part III State and Anti-System Party Interaction In Lebanon

In Lebanon, the interaction of both anti-system and non-state actors with the state has always been difficult to assess or measure, primarily because it is difficult to identify who those actors are. At the same time, one cannot discuss anti-system actors without considering the problem faced by the Lebanese state since the formation of greater Lebanon in 1920. This problem is, simply, its own fragility. The Lebanese state was formed as a summation of sectarian and religious communities and aimed to protect the interests of these communities. The successive civil wars and social upheavals were the result of specific communities finding themselves at some point outside the circle of state benefits. The changing tides have meant that these communities have often simultaneously acted within the state framework *and* as anti-state actors.

This study addresses the interaction between anti-system actors and the state by using relations between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state as a case study. Hezbollah pursues a “holistic” approach that brings together Shiite historical discourse, the religious duty of resistance, and the provision of social services to securitize policies threatening their political objectives (Harb and Leenders, 2005). In Hezbollah’s speech-act, the Shiite are usually portrayed as deprived of equal rights and permanently under imminent attack by existential threats: if not from external aggression, then from internal schemes seeking to marginalize their community. The fragility and failure of the Lebanese state, as well as the internationalization of Lebanese affairs, exemplify how security problems can quickly be manipulated by internal forces to achieve political ends.

Our initial focus will be on the rise of Hezbollah, its dominance over the Shiite community in Lebanon, and its ability to perform the duties of the state, and perhaps even replace it. Secondly, the web of relations linking Lebanese state actors and Hezbollah will be analysed by examining the four most securitizing issues to have emerged throughout the contemporary political and economic history of Lebanon: (1) The feeling of an uneven distribution in Lebanon’s consensual democracy, which excluded the Shi’a political identity, along with Hezbollah’s Shi’a orientation, versus the need for national conciliation at the state level, (2) Hezbollah’s connection with foreign powers, versus state sovereignty, and (3) How the state’s legitimacy is undermined by the Hezbollah economy, and (4) Hezbollah’s armament and the failure of the state to guarantee security.

The Lebanese Political System and its Components

a. Lebanon: A failed state?

The history of Lebanon is characterised by sectarian conflict and communal differentiation. Lebanon is home to three religions, eighteen sects, and at least two ethnic minorities. In the 19th century, Mount-Lebanon was a semi-autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire, harbouring many religious minorities, principally the Druze, the Maronites, and the Shi’a. Yet Beirut, as well as other coastal towns with Sunni majorities, was still under direct Ottoman rule. By the late 17th century, Beirut had been named the capital of an Ottoman province and hosted the headquarters of the Ottoman governor. This governor relied on a local bureaucratic structure and urban leadership composed mainly of Sunni notables, merchants, and religious figures. As noted earlier, however, Mount Lebanon was much more autonomous. Power was in the hands of a local Prince who was semi-independent from the Ottomans but nonetheless had to pay them taxes on a regular basis. During the 19th century, and especially between 1825 and 1860, Mount Lebanon was plagued by civil strife, primarily due to competition between Druze and Maronite feudal leaders over who would rule Mount Lebanon. In response, the great foreign powers of the time (namely the French, Russians and British) took advantage of this civil unrest to weaken the Ottoman Empire, at the time commonly referred to as the “sick man of Europe”. These great powers, in coordination with the Maronite Church, engendered a power-sharing system based on a confessional distribution of seats in the local administrative council of Mount Lebanon.

This system survived until the end of World War I and the occupation of Lebanon by French forces. In 1920, the French then decided to merge Mount Lebanon (with its delicate communal balance) with Beirut and other coastal towns, thus creating Great Lebanon, or simply, Lebanon. This merger disturbed the fragile communal balance, especially given the Sunni majorities present in Beirut and other coastal towns. As such, the most pressing challenge became to create a shared Lebanese identity and to convince the major communities in Lebanon that they could all benefit from the new arrangement.

In 1926, Michel Chiha, a philosopher and banker by profession, proposed a Lebanese Constitution inspired by the Constitution of the Third French Republic. Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution states that “all Lebanese are equal before the law; they equally enjoy civil and political rights, and are equally bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction.” In relation to public office, Article 12 of the Constitution grants every citizen the right to hold public office without any preference besides on the basis of merit and competence.

This constitution was sponsored by the French Mandate and was intended as the foundation for a social contract towards an independent Lebanon. Accordingly, a power-sharing arrangement representing all confessions was created. This system required consensus and the cooperation of the elite. It lasted until the eve of the 1975 Civil War and was later restored, albeit with a few modifications, by the Tai’f National Accord of 1989. As a result of these developments, the system defined as confessionalist, ensuring confessional representation, became an end in itself as the most important institution, or pillar, in Lebanon, responsible for maintaining national stability.

One could argue that this arrangement, “the National Pact”, was introduced to calm the fears of other minorities. From the late 1920s up to the present day, Lebanon has been governed by norms based on unconstitutional parallel arrangements whereby confessional leaders, with the blessing of their religious establishment, have imposed a cartel. As a result, Lebanon is ruled by consensus – a format that has spread to all other institutions. As stated by Chaaban and Gebara, “in confessional states, modern forms of associations, which are based on either ideology or socio-economic factors, are always overridden by primordial ties or forms of allegiances” (2007:5). In other words, although modern institutions were established to create a new form of identity and allegiance, in Lebanon, the primordial form of association became a necessary condition for occupying and ensuring the proper functioning of these institutions.

Indeed, Shiite political mobilization is rooted in its community’s uneven share of Lebanon’s consensual democracy. With the emergence of Imam Musa Al-Sadr in the late 1960’s, and the creation of the Amal movement, demands for increased participation became formalized in the Shiite psycho-cultural orientation, which continues to be championed by Hezbollah today. This feeling of marginalization acts as a catalyst for solidarity and Shiite identification with a greater cause. It has been used to justify extraordinary measures to remain outside the mandate of the state, while concurrently maintaining legitimacy amongst its constituency.

Lebanon is in many ways considered a “failed state” – a failure that created the conditions and framework for both securitization and counter-securitisation by Lebanese state and anti-system actors. Defined throughout its history by confessional and communal forms of allegiance, the state has been unable to provide the Lebanese with either security or public services. Lebanon has even failed in becoming a “state of infrastructure”. Thus, Lebanon has since its inception required the direct and indirect intervention of foreign actors to maintain its statehood. International involvement in the country has grown in recent years, especially since 2004, with mounting pressures to implement the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1559, a document drafted and advocated by France and the US. This Resolution called for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, including Hezbollah. After the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, along with other subsequent political assassinations and assassination attempts, Lebanon found itself in an even more pernicious situation in its handling of internal security affairs than during its fifteen years of civil war, and thus entrusted the international community with its judicial affairs. In July 2006, Lebanon once again witnessed 34 days of war, causing major damage to its infrastructure and its already frail economy. Once again, Lebanon turned to the international community to ensure its internal stability, economic support within the framework of the five-year aid plan (2002-2007) that had been formulated at the Paris II Conference, and aid in rebuilding its infrastructure. Lebanon’s sovereignty has thus been breached in what concerns the main functions of a state, leaving the implementation of its security, judicial, economic, and infrastructure affairs in the hands of international actors. But more importantly, is the internationalisation of Lebanon’s political affairs that was seen from the beginning of the civil war to the latest communal clashes in May 2008. This was indeed a securitizing move, in which any conflict related to Lebanon was automatically treated as a security issue by international public opinion.

The realm of political activity in Lebanon is shared by political actors denominated not by their stance on domestic affairs, but by their alleged alliances with external actors, which basically boils down to the pro-Syria or the anti-Syria bloc, also known as the Franco- and Americo-philes. The anti-Israeli position obviously runs deeper in the pro-Syria bloc, but it would be wrong to define the anti-Syrian bloc as pro-Israel. Hezbollah may hegemonize the political opposition, yet the anti-Syria position is on the whole decidedly anti-system. In contemporary Lebanese politics, the anti-system faction also struggles to maintain its unified standing – since when evaluated within their externally-motivated blocs, both system and anti-system parties emerge as heterogeneous. Thus, claiming an “anti” or “pro” position, and subsequently adopting a securitized rhetoric, becomes a necessity. Currently, the pro-Syria bloc encompasses, apart from Hezbollah, the Christian Maronites, whose leaders include Michel Aoun. They act in unison when denigrating Israeli action both within and outside Lebanon. The anti-Syrian coalition, dubbed the March 14 coalition, is a more populated and diverse group: The leaders of this coalition are Fouad Siniora, the Prime Minister, and Saad Hariri, the son of former President Rafik Hariri. The March 14 coalition includes the Druze Progressive Socialists, led by Walid Jumblatt, the National Liberals, the Lebanese Forces party, and even some Christian Maronite fractions – namely, the Kataeb Party of Amin Gamayel. The March 14 coalition represents the current Lebanese government, however, it cannot be equated to a system establishment in its entirety. In fact, the heterogeneity of the anti-Syrian bloc hinders its systemic status. Political actors in Lebanon struggle to identify directly and unequivocally with the state, seen as a failed entity, and choose instead to identify themselves through a securitized language with external actors.

b. The case of Hezbollah: An anti-system actor

Hezbollah, the Party of God, is an organization representing Lebanon’s Shi’a community and was established to politically and ideologically counter the state and the Franco-American influence. Hezbollah firmly positioned itself as an anti-state actor in Lebanon, but its material and ideological reach permeates far beyond the physical and conceptual boundaries of the Lebanese state. If one examines the case of Hezbollah – identified as a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel, though not listed as such by the European Union – it is undeniable that the organization gathers its greatest support from some of Lebanon’s poorest districts, where Shiite communities reside. These include Mount Lebanon, where the Southern suburbs are located, the Bekaa, and parts of the South and Nabatiyyeh. Hezbollah has established a broad support base across all sections of the Shi’a community. As will be explained in this paper, Hezbollah’s success can be traced back to three core pillars: Its championing of the Palestinian cause; its close ties with the clerical structure of the Shi’a community; and its political economy. At all three levels, Hezbollah constitutes its constituency.

Certainly, given its broad network of social services and the war waged against Israel in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah appeared to be behaving like a state within a state. Or as Lebanese-American scholar Amal Saad-Ghorayeb states, Hezbollah is behaving like a “state within a non-state” (Kifner, 2006).

Analysis of the background and conditions within which Hezbollah emerged as a social, political, and military actor showed that Hezbollah’s presence as an anti-system actor has its roots in the process of recalibration of political power in Lebanon, which excluded Shi’a political identity. The rest of this paper will explore the sources of the securitization that has developed between the state and Hezbollah in Lebanon, rendering any reconciliation at the state level very difficult. In so doing, four issues will be highlighted: The challenge posed by Hezbollah’s rise as a political movement to national reconciliation in Lebanon; Hezbollah’s connection with the foreign powers that undermine Lebanese sovereignty; and finally, how Hezbollah’s economy undermines the legitimacy of the state, as well as the Hezbollah arms issue.

The rise of Hezbollah: Uneven distribution in Lebanon’s consensual system

This section will briefly consider the context within which Hezbollah emerged – namely, that of a society with clearly drawn divisions, where communal loyalties usually supersede national loyalty – in order to clarify what makes the existence of this actor a security problem for the Lebanese state.

The organization first appeared in the early 1980s as an offshoot of the military wing of the Movement of the Dispossessed. This Movement was founded in 1974 by Shiite cleric Mousa al-Sadr to improve the economic and social conditions of Lebanese Shi'a.

The reasons for these poor conditions were multifaceted and complex. However, a key contributing factor to the inequality characterising that period, and which prompted the emergence of Mousa al-Sadr's reactionary movement, was the system of resource allocation. Lacking natural resources, Lebanon's economic growth was largely derived from tertiary economic activities (Gebara and Chaban, 2007: 3). While banking and trade boomed in the cities, development in rural areas stalled as agriculture and industry declined (Owen, 1997). Although Beirut became known as the 'Paris of the Middle East', agricultural workers endured Third World conditions in the countryside (Gates, 1989). Rural areas in northern, southern, and eastern Lebanon, many of which are predominantly Shiite, suffered the greatest setbacks. These economic inequalities emerged against the backdrop of a consociational political system in which a Shi'a held the significantly less influential position of Speaker of Parliament and where the confessional representation had a six to five ratio of Christian to Muslim parliamentary seats (Staten, 2008: 36). Subsequently, the majority of Lebanese Shi'a found themselves imprisoned within this restrictive system where their position was defined along class and sectarian divides that could not be transcended. This scenario reinforced the traditional conviction that Shiites are a historically oppressed people facing a secular struggle – hence the origin of the "Dispossessed movement" (Nasr and James, 1985: 12).

When southern Lebanon, a stronghold of the national Shi'a community, was occupied by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in 1982, local militias trained by Iran's Revolutionary Guards rose up against the occupying forces. Among these militants was Abbas Musawi, the former second-in-command of the Amal movement, who broke with the Shi'a organization after having accused it of corruption and political patronage, as well as of collaborating with the Israeli forces occupying the South of the country (Pape, 2005: 23). Under the leadership of Musawi, Hezbollah (the Party of God) was formed and grew from what started, in the early 1980s, as an underground resistance force to a "proletarian party with an Islamic manifesto" (Salamey and Pearson, 2007). The group championed the establishment of an Islamic state, the expulsion of imperialist and colonial forces from Lebanon, and the bringing to justice of the phalanges for crimes perpetrated against Muslims and Christians.

Among the impoverished Shiite populations of Beirut's southern suburbs, Hezbollah and Amal co-existed as the two major movements of the 1980s. At the time, Amal – supported by Syria – was at odds with Palestinian groups operating on Lebanese territory. Hezbollah, meanwhile, maintained that Israel was the sole enemy of all Muslims and refrained from participating in any such domestic fighting. It is important to note here that along the lines of Moussa al-Sadr's Movement of the Dispossessed, there existed a natural affinity between Shiites and Palestinians as disenfranchised, oppressed, and marginalized peoples. Amal's distancing from this association was clearly illustrated in the 1985-1986 War of the Camps, when the group besieged Palestinian camps in Lebanon. While Amal was highly political, Hezbollah focused on gaining support within the Shiite community, not only through its resistance against Israel¹⁵, but also through its connection with the community's clerics – a central feature in every Shi'a community. A 2006 survey conducted by the International Centre for Human Sciences in Byblos found that when Lebanese subjects were asked which factor was most influential for success in their lives, they rated "religious beliefs" ahead of education, achievement, luck, or connections (Hanf, 2007: 11). Hezbollah founder Abbas Musawi was himself a cleric. In addition, the organization enjoyed the support of the country's most popular Shi'a cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.¹⁶ Recognising the central role of clerics in the everyday life of the Shi'a population, Hezbollah thus established a direct link with the population.

Clerics were also central to the social activities organised by Hezbollah during its early stages, with clerics such as Sheikh Fadlallah lending their support in setting up hospitals, schools, and cultural centres. Making the most of the substantial financial support received from Iran, Hezbollah complemented its military activities with the establishment of social services in impoverished Shiite areas largely neglected by the Lebanese state. The decision to provide these services was partially rooted in the Islamic culture of charity as an obligation, but also reflected the realisation that offering charity to deprived masses secures their support.

¹⁵ The majority of Shiite residents in the Southern suburbs had in one way or another been affected through the loss of a family member in the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.

¹⁶ In the Shi'a faith, each village or neighbourhood has a central cleric whom they follow and who is intrinsically active in the everyday life of the members of the community. This cleric in turn follows a marjah, or a "reference you emulate". In Lebanon the most popular of these is Sheikh Fadlallah.

It is thus possible to identify three core rationales behind the rise of Hezbollah amongst the primarily Shi'a communities on the outskirts of Beirut: The first is the Palestinian cause: Israel embodies an oppressive force, which the Shiite community must resist "with its historical oppression and secular struggle" (Nasr and James, 1985: 12). The clerical structure is a second strong ingredient of Hezbollah's growth. The deep ties between Hezbollah and Shiite clerics provide the organization with a direct link to the populace and with an ideological credibility that facilitates the recruitment of individuals with similar convictions. Finally, Hezbollah has access to a deep pool of funds. Through Iranian financing, Hezbollah is able to materially supplement the influence it has gained over people through its fight for the Palestinian cause and its clerical connections.

R. T. Naylor identifies three stages of the politico-economic evolution of "model" guerrilla groups. The earliest stage witnesses such groups engaging in hit-and-run activities against individuals and institutions symbolizing the state. The group's expenditures are relatively small and focused on military activities at large. In a second stage, the group openly disputes the political power of the state in what Naylor describes as "low intensity war against the infrastructure of the formal economy." At this point, the group itself begins requiring more funding and qualitatively depends on a rising social security component to care for the group's direct dependents and for the population amongst whom it is trying to win support. Hereafter, the insurgents raise funds by parasitically reaping the steady and reliable incomes of citizens via mechanisms of the formal economy, such as taxation on income, wealth, and economic activities operating in clearly defined areas now firmly under the control of the group. The final stage in the group's politico-economic evolution is when it has amassed undeniable support and begins to constitute a serious rival to the state. At this point, fund-raising is no longer parasitical, but rather more symbiotic with the parallel formal economy. In fact, it is at this stage in particular, when fundraising activities become increasingly rewarding and overt, that asset management becomes a major issue. These fundamental activities soon require the guerrilla group "to interface with the formal and international economy in much the same manner as 'white collar' crime, seeking to hide and launder the returns from its fundraising."

Hezbollah's military strength, outreach, and institutional maturity gradually evolved along the phases described by Naylor, thus creating the present day Hezbollah, a consolidated and robust anti-system actor in Lebanon and a formidable transnational network. However, the party's financial structure and its relationship with the state fail to conform to Naylor's paradigm. Hezbollah's formation in the 1980s, at the height of the civil war, coincided with the state's highest level of disintegration and inability to perform its functions. Managing a network of social and public services and controlling areas of access was standard practice. In turn, Hezbollah's influence manifested itself in quasi- and sometimes paramilitary authority in areas populated mainly by Shi'a Lebanese.

By the time the Ta'if Accord entered into force in 1990, Hezbollah was already an established militia that practiced significant military and economic control over defined Shi'a areas of Lebanon. However, unlike its Shi'a counterpart Amal, Hezbollah only maintained minimal involvement in the Lebanese Civil War and achieved a 'resistance' status within Arab political circles. The Ta'if Accord brought about the formal disarmament of all Lebanese militias and the subsequent reintegration of political parties into a unitary polity represented by a national unity government. Nevertheless, Hezbollah was permitted to keep its arms under the direct political patronage of Syria. Having been given the upper hand in Lebanon following the Second Gulf War, Damascus secured Iran's share of power in Lebanon via Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's participation in the parliamentary and municipal elections only came about in 1992. While one group within its Shura Council disagreed with this move, the majority believed that political participation would tilt the Ta'if agreement to their advantage. (Harb and Leenders, 2005: 185). Despite its success in these elections, Hezbollah had always preferred to maintain its distance from Lebanese politics due to a deep-rooted distrust of the confessional and power allocation systems implemented to attain national reconciliation. This would explain why Hezbollah claimed no ministerial seats in any of the post Ta'if governments up to the year 2005. Furthermore, the group made sure to publicly distance itself from the dominant "pie-slicing" ethos adopted by other politico-sectarian parties in their interaction with the state.

In Lebanon, the system based on the recalibration of political power among different communities has usually been protected by foreign guarantors in the name of ensuring stability and domestic peace. This has given the Lebanese elites room to focus on improving their

own position within their respective communities and on countering challenges to their power by defending the power-sharing peace accord (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005: 239). These foreign actors have therefore played an influential role in defining the confines of the Lebanese system, to which Lebanon's political elite have clung in their resistance to anti-system challenges through a guise of strong attachment to the power-sharing mechanism developed following the Ta'if Agreement.

Hezbollah's connections with foreign powers vs. state sovereignty

Acting as a state within a non-state, Hezbollah has inevitably developed alliances, as well as enmities with external actors. As stated above, Hezbollah defines its identity and its *raison d'être* according to its choice of enemies, which includes most of the Western colonial powers, especially the United States and France. Similarly, the Lebanese state – irrespective of whether it is a non-state or failed state – determines its sovereignty and dynamics according to its relationship with external actors. While the state and Hezbollah converge in their outspoken criticism of Israel's policies towards Lebanon, they diverge remarkably in their approach to their neighbours, Iran and Syria in particular, and to Western states. The Lebanese state treats its Western allies with care since its very existence is secured by their involvement (especially of France) in Lebanon. At the same time, the Lebanese state and foreign policy elite blame Syria and Iran for posing direct and indirect threats to its sovereignty. Quite simply, Hezbollah's friends are Lebanon's enemies, and vice versa. Thus, state sovereignty in Lebanon is driven out of the two actors' countervailing foreign policies. Consequently, Lebanon's foreign policy is charged with a securitised rhetoric "constructed by patterns of amity and enmity" (Coskun, 2008: 91) that is problematic.

A common enemy, against which state-making in the post-colonial Middle East could and would come to direct itself, was born: Israel. However, as important as Israel's presence, its occupation and expansionist policies, its military and intelligence might, and its securitized rhetoric towards Lebanon and other neighbors may be, Israel alone does not explain the emphasis placed on securitization by Lebanon and Hezbollah. Israel's existence arguably promoted Arab unity at important junctions in the region's history, but the truth is that shared anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian stances among Arab states did not create sustained and fruitful alliances in the Middle East. Instead, Arab states militarily and diplomatically failed to resolve the Palestinian issue or to secure Israel's retreat to the pre-1967 borders, among many other policies that Arab states demanded of Israel.

The end of the July 2006 war on south Lebanon represented a victory for Hezbollah. Since the anti-Israeli position predominant in the Arab world did not manage to achieve its intended results, Hezbollah considered itself the victor in the Muslim world's otherwise-feeble state system, seeing as its militias were able to forcefully drive the Israeli military out of Lebanon. Nonetheless, this so-called triumph would not have been possible without the backing of Iran and Syria. Hezbollah's alliance with both these countries is a source of concern for Lebanon – hence, the accusations repeatedly made by Lebanese generals and statesmen against Hezbollah and Syria for compromising peace in Lebanon. Not only did Hezbollah undermine the state's legitimacy by aligning itself with Syria and Iran, but also precluded the possibility of consolidating a stable system in Lebanon. Therefore, while the July 2006 Hezbollah-declared war was considered a "win", it was in fact a loss for state stabilization and consolidation in Lebanon. This event marked the point when Syrian and Iranian influence over Lebanese affairs, and the divergence between state and anti-state actors in Lebanon became obvious.

The stabilization and consolidation of the Lebanese state has been made possible through the involvement of guarantor states, as previously mentioned. Since the mid-19th century, Lebanon has seen four power-sharing agreements, each working to guarantee the peace and stability of the instituted regime, constructed by foreign powers. When this foreign guarantee or protection withdrew from Lebanon, the regime collapsed and the country descended into turmoil. Thus, national state-building and maintenance has been conditional on the direct engagement of foreign actors (Zahar, 2005: 219-220). Recent political and security developments in Lebanon demonstrate that this power-sharing format is losing validity in the hands of Hezbollah, and by extension, Syria and Iran. Under the former Western power-sharing agreements, foreign actors were directly involved through institutionalized, internationally-sanctioned mechanisms. The current situation, in which Syria and Iran "help" Hezbollah act as a state within the Lebanese non-state, is not internationally-sanctioned and thus the involvement is not open, direct and legitimate.

Hezbollah justifies the support received from Syria and Iran on the grounds that without it Lebanon would not be able to resist Israeli aggression. In fact, it is believed that Hezbollah is almost entirely financed by its neighbor countries. Hezbollah has received vast financial and military support from its regional patron Iran, as well as significant backing from the Syrian regime. The economic expression of this reality is twofold, involving direct financial injections into Hezbollah institutions – both declared and undeclared – in addition to the logistical backing and facilitation provided by Damascus. According to some claims, the funding received from Tehran adds up to 60 million USD annually. In turn, Syria allegedly facilitates the passage of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah (Fanney, 2002). Moreover, the movement itself gathers funds through charities and various commercial enterprises. Hezbollah's fundraising activities definitely transcend national borders and standard practices. Police investigations in Paraguay, for instance, reported evidence of illicit fundraising networks among several Arab businessmen (Madani, 2002). With such a financially-sound network operating as a state within Lebanon, under the auspices, directives and parenthood of Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is able to justify its commitment to these regimes by delivering security and welfare assistance to the people of Lebanon and by periodically pursuing retaliatory violence against Israel.

c. Securitization through construction: A state within a non-state

In the eyes of the Lebanese state, the social services provided by Hezbollah create a dangerous security gap, while also increasing the popular support for Hezbollah's use of violence. Yet Hezbollah attaches a great deal of importance to service and welfare provision, seeking to convince the Lebanese people that in the absence of their assistance, certain segments of Lebanese society would simply remain deprived of access to wealth and public services.

In this sense, Hezbollah acts as a parallel state within Lebanon. Hezbollah's strength lies in its capacity to offer some of the state services that the Lebanese state has failed to provide in response to the demands of the Lebanese people. The movement's main objective is to counter Israeli aggression and support the Lebanese people. Its help is considered a major bonus in the absence of state assistance, especially in cases of dire need. Hezbollah's construction initiatives have aggravated the tense relations with the state establishment, which views them as a matter of securitization. During the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, Israeli forces targeted areas identified as Shi'a strongholds (Deeb, 2006: 115). The incursion destroyed 107,000 housing units, resulted in 150,000 direct or indirect job losses (Gebara and Chaaban, 2007: 5), and rendered agricultural land in southern Lebanon non-arable due to the presence of more than 350,000 unexploded cluster bombs (See 'A Lasting Legacy', 2006). Considering the impoverished conditions that characterised the majority of these areas before the Israeli incursion, the war had a devastating impact on the residents' already precarious living conditions. Not only did it result in massive displacements from the affected districts, but people described the return to their villages as "catastrophic", "disastrous" and "terrible" (Gebara and Chaban, 2007:10). They lost their homes and livelihoods, and pollution had contaminated their environment. Officials of Hezbollah's construction arm, Jihad al-Binaa, estimated that some 60 percent of inhabitants in southern Lebanon were plunged into poverty as a result of the war. According to a report by the World Bank and the Ministry of Social Affairs, when residents in these areas were asked upon whom they relied for support and aid, their responses included "no-one", "God", "Hezbollah", "family", or "NGOs and charity organizations" ('Post-Conflict Social and Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon', 2007:11). Tellingly, there was no mention of the government or public institutions. Hezbollah securitizes the political atmosphere in Lebanon by destroying the state's image and reliability, which in turn limits any potential for normal politics and breeds only high-level tension and securitization.

The Lebanese state economy is a victim of the persistent instability and conflict that plagues the country. The language of insecurity and danger employed by both securitizing and counter-securitizing actors in Lebanon impede the construction of a safe and stable economic environment. In fact, these actors derive the elements to legitimize their securitized rhetoric from economic destitution and instability. The July 2006 war waged by Israel in southern Lebanon significantly crushed the national economy, which is service-oriented, and already fragile and volatile. "Beyond the structural issue of massive public debt, which is about 190 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.), there are many other economic problems. G.D.P. will end the year at a negative five percent." Indeed, this severe deterioration of the Lebanese economy is another outcome of the Israeli assault on Lebanon.

Hezbollah may have declared victory, but from an economic perspective, the end of the war was by no means victorious: “The war depressed domestic consumption and damaged the productive and economic infrastructure of the country. This damage to infrastructure cost Lebanon about \$3.5 billion” (Cristiani, 2007). The grim economic indicators did not, however, deter the “Party of God” nor put it under public strain. Instead, the mass protests held in the aftermath of the war targeted the government and were organized by the opposition, including Hezbollah.

Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Lebanon depend heavily on the involvement and financing of Western donor states. In 2006, the Paris III conference was organized to raise funds to reconstruct the country’s economic infrastructure and to fuel production and growth. The Siniora administration wanted “to undertake economic reforms to stimulate the economy in the aim of creating a state of confidence with the international political and economic community – with both state actors and private investors – because the country needs important foreign financial aid to reinvigorate its economy” (Cristiani, 2007). But the Lebanese state failed to stimulate such domestically-generated economic recovery and inevitably succumbed to relying on the economic assistance of Western countries. Evidently, the Lebanese state views external actors as the best exit strategy in an economic crisis.

Hezbollah reinvigorates its securitized rhetoric on the basis of the state’s economic weakness and fuels securitisation by deeming state policies designed to repair the Lebanese economy through foreign aid as illegitimate. In the aftermath of the July 2006 war, on 4 January 2007, the Siniora Cabinet and the March 14 coalition called for a new package of economic reforms. The government was all ready to implement these reforms when Hezbollah intervened with claims that the package was unconstitutional and that any economic recovery program required national consensus. Furthermore, Hezbollah sabotaged the implementation of the state’s post-war welfare program by refusing to work in unison. In a way, Hezbollah operated as a political opposition party would in a conflict-free setting by refuting the legitimacy of a government proposal. Yet it simultaneously acted as a counter-securitizing, anti-system actor by blocking the implementation and legitimization of a government proposal. Finally, it associated the recovery package with a foreign plot against the people of Lebanon, underlining its ties to Western finances. In this way, Hezbollah enhanced the prevalence of securitized rhetoric in the public sphere.

The aftermath of the 2006 war also pitted Hezbollah against the government in its reconstruction efforts in many other ways. Within one week of the ceasefire, the organization’s construction arm, Jihad al-Binaa, was back in operation (“Southern Lebanese see Jihad al Binaa as ‘helping hand’”, 2007). It kept water flowing and hospitals open, as well as surveying all the damage in Southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs (2007). The *Waad* (Promise), a special project developed under the auspices of Jihad al-Binaa, was quickly established to oversee the rebuilding of Beirut’s suburbs. Hezbollah took matters into its own hands to bypass the perceived corruption and nepotism that characterized the existing state system. The movement reaped great benefits from appearing to be the key benefactor of the reconstruction process, rather than the government. This was particularly important given that otherwise Hezbollah could have been seen as having perpetrated the destruction that then had to be cleaned up by government, which would have jeopardized Hezbollah’s image as the sole force within the system championing the Shiite cause.

The *Waad* is part of an intricate web of NGOs that was established by Hezbollah to increase Shiite dependence on the party. Although NGOs are not completely independent of Hezbollah, they are given a substantial amount of autonomy in deciding which projects to fund, thus creating a feeling of participation within the Shiite community. Organizations including al-Shahid (the Martyrs), as-Mu’ssasa al-Tarbawiyya (the Educational Institute) and the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD) all provide material aid to their beneficiaries. In addition, they offer recognition and a sense of belonging within an Islamic world of meaning (Hala Islamiyya). This has great social importance, generating a strong collective identity amongst their supporters and collaborators that is used by Hezbollah to further justify the perpetual threat of securitization (Harb and Leenders, 2005).

Hezbollah’s international connections enhance the notion of a parallel Hezbollah state, strengthening the argument of a state within a failing state. Yet this image may only find validity in an atmosphere of high tension and securitization. While the government was still working to secure aid money from foreign powers, Hezbollah was able to dip into vast Iranian funds, enabling it to set-up a reconstruction plan well ahead of the government (Cambanis, 2006). In a ceasefire speech, Hezbollah leader Sheik Nasrallah declared that “we cannot, of course, wait for the government and its heavy vehicles and machinery be-

cause they could be a while” (Kifner, 2006). While Hezbollah was able to swiftly meet the population’s immediate needs, including housing and compensation for losses, the government embarked on longer term reconstruction plans targeting national infrastructure and economic measures (‘Lebanon: On the Road to Reconstruction and Recovery’, 2007).

Before the war, in a Lebanese survey conducted by the International Centre for Human Sciences in Byblos, Hassan Nassrallah was rated as the second-most popular leader in the country after Michel Aoun of the Free Patriotic Party (Hanf, 2007: 29). By the end of the 2006 war, observers noted a rise in that ranking. Rami G. Khouri of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut wrote that Sheik Nasrallah, in his ceasefire speech, “seemed to take on the veneer of a national leader rather than the head of one group in Lebanon’s rich mosaic of political parties” (Khouri, 2006). Hezbollah also earns the title of a state within a state because of its independent and often underground economy, which promotes further securitization between the movement and the state establishment. Shiites living abroad provide extensive support through remittances from Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the United States. The combination of strong internal manpower, external political backing from Iran and Syria, and successful independent fundraising for their military wing give Hezbollah a significant autonomy from the state, leading one female inhabitant of a southern suburb to assert: “I feel that Hezbollah is the government. They protect us” (Cambanis, 2006).

d. Hezbollah arms: Cycle of securitization in Lebanon

The ongoing Hezbollah arms issue is a source of securitization in Lebanese politics in a dual sense. Hezbollah has a strong military branch and quickly emerged as Lebanon’s most powerful armed group. The movement’s armament securitized its relations with the Lebanese state and the state’s inefficiency in combating this phenomenon created an impetus among other Lebanese groups to acquire weapons and recruit militias. This dual nature of armament in Lebanon established a cycle of securitization in Lebanon whereby politicians mobilize resources and build militias to be activated in times of communal strife. Once the situation stabilizes, these armed groups are suspended until the next crisis. An example of this securitization cycle occurred during the dramatic May 2008 events in Beirut, when Hezbollah directly opposed the government’s decisions through violent means, bringing the country once again to the brink of civil war.

After the Hezbollah-led attack on west Beirut, a group operating as a private security firm soon appeared to counter the Shiite group (Borzou and Rafei, 2008). The group is aligned with the Sunni Future Movement headed by Saad Hariri, who has disbursed millions of dollars in building a militia to “create a balance of terror”, protecting Sunni interests, and countering the Hezbollah armed movement (2008). It is noteworthy that the rise of this Sunni militia is directly linked to a regional Sunni axis, which encompasses Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. These events have dramatically altered the discussion of security in Lebanon. For the first time since the end of the civil war in Lebanon, and as Hezbollah departed from its original call for resistance solely against foreign forces, arms have been used by internal actors, turning them against each other. Once such militia groups are established, it becomes almost impossible to return to the previous situation. The armament of social groups against one another is a clear indication of increasing securitization, which renders a peaceful solution very difficult.

The May 2008 confrontation, which started with Hezbollah’s aggressive takeover of west Beirut, proved that Hezbollah’s actions are advancing within Lebanon’s highly securitized environment. After the conflict ended and a ceasefire was reached, Hezbollah justified its actions as being a necessary measure to protect the party, and by extension, the Shiite population at large. This example proves that de-securitization is a difficult process in the Lebanese context. With new rules being established to defend Hezbollah’s actions, the securitized environment is perpetuated by reframing newly-emerging obstacles always within the same existential questions related to Shiite identity and their underprivileged status within the Lebanese polity.

On the other hand, the failure of state institutions, especially in providing security, has created an opportunity for the ascension of non-political actors through their efforts to replace the state, guarantee security for their communities, and fill the socio-economic vacuum by providing charity services. The essence of the problem is the mutual Hezbollah-state securitization of the issue, which has raised the tension between these two actors. The state establishment’s failure to counter Hezbollah military operations has paved the

way for the militarization of already deteriorating factional politics in Lebanon. It also motivates the state's alignment with some societal groups against Hezbollah. However, there is no guarantee that these groups will continue as allies and will not turn against the state in the future.

Part IV Conclusion and Recommendations

In both Lebanon and Turkey, the interaction between state and anti-system parties securitizes the political ground and narrows the boundaries of normal politics. Although there are differences between the political systems operating in Turkey and Lebanon, the securitization relations between anti-system parties and the state help us to understand the state-society tensions and security-dominated politics that characterise the two political contexts. Once the political agenda has become swamped by security concerns, the role of political actors in de-securitization efforts is limited, whether they are system or anti-system parties. The situation gets even more complex with the inclusion of system parties, civil society, security elites, and international actors. The internal situation in Turkey and Lebanon has serious implications for EU policies toward the Mediterranean region. The large Turkish and Kurdish populations in European countries have also made the Kurdish issue an internal problem for the EU. Relations between the state and the anti-system Kurdish party not only find expression in Turkey but also quickly extend to countries like Germany, France, and Holland due to the presence of an active Kurdish diaspora in these countries.

The securitization of state relations with anti-system parties creates domestic disorder, strengthens and sharpens the positions of security elites, limits the problem-solving capacity of civilian political elites, and advances a security-oriented agenda over democracy and democratization. In countries like Lebanon and Turkey, security is seen as a domestic issue; yet the internal security context is also related to regional and international security. For example, the Kurdish question in Turkey influences the country's relations with almost all its neighbours, as well as its EU membership process. The EU has created new mechanisms and policy tools to engage with countries in neighbouring zones. Its most influential policy instrument is the membership process itself. The EU issues criteria for membership, progress reports to follow-up on developments, and political check lists to guide certain policies in candidate countries. We will now outline a number of policy recommendations for EU policy-makers in a bid to facilitate solutions to state versus anti-system party problems in Lebanon and Turkey and to address the cross-border impacts of the related insecurities existing in these countries.

Turkey

- The EU has played an important role in the promotion of cultural and linguistic rights in Turkey, yet the Turkish state resists implementing these reforms. There is an urgent need for the EU to ensure their implementation and closely monitor this process through progress reports, which should also seek to identify the obstacles being encountered. One way to strengthen the EU's observation of reform implementation is to look beyond formal legal changes and pay close attention to the bureaucratic mechanisms and regulations potentially hindering progress. For example, although the Turkish state television (RTUK) recently launched a Kurdish channel, major bureaucratic barriers to full language rights remain: RTUK and the Turkish police strictly monitor Kurdish-language broadcasting, and there are court cases against the Kurdish broadcasting of GUN Television over the wording of Kurdish songs.

The Turkish state pays lip service to the language and cultural rights demanded by the EU and the Kurds of Turkey. The securitization of these rights has allowed the security-oriented state apparatus to develop an argument of Turkish exceptionalism, which is built upon an exaggerated perception of the threat of separation. The Turkish state's attitude tends to view language and cultural rights as mere nationalist fantasies of Kurdish separatists, and thus not of much importance. As such, EU policy-makers should not tone down their significance vis-à-vis the Turkish bureaucratic state mechanism. Yet even if the EU and the Turkish state bureaucracy manage to reach common ground on this issue, the problem will not disappear. Kurdish politicians will maintain the demand for these rights alive and will not hesitate to securitize the issue if they feel unsatisfied with reform measures. A better way to deal with this would be to make sure that the EU criteria for language and cultural rights is part and parcel of integral European values and political principles, and not simply a bureaucratic measure bound to the membership process. The advances made by Turkey in the realm of language and cultural rights have been noted in a number of past progress reports. However, the state's overall performance on this issue far from satisfies the EU objectives. While it is important to recognize progress, EU policy-makers should develop observation mechanisms to follow the implementation of the reforms.

- In addition to observation mechanisms, the EU should support civil initiatives to encourage the participation of civil society in the promotion of language and cultural rights. Civil society involvement may also be helpful in the development of educational programs on multi-culturalism and minority and language rights. The security-oriented state discourse dominates popular culture, the media, and education. EU support for civil society initiatives at various levels may help transform the resistant political culture and facilitate the implementation of reforms.

The EU should become more active in this matter. The EU, the Turkish state, and Kurdish politicians should aim to create a common discourse that provides an escape from the vicious circle of securitizing moves. They should find a way to work together in an effort to engage with the problem in a more constructive way. Any new discourse should be non-hegemonic, flexible, civilian, and peace-oriented, in such a way that it manages to satisfy both the security concerns of the state and the demands of the Kurdish population. This fresh approach should reconcile the security concerns of individuals and society with those of the state. Such an approach is likely to solve the deep-rooted democracy/security dilemma in favour of democracy, which will ultimately produce greater security. This is the outcome that best conforms to the European agenda for candidate countries.

- EU policy-makers should actively engage in discussions surrounding the closure of the DTP, as they did in the case of the AK Party closure. One of the most upsetting political issues as regards EU relations with Turkey has been the Turkish judiciary's intervention in politics, specifically the party closure cases, which dominated the political agenda for a long time and veered Turkey away from the reform process.

The EU could potentially play a role as a broker between the Turkish state and Kurdish politicians, though not necessarily as a classic negotiator. Certain segments of the Turkish state and Kurdish politics consider EU membership an ideal solution to the problem. In this perspective, EU membership would guarantee Turkey's national security, as well as legitimate the Kurdish demands. Since the EU has significant leverage over pro-EU groups in Turkey, EU policy-makers should explore this advantage in regulating relations between the state and Kurdish parties. The EU should orient the state towards widening the legitimate borders of the national political space to include legitimate Kurdish demands. It could also seek to influence Kurdish politics to become a genuinely democratic actor in providing a voice for Kurdish demands at large. The Kurdish representation should be persuaded to meet the acceptable norms for political parties in Europe.

The EU has long been a supporter and believer in the AK Party's potential for bringing about reform – a stance made clear during the AK Party's closure case. The EU should, however, avoid creating the perception that its support for the AK Party is a given. EU support should be based on the condition that the AK Party continues to be a fervent promoter of democratic reform processes in Turkey. In keeping with this line, the AK Party should also be persuaded to assume a firm stance against the DTP's closure, on the grounds that it is a democratic actor, thereby hopefully improving its relations with Kurdish politicians. The AK Party's stance against the DTP closure will be a litmus test of its democratic credentials.

- In the EU's 2008 Progress Report, Turkey's foreign policy efforts with respect to Northern Iraq were deemed positive. The Report acknowledged Turkey's recent attempts at dialogue with the Kurdish regional government, as well as Turkey's active regional diplomacy with Iraq's neighbours. Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq did not face criticism from the EU on the grounds that approval for these cross-border operations had been given by the democratically elected parliament. However, at the centre of that decision laid the military's belief in the use of the armed forces to confront the armed Kurdish resistance. The EU should have been more vehement about the importance of political solutions to the Kurdish problem at large and should have demanded greater accountability and justification for cross-border operations. A military tone dominated the discussion of the Kurdish question both before and after the operations, and the government clearly followed a pro-military line in its approach to the Kurdish question. This political and military consensus kept the tools for a political solution out of the public agenda and marginalized those groups advocating for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

At this point, the EU should use its leverage to influence Kurdish politicians to adopt a more constructive position on the situation in northern Iraq. The crucial nuance here is about how to deal with the PKK. The DTP obviously does not share the state's military approach, but the issue is that the DTP fails to even define the PKK as a problem. As long as the DTP maintains this stance, its policies will lack legitimacy. By recognising that the PKK presents a problem, the DTP may finally be able to establish a dialogue with at least some segments of the strong pro-military coalition. To this end, the DTP should be persuaded to broaden its constituency and avoid alienating its democratic supporters within Turkish society and EU policy circles. If the DTP isolates itself from the EU reform agenda and liberal segments of Turkish society, it will risk its presence in the national political system and is likely to become marginalized as an ethno-nationalist party.

Lebanon

As is now well documented, Hezbollah rests upon two pillars – its military wing and its socio-economic agenda. The latter has gained prominence in recent years, not least in the aftermath of the 2006 war. While the United States, Israel, Canada, and the Netherlands generally label it a terrorist organization, the United Kingdom and Australia distinguish between the two pillars and only brand the military wing as terrorist. The reality is arguably that as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict persists, Hezbollah will remain armed. Israel is, after all, the organization's *raison d'être*. The group was created as a resistance movement against Israel and, as illustrated by the July 2006 war, the anti-Israeli sentiment is still intense. It is thus necessary to distinguish between the group's two arms when dealing with Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's relationship with the Lebanese political system is curious. Throughout the post Ta'if era, Hezbollah was deliberately kept separate from the national executive political process, which meant that the movement's institutions grew in divergence to the post Ta'if state institutions. Subsequently, so did its contingency. The enormous distrust felt between the government and Hezbollah, evident throughout the reconstruction process following the July 2006 war, resulted from the absence of the political leverage previously provided by the Syrians.

The armed presence of a non-state resistance force provides a unique challenge to security sector reform in Lebanon. The possibility of Hezbollah's disarmament has broad regional implications and remains highly politicized. Questions regarding who is to set the terms of disarmament and who stands to benefit are difficult to assess within the Lebanese context of a conglomeration of interests. The political ramifications of disbanding Hezbollah's militia remain high however, seeing as attempts to force disarmament will be futile and counter-productive, only serving to antagonize the Shiite community. Hezbollah's arms have long been considered the "great equalizer" in the otherwise unfair political make-up under the confessional system (Choucair, 2006: 11).

- Actors such as the EU should adopt a more comprehensive approach to Hezbollah that transcends the deep-rooted political divisions and incorporates an overall understanding of the evolution and implications of the Shi'a position within the Lebanese system. Such a process requires a concrete understanding of the Shi'a aspirations that led to their political activism from the 1960s until today.
- Evidently, the Shi'a in Lebanon always benefited the least from the state. While that may not necessarily mean that they are the most disenfranchised in comparison to other sects, it does indicate that their public directives – via Hezbollah – have the weakest sense of belonging to state institutions. The Jihad Al-Binaa affair was an economic reflection of this. The fragile relationship could be repaired with the help of external forces such as the EU, and such an improvement would definitely imply a sustainable, more inclusive economy, and thus greater stability in Lebanon. A means of establishing the fundamental trust factor would be to increasingly include Hezbollah in state affairs, notably in the economic sphere.
- It is necessary to provide economic incentives to reconcile Hezbollah's financial infrastructure with Lebanon's formal economy. This may be achieved by giving Hezbollah a stake in the country's banking system, which would encourage the organization to formalize at least part of its financial affairs.

- A key reason behind Lebanon's inability to develop its economy has been its heavy reliance on external funding as a source of finance, rather than domestic production. Indeed, as was described earlier in this paper, the rapid expansion of the country's service sector to the detriment of its tertiary sector resulted in an income cleft, with the brunt of stagnation being primarily borne by the Shi'a of rural areas. External actors, such as the EU, should work in conjunction with the Lebanese state and Hezbollah to develop agriculture, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and industrial zones in rural areas, which are inhabited by large Shi'a communities. This would provide jobs and encourage local actors to set-up their own businesses, which would in turn provide an entry into the formal economy. In order to promote such a move, the EU must improve conditions in Shi'a areas without challenging Hezbollah's political, cultural, and religious grip over them.
- Such a process would naturally lead to at least a partial reversal of the urbanization and brain drain phenomena. By working towards the true development of these impoverished and marginalized areas, any EU initiatives would gradually forge a "formalization" of the Shi'a political economy and inevitably promote the further inclusion of its produce and structure in the formal economy and state institutions of Lebanon.
- The EU and the international community also need to encourage the different Lebanese groups to develop a common national security agenda that takes into consideration the military wing of Hezbollah. The unwillingness of the international community to acknowledge Hezbollah has had serious domestic implications and led to increased polarization. At the same time, the international community needs to support the Lebanese military by arming it and providing training to ensure that it can handle external and local challenges.

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Firat Anlı, DTP Diyarbakir Mayor for Yenisehir District, 8 August 2008.

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
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