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The EU and the African Peace and Security Architecture

Introduction

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has evolved at a remarkable pace in the six years since the establishment of the African Union (AU). Underpinned by a strong interventionist commitment in the AU charter it offers a real prospect of African solutions to African problems. The European Union has been heavily involved in the successful development of APSA to date and has made a firm commitment to remain so.

In recent times humanitarianism has emerged as the driving force behind European efforts towards Africa. This phenomenon, most notably expressed in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report *Responsibility to Protect*, was inspired by the experience of genocide in Rwanda and strengthened by the crisis in Sudan. In parallel, over the last decade African states have become more active in seeking their own solutions to the challenges they face.

The peace and security architecture in Africa has evolved over the last forty years. The most significant steps have been taken since the establishment of the African Union in 2002. The AU has moved away from the approach taken by its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity – of absolute respect for national sovereignty, to one where the duty to protect and the right to intervene are enshrined in the constitutive act.¹

What is APSA?

African Peace and Security Architecture describes the various elements developed, or in development, by the African Union (and some regional organisations) to bring about peace and security on the continent. The structure, as set out below, provides for a political decision making body (the Peace and Security Council [PSC]), an intelligence gathering and analysis centre (the Continental Early Warning System [CEWS]) a military element (the African Standby Force [ASF] and Military Staff Committee [MSC]), an external mediation and advisor body (the Panel of the Wise [POW]) and a special fund to cover costs (the Peace Fund). The different elements are intended to provide a comprehensive set of tools for addressing the security concerns of the continent by African actors. The PSC receives advice and information from the POW,

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¹ www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm. The Constitutive Act is the constitutional treaty of the AU.

CEWS and Military Staff Committee and then instructs the ASF on the actions it deems necessary.


The PSC is composed of fifteen members who change either every two or three years, legitimising and coordinating the actions of all the other elements of the architecture. The PSC is the central organ of APSA. The POW is one of the most innovative elements of APSA and acting on the instruction of the PSC, the Chairperson of the AU Commission or at their own initiative, the POW will undertake action in support of PSC objectives and give opinions on issues surrounding peace and security. In practice this is likely to mean mediating between warring groups or in situations where a conflict looks likely. It may also involve a behind the scenes role of raising issues with the PSC that are too politically sensitive for active politicians to handle. Using open source information the CEWS compiles reports using software adapted from the European early warning system. The reports identify potentially dangerous activity and are then passed to Early Warning analysts who decide on the level of gravity and potential consequences from events identified.

The African Standby Force is still in the early stages of being established, but is being designed to take the role of an African Rapid Reaction force capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. The force is based on and divided into 5 regions, North, South, East, West and Central and will draw on military and civilian resources from a combination of some or all of these regions. Each region, when able, will provide a brigade available to be deployed under one of the six scenarios envisaged for deployment of the ASF:

- Military advice to a political mission – deployed within *thirty* days of an African Union resolution.
- Observer mission to be deployed alongside a UN mission – deployed within *thirty* days of an AU mission.
- A stand alone observer mission – deployed within *thirty* days of an AU mission.
- Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment and peace building – deployed within *thirty* days of an AU mission.
- Complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Complete deployment within *ninety* days and military elements within *thirty*.
- Intervention by AU when international community fails to act, for example over genocide – deployment within *fourteen* days.²

Each region will have regional headquarters and planning elements to support the work of their brigades. As will be discussed later in the paper, exact regional structures will vary depending on regional circumstances.

² Cilliers and Malan (2005), *Progress with the African Standby Force*, ISS Paper, 98 May, p3.



Organogram showing the relationship between different elements of the APSA

EU involvement in African Security

In December 2005, the EU adopted its Africa Strategy the aim of which is to “support Africa’s efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and make Europe’s partnership with Africa more efficient”.³ Much of the EU’s involvement is in terms of financial support channeled through the European Development Fund (EDF) which, as a formal EU mechanism under the EU’s first pillar (which covers most areas of the EU’s Single Market – excluding taxation –, but includes external trade policy and EU foreign assistance), comes primarily under the direct control of the European Commission.

The new EU strategy also recognizes the central role that peace and security play in achieving development goals and commits the European Union to supporting the development of APSA. The Africa-EU strategic partnership adopted at Lisbon 2007 makes peace and security one of the central issues for cooperation.⁴ The EU is involved

³ http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/europe-cares/africa/eu_strategy_en.html

⁴ http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Noticias_Documentos/20071209PARCEST.htm

directly in promoting security in Africa, with Common Foreign and Security Policy-mandated EU missions to African countries, such as the mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Chad and the Central African Republic, or the initiative by EUPOL (the EU's new effort to support the development of police capacity in key countries such as Afghanistan) to help develop police capacity in Kinshasa, and indirectly through financial and technical support to African actors. These EU military missions are financed through the Athena Mechanism, a special fund that is used to finance EU military or defence operations. The mechanism meets common costs such as communications or headquarters, but operational costs are the responsibility of the participating Member States.

In terms of APSA, EDF money may be used for conflict prevention, but not for anything with lethal implications. This means that, if the African Peace Facility is financed out of the EDF, these funds may not be used to provide military hardware to African missions.⁵

The new African Peace and Security Architecture has grown out of previous attempts to create a stable and peaceful continent. A major influence on its development has been the principle of African solutions for African problems, epitomised by the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. African states have a variety of motivations for participating in peacekeeping operations. South Africa intervened in Lesotho for the sake of regional stability, and in the DRC to bolster its position as a leading African nation. Uganda sees advantages in deploying to Somalia in support of US anti-terrorism concerns, while Rwanda's interest in Darfur is motivated by their experience of Genocide. Some states will join a mission to generate funds for their armed forces and some for more idealistic ends. Europe's role in peacekeeping has moved towards support for African missions and short-term interventions, like Operation Artemis, rather than contributing troops to long-term operations. Individual Member States, the UK and France in particular, continue to be involved in certain countries, but interventions are increasingly being "Europeanised".

Artemis

It seems likely that future direct involvement by European troops in African peace and security will follow the model set by Operation Artemis. This mission to the Ituri region of the DRC was launched in June 2003, with the aim of stabilising the region in order that a reinforced UN presence could take over. (The short term bridging role of EU troops is again in evidence with the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission⁶). UN Security Council Resolution 1484⁷, adopted in May 2003, mandated an Interim Emergency Multinational Force to stabilise Bunia. Following a feasibility study by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU Council adopted a joint action plan for a mission to the DRC and France was appointed "Framework" nation⁸. The mission was pushed by the UK and France with Germany supporting. This mission was significant for a number of reasons; it was the EU's first

⁵ *Africa: What will it finance*

http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/africa/what_finance/index_en.htm

⁶ EU Council Secretariat, *Background: EU military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic*, January 2008

⁷ Security Council Resolution 1484 available at:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/377/68/PDF/N0337768.pdf?OpenElement>

⁸ Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" In *International Peacekeeping*, vol.11 no.3 Autumn 2004, p512.

autonomous mission outside Europe, it adopted the “lead nation” principle, and worked to a very short timescale.

When Artemis came to an end and EU forces handed over to MONUC (UN mission in Congo) it was generally considered to have achieved its objectives. Although there was some criticism that the limited focus on Bunia town had allowed militias to simply spread into the surrounding countryside, this is more a criticism of the parameters of the operation than of the results it achieved on the ground.

Sudan

Missions are ongoing in both Sudan and Somalia. AMIS – the African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur) –, originally established as a monitoring mission in 2004, was subsequently expanded to become a peacekeeping mission with a wider focus. As a wholly African-run mission, AMIS can offer lessons for the future vis-à-vis identifying areas of strength and weakness in security operations as we move towards exclusively African operations.

With only around 7,000 troops in Darfur the mission has been seriously stretched. It has also been constrained by a weak mandate that prevents it from taking a more assertive role in *imposing* peace. AMIS has been financially supported through the EU’s African Peace Facility (APF), although some at the AU blamed slowness in releasing EU funds as a reason why troops in Darfur have at times received their wage payments late. The APF is funded through the European Development Fund so these funds may not be used for actions with potentially lethal consequences. Although most requirements of AMIS are met through the APF, those at the AU responsible for organising AMIS bemoan the restrictions that the EU places on the funds.

These constraints led to the decision to “re-hat” the mission as UNAMID (United Nations/African Union mission in Darfur) under UN Security Council Resolution 1769. The new UN-led mission will, at the insistence of Sudan, remain primarily an African force. Troop levels should rise to 26,000 but the relatively weak mandate may mean that the mission will continue to have trouble pacifying Darfur.⁹

The difficulty in getting the Sudanese government to accept a multinational force with a strong mandate might point to future problems when AU missions seek to intervene in complicated internal disputes. Although the AU has an interventionist mandate it does, nevertheless, constitute a collaboration between fifty-three nations; and, if one or more of them feel that an intervention could potentially threaten their own position, they can dilute the action agreed upon. After the attack on AU troops, some contributing nations, perhaps understandably, appeared reluctant to continue; something that does not bode well for future missions¹⁰.

As more African conflicts are addressed by African actors, the involvement of the EU is likely to become more focused on financing and technical support rather than direct intervention. EU troops will continue to play a role in short-term missions, preparing the ground and providing technical assistance for UN or AU missions to follow. ECOMOG has been adopted as a continental model for the ASF brigades but as seen in Sudan, African capacity remains limited. It is possible that AU missions will re-hat under the

⁹ Security council resolution 1769 establishing UNAMID can be found at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁰ IOL Online, *Senegal warns it may withdraw from Darfur* 1 October 2007 http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=nw20071001200546678C401979&set_id=1&click_id=136&sf
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UN if they develop into long-term operations but it remains difficult to find a ready supply of African troops of sufficient readiness and with appropriate equipment including heavy lift aircraft and helicopters for the most dangerous situations. When African states see that a peace process is failing to produce results, as in Somalia, they can calculate that the risk to their personnel is too great and be reluctant to get involved.

What is holding the AU back

The EU supports many aspects of the APSA, and the development of an African capacity in the field of Peace and Security is seen as a priority for the future¹¹. APSA compliments CFSP regarding promotion of stability and security. While money for operations is crucial, its long-term success also depends on solving the problems with staffing and back room capacity. Europe can help the CEWS with software and expertise, but without well trained and experienced analysts, its impact will be limited. Likewise, the POW is an innovative opportunity to pre-empt problems, but if its secretariat is overwhelmed or under funded its ability to provide useful advice will be compromised.

A key element of the AU decision making process should involve the advice that the PSC receives from the Military Staff Committee¹². Yet, since the death of the Nigerian chair almost two years ago the MSC has lacked leadership and has met only infrequently. In addition, the already stretched national militaries are understandably reluctant to second top staff to Addis Ababa, as they see this as detracting from national priorities. Without regular contact with military professionals the politicians on the PSC are in danger of making decisions that are operationally suspect. This is an area where APF funds could be targeted, helping to ensure staff of suitable rank are available in Addis Ababa to provide advice to the PSC, in much the same way the EU plans to provide the means for liaison officers from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), to be based in Addis Ababa. It may also be an area where seconding EU experts to support the MSC would be helpful.

At the centre of the AU's problems in delivering effective peace and security programmes is capacity constraint. Something as crucial as paying serving troops on time has proved to be difficult during the current mission in Sudan¹³. Many people complained in interviews that support services such as the finance and human resources departments are simply not able to cope with their workloads. While EU capacity-building support has mainly been targeting elements of the Peace and Security Department, if the frontline is to be effective the backroom departments need to be supported as well.

Lack of military equipment and a reluctance to risk scarce resources remains a key constraint for many countries. The support that Nigerian troops received from the United States in preparation for their mission to Liberia in 2003 ensured they were properly equipped, and so able to deploy in Monrovia. EU Member States could perhaps take a similar approach and bilaterally provide the helicopters, armoured

¹¹ 'Africa-EU strategic partnership'

¹² PSC Protocol, Article 13 paragraph 8-12.

¹³ Response by UK International Development Secretary Hillary Benn to question on AU capacity in Darfur 19 December 2006

<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061219/text/61219w0013.htm>

personnel carriers and other hardware that Ghana, Nigeria and Malawi might need to work effectively in Somalia.

The AU is trying to deal with almost every aspect of life on the continent, yet its staff is small, of variable aptitude and its most effective members are swamped under an ever growing workload. Superficially, the AU looks like an African version of the EU, but it is built on different foundations and operates in a radically different, and more difficult, environment. Understanding the realities of the AU should enable EU money to be better targeted at those areas where it can be deployed most usefully. Key to the success of any project is not just the finance for frontline operations but the quality of the structures underpinning them. Providing a reliable and consistent source of funds, over the long-term, for the employment by the AU of key people in these backroom service areas could be highly beneficial.

Regional disconnects and brigades

The development of APSA is heavily dependant on the "buy in" of the Regional Economic Communities, because without regional cooperation there will be no African Standby Force and the CEWS and POW will be severely weakened.

- West Africa stands out as the region that has done most to meet the APSA timetable and looks likely to be the most effective region in terms of peace and security for some time.
- Southern Africa has potential to support APSA although in practical terms it has some way to go.
- East Africa has overcome some obstacles to put architecture in place albeit in a limited manner.
- Central Africa has made limited progress: the political fragility of the region and lack of a strong regional body mean this area would benefit from external help.
- North Africa could make a significant contribution as the best equipment and resources are at its disposal. Despite tension within North Africa and competing demands for its attention on Middle East issues, the region has made some progress towards the APSA goals.

There are five regions designated by the AU for the purposes of APSA, but these do not correspond directly with the existing eight Regional Economic Communities. For example, East Africa has the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC); neither organisation has a security element, or a comprehensive regional membership. Responsibility for coordinating the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG), drawn from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea, Seychelles, Madagascar and Rwanda was given to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but the latter three countries are not members of IGAD so a new EASBRIG mechanism has had to be established¹⁴.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) both have a security arm within their structure. Tanzania, which is a member of the EAC and SADC is listed as a member of EASBRIG, yet Tanzania is also a signatory of the memorandum establishing the SADC

¹⁴ *Memorandum of understanding on the establishment of an East African Standby Brigade:*
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/easbrig/mouapr05.pdf

Brigade¹⁵. Angola, another member of SADC and signatory of the SADC Brigade memorandum is seen as a key state in the Central African Brigade. It may take some time before the exact make up of the brigades becomes clear. These regional incoherencies need not mean that the peace and security architecture cannot be established, but it will make it harder. Moves to rationalise the regional organisations have been discussed. For the new Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the EU wants to deal with African regional groupings, rather than individual states, and has expressed its hope that the REC structure will be rationalised.

It is important that the EU recognises the special role of regional leaders, South Africa and Nigeria in particular, and works closely with them to achieve common goals, while sensitively negotiating regional politics. Despite the ambivalence of some African states to those countries taking a lead role they will continue to be the most important regional players and will normally be the countries in Africa most able to provide the equipment, manpower and finance for APSA.

Continued support of the RECs by the EU is important, particularly those that are doing well in developing APSA. And while the desire to rationalise the regions for the EPAs is understandable, letting Africa develop its own regional arrangements is an important part of the new partnership.

Developments in the EU's role

The EU has been central to the success of the AU to date; its support for the operation in Sudan is particularly prominent, but the capacity-building programme will, in the long run, help give APSA the human capacity to become fully operationalised. Member States can also play an important role in improving peace and security capacity on the continent. The CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), while still in the early stages of their evolution, can be used to great effect in Africa where support for African initiatives and even direct EU intervention could be crucial. The appointment of Koen Vervaeke as EU special representative to the AU is an important development in this relationship¹⁶. It signals a level of mutual respect and will hopefully increase understanding of the AU in Brussels and will improve the effectiveness of EU projects in Africa.

The appointment an EU special representative to the AU at the end of 2007 is to be welcomed¹⁷. This new appointment, with the right responsibilities, has the potential to play a very positive role. There are two key areas: at the level of political relations between the EU and Africa; and then in the area of distributing funds. The new special representative combines representing the Council and the Commission thereby streamlining the interface with Europe. His appointment signals to the AU that the partnership with Africa is being taken seriously in Brussels. The creation of a role at this senior level tasked with dealing exclusively with the AU should also serve to increase the level of understanding of the AU in Brussels.

¹⁵ *Memorandum of Understanding Amongst the Southern African Development Community Member States on the Establishment of a Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade*
www.sadc.int/news/news_details.php?news_id=1056

¹⁶ As is the appointment of General Pierre-Michel Joana as 'Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities' to Javier Solana.

¹⁷ Koen Vervaeke was appointed on the 5th December 2007.
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st13/st13814.en07.pdf>

Secondly, if the new representative is given discretionary power over funds it should enable money to be assigned, and paid, quickly and to the most pressing projects. At present, monies are assigned to specific projects; however, it is a somewhat rigid system, which allows little room for adaptation to changing circumstances.

The RECAMP (Reinforcing of African Peacekeeping capacities) initiative run by France since 1997 offers training support for African forces, and is generally regarded as a success. It provides training at an individual and operational level but also provides equipment support. There are moves to 'Europeanise' the financing of RECAMP while maintaining the structure put in place by France¹⁸. This will provide a direct way for the ESDP to become involved in training African troops, traditionally the training area is one in which European Member States have been very active and where their expertise and money can be used very effectively¹⁹, the development of an EU role in training is to be welcomed if it can bring greater coordination and perhaps the involvement of European nations not traditionally involved in Africa.

As stated earlier, the EU has taken an active interest in supporting APSA with the initial allocation of €250 million to the APF which has grown with further requests to €450 million, much of which has gone towards the AMIS mission. This seemingly large allocation of funds should be seen in proportion, the 9th EDF had a total budget of €13.5 billion and the 10th €22.7 billion²⁰. Questions of what exactly can be funded will need to be resolved if money from Europe is to be used in the most effective way. At the moment money from the APF can only be used in support of Peace Support Operations²¹. While it seems unlikely that the EU will be able to use EDF funds for direct military support, finding new ways to enable the direct funding of military development would be fruitful. For example, it might be helpful if EDF funds could be used in the future to help standardise military equipment. The need for the EU to find ways of supporting APSA that allow for a greater military element has been made by many who are involved with the AU. As the Athena mechanism for ESDP operations has shown, a special fund into which Member States can donate directly, coordinated by the EU, could be one solution.

It is also important to find a way to involve North African countries and South Africa in the APF as they are too developed to qualify for funding from the APF. Even with this constraint, the APF has not been unsuccessful; it has allowed AMIS to operate in very testing circumstances.

Parliaments and civil society

The Africa Strategy also committed the EU to engage with Africa at a civil society and Parliamentary level. To this end the EP and Pan-African Parliament have engaged in joint meetings, the most recent of which took place at the Lisbon summit. As will be explained, however, the Pan-African Parliament lacks the oversight power of the EP and so is restricted in the role it can play at present.

¹⁸ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st08/st08551-re02.en07.pdf>

¹⁹ For example German support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeper Training Centre in Ghana.

²⁰ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/92&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

²¹ *Africa: What will it finance*

http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/africa/what_finance/index_en.htm

Incorporated within the AU structure²², the Pan African Parliament (PAP) has existed since 2004. The 265 representatives who serve in the PAP are elected from within the national legislatures of fifty three African countries. The ability of the PAP to exercise democratic oversight is a key way in which AU institutions can be made more relevant to the needs of African people. In Africa, the gap between the representative and the represented is wide and the limited scope of the PAP's powers means it is, as yet, unable to carry out the level of oversight and legislative function of the European Parliament, for example. The EP is a good model for the PAP as it also began life as an indirectly elected body with few powers until, over time, it has developed a much greater say in EU policy-making. In the area of peace and security, however, this level of power and cohesion remains very limited: something the PAP might bear in mind.

The EU has committed itself to greater exchange with Africa at the Parliamentary level and to this end the EP and PAP addressed the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon last year. In preparation the EP and PAP met in Midrand (South Africa) in October 2007 before the Lisbon summit to draw up common positions.²³

Peace and security is a headline-grabbing issue, and, as such, with respect to the AU, has tended to be monopolised by the executive and has, so far, not been held up to full parliamentary scrutiny. To date, the PAP has not been invested with the powers to do more than offer advice on APSA. That advice lacks power as it comes from an indirectly elected body.

Giving the PAP powers to hold the executive to account, control budgets and exercise a vigorous oversight role would be beneficial. An assembly of ruling parties would not be conducive to effective oversight. The European Parliament with its experience of transitioning to a fully elected parliament with legislative powers could provide useful lessons for the PAP.

Other problems, such as the location of the parliament in South Africa while most other institutions are in Ethiopia will also need to be solved, either by relocation (very unlikely) or by the establishment of a fully functioning liaison office between the PAP and AU headquarters. The potential benefits to be gained from giving the PAP the power and resources to operate full oversight of APSA are great and the EU could assist this outcome both through advice and encouragement.

The European Parliament may be considered to have a natural relationship with the PAP and could do much to foster the development of it. Regular meetings between the two parliaments are a good starting point but other activities such as bringing PAP delegations to Strasbourg or Brussels to speak on African issues and return visits to Midrand (in South Africa) would further strengthen the relationship and perhaps give greater weight to issues raised by the PAP. The EP might want to look for ways it can help develop the capacity of the PAP secretariat to be effective in the peace and security spheres.

Civil society is involved at all stages and in all areas of APSA. Civil society works on the ground in post-conflict situations to try and reintegrate combatants or to campaign against small arms. These activities, while independent from the official APSA structure, are invaluable ways of making Africa a more peaceful place. In the past, private security actors have played an important role and will continue to play a part in

²² http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/protocol-panafrican-parliament.pdf

²³ <http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/News.aspx?ID=262>

African peace and security.²⁴ The private sector (particularly in the area of extractive industries) has at times been a contributing factor to the destabilisation of the continent, but the prosperity that can result from investment can serve to diminish the causes of conflict. How the APSA will interact with these elements will be interesting. While there is interaction between the official AU and REC structures and civil society this is an area that could be further developed. It is once again capacity constraints that prevent a fuller engagement with civil society.

Following the Cotonou agreement the EDF has expanded to incorporate civil society involvement both in forming policy and as recipients of monies²⁵. The EU commitment to supporting civil society through the EDF could help ensure viable long term solutions. Member States have been important partners for elements of civil society; the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa have received support from Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands²⁶ for example. This bilateral support for civil society is important and allows Member States to support projects that fall within their areas of expertise.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Lisbon summit in December 2007 marked a new stage in the partnership between the EU and Africa. African Peace and Security Architecture is at the heart of this partnership²⁷. Africa has made remarkable progress to be in such a position, just five years after the inception of the African Union. The ability to move so quickly is due to political will within the continent, but also the willingness of outside partners, particularly the EU and its Member States, to finance the setting up of APSA.

Successfully operationalising APSA offers the prospect of more African solutions to African challenges. APSA is a holistic approach to peace and security that recognises the importance of prevention and mediation as much as peacekeeping, hence the prominent place for Continental Early Warning and the Panel of the Wise. The adoption of the AU constitutive act and its commitment to intervention in extreme circumstances shows an acknowledgement that events such as Rwandan genocide should not happen again on African soil. It would be naïve to think that even a fully operationalised APSA will solve all African conflicts but it does offer a very good chance of improving security on the continent.

The emergence of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy for concerted EU action and as a forum for internal consultation and diplomatic communication demonstrates the development of the EU into an important global player on the political as well as economic front. Combined with the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU is now willing and able to carry out operations in diverse parts of the globe. CFSP is about more than just military missions, and the EU is committed to building a comprehensive approach to security that combines traditional dimensions of security with support for economic development, good governance and institutional strengthening in countries at risk. The connection between development and security in Africa is recognised in the use of European Development Fund monies for the African Peace Facility and in the EU's commitment to APSA. Although EU Member States are

²⁴ For example the recent announcement of the potential involvement of a French firm in policing Somali waters <http://voanews.com/english/2008-06-20-voa64.cfm>

²⁵ *The EDF in a Few Words*. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/fed_en.pdf

²⁶ http://www.iss.org.za/index.php?link_id=1&tmpl_id=3&slink_id=94&link_type=13&slink_type=12

²⁷ See *The Africa-EU Strategic partnership*

less willing than in the past to commit troops to UN missions, the development of EU military operations acting as precursors to longer-term missions means EU soldiers will continue to play a direct role in creating peace and stability.

Although progress in the five years since the AU was inaugurated has been impressive there is still much to do before APSA is fully operationalised. The readiness of the ASF brigades is primarily a regional political issue and there is little external actors can do to quicken their formation. However continued and expanded assistance in the areas of training and logistics to those that are more developed would be welcome. The AU is well funded by external partners but it could be from investment in improving backroom services. The EU could offer important long term support if a new mechanism could be found to finance activities that may carry lethal consequences. The importance being placed on the relationship by the EU is welcome; the appointment of an EU representative to the AU in Addis Ababa will strengthen this relationship further.

The commitment to civil society and parliamentary involvement is clear, at least on paper, from both sides. The Pan African Parliament may eventually play an important role in APSA but in the meantime the EP can use the PAP as an entry point for supporting the involvement of national parliaments in APSA. Civil society plays an important part in assessing and supporting APSA, both the AU and EU should try to find ways to make real the aspiration to involve civil society in peace and security. Focusing solely on the military aspects of peace and security risks neglecting the equally important part that non-military developments play in securing peace. It is to be hoped that parliamentary and civil society involvement will ensure this does not happen.

Recommendations

Operational issues

- *Military Logistics.* African militaries lack much of the hardware necessary for operations in support of APSA. EU Member States could, on a case by case basis, provide either funds or equipment directly to forces engaged in AU sanctioned peace and security operations. This problem is particularly acute with regards to helicopters and heavy lift capacity.
- *Direct assistance to most developed regional brigades.* Given that it seems unlikely that all regions will be ready with ASF brigades by 2010, assistance should be concentrated on those that are most likely to achieve this target, West, East and Southern Africa.
- *More attention on non-military aspects.* While military peacekeeping is the most high profile aspect of APSA, establishing the rule of law is central to the long term success of any mission. Support for police African Standby Force (ASF) units and the inclusion of human rights advisors with ASF missions would be a useful development.

Political relations

- *EU Ambassador.* The new Commission/CFSP representative to the AU, Koen Vervaeke, should be given a strong mandate with discretionary powers over funds. This will provide the EU with a well informed decision maker and help support initiatives that are most pressing and respond quickly to changing events.

Organisational structure

- *AU backroom capacity.* Without effective finance and human resource capabilities the efficacy of investment in operations, planning or early warning is reduced.
- *A standardised reporting system.* The EU as the major donor to the AU is well positioned to seek a standardised method of reporting back to donors. This will save time and increase the quality of reporting by AU staff.

Financial issues

- *New source of funding.* At present the APF is prevented from contributing towards potentially lethal ends, however the Athena mechanism could be a model for the EU to develop a special fund to finance African military needs in pursuit of APSA objectives.

Parliamentary

- *Support for the Pan African Parliament.* The PAP can play a central role in developing a democratic approach to APSA, however it will need long term financial and political support from the EP if it is to achieve this objective.
- *Firm commitment to inter parliamentary dialogue.* The EP can foster strong parliaments in Africa through a continued commitment to the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary forum.
- *Support Civil Society and national Parliaments' interaction with APSA.* Civil society and parliaments should play an important role in ensuring APSA remains on target and within mandate. However there is as yet little critical analysis of how national parliaments, civil society and APSA may best interact. The PAP may be well placed to promote and facilitate such consultation given its members are also members of national parliaments, and the EP might use its relationship with the PAP to encourage this.