

Soviet Foreign Policy under Gorbachev

Oles M. Smolansky*

Since March 1985, dramatic changes have taken place in the domestic affairs of the USSR. They are generally referred to in the West as *perestroika* (restructuring), *glasnost* (openness), and *demokratizatsiia*. Although generally less appreciated in the West, many important innovations have also been introduced into the Soviet approach to foreign policy as well.

For example, Mikhail Gorbachev's «New Thinking» is based on the concepts of «global interdependence» and «mutuality of security». The General Secretary argues that the revolution in science and technology has created a global interdependence, especially in economic matters but also in international politics. He insists, moreover, that the superpowers as well as other actors on the international arena cannot be secure if their respective rivals, for whatever reason, feel themselves or their interests to be threatened. Gorbachev goes on to suggest that the *politics* of international security are more important than its military aspects and that, in any event, questions of international security must be *negotiated* by the parties concerned. Finally, Gorbachev asserts that all international actors, including the USSR, must respect the legitimate interests of other nations.

Turning from theory to practice, it is widely recognized that Gorbachev's foreign policy has been more active, more pragmatic, and more flexible than that of his predecessors. Specifically, since 1985, the Soviet Union has tried hard to improve relations with the Western powers (particularly the United States), the People's Republic of China, and a number of prominent Third World countries.

Reasons behind change

It should be noted at the outset that Gorbachev's primary objective is to ensure the long-range security of the USSR by means of strengthening its economic and military potential. Everything he has said or done flows from this overriding necessity. Put differently, the driving force behind the General Secretary's pronouncements and actions is the realization that the military might of the Soviet Union - a «Grade A» superpower - rests on a «Grade C» economy which, in many respects, but especially with regard to high technology, is years behind those of the West. Moreover, because

* Lehigh University, Department of International Relations (USA).

of the ongoing technological revolution, the gap will continue to widen in the years and decades to come unless the USSR acts quickly and decisively. To recapitulate, Gorbachev is the first Kremlin leader to say publicly that, in order to retain its status as a military superpower, the Soviet Union must radically restructure and modernize its economy.

Gorbachev's decision to proceed with *perestroika* has inevitably affected both the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. Internally, the Kremlin is facing the problem of reallocation of resources. (By «resources» is meant not only capital but also advanced technologies and skilled manpower.) Traditionally, the scramble for resources pitted the formidable and technologically more advanced military sector against the generally backward civilian sector of the Soviet economy. In the past, the military always had the upper hand, for the USSR perceived itself as existing in an essentially hostile international system. However, if the productivity of the civilian sector is to be increased and if it is to have a chance to catch up with the technological revolution, it must be allocated greater resources. The latter can come only from the military sector. To effect the needed transformations, Gorbachev must convince all concerned, above all his military establishment, that the international climate has changed, that relations between the «socialist» and «capitalist camps» are being normalized, and that, as a result, Soviet security is no longer seriously threatened by outside forces. For this reason, and because the USSR must attract Western financial and technological assistance in order to proceed with *perestroika*, Gorbachev has set out to improve relations with the outside world and particularly with the Western powers.

Normalization of relations

As already noted, Gorbachev's foreign policy derives from, is determined by, and is subordinate to domestic economic priorities. For this reason, as part of his campaign to normalize relations with the outside world, the General Secretary has engaged in skillful diplomacy designed to promote Soviet interests through cooperation, rather than confrontation, with Moscow's capitalist rivals and adversaries. Among these, the United States continues to occupy a central place in Soviet foreign policy. This is not surprising because Washington holds the keys to solving many of Moscow's most pressing foreign and domestic problems. The most prominent among them are: reduction of the danger of nuclear war; reduction of military costs; access to capital and high technology; increase in trade; and alleviation and, possibly, resolution of some

regional conflicts (above all Afghanistan). The importance which Gorbachev attaches to US-Soviet relations and the extent of his willingness to accommodate Washington is reflected in Moscow's treatment of the three major issues, pressed by the Reagan Administration since 1981. They are: arms control, regional conflicts, and human rights. Also indicative of Gorbachev's priorities are both the positive tone which he has set for the summit meetings with President Reagan and the appointment of prominent «Americanists» (led by former Ambassador to the United States Anatolii Dobrynin) to key positions in the CPSU Secretariat and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Arms Control. One of Mikhail Gorbachev's main thrusts toward the «normalization» of Soviet-Western relations has been in the arms control area. The process of limiting the arms race is important to the General Secretary for several reasons. It provides him with a rationale for cutting Soviet military spending. It also helps create a more stable international environment which, in turn, facilitates the expansion of foreign economic relations (including trade) and is generally conducive to developing the civilian sector of the Soviet economy. Finally, the arms control process serves an important political purpose. As a major participant in it, the USSR is perceived as a co-guarantor of international peace and as a superpower which is militarily and politically an equal of the United States. (Though intangible, these status symbols have traditionally been important to the Soviet leaders.)

In order to be able to engage in meaningful arms control negotiations, Gorbachev has introduced important changes in Soviet military doctrine. The most far-ranging one has been the shift from offense to defense. Before 1985, the Soviet strategic military doctrine was based on offense or, more particularly, on the need to attack and to defeat the NATO forces in case of a war between the two blocs. Chronologically, after 1945, the Soviet military doctrine went through the following stages:

- «inevitability» of war in the 1940s and early 1950s;
- «possibility» of a nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s; and
- «mutual assured destruction» (MAD) in the 1970s and early 1980s.

During the first and second stages, it was generally assumed that, if World War III were to occur, the Warsaw Pact forces would attempt to overrun Western Europe. During the second stage, the United States would also be subjected to preemptive Soviet nuclear strikes. (The USSR acquired the capability to do so sometime in the early 1960s.) MAD made a nuclear war between the superpowers unlikely but a conventional war in Europe and the use of tactical nuclear weapons there were still held possible. If such a conflict were to take place, Soviet military doctrine envisaged offensive, rather than

defensive, actions. Since the mid-1980s, however, Gorbachev has called on the two blocs to alter their respective strategic doctrines and to gear them to the aims of defense. It is worth noting that his insistence on «reasonable sufficiency» (which, among other things, rejects the concept of numerical parity in missiles as well as in other weapons systems) has been challenged by some Soviet military leaders who have publicly argued that the USSR's military posture must rest on «defense sufficiency». Seemingly isoteric, the discrepancy revolves around a deep disagreement between Gorbachev and the generals over some of the vital issues of Soviet military doctrine.

Gorbachev's position paves the way for nuclear arms control treaties with the United States and, possibly, for the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe. According to the General Secretary, there are two approaches to protecting the national security of the USSR - increasing the levels of armaments on both sides or decreasing them but in such a way as to guarantee the security of both power blocs. Gorbachev has left no doubt that he favors the latter approach.

Gorbachev's flexibility helped achieve the first treaty in the history of US-Soviet relations which actually reduces the number of missiles in their respective nuclear arsenals, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, ratified by the US Congress in May 1988. Because it affected only intermediate-range ballistic missiles and because it decreased the overall nuclear arsenals of the superpowers by only 4 percent, the INF Treaty, *per se*, is not too important. Its significance lies in the fact that it constitutes a symbolic first step in the process of limiting the increasingly expensive and, to some, irrational buildup of nuclear weapons by both superpowers. The INF Treaty is also important because by signing it, the USSR has accepted the principle of asymmetrical reduction in a weapon system (the SS-20s) in which the Soviets enjoyed a numerical superiority.

As of this writing, negotiations on the reduction of the longer-range (including intercontinental) ballistic missiles - the so-called START talks - are continuing. It is much more difficult to achieve a breakthrough in these weapons categories because of the diversity of the types of missiles (cruise versus intercontinental; land-based mobile versus stationary; land-based versus air or submarine-launched, etc.) and because they constitute the core of each superpower's defense against a possible attack by its transoceanic rival. More specifically, although progress has been reported in the negotiations conducted at the May 1988 Moscow summit, the thorny question of verification of land and sea-based missiles remains unresolved. Particularly vexing has been the problem of relatively small, low-flying, and accurate submarine-launched

cruise missiles which can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Another issue has revolved around the type of intercontinental ballistic missiles which each superpower would be allowed to keep under the START agreement. The United States insists that the land-based missiles should be armed with no more than 3,300 warheads, an arrangement which would significantly reduce the Soviet Union's main strategic delivery system. Not surprisingly, the USSR wishes that ceiling to apply as well to the submarine-launched ICBMs, a strong suit of the US nuclear «triad». Last but not least, Moscow wants to curb Washington's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Reagan Administration has been equally adamant about excluding SDI from the START Treaty. (It might be noted parenthetically that the USSR is no longer concerned about the successful deployment of the SDI defense system. Even if it were physically possible for the United States to do so - by no means a certainty - Moscow says that it would respond by deploying various types of countermeasures, including additional ICBMs. Rather, the Kremlin has been worried about technological breakthroughs that may result from the SDI research. In addition, extending the superpower military rivalry into space would absorb massive resources, diverting them from the task of economic modernization in the USSR).

In any event, although some progress on the START Treaty was made during the Moscow summit, serious problems remain. Whether they can be solved before the end of the Reagan Administration remains to be seen. In the meantime, a desire to advance has been demonstrated by both sides and it can be reasonably assumed that efforts to move ahead in the nuclear arms reduction talks will continue in 1989 and beyond. The international community can but applaud the superpowers' commitment to limiting their respective nuclear arsenals. Equally worthwhile would be steps toward reducing the conventional forces of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact. Since the USSR and its allies enjoy a conventional advantage over their Western counterparts, the Kremlin would be wise to initiate the process by means of some unilateral cuts in the Warsaw Pact forces. (The precedent for reduction of asymmetrical forces, as noted, was accepted by the Soviets in the INF Treaty.) It is difficult to imagine that the NATO allies would fail to respond to such an initiative.

Regional Conflicts. Since December 1979, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan and installed in power the pro-Moscow regime of Babrak Karmal, events taking place in that Muslim, Third World country have periodically occupied the attention of the outside world. Not surprisingly, the conservative Reagan Administration placed Afghanistan at the top of its regional conflict agenda in negotiations with the Soviet leaders. No success had been recorded before 1985. However, after Gorbachev became General

Secretary of the CPSU, the Kremlin gradually recognized that the continuing war in Afghanistan had proved to be economically more costly than had been anticipated originally. It was also militarily embarrassing, as the «limited Soviet contingent» proved unable to crush the *mujahideen*, supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the People's Republic of China, and the United States. Finally, the war was counterproductive politically. Important international organizations, such as the United Nations, the Non-aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic States, condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; many saw it as the latest manifestation of Moscow's expansionist policy. In short, the Afghan adventure had become a major liability, eventually causing Gorbachev to decide to cut Soviet losses and to agree to the evacuation of Soviet troops. A dramatic move, it has no precedent in the post-1945 history of the USSR. There can be no doubt that the ongoing withdrawal from Afghanistan has contributed significantly to the improvement of US-Soviet relations.

Afghanistan aside, Gorbachev has publicly downgraded the prospects for Soviet gains in the Third World. The tendency to do so was signaled at the XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU, held in 1986. In his speech, the General Secretary, explicitly or by implication, registered the following points: little revolutionary potential existed in the Third World; the utility of the Non-aligned Movement to the USSR had diminished significantly; the «national-liberation movements» had proved costly to sustain; and, when measured against the negative effects they had exerted on Soviet-Western relations, they were also counterproductive.

Gorbachev's sentiments were subsequently translated into the following initiatives:

- 1) The USSR would not abandon the established Third World client-states, in spite of occasional misgivings with some of their policies. Some of these clients (Vietnam, South Yemen, Cuba) retained their military-strategic value to the Soviet Union while others (Ethiopia, Angola) remained important for political and prestige reasons. Nevertheless, all of them have been admonished that Soviet economic assistance would be curtailed. Cuba's example is particularly instructive: Moscow has cut by one third the supply of petroleum to Havana and has unilaterally lowered the price of sugar purchased from Cuba. (The USSR is the largest importer of Cuban sugar.) Similar cost-cutting measures have been implemented in other client-states as well.
- 2) The USSR would not acquire any new major Third World clients. The Nicaraguan government, although it receives some Soviet military aid, has been barely able to fend off the «Contras». Fuel is in particularly short supply,

partially explaining the Sandinistas' willingness to negotiate with their US-backed opponents.

- 3) The USSR would attempt to improve relations with some of the major Third World nations, such as India (an old strategic ally), Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, to mention but the most prominent examples. In these countries, the Soviets would refrain from cultivating revolutionary forces but would, instead, deal with their respective governments in an attempt to improve bilateral relations and trade.
- 4) Within the confines of the above guidelines, the USSR would attempt to help resolve some of the major regional conflicts in the Third World. Using Afghanistan as a precedent for US-Soviet cooperation, the Kremlin singled out the Cambodian and Angolan crises as conflicts in which the superpowers might *jointly* assist the opposing parties to reach mutually acceptable solutions. It is worth mentioning that this Soviet position has caused considerable uneasiness in Hanoi and Luanda, which are apprehensive about a possible cut-off of Moscow's assistance. Both have since insisted that their respective situations are unique and that solutions reached «elsewhere» (that is to say, in Afghanistan) are not applicable to them.

In addition to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola, Gorbachev's «New Thinking» in the Third World is also directed at two other major regional problems - the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iran-Iraq war - both set in the Middle East, a region which is contiguous to the USSR and which has long served as an arena of intensive superpower competition. In spite of Gorbachev's genuine interest in cooperation with the «capitalist» world, the Soviet leaders insist that the USSR is a superpower and must be treated as such. In the Middle East in particular, Gorbachev is requesting that the United States recognize the Soviet Union as a political equal. The Reagan Administration, in contrast, has rejected the concept of political parity and has refused to accept the principle of equal Soviet participation in attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli and the Iran-Iraq conflicts. As long as Washington adheres to this position, Moscow will pursue its interests in the Middle East independent of and occasionally in competition with the United States.

Human Rights. Willingness to accommodate the United States without creating the appearance of giving in to American pressure is clearly discernable in the category of human rights. As defined by Washington, this concept encompasses the issues of Jewish, Armenian, and German emigration from the USSR, as well as the fate of the

political prisoners detained in the Soviet concentration camps and psychiatric wards. Since 1985, considerable progress has been made on all of the above issues. Jewish emigration, though far from the high levels of the mid and late 1970s when over 40,000 persons were permitted to leave the USSR per year, has rebounded from a low of several hundred in 1986 to approximately 10,000 in 1987. Similarly, over 10,000 Armenians and some 20,000 Germans emigrated in 1987. The number of known political prisoners has been cut down by about one third, leaving approximately 500 in confinement. In short, there has been measured progress in the general area of human rights as defined by the United States, and there can be no doubt that it has been due to Gorbachev's attempt to persuade Washington and the West generally that he genuinely wishes to improve relations with the «capitalist» world.

Western Europe. In addition to the United States, Western Europe, too, is crucial to the success of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. Europe has emerged as an independent factor in world politics; it has generally been more forthcoming than Washington in its dealings with the USSR; and it can be used as an instrument of political leverage on the United States in such important issues as opposition to SDI. Last but by no means least, Western Europe is an invaluable source of credits, technology, and trade. The importance which Gorbachev attaches to Western Europe is reflected in many high-level visits and in his references to the «common European house». Although he has not defined the meaning of that phrase, it is obvious that Gorbachev is strongly interested in expanding Soviet-West European cooperation. (It might be noted in passing that his image in Western Europe has been greatly enhanced by the signing of the INF Treaty.)

Eastern Europe. Gorbachev has encouraged the East Europeans to develop their own approaches to *perestroika* and has implied that Moscow might tolerate a greater degree of diversity than it has in the past. However, the General Secretary has not yet formulated a coherent strategy toward the satellites, explaining why they have been slow in responding to the changes that are taking place in the USSR. In addition, several East European states are governed by the conservative appointees of the pre-Gorbachev period who oppose *perestroika* for fear of losing their jobs. The region is also plagued by major and growing economic problems. In terms of basic industries and technology, Eastern Europe has fallen behind some of the more developed states of the Third World, such as Brazil and South Korea. Efforts to solve these economic problems, while groping for more *glasnost* and *demokratizatsiia*, may be expected to present the East European governments with major difficulties that are bound to affect the politics and economies of these countries as well as the Soviet position in Eastern

Europe generally. As of now, the situation there remains in a state of flux.

The Far East. In his July 1986 speech at Vladivostok, Gorbachev let it be known that he regarded the Far Eastern and Pacific regions as of great political and economic importance to the USSR. Among the countries of the Far East, the General Secretary, not surprisingly, singled out the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan. China borders on the Soviet Union and is, potentially, a major world power. The two states share a history of intermittently hostile relations. Gorbachev has made no secret of his desire to improve and expand political and economic ties with the PRC, and Soviet schemes for Asian security and cooperation are no longer intended to isolate Beijing. In addition, the Kremlin has encouraged Mongolia to be more cooperative with the People's Republic and has urged Vietnam to help work out a diplomatic solution in Cambodia. (Hanoi's recent decision to pull 50,000 of its troops out of Cambodia is generally credited to Gorbachev's pressure.) Both steps have long been urged by Beijing. In pulling out of Afghanistan, the Soviets also seem to be signaling to China their willingness to meet the PRC's conditions for improved relations. Finally, Gorbachev recognized the legitimacy of the Chinese claim to the main channel of the Ussuri river – for a long time a major bone of contention in Moscow-Beijing attempts to delineate their border. In short, the USSR has demonstrated flexibility and a willingness to improve relations with the PRC. However, aside from some governmental contacts and increased trade, the Kremlin thus far has little to show for its efforts.

Although Japan is a major industrial power, capable of offering the USSR financial and technological assistance required for the economic development of eastern Siberia, Gorbachev has refused to discuss with Tokyo some of its major concerns. Moscow's reluctance to budge on such issues as the «northern territories» (i.e., the southernmost Kurile islands, occupied in 1945), the militarization of the soviet Far East, and the fishing rights in the northern Pacific stands in sharp contrast to the flexibility which the USSR has displayed toward the PRC. Otherwise, as part of the INF Treaty, Gorbachev agreed to dismantling a number of 55-20 missiles stationed in the soviet Far East. So far this measure has been one-sided, as no one else has chosen to follow his example.

In any event, there can be no doubt that Gorbachev has introduced important changes in Soviet foreign policy. However, the focus of his attention has remained the same: the United States and Western Europe top the list of Moscow's geographic priorities, with the Far East and the Third World, in that order, following suit.

Evaluation

There can be no doubt that the USSR has benefited from Gorbachev's policies. Among other things, they have contributed to the creation of a less threatening image of the Soviet Union and hence to a more stable international climate. Moreover, the signing of the INF Treaty may well lead to a decrease in Soviet military spending and to a greater willingness on the part of the Western powers to extend capital and to sell high technology products to the USSR.

Nevertheless, serious problems remain. One of them is the issue of domestic political support for Gorbachev's reforms. As is well known, internal opposition to his political and economic initiatives is widespread and encompasses party bureaucrats, fearful of losing their numerous privileges; the military, who object to cuts in defense spending and who smart under the implicit accusation that they could not «handle» the Afghan situation; the KGB, which opposes *glasnost* because it is used as a cover for challenging the Communist system, as evidenced, in part, by the Armenian-Azerbaijani embroglio; and, last but not least, the workers who suffer most from the shortages of food and consumer goods and who resent Gorbachev's anti-alcoholism campaign. In addition, the General Secretary has been subjected to criticism by both the «Left» (the so-called «radicals») and the «Right» (the «conservatives») within the CPSU for not pushing *perestroika* far and fast enough or for the exact opposite, respectively. Gorbachev is also facing other problems: he is vulnerable to external factors, such as the willingness of the NATO allies to cooperate with the USSR, and to unanticipated domestic developments, such as the nationality problems in the Soviet Union which his *glasnost* has unleashed.

In the opinion of many Western observers, Gorbachev's chances of survival in the face of such formidable internal opposition are rather slim. The fate of the earlier would-be reformer Nikita Khrushchev is often cited in support of this proposition - he was ousted for trying to do much less than Gorbachev has already accomplished. What the Western observers overlook, however, is that the current state of the Soviet economy is vastly different from that of the 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, the USSR was well on its way to building a nuclear arsenal and the Soviet economy was developing at the healthy rate of 4 to 5 percent a year. As a result, Khrushchev boasted that the USSR would overtake the United States economically in the next 20 years. Conversely, by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was roughly equal to the United States militarily but its might rested on an economic base only half the size of that of its American rival. Moreover, while the US economy was developing at a rate of 3 to 4 percent *per annum*, its Soviet counterpart had difficulty sustaining a growth rate of 1 percent.

These figures are important because, although the internal opposition to Gorbachev is

genuine and widespread, it is directed mainly at his methods and not at the heart of his message. Most Russians understand that Gorbachev is telling the truth: if the Soviet economy is not restructured in the relatively near future, by the 21st century, if not before, the USSR will lack the base to retain its status as a military superpower. For this reason, it is no exaggeration to say that much of the opposition to Gorbachev concerns the means of going about *perestroika* and not whether to undertake a restructuring of the Soviet economy. In other words, most Russian party functionaries, the military, and the ordinary citizens, agree with Gorbachev's conclusion that *perestroika* is essential to preserve the USSR's superpower status and wholeheartedly approve of it. They do so, in part, because of national pride, a sentiment that Gorbachev shares and to which he has been appealing. This being so, it then becomes a matter of the General Secretary's political agility, that is to say, of his ability to survive in the face of widespread disagreement over the means to a consensual end.

It should be noted at the outset that Gorbachev's record inspires considerable confidence. On the Politbureau level, he has been able to withstand challenges from the «Left» as well as from the «Right». In October 1987, former Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin criticized the «Right» wing of the CPSU for sabotaging *perestroika*. Since the attack was delivered at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee without advance notice, Gorbachev must have been caught by surprise. Prudently, the General Secretary came to the defense of the «Right» and of its nominal leader Yegor Ligachev. Yeltsin was subsequently dropped from the Politbureau. In March 1988, *Souetskaiia Rossiia* published a long letter; signed by a science teacher from Leningrad, which amounted to an anti-Gorbachev manifesto. (Not coincidentally, the General Secretary was out of the country, visiting Yugoslavia.) It was widely, and correctly, assumed in the USSR that the «letter» had been sanctioned by Ligachev. Gorbachev met that challenge as well: a page-long rebuff of the letter appeared in *Pravda* in April 1988. It made clear that *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and *demokratizatsiia*, as defined by the General Secretary, remained the order of the day and that no «leftist» or «rightist» deviation from this course would be tolerated. More recently, Gorbachev drove home this point effectively at the XIXth Conference of the CPSU which concluded on July 1, 1988. Whether Ligachev will eventually follow Yeltsin into demotion remains to be seen. As of this writing, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Gorbachev and the «Center» of the CPSU are firmly in control of the party and of party policy.

Conclusion

Gorbachev's efforts to come to grips with the Soviet Union's economic problems present the West with an important question: should the members of NATO and others assist Gorbachev in his *perestroika* or would it be more prudent for the West to leave the USSR to its own devices in the reasonable expectation that the General Secretary and his successors will not be able to modernize the Soviet economy effectively?

Strong arguments can be made in favour of the proposition that an economically, and hence also militarily, more powerful USSR would constitute a greater threat to Western security than a Soviet Union which for the indefinite future would need to divert resources to effect *perestroika* without any Western assistance and support. Nevertheless, in this writer's opinion, it is in Western interests to back Gorbachev's efforts to achieve a systemic change in the USSR. For one thing, it will take decades, not years, to complete the process. In the interim, the West will face a Soviet Union interested in expanding cooperation and in normalizing relations. Moreover, based on the experience of the past three years, it can be confidently predicted that, if and when *perestroika* is completed, the USSR will be a vastly different country. Given the nature of the changes which Gorbachev is intent on introducing, it is likely that the Soviet Union will be a more moderate member of the international community than it had been in the past.

More specifically, to succeed even with Western assistance Gorbachev will have to channel resources from the military to the civilian sector. In the meantime, to stimulate the economy, he is encouraging entrepreneurial activity, which means relative freedom of action from the oppressive central bureaucracy, and replacement of rigid centralized controls by market mechanisms. Moreover, advanced information technologies must be introduced and made widely available, with all the consequences that such steps imply in a closed society. In brief, if Gorbachev were to succeed, the Soviet society and state would be changed beyond recognition. At the very least, the powers of the three pillars of the Soviet system - the party bureaucracy, the military, and the internal security apparatus (the KGB) would be greatly curtailed. Finally, as already mentioned, *perestroika* of the Soviet economy requires Western cooperation and reliance on the West means greater international stability.

Since such tendencies correspond to Western interests, the Western powers should extend Gorbachev a measure of economic, financial, and technological support. But willingness to cooperate must not lead to a lowering of the guard. It must be clearly

understood that the fortuitous state of current East-West relations is a direct result of continuing Western economic superiority and military might. Put differently, it has been Western resolve and power, combined with economic and technological progress, that made *perestroika* inevitable. To insure that Gorbachev and his successors stay on course and to guard against any future surprises, the West must remain strong militarily and must advance economically and technologically. In the meantime, however, it should also cooperate with the USSR in an effort to secure mutually beneficial military, political, and economic arrangements.